William M. Conant vs. Charles R. Evans

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1909-05-20

202 Mass. 34

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court's directed verdict for the plaintiff was improper. The defendant's post-service admissions in his correspondence were admissible evidence but not conclusive, the defendant was not estopped from contesting liability, and completed services cannot furnish consideration for a subsequent promise to pay. The exceptions to the trial judgment were sustained.

A physician sued to recover payment for surgical services performed on the defendant's minor son at the defendant's request. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that the defendant promised to pay $1,000 for the operation. The plaintiff relied on letters the defendant wrote after the services were completed, in which the defendant made certain admissions about the bill. The trial judge ruled that these post-service admissions conclusively established the defendant's liability and directed a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount claimed.

The court held that while the defendant's letters were admissible as evidence regarding both liability and the amount owed, they were not conclusive on either point. The court found no basis for estoppel because the plaintiff offered no evidence that he relied on the defendant's statements or admissions when performing the services. Additionally, services already performed cannot serve as valid consideration for a promise made afterwards. The court concluded that the case should have been submitted to the jury with instructions allowing the defendant to present evidence about the reasonable value of the services.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether post-performance admissions in correspondence conclusively establish liability
Whether services already rendered can constitute consideration for a subsequent promise to pay
Whether estoppel applies without evidence of reliance on the defendant's statements

Procedural posture

The plaintiff recovered a directed verdict at trial for services rendered, and the defendant appealed by bill of exceptions.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Mobton, J.

This is an action of contract to recover for services rendered in performing an operation at the defendant’s request on the defendant’s minor son. The declaration is in three counts, the first alleging that the defendant employed the plaintiff to perform an operation on the defendant’s son, which the plaintiff did, and that the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff the sum of $1,000 for his services, the second on an account annexed for services in operating on the defendant’s son at his request, and the third alleging, like the first, that the plaintiff performed the operation at the defendant’s request and then alleging that the defendant promised to pay what the services were reasonably worth, and that thereafter the plaintiff offered to accept and demanded of the defendant $1,000, and that the defendant promised to pay the same.

As we construe the first and third counts the promise alleged to have been made was made after the services were plTffof med. This construction accords with the facts as they appeared in evidence at the time. The plaintiff did not contend and offered no evidence tending to show that the defendant promised to pay the sum named before the services were rendered and in consideration thereof. What he did contend was, in effect, that the defendant had made certain admissions in reference to the plaintiff’s bill in a correspondence, which took place between the parties after the services had been rendered and which was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff, which conclusively established, as he contended, the defendant’s liability for the sum named and constituted an agreement to pay it. The judge so ruled and directed a verdict accordingly, and the principal question presented by the bill of exceptions is whether this ruling and direction were right. We do not think that they were.

It is plain that the letters written by the defendaniuwere competent so far as theycontained any statements or admissions in relation to theTnatter in controversy, and the defendant’s exception to their admission must, therefore, be overruled. Such statements and admissions were competent not only in regard to the question of liability, but also in regard to the question of amount, and they were not rendered incompetent by reason of the defendant’s admission that the operation was performed at his request and that he owed the plaintiff whatever his services were reasonably worth. The answer was a general denial and the plaintiff was not obliged to accept or be content with the concessions or admissions made by the defendant in the course of the trial. Dawson v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 156 Mass. 127. Dorr v. Tremont National Bank, 128 Mass. 349, 360. Priest v. Groton, 103 Mass. 530, 540.

But the statements and admissions made by the defendant in the correspondence, while admissible as evidence on the question of his liability and the amount thereof, were not of such a nature as to be conclusive in regard to either his liability or the amount thereof. There was nothing to show that the plaintiff did anything or refrained from doing anything in reliance upon such statements or admissions, and there was, therefore, no ground on~which*ihe defendant was estopped to contest his liability or the amount to which the plaintiff was entitled. Mackay v. Holland, 4 Met. 69.

So far as the services that were rendered were relied upon to support the°expreis promise alleged to have beehTuBsequehfly made, it is settled that they did notfurnish a sufficient consideration^for such promise. Massachusetts Mutual Ins. Co. v. Green, 185 Mass. 306. Moore v. Elmer, 180 Mass. 15. Chamberlin v. Whitford, 102 Mass. 448. The defendant, therefore, should have been permitted to introduce evidence, as he offered to do, of what the services rendered were reasonably worth, and the case should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions. Many of the questions now raised may not arise at another trial, and therefore we have not dealt with the defendant’s requests in detail.

^Exceptions sustained.