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Marion B. FOLSOM, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Appellant, v. Robert POTEET, as executor of the estate of Ralph B. Thorbus, deceased, Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit1956-07-25No. No. 14575
235 F.2d 937

Summary

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's judgment that Thorbus's apartment-rooming house operation qualified as a hotel-apartment house under Social Security Administration regulations, making him eligible for old-age insurance benefits, except that the court reversed the district court's award of costs against the Secretary.

Ralph Thorbus operated a low-cost apartment-rooming house in Los Angeles, renting units on daily, weekly, and monthly bases. After paying self-employment taxes for 1951 and 1952, he applied for old-age insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, which required that his operation qualify as a hotel or apartment hotel rather than merely rental real estate. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare denied his claim at the administrative level, finding he was only leasing property. Thorbus then appealed to the district court, which ruled in his favor.

The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision. Although Thorbus provided minimal in-room services—leaving tenants to clean their own quarters and change linens—he performed numerous services outside the rooms, including office-based assistance and tenant-area maintenance. The court determined these services, combined with the semi-transient nature of his clientele and the economic reality of operating a budget facility, were sufficient to classify his operation as a low-grade hotel-apartment house under the applicable Social Security regulations. The court emphasized that social security coverage should receive a liberal rather than narrow interpretation, and the applicable regulations reflected an inclusive policy.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether operating a low-cost apartment-rooming house with limited in-room services constitutes a 'hotel' or 'apartment hotel' for Social Security benefits eligibility
  • Appropriate interpretation and scope of Social Security Administration regulations governing coverage
  • Weight given to semi-transient tenancy and landlord services rendered outside individual units

Procedural posture

The appellant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare appealed from a district court decision that reversed the administrative denial of old-age insurance benefits to Thorbus's estate.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

CHAMBERS, Circuit Judge.

For many years Ralph B. Thorbus leased as lessee in Los Angeles what appears to have been a rather shabby apartment-rooming house. He rented out the apartments therein to people on a weekly and monthly basis. Some occupants were on a daily basis.

For the years 1951 and 1952 he paid the self employment tax. As a consequence of amendments to the Social Security Act made in 1950, he was eligible in 1953 for social security benefits for old age assistance if the operation he conducted classified as a hotel or an apartment hotel. He was not if he was just operating an apartment house without more.

He lost the lease on the building and applied for the old age insurance benefits. He exhausted the administrative procedures of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, where he was consistently ruled against on the ground that he was just renting real estate to others.

The facts were all presented to the administrative agency from the mouth of Thorbus. Its findings indicate complete credence was given to all facts related by him. As the law permits, he sought review of the record in the United States District Court. There he prevailed. This appeal by the secretary followed.

In law, this is a borderline case. We shall always have them when delineations must be made. Of course, there are areas where the fact finder should not be disturbed on his findings on undisputed facts, where he may decide which facts point more strongly to one conclusion than to another.

Here Thorbus rendered many, many services to the tenants not associated with merely acting as lessor of an apartment to a tenant. The only thing really against his claim is that he rendered little service within the rooms. Except when occupants came and went, he let them clean their own rooms and change the linens, for the washing of which the renter paid either Thorbus or others, depending on who handled it.

If we are to have a social security system, certainly by interpretation it should not be given a narrow construction as to those covered. Likewise, it should not be construed loosely. The apposite regulations enunciate a liberal policy.

After considering the evidence before the administrative agency, we are inclined to agree with the district court. Our analysis of the record, points rather conclusively (to us) to a low grade hotel-apartment house where, because of the cheapness of the rent, management did not and could not give de luxe hotel or hotel-apartment service. But Thorbus did give, in our judgment, sufficient service of the hotel variety at his office, in the halls and at the doors of his tenants to bring him within the department’s regulations for coverage under the statute. A factor that is entitled to some weight here is the semi-transient nature of his custom. Alone it would not be enough.

Appellee concedes that the district court was in error in awarding costs against the appellant. The judgment will be affirmed except as to costs.

. Thorbus was the petitioner for review in the district court and appellee here. After oral argument, but before this decision was ready, he died. The present ap-pellee, substituted in the stead of Thor-bus, is the latter’s executor.

. See 42 U.S.O.A. §§ 402(e), 405(a) and (b), 411(a) and 414(a).

. The pertinent Social Security Administration regulation appears at 20 C.F.K. 404.1052. Secretary Folsom says one of tbe questions bere is the validity of the regulation. We think not. Our conclusion assumes the validity of the regulation. The scope of the regulation certainly is not a restrictive one. A better argument could be made that the regulation sins on the side of inclusion rather than exclusion. But this court’s view is that the regulation does not exceed the limits of the underlying statute.