SECOND DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
DAVIS, J., and SENIOR JUDGE FULLER
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules
June 25, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A26A1449. DUNN v. LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT.
DOYLE, Presiding Judge.
Danny Dunn, proceeding pro se, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his
petition for declaratory and injunctive relief against “the Judges of the Lookout
Mountain Judicial Circuit,” and Kathy Page, as Clerk of Dade County Superior
Court. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition, and Dunn appeals,
alleging several enumerations of error. For the reasons that follow, we affirm and levy
sanctions against Dunn for filing a frivolous appeal.1
In July 2019, Dunn’s ex-wife filed a run-of-the-mill petition for divorce and
child custody, see generally Dunn v. Dunn, 368 Ga. App. 161 (889 SE2d 352) (2023)
1
See Court of Appeals Rule 7(e)(2) (2025).
(“Dunn II”), which has ballooned into at least nine different trial court proceedings
and even more appeals.2 The final order of divorce was issued on December 15, 2020,
but Dunn filed a motion to set aside the order and motion for new trial. See id. While
those motions were pending, on January 7, 2021, his ex-wife filed a petition for a
temporary protective order, which was granted by Judge Brian House, who presided
over the divorce proceeding.
By January 26, 2021, in the main divorce case, Dunn’s attorneys moved to
withdraw, and Dunn filed a pro se motion to recuse Judge House from any further
proceeding involving the custody of Dunn’s children, attaching to the motion a tenpage affidavit listing alleged instances of bias. Dunn also moved to strike the guardian
2
See, e.g., Dunn v. Dunn, 363 Ga. App. 132 (871 SE2d 30) (2022) (“Dunn I”) (reversing trial court’s entry of contempt and protective orders); Dunn II, 368 Ga. App. at 161; Dunn v. Dunn, Case No. A24D0325 (May 10, 2024) (dismissing application as untimely); Dunn v. Dunn, Case No. A25D0186 (Jan. 23, 2025) (dismissing application for failure to obtain superior court ruling); Dunn v. Dunn, Case No. A25A1061 (Feb. 11, 2025) (dismissing direct appeal because Dunn was required to file an application for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(2)); Dunn v. Dunn, Case No. A25D0255 (Mar. 3, 2025) (dismissing discretionary application as untimely and because Dunn was not entitled to a second appeal from the same order); Dunn v. Dunn, Case No. A25A1759 (Jun. 24, 2025) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction an appeal from an email from the superior court clerk’s officer returning as unaccepted one of many of his motions to recuse certain judges from the circuit); Dunn v. Dunn, Case No. A26A0772 (direct appeal of the denial of Dunn’s petition to modify custody).
2
ad litem’s testimony, and after his first motion to recuse was denied by Judge Don
Thompson, Dunn filed another motion to recuse Judge House.3 Dunn’s ex-wife also
filed two motions for contempt of the December 15 order, which Judge Thompson
granted. Those orders were later reversed on appeal due to the pending motion for
new trial, and in the same appeal, this Court reversed the family violence protective
order for lack of sufficient evidence. See generally Dunn I, 363 Ga. App. at 132. In the
meantime, on August 19, 2021, all the judges of the Lookout Mountain Circuit
voluntarily recused themselves from the divorce proceeding, noting that the recusal
was for that proceeding.
Eventually, after our decision in Dunn II, on March 26, 2024, a senior judge
sitting by designation entered a final order with a parenting plan.4 A few months after
entry of the March 26 order, on June 7, 2024, Dunn filed a petition for custody
modification. Judge Chris Arnt was scheduled to hear certain motions, and Dunn
3
In October 2021, Dunn also moved for contempt against the trial court clerk for failing to accept his e-filed documents, and to impeach the guardian ad litem for false testimony.
4
Dunn later challenged the appointment of this judge via a writ of quo warranto, which the trial court dismissed on February 20, 2025. Dunn appealed that decision, and we dismissed that appeal. See Dunn v. Matthews, Case No. A25D0390 (order issued May 29, 2025).
3
moved to recuse him on the basis that he previously worked in the district attorney’s
office when Dunn was prosecuted for charges arising from the divorce. Judge House
denied the motion to recuse Judge Arnt, and Dunn moved to recuse Judge House.
Dunn’s ex-wife also moved to compel discovery and for contempt in the
modification proceeding, which motions Judge House granted on December 5, 2024,
and January 9, 2025. Dunn appealed those orders, but this Court dismissed the appeal
on February 11, 2025, for failing to file a discretionary application.
Along with his appeal of the January 9 contempt order, and based on that same
order and other rulings by Judge House in the modification case, Dunn filed three
petitions for extraordinary relief, including requests for mandamus and writs of
prohibition, which were docketed as three separate cases. Dunn argued that Judge
House and the rest of the Lookout Mountain Circuit judges should be recused from
any action in which he appeared, and the sheriff should be prohibited from enforcing
the January 9 contempt order, among other things.
An administrative judge appointed Senior Judge William McLain to review the
petitions, and he dismissed them in a consolidated order issued on March 7, 2025.
Essentially, Judge McClain determined that Dunn’s recourse for the judges’ failure
4
to recuse was not mandamus or an extraordinary writ, but a direct or discretionary
appeal to this Court.
Judge House continued to issue orders in the modification action, and in
February 2025, he also issued a screening order requiring that any filing made by
Dunn required review by him or another judge prior to docketing in order to manage
the volume of frivolous filings made by Dunn. Dunn filed more motions to recuse
Judge House in the modification action, and he eventually filed another petition for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in a separate action in July 2025, naming
the entire Lookout Mountain bench and the superior court clerk. Dunn argued that
Judge House and the rest of the Lookout Mountain Circuit judges should be
prohibited from presiding over his cases, that the orders of designation allowing Senior
Judge Matthews to preside over his divorce proceeding and allowing Senior Judge
McClain to preside over his extraordinary petition cases were not proper orders of
designation, and that the clerk should accept his filings without pre-screening.
Eventually, Judge House recused himself from the modification action on
August 19, 2025. Judge McClain presided over the remainder of that proceeding,
5
deciding the merits of the custody modification on September 25, 2025, and this Court
recently affirmed the order in Dunn v. Dunn, Case No. A26A0772.
In the current case, Judge McClain presided over the proceedings, dismissing
the petition in a thorough and well-reasoned order on January 20, 2026. This appeal
followed.
Dunn alleges 15 enumerations of error, none of them meritorious. Ultimately,
the issues that Dunn raises were not justiciable, and if they were, Dunn’s recourse was
in underlying actions and proper appeals thereof — either the divorce action, custody
modification, or contempt proceedings. See, e.g., Cobb County v. Floam, 319 Ga. 89,
97(2) (901 SE2d 512) (2024) (explaining that a petition for declaratory relief is
appropriate to guide parties from future uncertainty and not to address a
determination of rights already accrued); Tsoglin v. Jackson, 375 Ga. App. 367,
368–69(2) (916 SE2d 209) (2025) (holding that the dismissal of an action filed against
a sheriff was an impermissible collateral attack of a prior proceeding in which the
plaintiff failed to timely intervene); Armstrong v. Solicitor-General of Gwinnett County,
366 Ga. App. 865, 868 (884 SE2d 556) (2023) (holding that neither a petition for
mandamus nor a request for a declaratory judgment were appropriate vehicles for
6
challenging a court policy, which policy did not create a justiciable controversy
between the parties). Most of the allegations were mooted by the determinations on
appeal by this Court or by Dunn’s failure to properly appeal those orders, notably the
amended final order from March 26, 2024. Other claims are based on
misrepresentations or misunderstandings of the record or Judge McClain’s order.
Further, screening orders of motions or other documents like the one imposed on
Dunn are permitted if a litigant has abused his access to the court, which may in turn
exercise its “discretion in undertaking such actions to aid in the orderly administration
of [court] business[.]” Higdon v. Higdon, 321 Ga. App. 260, 266-67(4) (739 SE2d 498)
(2013). See also Moreton Rolleston, Jr., Living Trust v. Kennedy, 277 Ga. 541, 542–43
(591 SE2d 834) (2004). Accordingly, Dunn’s arguments are without merit, and the
trial court did not err by dismissing this action.
Moreover, Dunn’s petition as well as his appeal of this order are frivolous.
“‘No person is free to abuse the courts by inundating them with frivolous suits which
burden the administration of the courts for no useful purpose.’” Higdon, 321 Ga. App.
at 266(4). Given Dunn’s history of filing meritless, repetitive actions as summarized
in this opinion, we hereby assess frivolous appeal penalties in the amount of $10,000
7
against Dunn. The trial court is DIRECTED to enter a money judgment in this
amount in favor of the defendants in this action upon remittitur. See Court of Appeals
Rule 7(e)(2), (e)(3).
Judgment affirmed. Davis, J., and Senior Judge C. Andrew Fuller concur.
8