Roberts v. The State of Georgia

Supreme Court of Georgia1889-05-03

83 Ga. 369

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of conviction for simple larceny is affirmed. The trial court properly admitted detailed testimony about the stolen bills despite general indictment language, correctly charged the jury on the applicable law despite minor inaccuracy in distinguishing types of evidence, and properly refused the motion for a new trial where the evidence supported the verdict.

Roberts was indicted for simple larceny of one hundred dollars in cash. At trial, Roberts objected to evidence describing the bills in detail, arguing such testimony exceeded the general description in the indictment. The court admitted the evidence and the jury found Roberts guilty. Roberts moved for a new trial on multiple grounds, including the claim that testimony about the bills' characteristics was improper, that the taking occurred in ambiguous circumstances potentially amounting to finding rather than theft, and that the jury instructions on evidence were erroneous.

The court rejected Roberts's arguments on appeal. Although the indictment may have been vulnerable to a demurrer for insufficient specificity, Roberts failed to raise that challenge procedurally and instead objected to evidence at trial—the wrong mechanism. The court noted that witnesses may always describe stolen property in detail consistent with an indictment. Regarding the location and circumstances of the taking, the court found that even if the bills were found in a railroad depot, Roberts's failure to return them to the owner's agent who was present established larcenous intent. The court also found that while the jury charge on evidence contained some imprecise language about distinguishing direct from circumstantial evidence, any such error was harmless because the jury received proper general instructions on reasonable doubt and the definitions of the evidence types.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether detailed testimony about stolen property may be admitted when the indictment uses general description
Whether finding lost property under circumstances where the owner's agent is present constitutes larceny
Whether trial court's instruction on direct versus circumstantial evidence was reversible error

Procedural posture

Roberts was convicted of simple larceny following trial; he moved for a new trial on multiple grounds, which was denied, and he appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Blecklet, Chief Justice.

The indictment was for simple larcency, and the goods stolen, as alleged, consisted of “one hundred dollars in greenback bills, of the value of one hundred dollars.” There was no demurrer to the indictment for insufficient description of the hills.

Simple larceny is “the wrongful and fraudulent taking and carrying away by any person of the personal goods of another with intent to steal the same.” Code, §4393. Being found guilty, the accused moved for a new trial on various grounds. ~We will dispose of these grounds by ruling upon all of them which seem material.

1. It was contended that it was erroneous to admit evidence descriptive of the bills stolen, inasmuch as they were not described in the indictment. It may be that the indictment was demurrable by reason of being too general in the matter of description ; but this, we think, should have been taken advantage of by demurrer, and not by objection to the evidence. Certainly the witnesses, if they could testify as to bills at all, could describe them. There is no rule that restricts testimony to the limits of the indictment in describing stolen property. Any description, however minute, which is consistent with the indictment may be given in the testimony.

2. The bills were lost from possession of an agent of the owner, and it is doubtful whether they were lost in certain railroad depot or elsewhere, some of the evidence tending to show that the loss took place in the depot. The accused may have found them in that build-ing, but if he did so it was whilst the agent of the owner was present, to whom he might have restored them instantly if he had not intended to steal them. They had not been placed in the house by design, if they were there at all, and consequently were not, so to speak, in the protection of the building as a house. Larceny from the house, as defined by the code, §4413, “is the breaking or entering any house with the intent to steal, or after breaking or entering said house, stealing therefrom any money, goods, chattels, wares, merchandise, or any thing or things of value whatever.” If the finding was in the house, the stealing was there also; and though it may have been larceny from the house, we think, under the peculiar circumstances of such a larceny from the house, it was one which included simple larceny. He had already stolen the money before, he left the house, and if he never had left it, the simple larceny would have been- complete.

3. A lengthy request to charge was made, embracing numerous propositions, some of .which perhaps were legal, but certainly others of them were illegal. This being so, the request was properly refused.

41 After defining to the jury in terms of the code, both direct and circumstantial evidence, the court charged as .follows : “The only distinction that the law makes between the two classes of evidence is, that where positive and direct evidence is relied upon, then the jury must he satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the party. If circumstantial evidence alone is relied upon for conviction, the rule is then .that th.e evidence must go to the extent of satisfying the jury to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the. guilt of the accused.” The court added in a subsequent part of the charge : “If after you haye gone over all the testimony of the case, and weighed and considered it, there- remains in your minds a reasonable doubt as to whether the.defendant is guilty or not, you ought to give him the benefit of .that doubt and acquit him, hut the doubt must he a reasonable one.” It is plain that the court was not acurate in saying that the only distinction that the law makes between the two classes of evidence is as he states. But we think this inaccuracy did no harm. It was not necessary to charge at all on the distinction; for the court had already properly defined direct and circumstantial evidence; and .from the definition, the jury could see the distinction which was material for .themselves. We do not quite understand what the court meant by the only distinction, and by stating it in- -the terms above recited; nor have we .any idea that the jury understood this part of the charge. If they thought the court meant that direct evidence must be strong enough to exclude reasonable doubt, and circumstantial-strong enough to exclude reasonable hypothesis, they probably thought hypothesis and doubt both had to -be expelled from the. mind, in a case of circumstantial evidence as this was. And they were subsequently told again that if reasonable doubt remained, the benefit of it was to be given -to the accused. The result is, that while we cannot approve the only distinction between the two sorts of evidence as marked out in the charge, because, besides other reasons, we do not. quite understand.it, yet if error at all, we are satisfied it is not reversible error.

5. If the court committed any other error, it was not such as to be hurtful to -the accused. The evidence warranted the verdict, and a new trial was properly re • fused.. Judgment affirmed.