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Rosser, Armistead & Company vs. Darden

Supreme Court of Georgia1888-11-05
82 Ga. 219

Summary

Holding. The judgment in favor of Darden was reversed. Where a principal deliberately conceals agency and voluntarily gives an agent the external indicia of ownership and authority to sell, the principal cannot recover proceeds from third parties who dealt fairly with the apparent owner, and those third parties retain all defenses they would have had against the agent.

Darden grew cotton on his farm and arranged with English, a merchant, to ship the cotton in English's name to commission merchants (the plaintiffs) in Atlanta. The parties understood that English's name would be used on the shipment to help secure a better price, effectively concealing Darden's ownership. English was already indebted to the plaintiffs at the time. The plaintiffs, who had no knowledge of Darden's involvement, received the cotton, sold it, and paid English for the proceeds. English later failed financially. Darden sued the plaintiffs to recover the sale proceeds.

The court held that although a principal can ordinarily enforce contracts made by an agent, this rule does not apply when the principal has deliberately concealed the agency relationship. Here, Darden voluntarily authorized English to appear as the owner and to receive payment, thereby giving English the external indications of ownership and authority to sell. When an owner voluntarily clothes another with such apparent authority and external indicia of ownership according to trade custom, the owner loses the right to pursue the goods or their proceeds against third parties who deal fairly with the apparent owner.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Enforceability of undisclosed principal's claims against innocent third parties
  • Effect of deliberate concealment of agency on principal's rights
  • Whether visible indicia of ownership and sales authority bar recovery by concealed principal

Procedural posture

The trial court entered a verdict for Darden against the commission merchants; the merchants moved for a new trial based on grounds including that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, the motion was overruled, and the merchants appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Simmons, Justice.

It appears, from the record in this case, that Darden raised twelve bales of cotton on his farm, which he carried to Milner and stored in the “ Empire Warehouse.” He then turned it over to English, a merchant and cotton buyer of Milner, with the understanding and agreement between him and English, that English was to ship it in his own name to a commission merchant in Atlanta. He agreed to this because he thought English could get a better price for it if shipped in English’s name. English accordingly shipped the cotton in his own name to the plaintiffs in error, taking the bill of lading in his own name and sending a duplicate thereof to the plaintiffs in error. English was indebted to the plaintiffs in error at the time the cotton was shipped to them. When they received the cotton, they sent English, at his request, $1,000 more, with which to purchase other cotton to he shipped to them. They sold Darden’s twelve bales of cotton, and accounted to English for the sale thereof. English subsequently failed, by reason of his storehouse and goods having been consumed by fire. The plaintiffs in error, in these transactions, knew nothing of Darden, had never heard of him or that this cotton belonged to him, and dealt only with English. Darden brought this action against the plaintiffs in error for the proceeds of the cotton, and the jury returned a verdict in his favor for the same. The plaintiffs in error moved for a new trial upon several grounds; the motion was overruled, and they excepted.

Among the grounds taken in the motion was, that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. While the law seems to he well-settled that a principal may take advantage of any contract made by his agent, whether the agency is disclosed or undisclosed, we do- not think that the rule, pure and simple, applies to this case, under the facts as disclosed by this record. While the facts show that English was the agent of Darden, they show further that, by agreement, this agency was to be concealed from third parties, the cotton being shipped in the name of English in order that a better price might be obtained. We think that where a principal agrees that the ageucy may be concealed, the rule above announced applies with this qualification, that third parties contracting with the agent would be entitled to all the equities and all the defences which they would have had against the concealed agent, the same as if they had treated with him as principal. Code, §2204. In this case, the plaintiffs in error had no knowledge of the principal, nor could they have had if they had inquired of English, the agent; because, as before said, it was the agreement that his agency should be concealed. It would be wrong, in our opinion, to allow the principal, after he has authorized his agent to sell and receive the proceeds of sale, and after the proceeds of the sale have been paid to his agent, and the agent has failed, to recover the money from third parties, without allowing the third parties their defences against such concealed agent. The record shows that Darden voluntarily clothed English with the apparent ownership and the authority to sell this cotton and to receive the proceeds thereof. Where an owner has, by his own voluntary act or consent, given to another such evidence of the right of selling his goods as, according to the custom of trade or the common understanding of the world, usually ac companies the authority of disposal, or has given the external indicia of the right of disposing of his property, he loses the right of following it. “However the possessor of such external indicia may abuse the confidence of his principal, a sale to a fair purchaser divests the first title, and the authority to sell so conferred, whether real or apparent, is good against him who gave it.” Note to Williams vs. Merle, 25 Amer. Decis. 611 and 612. See also, 15 East, 1st Ed. 88; George vs. Claggett, Smith’s Lead. Cas., vol. 2, part 1, 118, and notes. Code, §2204.

The verdict, therefore,wascontrary to the evidence. It is unnecessary to discuss the other grounds of the motion for a new trial.

Judgment reversed.