Supreme Court
No. 2025-192-Appeal.
(W 19-2200M)
Kelly K. Fitzgerald :
v. :
James W.A. Jackson. :
ORDER
James W.A. Jackson (Mr. Jackson or defendant), a self-represented litigant,
appeals from an order of the Family Court denying his motion seeking recusal of the
trial justice assigned to adjudicate custody of Mr. Jackson and Kelly K. Fitzgerald’s
(Ms. Fitzgerald or plaintiff) minor children (the children). This case came before
the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show
cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. After
considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we
conclude that cause has not been shown and that we may decide this case without
further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this order, we affirm the
order of the Family Court.
Mr. Jackson’s motion to recuse the trial justice arose in the context of a
drawn-out custody, visitation, and child support dispute against Ms. Fitzgerald, the
children’s mother. This Court recited the facts and prior procedural history of the
-1-underlying family dispute in Fitzgerald v. Jackson, 307 A.3d 1283 (R.I. 2024); we
need not repeat them here. It suffices to note that we remanded the papers with the
explicit expectation “that the case will proceed as expeditiously as possible” to an
“evidentiary hearing on the fundamental issues of custody and visitation * * *.”
Fitzgerald, 307 A.3d at 1293.
Once back in the Family Court, however, Mr. Jackson renewed a challenge to
the Family Court’s jurisdiction, this time pressing an argument under G.L. 1956
§ 15-14.1-20.1 In June 2024, a justice of the Family Court (hearing justice) rejected
that challenge, following a hearing at which Mr. Jackson was permitted to attend by
WebEx, and further ordered a comprehensive visitation schedule for the summer of
2024. Mr. Jackson thereafter filed several additional motions, including a motion to
join his minor daughter’s biological father as a party, a motion to expedite a hearing
on Mr. Jackson’s earlier-filed motion to dismiss the case, and a motion to reconsider
the decision of the hearing justice who rejected the renewed challenge to jurisdiction.
On May 15, 2025, Mr. Jackson filed the motion seeking recusal that is at issue
in this appeal. In seeking recusal of the justice of the Family Court who was
subsequently assigned to dispose of the additional motions and to adjudicate custody
1
General Laws 1956 § 15-14.1-20 is a portion of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act which provides that a court “shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction” where “a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct * * *.”
-2-(trial justice), Mr. Jackson cited the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Rule 2.11 of the Rhode Island
Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires a judge to recuse from “any proceeding in
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned * * *.” In sum, his
motion argued that the trial justice demonstrated bias by not granting him visitation
rights,2 by failing to decide numerous pending motions, by allegedly making
statements and rulings that discriminated against him, and by “suppress[ing]
evidence.”
At a hearing on the motion to recuse, at which Mr. Jackson again appeared by
WebEx, the trial justice noted that Mr. Jackson had filed most of the “dozen or so
more motions” filed in the two months before the hearing and that those motions
could not be resolved until she decided Mr. Jackson’s motion to recuse. The trial
justice proceeded to hear argument from both parties, permitted Mr. Jackson to enter
evidence into the record, and subsequently denied Mr. Jackson’s motion. In issuing
her ruling from the bench, the trial justice noted that she “reviewed the appropriate
documents as well as the exhibits, the exhibits that have been marked by both sides,
and * * * also reviewed the judicial canons, * * * [and] the case law.” She found
that “no ground exists to disqualify me under the rules or the case law” and denied
2
We observe that the June 2024 order of the Family Court outlined a detailed visitation schedule for the summer of 2024. We are aware of no impediment to Mr. Jackson’s ability to visit the children beyond his residency abroad.
-3-the motion. Mr. Jackson moved to stay the denial of his motion to recuse, which the
trial justice granted.
Before this Court, Mr. Jackson argues that the trial justice’s failure to recuse
violated the canons of judicial ethics; and that during the litigation, the trial justice
violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the United States
Constitution, failed to rule on certain motions, and excluded his evidence.
A litigant seeking the recusal of a trial justice must “affirmatively establish
‘that the judicial officer possesses a personal bias or prejudice by reason of a
preconceived or settled opinion of a character calculated to impair his or her
impartiality seriously and to sway his or her judgment.’” In re Adele B., 229 A.3d
671, 682-83 (R.I. 2020) (quoting State v. McWilliams, 47 A.3d 251, 260 (R.I. 2012)).
Appellate review of a decision on a motion to recuse is for an abuse of discretion.
See Kelly v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 740 A.2d 1243, 1246 (R.I. 1999)
(applying a deferential standard to a trial justice’s decision on a motion to recuse);
see also United States v. Gottesfeld, 18 F.4th 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2021).
Mr. Jackson argues that the trial justice displayed bias by failing to timely rule
on several of his pending motions. We disagree. Trial justices have considerable
discretion in managing their docket. See Coates v. Ocean State Jobbers, Inc., 18
A.3d 554, 558 (R.I. 2011) (“The widest discretion must be given to calendar justices
and trial justices in managing a trial calendar, a task that is among the most difficult
-4-of all judicial assignments.”) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Bergeron v. Roszkowski, 866 A.2d 1230, 1235 (R.I. 2005)). Here, the trial
justice prioritized Mr. Jackson’s motion to recuse over other pending motions so that
she could address the important threshold question regarding her adjudication of the
case. We discern no ethical transgression from her decision to so proceed or from
her other scheduling decisions. Moreover, Mr. Jackson has not provided this Court
with any legal basis on which to conclude that the delay in scheduling his motion to
reconsider the hearing justice’s order concerning jurisdiction 3 affirmatively
established evidence of bias or prejudice that would impair her ability to act
impartially in the case. See In re Adele B., 229 A.3d at 682-83.
Mr. Jackson also takes issue with rulings by the trial justice which purportedly
prevented him from presenting evidence in support of his case. However, “adverse
rulings alone do not show bias or prejudice,” and we cannot conclude that the trial
justice’s discretionary evidentiary rulings constitute evidence of “a preconceived or
settled opinion of a character calculated to impair [the trial justice’s] impartiality
seriously and to sway * * * her judgment.” In re Adele B., 229 A.3d at 682-83 (first
3
In his papers before this Court, Mr. Jackson argued that the trial justice failed to timely decide his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. However, Mr. Jackson clarified at argument, at which he once again appeared virtually, and in his supplemental briefing that he was in fact seeking a hearing on his motion to reconsider the earlier ruling on his jurisdictional motion to dismiss.
-5-quoting In re Antonio, 612 A.2d 650, 654 (R.I. 1992); then quoting McWilliams, 47
A.3d at 260).
Our review of the remainder of the record satisfies us that the trial justice
reached a rational conclusion on the motion to recuse. See Gottesfeld, 18 F.4th at 17.
Before the trial justice and in this Court, Mr. Jackson asserts that his due process
rights were violated; it is evident, however, that the trial justice provided Mr.
Jackson, who proceeded in this litigation without counsel and from Australia, with
ample opportunity to file and be heard via WebEx on motions which she dutifully
considered without evidence of bias in favor of either party. 4 See Cavanagh v.
Cavanagh, 118 R.I. 608, 622, 375 A.2d 911, 918 (1977) (declining to infer bias
where no evidence trial justice “had closed his mind to [a party’s] side of the case”).
Finally, Mr. Jackson makes a series of arguments which purport to establish that the
trial justice violated Rhode Island Code of Judicial Conduct 2.11. Our review of the
record, however, satisfies us that there is no reason to question the trial justice’s
impartiality considering her efforts to provide both parties with ample opportunity
to litigate the issues of custody, child support, and visitation of their minor children.
Ultimately, Mr. Jackson points to nothing that, under our caselaw, could be
considered evidence supporting recusal.
4
We commend the hearing justice and the trial justice for permitting and scheduling Mr. Jackson to appear by WebEx.
-6-Accordingly, we affirm the order of the Family Court justice denying the
defendant’s motion to recuse and remand the papers to that court.
Entered as an Order of this Court this ___ day of June, 2026.
By Order,
Clerk
Justice Lynch Prata did not participate.
-7-STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE
Licht Judicial Complex
250 Benefit Street
Providence, RI 02903
ORDER COVER SHEET
Title of Case Kelly K. Fitzgerald v. James W.A. Jackson.
No. 2025-192-Appeal.
Case Number
(W 19-2200M)
Date Order Filed June 25, 2026
Justices Suttell, C.J., Robinson, Long, and Flaherty (ret.), JJ.
Source of Appeal Washington County Family Court
Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Karen Lynch Bernard
For Plaintiff:
Felicia A. Manni-Paquette, Esq.
Attorney(s) on Appeal
For Defendant:
James W.A. Jackson, pro se
SU-CMS-02B (revised November 2022)