UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
VALERIE DORSEY, and
MARIBELLE SABIO,
Plaintiffs,
v. No. 25-cv-4045 (TSC)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Valerie Dorsey and Maribelle Sabio assert discrimination, retaliation, and
hostile work environment claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”),
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634, against the District of Columbia Department of Health. See generally
Am. Compl., ECF No. 14. Defendant moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See generally, Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 15. For the
following reasons, the court will GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, each more than 40 years old at all relevant times, were employed by Defendant
as Program Coordinators for the Centers for Disease Control Project Firstline initiative for
several years until the non-renewal of their appointments in 2024. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8–12, 39.
Sabio began as a contractor in July 2021 and transitioned to a full-time Program Coordinator in
November 2021; Dorsey was hired as a Program Coordinator in June 2022. See id. ¶¶ 8–12.
According to Plaintiffs, Defendant engaged in a pattern of age discrimination against them by
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paying them “less than younger employees with comparable or similar qualifications, including
Saria Widatalla, a Program Coordinator, and Charity Gaitirira, an epidemiologist.” Id. ¶ 40.
Defendant hired Widatalla, who was “younger and less experienced,” at a “significantly higher
salary” than Plaintiffs, id. ¶ 41, and similarly appointed Gaitirira “through a ‘named selection’
process . . . [at] compensation exceeding Plaintiffs’ pay,” id. ¶ 42. In October 2022, Plaintiffs’
supervisor, Candace Johnson, promised Sabio a Quality Step Increase (“QSI”) in recognition of
her “exceptional performance” and reaffirmed that promise on at least two occasions. Id. ¶¶ 13–
14. Neither Plaintiff received a QSI. Id. ¶ 49. Between May and August 2023, Plaintiffs
unsuccessfully requested salary increases to reflect their expanded duties as epidemiologists and
Program Coordinators overseeing program execution, compliance reporting, and staff training.
Id. ¶¶ 15–17, 26.
In August 2023, Plaintiffs presented “written and verbal complaints” of “age-based pay
disparities, harassment, and retaliation” to managers Anil Mangla and Fern Johnson-Clarke. Id.
¶ 18. Mangla and Johnson-Clarke “confirmed that Plaintiffs had gone above and beyond their
job descriptions” and directed Johnson to process their raises by October 31, 2023. Id. ¶¶ 27–28.
Johnson not only failed to do so, but also restricted Plaintiffs’ travel budgets, in-person training,
and conference opportunities. Id. ¶¶ 29, 45–48, 55. In November 2023, despite Plaintiffs’
“documented performance, positive partner feedback, and timely completion of grant
deliverables,” Johnson downgraded their evaluations below the 4.0 threshold required for a QSI
or equivalent merit increase. Id. ¶¶ 32–35. Until then, Sabio’s rating had been “tracking at
4.10.” Id. ¶ 31.
Plaintiffs filed age discrimination complaints with the D.C. Office of Human Rights
(“OHR”) in February 2024; submitted a formal letter of complaint to DC Health’s Human
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Resources Department in April 2024; and filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) in June 2024. Id. ¶¶ 19–21. In July 2024, Defendant declined mediation
with Dorsey and held mediation with Sabio that produced no resolution. Id. ¶¶ 22–23. In
December 2024, Plaintiffs received Notices of Charges of Discrimination and Mandatory
Mediation Letters from OHR. Id. ¶ 24. Between June 2023 and October 2024, Johnson
repeatedly stated—and Defendant’s internal budget spreadsheets confirmed—that funding for
Plaintiffs’ positions remained secure through 2027. Id. ¶¶ 37–38, 57. But on December 9, 2024,
Plaintiffs received non-renewal notices citing “lack of funding.” Id. ¶ 39.1
Plaintiffs filed suit in June 2025, alleging age discrimination, retaliation, and a retaliatory
hostile work environment in violation of the ADEA, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
and damages. Id. ¶¶ 3, 75–82.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning v. Clinton,
292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other
words, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court must assume all “well-pleaded factual allegations”
1
While Plaintiffs filed EEOC charges in June 2024, before the December 2024 non-renewal notices, Defendant does not argue that they failed to exhaust any claims premised on the nonrenewals. Because administrative exhaustion is a non-jurisdictional claim-processing requirement, see Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 551–52 (2019), the court deems any such exhaustion argument forfeited for purposes of this motion, see Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in his opening brief.”).
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are accurate, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, and “grant plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences that can be
derived from the facts alleged,” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir.
1994). But mere “labels and conclusions” or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause
of action” are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
III. ANALYSIS
1. ADEA Discrimination
The ADEA makes it “unlawful for an employer” to “discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. §
623(a)(1). Although a plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination at the motionto-dismiss stage, see Jones v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 642 F.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 2011),
courts look to the prima facie elements to determine “whether the plaintiff can ever meet [her]
initial burden to establish a prima facie case.” Redmon v. U.S. Capitol Police, 80 F. Supp. 3d 79,
86 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Hutchinson v. Holder, 668 F.Supp.2d 201, 211–12 (D.D.C. 2009)).
To do so, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he suffered an
adverse employment action, and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of
discrimination (that is, an inference that his employer took the action because of his membership
in the protected class).” Forkkio v. Powell, 306 F.3d 1127, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2002). “A plaintiff
can raise an inference of discrimination by showing ‘that she was treated differently from
similarly situated employees who are not part of the protected class.’” Brown v. Sessoms, 774
F.3d 1016, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 412 (D.C. Cir.
2005)).
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Courts in this Circuit “have consistently recognized the ‘ease with which a plaintiff
claiming employment discrimination can survive . . . a motion to dismiss.’” Fennell v. AARP,
770 F. Supp. 2d 118, 127 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Rouse v. Berry, 680 F. Supp. 2d 233, 236
(D.D.C. 2010)). “The factual detail required to survive a motion to dismiss can be quite
limited.” Hill v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of D.C., 146 F. Supp. 3d 178, 184 (D.D.C. 2015).
Courts “rarely require more than an assertion that the plaintiff suffered an adverse action due to
his age, so long as this assertion is accompanied by sufficient facts to put the defendant on notice
of the incidences giving rise to the claim.” Badwal v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 139 F. Supp.
3d 295, 315 (D.D.C. 2015). Nevertheless, a plaintiff must “plead sufficient facts to show a
plausible entitlement to relief,” Fennell, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 127, as the court “cannot ‘create
something out of nothing,’” Arnold v. Speer, 251 F. Supp. 3d 269, 273 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting
Jianqing Wu v. Special Counsel, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 48, 56 (D.D.C. 2014)).
In the face of these liberal pleading requirements, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have
not alleged facts sufficient to support an age-discrimination claim based on pay disparities
between Plaintiffs and similarly situated younger employees. The court disagrees.
As a preliminary matter, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiffs are members of a
protected class under the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). And Defendant does not contest that
denied raises or lower pay “are the typical adverse actions in employment discrimination cases.”
Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The parties’ dispute centers on
causation. Plaintiffs allege that Widatalla and Gaitirira, who are substantially younger and less
experienced, were hired at significantly higher salaries despite being subject to the same
evaluation, compensation, and supervisory structure as Plaintiffs. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40–42, 53;
Opp’n at 7, ECF 16. Plaintiffs further contend that they each individually performed the
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combined responsibilities of both younger employees, in addition to overseeing program
execution, compliance reporting, and staff training. Am. Compl. ¶ 16. Finally, Plaintiffs allege
that they consistently exceeded role expectations and were repeatedly promised corresponding
pay increases that never materialized. See id. ¶¶ 13–14, 32.
At this stage, Plaintiffs need not prove that their comparators were identical in every
respect. It is enough to allege that substantially younger employees in comparable or less
demanding roles within the same compensation and supervisory structure received materially
higher pay despite Plaintiffs’ greater experience and expanded responsibilities. These allegations
clear the minimum pleading threshold. See, e.g., Bowe-Connor v. Shinseki, 845 F. Supp. 2d 77,
89 (D.D.C. 2012) (allegations that plaintiff was labeled one of the “GOLDEN GIRLS” and that
supervisors failed to curtail such conduct sufficient to plausibly support age-based salary
discrimination claim); Golden v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 319 F. Supp. 3d 358, 376 (D.D.C.
2018) (allegation that younger managers received lesser discipline despite unsatisfactory
performance sufficient); Jones v. District of Columbia, 273 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66 (D.D.C. 2003)
(allegation that employer “[r]emoved . . . senior employees while preferring younger employees”
sufficient); Washington v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 170 F. Supp. 3d 234, 241–42 (D.D.C. 2016)
(allegations that the plaintiff was qualified, was terminated because of age, and told “too bad you
didn’t fit in” sufficient). Plaintiffs’ discrimination claim therefore survives.
2. ADEA Retaliation
“To state a claim for retaliation under the ADEA, a plaintiff must allege that ‘(1) he
engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) that he suffered a materially adverse action by his
employer; and (3) a causal link connects the two.’” Golden, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 370 (quoting
Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). An action is materially adverse if it
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“could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). Defendant
does not contest that Plaintiffs engaged in protected activity through their August 11, 2023
internal complaints, Am. Compl. ¶ 18; their February 4, 2024 OHR charge, id. ¶ 19; their April
5, 2024 communication to human resources, id. ¶ 20; and their June 2024 EEOC charges, id. ¶
21. See, e.g., Bell v. Gonzales, 398 F. Supp. 2d 78, 94 (D.D.C. 2005).
Plaintiffs have also plausibly alleged that they were subject to materially adverse
employment actions. Plaintiffs point to Defendant’s refusal to process their raises, their
downgraded performance evaluations—which disqualified them for pay increases—and their
non-renewal notices. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32–35, 66. Termination, denial of expected salary
increases, and performance evaluations carrying financial consequences are prototypical
materially adverse actions. See Bridgeforth v. Jewell, 721 F.3d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(“Tangible harm akin to ‘firing’ . . . is obviously materially adverse.”); Russell v. Principi, 257
F.3d 815, 819 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that deprivation of monetary bonuses, salary, and
other tangible, quantifiable awards qualify as materially adverse); Baloch, 550 F.3d at 1199
(“[P]erformance reviews typically constitute adverse actions . . . when attached to financial
harms.”).
Plaintiffs’ allegations support a plausible causal connection between their protected
activity and the denial of merit increases, but not as to the later non-renewal notices. Temporal
proximity can suggest causation where “the employer had knowledge of the protected activity
and . . . the adverse action occurred soon thereafter.” Marshall v. Potter, 634 F. Supp. 2d 66, 73
(D.D.C. 2009). “Although courts have not established the maximum time lapse between
protected . . . activity and alleged retaliatory actions for establishing a causal connection, courts
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generally have accepted time periods of a few days up to a few months and seldom have
accepted time lapses outside of a year in length.” Brodetski v. Duffey, 141 F. Supp. 2d 35, 43
(D.D.C. 2001); Allen v. Napolitano, 774 F. Supp. 2d 186, 201 n.2 (D.D.C. 2011) (“In the D.C.
Circuit, courts have held that alleged retaliatory acts must occur within three or four months of
the protected activity to establish causation by temporal proximity.”).
Plaintiffs allege that 17 days after their initial complaint to Mangla and Johnson-Clarke,
Johnson announced that no raises would be granted—despite having repeatedly promised Sabio a
QSI in recognition of her strong performance and having advocated on her behalf. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 13–14, 18, 20, 26. Even after Mangla and Johnson-Clarke confirmed that Plaintiffs had
exceeded expectations and DC Health management directed that their raises be processed by
October 31, 2023, Johnson refused. Id. ¶¶ 26–29. In other words, within three months of their
protected activity, Johnson reversed course in direct contravention of explicit direction from
upper management. Similarly, three months after Plaintiffs’ initial complaint, Johnson
downgraded their evaluations below the QSI threshold—despite Sabio having tracked above it
and Mangla and Johnson-Clarke’s confirmation that Plaintiffs “had gone above and beyond their
job descriptions.” Id. ¶¶ 27, 31, 32–34. These allegations are sufficient, at this stage, to raise a
plausible inference of retaliation. See Bryant v. Pepco, 730 F. Supp. 2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 2010).
The non-renewal notices stand on different footing. The most recent protected activity
that could anchor that claim is the June 2024 EEOC charge, filed roughly six months before the
notices issued.2 A gap of that length does not, standing alone, support a causal inference. See
2
To the extent Plaintiffs argue that the December 4, 2024, OHR Notice of Discrimination Charge constitutes additional protected activity, the court is unpersuaded. Protected activity encompasses filing complaints, initiating EEO counseling, and invoking informal grievance procedures—not receiving administrative notifications that such complaints have been received.
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Greer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 113 F. Supp. 3d 297, 311 (D.D.C. 2015) (“When relying on
temporal proximity alone to demonstrate causation, there is no bright-line rule, although three
months is perceived as approaching the outer limit.”); Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d 1344,
1357–58 (D.C. Cir. 2012). To be sure, “[a] large gap between protected activity
and retaliation is not necessarily fatal to a claim when the plaintiff can point to other factors
leading to an inference of causation.” Greer, 113 F. Supp. 3d at 311. But Plaintiffs allege no
such factors. To the contrary, they allege that in the months immediately following the EEOC
filings, Johnson repeatedly informed Plaintiffs that funding for their positions was secure; the
non-renewal notices came from broader management in December. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 37,
39. Nor is this case like those in which courts have bridged a comparable temporal gap because
the decisionmaker responsible for the adverse action was the same person accused of
discrimination or retaliation. See Buggs v. Powell, 293 F. Supp. 2d 135, 149–150 (D.D.C. 2003)
(inferring causation despite seven-month gap where official responsible for promotions was
under investigation for plaintiff’s complaint); Payne v. District of Columbia, 4 F. Supp. 3d 80,
89–90 (D.D.C. 2013) (inferring causation despite six-month gap where plaintiff was terminated
by individuals he had accused of retaliation). Plaintiffs allege no comparable nexus between the
non-renewal decisionmakers and their protected activity.
Because the Amended Complaint nonetheless states a plausible retaliation claim based on
performance downgrades and withheld pay increases, dismissal is not warranted on this count.
3. ADEA Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment
To prevail on their hostile work environment claim, Plaintiffs must allege that they were
“subjected to discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was sufficiently severe or
See, e.g., Richardson v. Gutierrez, 477 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2007); Bell, 398 F. Supp. at 94–95.
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pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working
environment.” Brooks v. Grundmann, 748 F.3d 1273, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).
“[T]he court looks to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct, its severity, its offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an
employee’s work performance.” Graham v. Holder, 657 F. Supp. 2d 210, 216 (D.D.C. 2009).
This is a demanding standard: even “abusive behavior . . . motivated by discriminatory animus”
must be “extreme” to be actionable. Rattigan v. Gonzales, 503 F. Supp. 2d 56, 78 (D.D.C. 2007)
(cleaned up). A retaliatory hostile work environment claim additionally requires “a causal
connection between the harassment and [the] protected activity.” Graham, 657 F. Supp. 2d at
216.
Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim. They argue that Defendant’s “persistent denial of
merit‑based raises,” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 35; “failure to issue a promised QSI,” id. ¶¶ 13, 35;
“downgrading of performance evaluations following Plaintiffs’ protected activity, despite strong
performance,” id. ¶¶ 30–35; “exclusion [of Plaintiffs] from key meetings, trainings, and
collaborative initiatives with CDC partners,” id. ¶ 48; and “issuance of non‑renewal notices
terminating Plaintiffs’ positions,” id. ¶ 39; constituted “an ongoing campaign of hostility based
on retaliation that, when viewed in its entirety, altered the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs’
employment.” Opp’n at 14.
In grounding their hostile work environment claim in a series of discrete acts involving
different types of employment decisions by different actors, Plaintiffs misunderstand the nature
of a hostile work environment claim. A plaintiff “cannot so easily bootstrap alleged retaliatory
incidents into a broader hostile work environment claim.” Keeley v. Small, 391 F. Supp. 2d 30,
51 (D.D.C. 2005); see Franklin v. Potter, 600 F. Supp. 2d 38, 77 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Cobbling
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together a number of distinct, disparate acts will not create a hostile work environment.”). As
the Supreme Court has explained, “[h]ostile environment claims are different in kind from
discrete acts” because “[t]heir very nature involves repeated conduct.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002). A plaintiff must allege “‘one unlawful employment
practice’ of pervasive, insulting, discriminatory conduct that makes the plaintiff’s day-to-day
work environment severely ‘abusive.’” Rattigan, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 82 (quoting Morgan, 536
U.S. at 117). When a claim rests on the “cumulative effect” of “several individual acts,” “those
actions must be adequately linked such that they form a coherent hostile environment claim.”
Shanks v. Int'l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, 134 F.4th 585, 597 (D.C. Cir. 2025)
(cleaned up). Relevant factors include “the frequency of the individual acts and whether they
involve the same managers and the same kind of employment action.” Id. at 597–98; see Baird
v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Plaintiffs’ allegations do not clear that bar. The acts they invoke span more than two
years, involve qualitatively different employment decisions, and are not all attributable to the
same decisionmaker. See Shanks, 134 F.4th at 598. While the Amended Complaint attributes
the raise denials, evaluation downgrades, and travel restrictions to Johnson, the non-renewal
notices—the most consequential adverse action—came from different management, undermining
any inference of a unified campaign. Several of the remaining acts, including exclusion from
meetings and professional development opportunities, are not the sort courts have found
“sufficiently offensive, intimidating, or out of the ordinary in a typical workplace to change the
conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.” Heavans v. Dodaro, 648 F. Supp. 3d 1, 18 (D.D.C.
2022); see Johnson v. Perez, 66 F. Supp. 3d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2014) (collecting cases). The
remaining acts duplicate those underlying Plaintiffs’ discrimination and retaliation counts and do
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not independently supply the necessary element of pervasive intimidation, ridicule, or insult. See
Keeley, 391 F. Supp. 2d at 51. Dismissal is therefore appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will GRANT in part and DENY in part Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 15. A separate order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: June 25, 2026
Tanya S. Chutkan
TANYA S. CHUTKAN
United States District Judge
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