[Cite as State v. Fusco, 2026-Ohio-2404.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 115029
v. :
ANDREW FUSCO, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 25, 2026
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-24-693354-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Erica Sammon, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
Michael V. Wilhelm, Assistant Public Defender, for
appellant.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
Defendant-appellant Andrew Fusco (“Fusco”) appeals his convictions
and sentence following a guilty plea arising from a four-count indictment relating to a group motorcycle street takeover. After a review of the record, we affirm Fusco’s
convictions.
I. Procedural History
On July 9, 2024, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned a fourcount indictment against Fusco following a large-scale motorcycle street takeover
on Detroit Road. The underlying incident involved a group of motorcyclists
occupying multiple lanes of traffic, during which Fusco stopped and then
accelerated, dragging and injuring Cleveland Police Officer Petitt.
On February 20, 2025, Fusco pleaded guilty to an amended Count 1,
vehicular assault, R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b), a fourth-degree felony, and Count 3 as
charged, failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer,
R.C. 2921.331(B), a third-degree felony. Counts 2 and 4, felonious assault under
R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and obstructing official business under R.C. 2921.31(A),
respectively, were nolled.
The matter proceeded to sentencing on March 27, 2025. Prior to
imposing sentence, the trial court reviewed a presentence-investigation report and
viewed Real Time Crime Camera (“RTCC”) and Cleveland Police body-camera video
footage. The court also received a victim-impact statement from Officer Petitt
regarding the severe daily impact of his injuries. In mitigation, defense counsel
argued that Fusco was remorseful, had experienced a temporary lapse in judgment
by following a “mob,” and had maintained stable employment at Lincoln Electric for
six years.
Fusco was sentenced to an 18-month prison term on amended Count
1 and a 24-month term on Count 3. Pursuant to law, the sentences were ordered to
run consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of three and one-half years. In
determining the sentence, the trial court explicitly noted on the record that this
incident marked Fusco’s fifth conviction for failing to comply with police orders and
that he had actively violated the terms of his court-supervised release while the case
was pending. Fusco was granted jail-time credit, found indigent, and advised of
postrelease control. A timely notice of appeal was subsequently filed, and appellate
counsel was assigned.
Appellant’s counsel filed a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel
and brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Anders held that
where, after a conscientious examination of the case, appellate counsel is unable to
find any meritorious issues for review, counsel may inform the court and request
permission to withdraw. The request must be “accompanied by a brief referring to
anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” Id. at 744. A copy
of the brief should be furnished to the indigent, and time should be allowed for the
indigent to raise any points that he or she chooses. “[T]he court — not counsel —
then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the
case is wholly frivolous.” Id. “If it so finds, it may grant counsel’s request to
withdraw and dismiss the appeal . . . .” Id. If the appellate court determines that
one or more legal points have merit, the defendant will be afforded counsel to argue
the appeal.
Counsel contended that after a conscientious examination of the case,
there were no meritorious issues for review. The Anders motion was referred to the
merit panel for decision, and the matter was submitted on the briefs. Fusco was
served with the motion and brief and advised of the right to file a pro se brief in the
case but did not do so.
After an independent review of the record, this court permitted
original appellate counsel to withdraw and appointed new appellate counsel. The
second appointed appellate counsel filed a motion and brief requesting to withdraw
as counsel pursuant to Anders. Appellate counsel stated he had conducted a
complete and conscientious review of the entire record and moved to withdraw
having determined that the appeal presented no nonfrivolous issues for review.
We note that the second appointed appellate counsel’s Anders filing
suffered from a procedural defect, because counsel failed to properly serve appellant
with a copy of the brief and motion to withdraw. However, this court subsequently
intervened, conducted an independent review of the record, permitted the second
counsel to withdraw, and appointed a third, new appellate counsel to protect Fusco’s
appellate rights.
Appellant, through his third assigned counsel, raises a sole
assignment of error for our review:
Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide context for the video
that was shown during sentencing, prejudicing Mr. Fusco.
II. Law and Analysis
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the
two-pronged standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d
136 (1989). To succeed, a defendant must demonstrate both that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this
deficiency prejudiced the defense. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus; Strickland
at 687. Because a defendant must satisfy both prongs, the failure to establish either
deficiency or prejudice is fatal to the claim.
Under R.C. 2929.19(A) and 2951.03(A)(1), a trial court is statutorily
permitted to consider all information relevant to the offense at sentencing, including
video evidence, regardless of whether a defendant pleads to reduced charges. State
v. Bowser, 2010-Ohio-951, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). Furthermore, because both offenses to
which Fusco pleaded guilty (R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b) and 2921.331(B)) require
elements of serious physical harm or a substantial risk thereof, the video directly
substantiated the statutory charges.
Given Fusco’s history of four prior failure-to-comply convictions and
his bond violations, there is no reasonable probability that an objection or additional
context by counsel would have altered the consecutive sentencing framework
mandated by R.C. 2921.331(D). Thus, appellant cannot establish prejudice under
Strickland v. Washington.
Accordingly, Fusco’s assignment of error is overruled.
The trial court’s judgment entry is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR