Mr. Justice Bjatchford
delivered the opinion of the court.
The owners of the canal-boat Brilliant and her cargo filed a libel in admiralty, in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, against the steam canal-boat B and C, in a case of collision. The libelalleges that the Brilliant is a vessel of more than 20 tons burden, and was employed, at the time of the collision, in the business of commerce and navigation between ports and places in different States and Territories in the United States, upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting said lakes; that the B and C is a vessel of more than 20 tons burden, and was, at the time of the collision, enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and employed in the business of commerce and navigation between ports and places in different States and Territories of the United States, upon the lakes and navigable waters of the United States; that, in August, 1882, the Brilliant, while bound from Morris, Illinois, to Chicago, Illinois, towed, with other canal-boats, by a steam canal-boat, and carrying the proper lights, and moviilg up the Illinois and Lake Michigan canal, about four miles south of the Chicago end of the canal, was, through the negligence of the B and C, struck and sunk, Avith her cargo, by the B and C, AvhichiAvas moving in the opposite .direction, to the damage of the libellants- $1,500. The OAvners and claimants of the B and C answered the libel, giving their version of the collision and alleging that it was Avholly due to the faulty naAngation of the Brilliant, and that it occurred on the Illinois and Michigan canal, at a place Avithin the body of Cook county, in the State of Illinois. In November, 1883, the district court made an interlocutory decree, finding that both parties Avere in fault, and decreeing that they should each pay one-half of the damages occasioned by tbe collision, to be thereafter ascertained and assessed by tbe court.
Tbe owners of tbe 33 and 0 have now presented to this court a petition, praying that a writ of prohibition may issue to tbe judge of tbe said district court, prohibiting him from proceeding further in said suit. Tbe ground alleged for tbe writ is tbe want of jurisdiction of tbe district court, as a court of admiralty, over tbe waters where tbe collision occurred.
Tbe Illinois and Michigan canal is an artificial navigable water-wa/ connecting Lake Michigan and tbe Chicago river with tbe Illinois river and tbe Mississippi river. By tbe act of Congress of March 30th, 1822, cb. 14, 3 Stat. 659, tbe use of certain public lands of tbe United States was vested in the State of Illinois forever, for a canal to connect tbe Illinois river with tbe southern bend of Lake Michigan. Tbe act declared
“ That the said canal, when completed, shall be and forever remain a public highway, for the .use of the government of the United States, free from any toll or other charge whatever for any property of the United States, or persons in their service, passing through the same.”
This declaration was repeated in tbe act of March 2d, 1827, cb. 51, 4 Stat. 234, granting more land to tbe State of Illinois to aid rb in opening tbe canal. We take judicial notice of tbe historical fact that tbe canal, 96. miles long, was completed in 1848, and is 60 feet wide and 6 feet deep, and is capable of being navigated by vessels which a canal of such size will accommodate, and which can thus pass from the Mississippi river to Lake Michigan and carry on inter-State commerce, althoughtbe canal is wholly within tbe territorial bounds of tbe State of Illinois. J3y tbe act of 1822, if tbe land granted thereby shall cease to be used for a canal suitable for navigation, the grant is to be void.; It may properly be assumed that tbe district court found to be true tbe allegations of tbe libel, before cited, as to tbe character and employment of tbe two vessels, those allegations being put iñ issue by tbe answer.
Within tbe principles laid down by this court in the cases of The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, and The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, which extended the salutary views of admiralty jurisdiction applied in The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, and The Eagle, 8 Wall. 15, we have no doubt of the jurisdiction of the district court in this case. Navigable water situated as this canal is, used for the purposes for which it is used, a highway for commerce between ports and places in different States, carried on by vessels such as those in question here, is public water of the United States, and within the legitimate scope of the admiralty jurisdiction. conferred by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, even though the canal is wholly artificial, and is wholly within the body of a State, and subject to its ownership and control; and it makes no difference as to the jurisdiction of the district court that one or the other of the vessels was at the túne of the collision on a voyage from one place in the State of Illinois to another place in that State. The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624. Many of the embarrassments connected with the question of the extent of the jurisdiction of the admiralty disappeared when, this court held, in the case of The Eagle, ubi supra, that all of the provisions of § 9 of the Judiciary Act of September 24th, 1789,-ch. 20, 1 Stat. 77, which conferred admiralty and maritime jurisdiction upon the district courts were inoperative, except the simple clause giving to them “ exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” That decision is carried out by the enactment in § 563 of the Revised Statutes, subdivision 8, that the district courts shall have jurisdiction of “ all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” thus leaving out the inoperative provisions.
This case does not raise the question whether the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court extends to waters wholly within the body of a State, and from which vessels cannot so pass as to carry on commerce between places in such State and places in another State or in a foreign country; and no opinion is intended to be intimated as to jurisdiction in such a case.
The prayer of the peUtion is denied.