J-S14042-26
2026 PA Super 135
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMIE LEE WAGNER JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 1559 MDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered October 8, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-54-SA-0000110-2025
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: JUNE 25, 2026
Jamie Lee Wagner Jr. (“Appellant”) appeals pro se from the order
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County dismissing his
appeal from a magisterial district judge’s adjudication of five summary traffic
offenses due to Appellant’s failure to appear at his de novo trial.1 We affirm.
We briefly recount the facts and procedural history leading to this
appeal. On April 18, 2025, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Christopher
Rooney issued five separate citations at five separate dockets to Appellant, all
of which arose from the same traffic stop. The five violations were for failing
to display a registration plate, operating a vehicle with a suspended, revoked,
1 Appellant purported to appeal from the judgment of sentence. As explained in the body of this opinion, the order dismissing Appellant’s appeal resulted in the reinstatement of the magistrate district judge’s judgment of sentence. To secure relief, Appellant must show that the trial court erred in entering that order. We have amended the caption accordingly.
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or canceled driver’s license, operating an unregistered vehicle, operating a
vehicle without a valid certificate of inspection, and operating a vehicle without
the required financial responsibility.2
The magistrate district judge found Appellant guilty at all dockets on
July 9, 2025. Appellant thereafter filed a notice of appeal at each docket to
the Court of Common Pleas. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 462(a) (“When a defendant
appeals after the entry of a guilty plea or a conviction by an issuing authority
in any summary proceeding ... the case shall be heard de novo by the judge
of the court of common pleas sitting without a jury.”). The five traffic citations
were consolidated under docket CP-54-SA-0000110-2025 with trial scheduled
for October 8, 2025. In the interim, Appellant filed pre-trial motions seeking
dismissal and discovery. The trial court did not rule on the motions. Instead,
on Appellant’s trial date the trial court entered an order dismissing the appeal
due to Appellant’s failure to appear. See Order, 10/8/25 (“And NOW, this 8th
day of October, 2025, the Court ... Grants the Commonwealth’s motion to
dismiss the appeal for Defendant’s failure to appear.”).
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 20, 2025, and
complied with the trial court’s order to file a Rule 1925(b) concise statement.
The trial court issued an opinion concluding that the court “did not err in
dismissing … Appellant’s summary appeal” due to his “failure to appear at the ____________________________________________
2 The citations were filed at MJ-21301-TR-0000631-2025 through MJ-21301-TR-0000635-2025. The respective statutory citations for the five offenses are 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1332(a), 1543(a), 1301(a), 4703(a), and 1786(f).
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October 8, 2025 hearing.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/9/25, at 3. On appeal,
Appellant seeks to argue the following errors:
1. Whether the trial court erred in exercising jurisdiction where
the initiating citations and/or complaints lacked a sworn or
verified affidavit of probable cause.
2. Whether the trial court erred by permitting proceedings in
violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution and Article I of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
3. Whether the trial court erred by failing to enforce Pa.R.Crim.P.
573, thereby depriving Appellant of discovery and exculpatory
evidence in violation of due process and Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4. Whether the arresting officer acted ultra vires by detaining
Appellant absent probable cause, evidence of commercial
activity, or a threat to public safety.
5. Whether the trial court erred in admitting or relying upon
evidence derived from compelled identification of Appellant,
obtained under threat and duress without probable cause, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment and Article I § 9.
6. Whether the seizure and towing of private property without a
judicial warrant constituted an unreasonable seizure under the
Fourth Amendment and Article I § 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.
7. Whether the enforcement of Title 75 against a non-commercial
private traveler violated Appellant’s constitutional rights to
liberty and travel.
8. Whether the trial court’s denial of dismissal, despite these
violations, constitutes reversible error and a deprivation of
fundamental fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment.
9. Whether the trial court erred in proceeding without a trial by
jury and without obtaining a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of that right, thereby denying Appellant his
constitutional protections under Article I § 6 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
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Appellant’s Brief at 3-5.3
The trial court effectively concluded that Appellant forfeited all his issues
by failing to appear. We agree. Rule 462 specifically states: “If the defendant
fails to appear, the trial judge may dismiss the appeal and enter judgment in
the court of common pleas on the judgment of the issuing authority.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 462(3)(D). Appellant does not raise any issue concerning the
propriety of the dismissal nor does he explain his failure to appear. In
Commonwealth v. Marizzaldi, 814 A.2d 249, 250 (Pa. Super. 2002),
Marizzaldi failed to appear for his Rule 462 de novo appeal and the trial court
reinstated the district magistrate’s judgment. On appeal to this Court,
Marizzaldi “attached an affidavit to his brief wherein he assert[ed] that he
arrived for his summary appeal hearing approximately ten minutes late and
learned that his appeal had already been dismissed.” Id. at 251. He also
alleged “that he was not given an opportunity to explain to the trial court the
reason for his tardiness.” Id.
The Comment to Rule 462 explains that “the trial judge may dismiss a
summary case appeal when the judge determines that the defendant is absent
without cause from the trial de novo.” Id. (quoting Comment). While
Marizzaldi argued “that the trial court’s failure to make inquiry into his absence
constitutes reversible error,” we did not hold that the mere failure to probe
that issue warranted relief. Instead, we cited Marizzaldi’s affidavit attached
3 The Commonwealth did not file a brief.
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to his brief, stating: “[A]ssuming arguendo that the facts set forth in
[Marizzaldi’s] brief and affidavit are true and correct … [t]he abbreviated
transcript in the certified record does not contradict [his] assertions on appeal,
and the brief opinion of the trial court makes no mention that a determination
of the cause or duration of [Marizzaldi’s] absence was made.” Id. at 252.
Thus, we vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for trial.
It is unknown whether the Commonwealth’s request to dismiss the case
was made on the record in open court; hence, we cannot determine whether
the trial court made inquiry into Appellant’s absence. 4 However, this alone
does not constitute reversible error. In Commonwealth v. Dixon we held:
We understand Marizzaldi to require a new trial when: (1) a trial
court dismisses a summary appeal without considering whether
the absentee defendant had cause to justify the absence; and (2)
the absentee defendant presents an affidavit on appeal that
(assuming the assertions delineated in the affidavit are true)
presents at least a prima facie demonstration that cause existed
for the absence, rendering that absence involuntary.
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 66 A.3d 794, 797 (Pa. Super. 2013) (emphasis
added). Whereas the Marizzaldi Court vacated the judgment of sentence
4 “Our law is unequivocal that the responsibility rests upon the appellant to ensure that the record certified on appeal is complete in the sense that it contains all of the materials necessary for the reviewing court to perform its duty.” Commonwealth v. Harlan, 208 A.3d 497, 501 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 6-7 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc)).
We add that the trial court opinion could not address this issue, as the jurist who issued the order retired before the opinion could be filed. See Order, 11/12/25 (order reassigning case).
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and remanded for a new trial due to the appellant establishing error in the
dismissal, the Dixon Court concluded that Dixon “failed in his affidavit to set
forth a prima facie case of involuntariness sufficient to warrant a new trial
pursuant to Marizzaldi.” Id. at 798. We thus affirmed the order dismissing
Dixon’s appeal.
Appellant’s failure to explain the reasons for his absence at trial and to
attach an affidavit setting forth this information precludes any form of relief.
Based upon the record before us, we have no basis to conclude that the trial
court erred in ordering Appellant’s de novo appeal dismissed for failing to
appear. We therefore affirm the order dismissing the appeal.
Next, consistent with our prerogative “to liberally construe materials
filed by a pro se litigant,” Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498
(Pa. Super. 2005), we discern from Appellant’s brief a complaint that the trial
court should have granted his pre-trial motions to dismiss the case instead of
holding the de novo trial. In other words, Appellant overlooks his own failure
to appear by arguing the merits of his motion to dismiss. See Appellant’s
Brief at 8 (arguing that the trial court erred “by refusing to adjudicate
preserved jurisdictional and constitutional claims”).
The trial court’s opinion effectively determined that Appellant’s failure
to appear forfeited his right to litigate the pre-trial motions. Appellant does
not raise any kind of argument responding to this finding. We therefore deem
any argument in that regard waived. Our willingness to construe pro se
materials liberally “confers no special benefit upon the appellant. To the
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contrary, any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must,
to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training
will be his undoing.” Adams, 882 A.2d at 498 (citation omitted).
Finally, even if preserved, we would conclude that the failure to address
Appellant’s pre-trial motions was not prejudicial as Appellant’s arguments are
frivolous. Appellant’s motion to dismiss alleged, in pertinent part, the
following:
4. The stop was initiated solely because Defendant’s private
automobile did not display a license plate. No evidence exists of
criminal conduct or a threat to public safety.
5. During the stop, Defendant was compelled under threat and
duress to identify himself despite asserting he was not engaged in
commerce.
Motion to Dismiss, 9/17/25, at ¶¶ 4, 5.
Appellant filed a memorandum of law in support, and a review of that
memorandum establishes that Appellant’s arguments are adopted from the
“sovereign citizen” movement. While Appellant does not use that phrase or
identify himself as such, he theorized that the traffic stop was per se invalid
on the basis that citizens have a right to engage in “non-commercial” travel
which may not be regulated by the States. His memorandum argued that
Corporal Rooney “tow[ed] [Appellant’s] private property” against his will,
despite Appellant’s “statement of not engaging in commerce.” Memorandum
of Law, 9/17/25, at 2. He cites passages from United States Supreme Court
caselaw, without accounting for context, to support an alleged “entitle[ment]
to carry on his private business in his own way,” and that he “owes no duty
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to the State ... to divulge his business[.]” Id. at 3 (quoting Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) (ellipsis in original).5 He invokes a “right of a citizen
to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon,” id.
at 4, and later draws a distinction between “commercial” use of the highways
and “non-commercial use,” arguing in relevant part:
There is no evidence the Defendant was using the automobile for
commercial purposes as well as no evidence of a corpus delicti
indicating a criminal offense. A mere traffic citation under § 1332
is insufficient to establish probable cause (Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)). Therefore the Pennsylvania State
Trooper exceeded lawful authority (ultra vires) depriving the
honorable court of jurisdiction over this stop.
***
I bring up this point regarding commerce because the alleged
violations are of P.a. C. S. Title 75, the Motor Vehicle Code, and
Congress has established that a motor vehicle means every
description of a carriage propelled or drawn by mechanical power
and used for commercial purposes in 18 U.S.C. 31 (7), where they
also define used for commercial purposes (8). Also, driver is
defined in 49 CFR 390.5T as any person who operates a
commercial motor vehicle (9).
Id. at 8.
These theories have been frequently associated with the “sovereign
citizen” movement, as explained in this law review article:
The most common type of Sovereign Citizen claim encountered by
local and state police, as well as federal border patrol agents, is
the “right to travel.” Citing the Constitution, Supreme Court
cases, and a plethora of other sources, Sovereign Citizens believe
they are not required to have driver’s licenses, license plates, ____________________________________________
5 The Hale Court was comparing the respective rights of an individual and a corporation when “summoned before a grand jury as a witness[.]” Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906).
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vehicle registration, or to stop at border or sobriety checkpoints.
Similar to other claims, Sovereign Citizens discussing the “right to
travel” place special emphasis on the words being used. They
differentiate between a driver and a traveler; an automobile and
a motor vehicle; commercial and non-commercial; and public
versus private conveyances. Once a Sovereign Citizen claims that
he or she is merely a traveler or traveling, he or she then uses
federal and state cases to support the “right to travel.” Sovereign
Citizens also believe the right to travel constitutes a complete bar
on government interference with travel in the absence of probable
cause or evidence that a victim has been harmed.
Caesar Kalinowski IV, A Legal Response to the Sovereign Citizen Movement,
80 Mont. L. Rev. 153, 167–68 (2019) (footnotes omitted).
We have previously cited this article in an unpublished memorandum
decision, Commonwealth v. Syke, 1213 WDA 2023, 2024 WL 3878319 at
*3 n.5 (Pa. Super. filed August 20, 2024) (unpublished memorandum), and
added, in response to similar arguments:
[Syke] appears to claim that any restriction that touches on the
“right to travel,” which in this case apparently extends to
operating a motor vehicle however [he] wishes, is per se invalid.
This argument does not account for the obvious countervailing
governmental interests involved. See generally Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (“All States require
vehicles to be registered and operators to be licensed. States and
localities have enacted extensive and detailed codes regulating
the condition and manner in which motor vehicles may be
operated on public streets and highways.”).
Id. at *3.6 So too here. See Appellant’s Brief at 16 (stating that “[t]he
automobile was Appellant’s private property” and that “inference with this
sacred use of property lacks any lawful justification,” and that the “absence of
6 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential memoranda decision of Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value).
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plates” was lawful “under common law”). Because Appellant’s arguments are
similarly frivolous, any error in not ruling on his motion to dismiss the case
did not prejudice Appellant.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 06/25/2026
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