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ATC Makena N Golf LLC v. Kaiama

2026-06-25No. SCWC-21-0000550

Summary

Holding. The court vacated in part the Intermediate Court of Appeals' judgment and the circuit court's final judgment and summary judgment order, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the discovery sanction but reversed summary judgment as to the Piena Parcels due to unresolved questions about title transmission.

ATC Makena, a group of business entities, sued Azizi Kaiama for trespass and nuisance based on her occupation of a large Maui property that ATC Makena purchased at foreclosure. Kaiama claimed she was the rightful heir to certain royal land grants originally awarded to someone named Piena in the 1850s. ATC Makena obtained a discovery sanction of $5,067.67 against Kaiama for inadequate discovery responses, which the lower courts upheld. ATC Makena also won summary judgment on its entire claim and was awarded attorney fees and costs totaling $91,563.72.

The Hawaii Supreme Court agreed that the discovery sanction was justified, as Kaiama had not provided adequate discovery responses and offered no substantial justification for her non-compliance. However, regarding summary judgment, the court identified a critical problem: there was a nearly fifty-year unexplained gap in the documented chain of title to the two smaller parcels in dispute. Although the record showed these parcels were originally granted to Piena in the 1850s, and a deed appeared in 1901 naming someone called Kapeka as conveying the property, there was no evidence showing how Kapeka actually obtained any ownership interest from Piena during that intervening half-century. Without proof of this crucial link, ATC Makena had not adequately established its own title as required in a trespass case.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether summary judgment was proper when there was an unexplained gap in the chain of title to property originally awarded by the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi
  • Whether a discovery sanction for inadequate discovery responses was an abuse of discretion
  • What evidence is required to establish title in a trespass action when title is contested

Procedural posture

This was a writ of certiorari proceeding from the Hawaii Supreme Court reviewing the Intermediate Court of Appeals' affirmance of a circuit court judgment granting summary judgment and a discovery sanction in a trespass and nuisance action.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

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Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX

25-JUN-2026

11:03 AM

Dkt. 25 OP

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

---o0o---ATC MAKENA N GOLF LLC, ATC MAKENA S GOLF LLC,

ATC MAKENA LAND SF1 LLC, ATC MAKENA LAND MF1 LLC,

ATC MAKENA LAND MF2 LLC, ATC MAKENA LAND MF3 LLC,

ATC MAKENA LAND C1 LLC, ATC MAKENA LAND U1 LLC,

ATC MAKENA LAND B1 LLC, ATC MAKENA LAND MF4 LLC,

ATC MAKENA LAND SF2 LLC AND ATC MAKENA LAND AH1 LLC,

Respondents/Plaintiffs-Appellees,

vs.

AZIZI KAIAMA,

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 2CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)

JUNE 25, 2026

DEVENS, C.J., McKENNA, EDDINS, AND GINOZA, JJ.,

AND CIRCUIT JUDGE NAKAMOTO, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DEVENS, C.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

This appeal arises from a lawsuit for trespass and

nuisance. Respondents/Plaintiffs-Appellees ATC Makena N Golf

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LLC, et al. (ATC Makena) filed suit in the Circuit Court of the

Second Circuit (circuit court) seeking damages and declaratory

and injunctive relief against self-represented

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Azizi Kaiama (Kaiama). The two

primary issues before us relate to a discovery sanction assessed

against Kaiama and the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment

in ATC Makena’s favor.

During the underlying proceedings, ATC Makena filed a

motion to compel discovery against Kaiama. The circuit court

granted the motion and awarded ATC Makena $5,067.67 in attorney

fees as a discovery sanction against Kaiama. The Intermediate

Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed the sanction, finding that the

circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding such

fees. We agree.

ATC Makena also filed a motion for summary judgment (MSJ)

on its claims, which the circuit court granted. As the

prevailing party, ATC Makena was awarded $91,563.72 in attorney

fees and costs. The ICA affirmed the summary judgment decision

but vacated the award of fees and costs. 1

We hold that because there was a genuine issue of material

fact relating to ATC Makena’s asserted ownership of two smaller

1 ATC Makena has not appealed the ICA’s vacatur of this fees and costs award.

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parcels within the larger subject property, summary judgment on

ATC Makena’s claims as it relates to those two parcels was

inappropriately granted.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Parcels At Issue

ATC Makena purchased Tax Parcel 108 of Tax Map Key (TMK)

Number (2) 2-1-005 consisting of approximately 489 acres in the

moku of Honuaʻula, Maui (Property), “as is,” at a public auction

following a foreclosure action. 2 Relevant to this appeal are two

smaller parcels within the larger Property, identified as: (1)

Land Commission Award (LCA) No. 2602 / Royal Patent (RP) No.

6233, ʻĀpana 2 (0.34 of an acre) in the ʻili of Manuanua, awarded

to Piena on September 18, 1854; and (2) Royal Patent Grant (RPG)

1228, ʻĀpana 1 (6.88 acres) in Moʻomuku and Moʻoloa, purchased by

Piena on August 31, 1853 (Piena Parcels).

B. Circuit Court Proceedings 3

1. ATC Makena’s Complaint for Trespass and Nuisance

On April 16, 2020, ATC Makena filed a complaint against

2 Hawaiʻi land divisions include: “moku,” defined in part as “district” or “island”; “ahupuaʻa,” a “land division usually extending from the uplands to the sea”; “ʻili,” “usually a subdivision of an ahupuaʻa”; and “ʻāpana,” defined (in part) as a “piece, slice, portion, . . . land parcel, lot[.]” Mary Kawena Pukui & Samuel H. Elbert, Hawaiian Dictionary, 252, 9, 97, 28 (6th ed. 1986).

3 The Honorable Peter T. Cahill initially presided; after his recusal, the Honorable Kelsey T. Kawano presided.

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Kaiama for civil trespass to land (Count I) and nuisance (Count

II). ATC Makena alleged that Kaiama entered and remained on the

Property, altered the land, and placed personal property and

refuse there without ATC Makena’s permission, and did not vacate

the Property when asked repeatedly to remove herself and her

things. ATC Makena’s complaint requested that the circuit

court: declare Kaiama to be a trespasser to the Property; enter

a writ or order and judgment of ejectment or possession

divesting Kaiama and all persons claiming through her of

occupancy and possession of the Property; and award attorney

fees and costs in the matter.

Kaiama answered by claiming that she was “the rightful heir

and owner of all Royal Patent Lands to Piena and Piena Heirs

‘forever’ in Moʻoloa and Moʻomuku,” she had a superior claim to

all “Piena Royal Lands,” including ʻili (plural) within the

Property, and that ATC Makena was a trespasser on the Piena

Parcels.

2. ATC Makena’s Motion to Compel Discovery; Award of

Discovery Sanctions 4

On June 1, 2020, ATC Makena filed a motion to compel

discovery from Kaiama, asserting that Kaiama’s interrogatory

answers were “incomplete and inadequate,” and she “did not

4 Judge Kawano presided.

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produce any documents” in response to their document requests.

The motion also requested the award of the attorney fees and

costs that ATC Makena incurred in making the motion as a

discovery sanction against Kaiama pursuant to Hawaiʻi Rules of

Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 37. 5 In opposing the motion, Kaiama

did not provide any discernable justification for failing to

appropriately comply with ATC Makena’s discovery requests.

The circuit court orally granted ATC Makena’s motion to

compel during a hearing held on September 16, 2020. 6

5 HRCP Rule 37(a)(4) (eff. 2015) provided in relevant part that:

If the motion [to compel discovery] is granted or if the

disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the

motion was filed, the court shall, after affording an

opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent

whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or

attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to

the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in making

the motion, including attorney’s fees, unless the court

finds that the motion was filed without the movant’s first

making a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or

discovery without court action, or that the opposing

party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was

substantially justified, or that other circumstances make

an award of expenses unjust.

HRCP Rule 37(a)(4)(A) (emphases added).

6 Neither party included the hearing transcript in the record on appeal. However, the circuit court’s minutes, although sparse, noted in relevant part:

- hearing held

- court strongly urge defendant to obtain legal counsel

- court grants motion as to all relief being requested

- court denied the oral motion for protective order to the

extent that party seem to suggest that documents should be

submitted as in-court in-camera review

- movant will prepare the order and submit proposed

declaration in support for attorneys[’] fees and costs

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Kaiama filed a “Motion for Reconsideration of Sanctions” on

September 22, 2020 and a nearly identical motion two days later. 7

Kaiama’s motion did not provide a discernable reason for

reconsideration of the circuit court’s discovery order and award

of ATC Makena’s incurred fees and costs.

On September 30, 2020, the circuit court entered its

written order granting ATC Makena’s motion to compel discovery

and request for sanctions. 8 Kaiama was ordered to turn over all

requested discovery within seven days, and ATC Makena’s counsel

was directed to submit a declaration of their fees and costs.

On October 7, 2020, ATC Makena’s counsel filed a

declaration itemizing their attorney fees in the total amount of

$5,067.67, which included time incurred by a paralegal. 9 On

October 8, 2020, the circuit court entered a discovery sanction

order awarding $5,067.67 in fees against Kaiama.

On October 16, 2020, Kaiama filed a motion to reconsider

the circuit court’s discovery sanction order but failed to

(Emphasis added.)

7 The second motion for reconsideration mirrored the first except for added citations from the State of Hawaiʻi’s Admissions Act, and the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi’s constitutions of 1852 and 1864.

8 The circuit court’s October 8, 2020 order also denied Kaiama’s oral motion for protective order to have the court review her documents in-camera.

9 ATC Makena’s counsel’s declaration stated that they were not requesting the fees incurred by one of their attorneys (approximately $8,500.00).

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contest the bases or reasonableness of the awarded fees. The

motion was denied on November 6, 2020.

3. ATC Makena’s Motion for Summary Judgment

On August 4, 2021, ATC Makena filed an MSJ on its claims.

ATC Makena’s motion included a declaration from Colleen H.

Uahinui (Uahinui Declaration), who indicated that she had

researched ATC Makena’s title related to the Piena Parcels. 10

Significantly, Uahinui explained that after the Piena

Parcels were granted to Piena in August 1853 (RPG No. 1228) and

September 1854 (LCA No. 2602), “[n]o conveyances appear of

record by PIENA dealing with the subject lands, likewise, there

is no probate proceeding of this estate.” She further explained

that an individual identified as “Kapeka” and her husband S.W.P.

Kaaiai next appear in the chain of title conveying the Piena

Parcels to Mary Waiwaiole in a May 13, 1901 recorded deed. The

Uahinui Declaration appears to quote a translation of the Bureau

of Conveyance’s (BOC) entry of the 1901 deed, originally written

in Hawaiian, where Uahinui characterizes Kapeka as “‘the own

daughter of Piena, deceased[.]’” 11 But the Uahinui Declaration

10 ATC Makena’s MSJ did not reference any prior quiet title or adverse possession proceedings relating to the Piena Parcels.

11 ATC Makena’s MSJ included the Declaration of Doris Moana Rowland (Rowland Declaration), the translator of the 1901 recorded deed. The Rowland Declaration stated that the phrase used in the 1901 deed was “kaikamahine ponoi a Piena I make[.]” The Rowland Declaration and the circuit court’s

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did not trace or explain how Kapeka came into ownership of the

parcels during the nearly fifty-year gap that elapsed between

the initial award and grant of the parcels to Piena in the

1850’s and Kapeka’s appearance and conveyance to Mary Waiwaiole

in 1901. Nor did the declaration specify what Kapeka’s

ownership interest was in the Piena Parcels, which Kapeka

purported to convey.

Uahinui concluded that following the subsequent conveyances

in the “chain of title to the Piena Parcels and Subject

Property, it is my opinion that title is insurable to [ATC

Makena].”

ATC Makena’s MSJ also included Kaiama’s answer to the

complaint and her answers to ATC Makena’s interrogatory

requests, in which Kaiama (inter alia) asserted that she was the

rightful owner of the Piena Parcels and ATC Makena were not the

real titled land owners; and she also provided names in her

genealogy allegedly tracing back to “Piena” to whom the land

award and land grant for the Piena Parcels was issued. 12

During the September 1, 2021 hearing on ATC Makena’s MSJ,

Kaiama contested, among other things, the genealogy of Kapeka

findings slightly misquoted the exact language of the deed’s phrase: “ke kaikamahine ponoi a Piena (k) i make[.]”

12 Kaiama did not file an opposition to the MSJ.

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and ownership of the Piena Parcels. The circuit court orally

granted ATC Makena’s MSJ.

On September 10, 2021, Kaiama filed a motion to vacate the

circuit court’s grant of summary judgment.

On September 22, 2021, the circuit court entered: (1)

written Findings of Fact [(FOFs)], Conclusions of Law [(COLs)]

and Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment,

Filed on August 4, 2021 (summary judgment order); (2) an Order

Denying Non-Hearing Motion to Vacate Judgment From September 1,

2021 Hearing, Filed On September 10, 2021; (3) a Writ of

Possession against Kaiama; and (4) Final Judgment for ATC

Makena. The circuit court awarded ATC Makena, the prevailing

party, their attorney fees and costs in the amount of

$91,563.72.

Relevantly, the circuit court’s FOF 6 stated that

“Plaintiffs’ title to the Piena Parcels is continuous and

unbroken from PIENA’s daughter, KAPEKA, to Plaintiffs”; and that

“Through KAPEKA, Plaintiffs’ title traces back to KAPEKA’s

father, PIENA, the original grantee of the Piena Parcels.” And

in COL 12, the circuit court concluded that “Plaintiffs’ title

to the Piena Parcels is continuous and unbroken from PIENA’s

daughter, KAPEKA, to Plaintiffs.”

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4. ICA Proceedings

Kaiama appealed to the ICA, challenging the circuit court’s

grant of summary judgment, the discovery sanction against her,

and the award of prevailing party attorney fees and costs to ATC

Makena.

In its summary disposition order (SDO), the ICA concluded

that “the circuit court found that ATC Makena’s title to the

subject property was continuous and unbroken, and that ATC

Makena paid the property taxes since acquiring the subject

property.” Further, the ICA determined that “[t]hese findings

[were] not challenged and are supported by the record,” citing

to Okada Trucking Co. v. Bd. of Water Supply, 97 Hawaiʻi 450,

458, 40 P.3d 73, 81 (2002) for the principle that “[f]indings of

fact . . . not challenged on appeal are binding on the appellate

court[.]”

The ICA also concluded that the discovery sanction assessed

against Kaiama was not an abuse of discretion. However, the ICA

found that the prevailing party award of attorney fees and costs

to ATC Makena exceeded the circuit court’s discretion. 13 The ICA

reversed, in relevant part, the circuit court’s Final Judgment

and summary judgment order pertaining to the prevailing party

13 As stated, the ICA’s vacatur of ATC Makena’s prevailing party fees and costs is not before us.

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fees and costs award, but otherwise affirmed. Judgment on

appeal was entered on March 20, 2025.

We granted Kaiama’s application for writ of certiorari.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment

We review the circuit court’s grant or denial of summary

judgment de novo. Hilo Bay Marina, LLC v. State, 156 Hawaiʻi

478, 486-87, 575 P.3d 568, 576-77 (2025). “[F]indings of fact

made by a trial court in relation to a summary judgment ruling

are not binding on appeal, nor do they alter our de novo

standard of review regarding a summary judgment ruling.” Id. at

487, 575 P.3d at 577.

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” HRCP Rule 56(c)

(eff. 2000). “A fact is material if proof of that fact would

have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential

elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the

parties.” Gima v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 156 Hawaiʻi 78,

88, 569 P.3d 1262, 1272 (2025) (quotation and citation omitted).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment,

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[t]he evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party. In other words, we must view all

of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light

most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

Nuuanu Valley Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 119 Hawaiʻi 90,

96, 194 P.3d 531, 537 (2008) (quotation and citation omitted);

Gima, 156 Hawaiʻi at 88, 569 P.3d at 1272; see HRCP Rule 56(c).

B. HRCP Rule 37 Sanctions

“This court reviews the circuit court’s imposition of

sanctions for discovery abuse . . . under the abuse of

discretion standard.” Fujimoto v. Au, 95 Hawaiʻi 116, 137, 19

P.3d 699, 720 (2001) (cleaned up). See also Wong v. City and

County of Honolulu, 66 Haw. 389, 394, 665 P.2d 157, 161 (1983)

(applying the abuse of discretion standard to HRCP Rule 37

sanctions).

IV. DISCUSSION

This court has held that filings by self-represented

litigants should be “liberally interpreted in order to promote

access to justice.” Erum v. Llego, 147 Hawaiʻi 368, 391, 465

P.3d 815, 838 (2020). So construed, Kaiama’s appeal asserts

that the ICA erred in affirming the circuit court’s findings and

conclusions related to ATC Makena’s trespass and nuisance claims

and the award of discovery sanctions against her.

A. Summary judgment was improperly granted.

Kaiama argues that ATC Makena’s MSJ provided “broken title”

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and did not establish ownership of the Piena Parcels, and thus

the ICA erred in affirming that there was no genuine issue of

material fact as to ATC Makena’s ownership of the Piena

Parcels. 14 We agree.

In an action for trespass, the essence of the tort lies in

the deprivation of or interruption in the possession. Gomes v.

Perry, 26 Haw. 661, 664 (Haw. Terr. 1922). But where title is

at issue in such an action, “it becomes similar to the action of

ejectment, and the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove [their]

title.” Mew Kung Tung v. Wong Ka Mau, 8 Haw. 557, 559 (Haw.

Prov. Gov. 1893). And “an action of trespass settles nothing in

regard to the title beyond the action tried.” Id.

This court has stated that to meet the requirements for

ejectment,

the plaintiff “must necessarily prove that [he or she] owns

the parcel[] in issue,” State v. Magoon, 75 Haw. 164, 175,

858 P.2d 712, 718-19 (1993); see State v. Midkiff, 49 Haw.

456, 460, 421 P.2d 550, 554 (1966), meaning that he or she

must have “the title to and right of possession of” such

parcel, Carter v. Kaikainahaole, 14 Haw. 515, 516 (Haw.

Terr. 1902). Additionally, the plaintiff must establish

that “possession is unlawfully withheld by another.” Id.

Kondaur Capital Corp. v. Matsuyoshi, 136 Hawaiʻi 227, 241, 361

P.3d 454, 468 (2015) (brackets in original). Further, “in

ejectment a plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own

14 Kaiama’s filings, and the record on appeal, do not present a discernable challenge to other specific parcels within the Property other than the Piena Parcels.

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title and not upon any weakness in the defendant’s title.”

Midkiff, 49 Haw. at 460, 421 P.2d at 554 (quoting Fong Hing v.

Yamaoka, 31 Haw. 436, 438 (Haw. Terr. 1930)).

In Omerod v. Heirs of Kaheananui, this court observed that

“[t]o establish legally cognizable private title to land .

. . one must show that he or a predecessor-in-interest

acquired a [LCA], a Royal Patent, a Kamehameha Deed, a

Grant, a Royal Patent Grant, or other government grant for

the land in question.” [State by Kobayashi v. Zimring, 58

Haw. 106, 114, 566 P.2d 725, 731 (1977)] (citing Thurston

v. Bishop, 7 Haw. 421 ([Haw. Kingdom] 1888); In re Title of

Pa Pelekane, 21 Haw. 175 ([Haw. Terr.] 1912)); see also

Rose v. Yoshimura, 11 Haw. 30, 32 ([Haw. Rep.] 1897)

(stating that “neither the Mahele . . . nor an application

for an award gave any title, and . . . until an award was

made by the [Land Commission] or by the Minister of the

Interior (after 1860), the land must be considered to still

belong to the government[ ]” (internal citations omitted)).

116 Hawaiʻi 239, 248, 172 P.3d 983, 992 (2007) (emphases added).

In the present case, ATC Makena sued Kaiama for damages, in

part, for her trespass upon the Property; and Kaiama challenged

ATC Makena’s title to the Piena Parcels, a subsection of the

Property. With title challenged in a trespass claim treated

similarly to an action for ejectment, ATC Makena was required to

establish their title to the Piena Parcels (the burden of

proving title in themselves).

Reviewing de novo, we therefore examine whether ATC

Makena’s evidence affirmatively established no genuine issue of

material fact as to their required showing that a predecessor in

interest acquired the land commission award and the government

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grant for the Piena Parcels. 15 Based on the evidence submitted

by ATC Makena, viewed in the light most favorable to Kaiama, we

conclude that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether and how Kapeka acquired title to or an ownership

interest from Piena in the Piena Parcels before she purportedly

sold those parcels in the 1901 recorded deed.

The ICA stated that “the circuit court found that ATC

Makena’s title to the subject property was continuous and

unbroken[.]” Respectfully, this was a mischaracterization, as

the circuit court instead found that “Plaintiffs’ title to the

Piena Parcels is continuous and unbroken from PIENA’s daughter,

KAPEKA, to Plaintiffs” (emphasis added). 16 The circuit court

then stated that “[t]hrough KAPEKA, Plaintiffs’ title traces

back to KAPEKA’s father, PIENA, the original grantee of the

15 In reviewing a circuit court’s findings and conclusions in its summary judgment order, an appellate court is not bound by findings unchallenged by an appellant. Hilo Bay Marina, 156 Hawaiʻi at 487-88, 575 P.3d at 577-78 (ruling that “[c]onsistent with this holding, we overrule past decisions to the extent that they treat a trial court’s unchallenged findings associated with summary judgment rulings as binding on the appellate court”).

Here, the ICA, citing to Okada Trucking Co., 97 Hawaiʻi at 458, 40 P.3d at 81, characterized the circuit court as having found that “ATC Makena’s title to the subject property was continuous and unbroken” and “that ATC Makena paid the property taxes since acquiring the subject property”; and then, for lack of Kaiama’s express challenge of these findings, the ICA concluded these findings were binding on the appellate court. As the ICA’s SDO here was issued prior to our Hilo Bay Marina published decision, we note that pursuant to Hilo Bay Marina, unchallenged findings are not binding on an appellate court reviewing a summary judgment decision.

16 The circuit court repeated this in COL 12, concluding that “Plaintiffs’ title to the Piena Parcels is continuous and unbroken from PIENA’s daughter, KAPEKA, to Plaintiffs.” (Emphasis added.)

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Piena Parcels.” (Emphases added.) The circuit court did not

find that ATC Makena established “continuous and unbroken” title

from Piena to themselves, and more importantly, there is no

evidence as to how Kapeka acquired title to or her ownership

interest in the Piena Parcels in the first instance.

ATC Makena’s evidence did not demonstrate how Kapeka may

have acquired the Piena Parcels from Piena. The Land Commission

issued Award No. 2602, ʻĀpana 2 to Piena in 1854 (with RP No.

6233 issued by the Minister of the Interior on the same in June

1869), and RPG No. 1228, ʻĀpana 1 was granted to Piena in 1853 by

the Kingdom of Hawaiʻi. The Uahinui Declaration unequivocally

stated that “[n]o conveyances appear of record by PIENA dealing

with the subject lands, likewise, there is no probate proceeding

of this estate” of Piena. And Kapeka’s conveyance of her

putative interest in the Piena Parcels to Mary Waiwaiole was in

1901.

The challenge to title in a trespass action requires a

plaintiff recover upon the strength of their own title and not

upon any weakness in the defendant’s title. Midkiff, 49 Haw. at

460, 421 P.2d at 554; Fong Hing, 31 Haw. at 438.

With all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the

evidence viewed in the light most favorable to Kaiama, ATC

Makena’s evidence presents an unexplained break of nearly five

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decades in the chain of their claimed title to the Piena

Parcels. It is unclear how the evidence that Kapeka was Piena’s

“kaikamahine ponoi,” in the absence of other evidence,

necessarily establishes Kapeka’s valid receipt of a property

interest in the Piena Parcels during the almost fifty years in

which, according to the Uahinui Declaration, no conveyances from

Piena or probate proceedings appear.

ATC Makena’s evidence established a genuine issue of

material fact regarding if, and how, any ownership interest in

the Piena Parcels was conveyed or passed from Piena to Kapeka

during the nearly half-century gap between the government’s LCA

and RPG in the 1850s and the 1901 deed to Mary Waiwaiole. Thus,

there is a genuine issue of material fact as to ATC Makena’s

deraignment of title from Piena, the original awardee and grant

recipient.

On this record, we hold that summary judgment was

inappropriately granted on ATC Makena’s claims as it relates to

the Piena Parcels.

B. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding

a discovery sanction against Kaiama.

Liberally construing Kaiama’s appeal to this court, she

appears to challenge the ICA’s affirmance of the circuit court’s

discovery sanction against her.

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Again, HRCP Rule 37 provides:

If the motion [to compel discovery] is granted or if the

disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the

motion was filed, the court shall, after affording an

opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent

whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or

attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to

the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in making

the motion, including attorney’s fees, unless the court

finds that the motion was filed without the movant’s first

making a good faith effort to obtain the disclosure or

discovery without court action, or that the opposing

party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was

substantially justified, or that other circumstances make

an award of expenses unjust.

HRCP Rule 37(a)(4)(A).

ATC Makena’s motion to compel discovery included a request

for attorney fees and costs. The exhibits and declarations

submitted in support of this motion documented their counsel’s

attempts to meet and confer with Kaiama to address her deficient

discovery responses. Kaiama’s opposition to ATC Makena’s motion

called ATC Makena’s request for attorney fees “rude” and accused

their attorneys of corruption. As to the discovery requested by

ATC Makena, Kaiama’s filing also stated, “I did not and still

don’t need to show them who I am[,] only to a Supreme Court

Judge because why? I AM A REAL ROYAL[.]”

The circuit court orally granted ATC Makena’s motion to

compel discovery and the request for attorney’s fees and costs

at the conclusion of the September 11, 2020 hearing on the

motion.

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*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

Kaiama was afforded an opportunity to be heard but did not

directly challenge the reasonableness of the $5,067.67 discovery

sanction levied against her. 17 Based on this record, the circuit

court did not abuse its discretion, and we affirm the discovery

sanction against Kaiama.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we vacate the ICA’s Judgment on

Appeal in relevant part, as well as the circuit court’s Final

Judgment and summary judgment order in relevant part, and remand

to the circuit court for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

Azizi Kaiama,

self-represented petitioner /s/ Vladimir P. Devens

Craig G. Nakamura, /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna Catherine M. Hall,

/s/ Todd W. Eddins

Peter A. Horovitz,

Loren K. Tilley, and /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza Kristine N.Y.K. Tsukiyama

for respondents /s/ Henry T. Nakamoto

17 The circuit court denied Kaiama’s motion for reconsideration of the awarded sanction.

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