UNITED COMPANIES LENDING CORPORATION v. PEACOCK et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia1996-09-09No. S96A0821

267 Ga. 145475 S.E.2d 601

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court reversed the attorney fees award and remanded for recalculation limited to the successful claim, and remanded the injunction for the trial court to enter specific findings of fact supporting whether a permanent injunction was warranted by the evidence.

David and Duron Peacock borrowed money from United Companies Lending Corporation (UCLC) secured by a deed on their property. When the Peacocks requested payoff figures and loan history documents in 1993, UCLC provided inaccurate information multiple times and eventually initiated foreclosure. The Peacocks sued on six counts, including claims for breach of good faith, fraud, and unjust enrichment, seeking an interlocutory injunction against credit reporting and other relief. After UCLC failed to answer, the trial court granted a permanent injunction preventing derogatory credit reporting, awarded $2,622.48 in damages on one count, and assessed $30,869 in attorney fees plus litigation expenses.

On appeal, UCLC challenged both the permanent injunction and the attorney fees award. The appellate court found that once the damages issue proceeded to trial, the court had authority to grant a permanent rather than interlocutory injunction if evidence supported it. However, the trial court failed to make required specific findings of fact explaining its basis for the injunction. Regarding attorney fees, the court noted that fees must relate only to the claim on which the party prevailed, but the Peacocks proved fees covering all six counts collectively without allocating amounts to the successful claim.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a permanent injunction may be granted when only an interlocutory injunction was requested in the pleadings
Whether a trial court must make specific findings of fact supporting an injunction
Whether attorney fees may be awarded based on work performed on all counts when plaintiff prevails on only one count

Procedural posture

The case was appealed from a trial court judgment that granted a permanent injunction and awarded damages and attorney fees following UCLC's default and subsequent trial on damages.

Authorities cited

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Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Benham, Chief Justice.

This case involves an appeal from the granting of a permanent injunction and the award of attorney fees.

David and Duron Peacock borrowed funds from United Companies Lending Corporation (“UCLC”) to purchase property, and gave UCLC a security deed on the property. In March 1993, the Peacocks requested a payoff figure and amortization schedule of loan history from UCLC in order to pay off the note. In April 1993, the Peacocks received an inaccurate payoff figure which overstated the amount of interest due, but did not receive an amortization schedule of loan history. At this time, the Peacocks ceased payments to UCLC. In June 1993, the Peacocks requested an accurate payoff figure and payment history from UCLC. In July 1993, the Peacocks received a letter from UCLC indicating that UCLC was going to begin foreclosure proceedings but still did not receive the requested amortization schedule. In August 1993, the Peacocks received a payoff figure which, though less than the previous payoff figure, still was inaccurate. In late September 1993, the Peacocks received a new payoff quotation from UCLC showing interest due of $2,298.39. In October 1993, UCLC instituted foreclosure proceedings against the Peacocks.

The Peacocks sued UCLC in a six-count complaint, seeking, inter alia, an interlocutory injunction against foreclosure and against dissemination of derogatory credit information, damages for failure to act in good faith in connection with a promissory note, attorney fees, damages for a scheme to defraud, and a recovery based On unjust enrichment. UCLC failed to answer the complaint, the trial court granted in part the Peacocks’ motion for entry of default judgment, and the case was set for trial on the issue of damages. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court dismissed three counts and awarded nothing under a fourth count, but granted a permanent injunction prohibiting UCLC from disseminating derogatory credit information about the Peacocks under one count, and ordered UCLC to pay the Peacocks $2,622.48 in damages under another count. The court also awarded $30,869 in attorney fees and $1,071 as expenses of litigation.

1. OCGA § 9-11-54 (c) (1) provides that:

A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings ....

Here, the Peacocks sought, inter alia, an interlocutory injunction to enjoin UCLC from disseminating derogatory credit information about the Peacocks. UCLC asserts on appeal that because the trial court issued a permanent injunction rather than an interlocutory one sought by the plaintiffs, the trial court erred. See, e.g., Watkins v. Wilkerson, 141 Ga. 163 (5) (80 SE 718) (1913) (trial court should not undertake to grant a permanent injunction at an interlocutory hearing). After entering a default judgment against UCLC, the issue of damages was litigated, and because the issue of damages was litigated, we conclude that this was not purely a default judgment. Moreover, under OCGA § 9-11-54 (c) (1), the trial court was authorized to issue a permanent injunction if the evidence presented at trial supported such an injunction. See also OCGA § 9-11-15 (b) (when issues not raised by pleadings are litigated, they shall be treated as if raised by the pleadings), and Wade v. Polytech Indus., 202 Ga. App. 18 (413 SE2d 468) (1991) (evidence introduced without objection suffices to amend the pleadings). However, because the trial court failed to set out specific findings of fact that it relied upon in issuing a permanent injunction, we cannot determine whether a permanent injunction was supported by the evidence. Although UCLC requested that the trial court make specific findings of fact pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-52 (a), the trial court failed to do so. Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for preparation of such findings of fact. See Henderson v. Glen Oak, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 380 (346 SE2d 842) (1986), aff’d, 256 Ga. 619 (351 SE2d 640) (1987).

Decided September 9, 1996

Reconsideration denied October 4, 1996.

Wade & Campbell, Douglas N. Campbell, Nancy P. Parson, for appellant.

Holland & Knight, Barry G. Roberts, for appellees.

2. A prerequisite to any award of attorney fees under OCGA § 13-6-11 is the award of damages or other relief on the underlying claim. Here, the Peacocks prevailed and were awarded damages under only one of the six counts initially sought. However, at trial, the Peacocks proved the lump amount of fees and expenses incurred to work on all six counts of the complaint on behalf of all three original plaintiffs. Because the Peacocks did not prove the amount of attorney fees attributable solely to the claim in which they prevailed, we hereby reverse the award and remand the case to the trial court with direction to conduct a hearing on attorney fees and limit the award of attorney fees to the amount based upon the prevailing claim. Southern Cellular v. Banks, 209 Ga. App. 401 (433 SE2d 606) (1993).

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction.

All the Justices concur.

Subsequent to purchasing the property, David and Duron Peacock deeded their interest in the property to Willard Peacock, their father. Willard Peacock was initially a party to the complaint, but the trial court dismissed him from the suit, finding that he was not a proper party.