COHEN v. BAXTER

Supreme Court of Georgia1997-01-21No. S96G1226

267 Ga. 422479 S.E.2d 746

Summary · law.co

Holding. The Court of Appeals erred in establishing an automatic disqualification rule for jurors with ongoing relationships to a defendant physician in medical malpractice cases; trial courts retain discretion to determine juror impartiality on a case-by-case basis. The judgment is reversed.

The Baxters sued Dr. Cohen for medical malpractice. A juror named Abercrombie disclosed during voir dire that she and her husband were current patients of Cohen's. When asked about her ability to remain impartial, she gave somewhat unclear responses but stated she could follow the court's instructions and apply the law regardless of the outcome. The trial court denied the Baxters' motion to remove her for cause, though they later used a peremptory challenge to strike her. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the trial court should have automatically excused any juror with an ongoing relationship with the defendant physician.

The state's highest court disagreed with the appeals court's automatic-disqualification approach. The court held that trial judges possess the traditional discretion to evaluate whether a juror can be impartial, even when that juror has a doctor-patient relationship with a defendant. Adopting a blanket rule requiring removal would strip trial courts of this discretion, could make jury selection impractical in some areas, and would invite expansion to other close relationships. The court noted that the Baxters failed to meet their burden of proving the juror was actually biased, so the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in keeping her on the panel.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a per se rule requires automatic removal of jurors with doctor-patient relationships to defendant physicians
The scope of trial court discretion in evaluating juror bias and impartiality
Whether the Baxters rebutted the presumption of juror impartiality

Procedural posture

The Baxters appealed a jury verdict for Cohen; the Court of Appeals reversed for trial court error in denying a for-cause challenge; the state supreme court granted certiorari.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Fletcher, Presiding Justice.

Susan and Timothy Baxter sued Dr. David Cohen for medical malpractice. The jury returned a verdict for Cohen and the Baxters appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in denying a challenge for cause against a juror who was a current patient of Cohen’s. This Court granted certiorari and posed the following question,

Whether the Court of Appeals properly held that it is error to deny a challenge for cause when a potential juror has an ongoing relationship with an individual personal physician, and that physician is the defendant in a medical malpractice action?

Because trial courts should retain the discretion to determine whether a juror can be impartial, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in establishing a per se rule and we reverse.

During voir dire, juror Carol Abercrombie stated that she and her husband were current patients of Cohen’s. Under questioning by plaintiff’s counsel she gave some ambiguous answers to leading questions about her ability to be impartial. However, she also stated that she could follow the judge’s instructions and apply the law to the facts and reach a verdict, regardless of what it was. At the beginning of jury selection, the Baxters stated that they objected to having any patients of Cohen on the panel. At the conclusion of questioning Abercrombie, the Baxters did not ask that she be dismissed for cause. The Baxters waited until 28 jurors were questioned and the rest of the panel dismissed before moving to strike Abercrombie for cause. The trial court denied the motion. The Baxters then exercised a peremptory strike to remove Abercrombie and she was not seated as a juror.

1. OCGA § 15-12-134 provides that “it shall be good cause of challenge that a juror has expressed an opinion as to which party ought to prevail or that he has a wish or desire as to which shall succeed.” The trial court is required to hear evidence regarding the challenge and must rule upon the challenge “according to the opinion it entertains of the evidence.” This statute reflects the reality that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the credibility of the juror and, therefore, trial courts have traditionally had significant discretion to retain or dismiss a juror.

The fact that the doctor-patient relationship exists between a juror and a defendant does not justify removing this discretion from the trial courts. Trial courts are often faced with jurors who have close relationships with parties in both civil and criminal cases. We have confidence that trial courts can ascertain whether a juror is partial because of a doctor-patient relationship with a defendant just as well as the trial court can determine bias arising from other sources. A per se rule cuts too broadly and is inconsistent with the traditional discretion given trial courts in this area. Furthermore, there are various close and confidential relationships that a juror may have with a party and the establishment of a per se rule to the doctor-patient relationship will open the door to the expansion of the per se rule to these other numerous categories. Finally, a per se rule may render it extremely difficult to obtain a full panel for a medical malpractice trial in some rural counties. Therefore, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred in requiring trial courts to excuse for cause any jurors who have an ongoing relationship with a doctor who is the defendant in a medical malpractice action.

Decided January 21, 1997.

Sullivan, Hall, Booth & Smith, Henry D. Green, Jr., David V. Johnson, for appellant.

Alan Z. Eisenstein, Robert M. Goldberg, for appellees.

2. The law presumes that potential jurors are impartial. After reviewing the record, we cannot say that the Baxters met their burden of rebutting this presumption and, therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove Abercrombie.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.

Baxter v. Cohen, 220 Ga. App. 893, 894 (470 SE2d 450) (1996).

Robinson v. State, 258 Ga. 279, 280 (368 SE2d 513) (1988); Hill v. Hosp. Auth. of Clarke County, 137 Ga. App. 633, 636 (224 SE2d 739) (1976) (appellate courts will reverse a trial court’s decision only for a manifest abuse of discretion).

Mooney v. State, 243 Ga. 373, 388 (254 SE2d 337), cert. denied, 444 U. S. 886 (100 SC 179, 62 LE2d 116) (1979).