In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 1, 2021
S21A0243. RIOS v. THE STATE.
S21A0402. CARTER v. THE STATE.
WARREN, Justice.
Appellants Jefrey Rios and Justin Carter, along with Marco
Cruz, were jointly indicted for three counts of felony murder and
other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Cristian
Carrillo. The State could not locate Cruz after the crimes, and the
case proceeded to trial against Rios and Carter. On the first day of
witness testimony, the trial court declared a mistrial, finding that
critical evidence had not been disclosed to the defense until that day
because of a Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) computer error
and that the trial could not proceed as a result. Rios and Carter filed
a joint plea in bar, but the trial court denied it and concluded that
double jeopardy did not preclude the State from retrying them. Rios
and Carter appeal, and we affirm.
1. Because the trial was terminated after the testimony of the
third witness on the first day that evidence was presented, we begin
by recounting parts of the opening statements to provide context for
what led to the mistrial in this case. In the State’s opening
statement, the prosecutor said that he expected the evidence to show
that Rios drove Carter and Cruz to a hotel where they intended to
purchase marijuana from Carillo, who was 17 years old. Five other
teenagers were in the hotel room with Carillo. According to the
prosecutor, Rios waited outside in his car while Carter and Cruz
went into the hotel room. Carillo had a gun beside him on a bed,
but, before Carter and Cruz arrived, it had “jammed” when “one of
the guys in the room fired into a mattress.” Within a few minutes
of entering the room, Carter “pistol whipped” Carillo, and Cruz shot
Carillo three times, killing him. Cruz fled shortly after the crimes
and has not been seen since. When law enforcement officers “picked
up” Carter four days later, he was in possession of a 9mm handgun,
which officers took into evidence. During Carter’s opening
statement, his counsel noted that the evidence would show that
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Carter had “a gun on him” in the hotel room; that he carried it in a
holster under his clothing; and that he had “a permit to be able to
carry a concealed weapon.”
GBI Agent Josh Ellis, who performed the forensic investigation
of the hotel room, testified that he found several 9mm shell casings
and cartridges in Room 132, which is where the shooting occurred.
He also found a bullet that had traveled through the wall of Room
132 and lodged in the wall of an adjacent room, Room 133. The agent
did not specify what type of bullet was found in the wall of Room
133.
After Agent Ellis testified, the prosecutor informed the trial
court that he had received new information at about 11:45 a.m. that
morning from a GBI firearms examiner, Noah Burdick, who was
scheduled to testify the next day. Burdick previously had prepared
three expert ballistics reports that the State had turned over to
defense counsel. According to the prosecutor, Burdick said that,
while preparing for his testimony the next day, he had printed off
copies of the reports he had prepared and realized that a fourth
3
report “had been generated at some time in July” and was sent
“through a software program from his computer to a device that
publishes that report via website. There was some sort of software
error, [and] the report never populated to be published or distributed
to anyone.” In other words, as the prosecutor explained to the trial
court,
the GBI did a report, we didn’t know about the report. I,
specifically, asked on Friday [September 20, 2019, the
Friday before the trial began], via e-mail, about any
outstanding reports and was told there were no reports. I
now have in my possession a report dated September 26,
2019, or today, in the same case.
The prosecutor acknowledged that before his most recent
communication with Burdick on September 26, the prosecutor had
told Carter’s attorney on Friday, September 20, that there were no
new expert reports. The prosecutor also told the trial court that he
had been prosecuting cases for 16 years and that he had “never in
[his] career seen this.”
With respect to the contents of Burdick’s fourth report, the
prosecutor informed the trial court that it contained new
4
information showing that the bullet that had lodged in the wall of
Room 133 was a .38-caliber bullet. The prosecutor explained that
this new information was “notable” because “[w]e anticipate all the
evidence would be, all the witnesses would testify, [that] any—all
firearms were semi[-]automatic weapons. But a .38 can only be fired
from a revolver. So that’s inconsistent with witness testimony.” He
added that if the court excluded the fourth report from evidence, the
State was still prepared to move forward with the trial, and that he
was not seeking a continuance.
Following the prosecutor’s disclosure of the fourth report, a
lengthy discussion ensued between the trial court, the prosecutor,
and defense counsel outside the presence of the jury, with counsel
having the opportunity to raise with the trial court issues such as
the importance of the report, whether it was feasible to exclude the
report, and whether it was feasible to proceed without discharging
the jury. During that exchange, Carter’s counsel informed the trial
court that “[b]ased upon this new evidence, . . . I would not feel
comfortable being able to move forward”; that “I don’t see how to be
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able to salvage the case at this point”; and that “I know that the case
as it stands right now can’t move forward.” He added that he would
need to have his ballistics expert review the fourth report.
In response, the trial court asked Carter’s counsel “how long it
would take to get your ballistics expert[] . . . up to speed on this.”
Carter’s counsel responded that he was “unsure if [he could] answer
that question” because he would “need to make arrangements” to get
“copies of the physical evidence” from the State and because he was
“not sure what his [expert’s] schedule [was] at this point.” The trial
court and counsel agreed that it was unlikely that the case could be
tried in one week, and Carter’s counsel stated that it was his
understanding that “this was the last 2 week calendar that the
Court had this year. So I imagine by the time this pops up again
that I would have what I would need to have if the case just
continued as opposed to dismissed.” After this discussion of a
possible continuance, Carter’s counsel reiterated that “this new
information . . . is material to our defense,” but further stated “I don’t
see how we can possibly move forward,” suggesting that he did not
6
believe that a continuance was feasible.
Rios’s counsel said that “I think we will all agree . . . that the
information we’ve just received is vital to our defense” and that
[w]e cannot use this jury which means we would have to
start all over again. And we simply cannot go forward
even if this is excluded. We can’t go forward because it’s
vital not only to their offense, but to my defense. And I
need to be able to evaluate that. . . . I don’t have time
right now to evaluate what they have presented to me.
With respect to the possibility of excluding the report, Carter’s
counsel at one point said that “if the Court says that . . . the State
can’t use this report, when Mr. Burdick is on the stand and I ask
certain inferences it’s gonna come right back to this report.” He later
added that
[e]xcluding this information is, obviously, an option.
However, if the examiner is going to testify in court I don’t
see a way around us asking certain questions and it not
bring this report back up. He would, essentially, have to
be on the stand and lie in order to be able to exclude this
report and him still testify and us have a thorough crossexamination based upon our theories of the case.
Carter moved for a mistrial based on the newly discovered
report, and Rios moved to dismiss the charges. The prosecutor
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stated that he did “not oppose a mistrial” and “recognize[d] . . . this
late breaking report is critical information.” The trial court found
that the prosecutor’s “explanation [was] credible”; that the State had
not “intentionally suppressed any evidence”; and that there had
been no prosecutorial misconduct. The court also concluded that
“[w]e can’t exclude the evidence. It’s obvious that’s gonna be critical
to the defense’s case.” The trial court granted a mistrial and denied
Rios’s motion to dismiss.
Rios and Carter later filed a joint plea in bar, contending that
double jeopardy principles barred their retrial. More specifically,
they moved for dismissal of the indictment “due to the misconduct
of the State for failure to comply with the rules of discovery and for
failing to deliver exculpatory evidence prior to trial.” Rios amended
his plea in bar, contending that the failure to disclose the fourth
report before trial “was . . . an intentional act on behalf of the
prosecution in order to induce a mistrial.” Similarly, at the hearing,
Rios and Carter contended that the State had engaged in intentional
misconduct designed to goad them into moving for a mistrial. The
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trial court denied the plea in bar, ruling that Rios and Carter had
not established “intentional prosecutorial misconduct,” “that the
person in control of the prosecution instigated any alleged
misconduct,” “an intent on the part of the prosecution to gain an
advantage at the retrial of this case,” or “an intent to goad [Rios and
Carter] into moving for a mistrial.”
Case No. S21A0243
2. Rios concedes on appeal that he has abandoned his earlier
argument that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct and
deliberately withheld Burdick’s fourth report. He contends,
however, that the trial court granted a mistrial without his consent
and that because there was no manifest necessity for doing so,
double jeopardy barred his retrial and the trial court erred by
denying his plea in bar. For the reasons explained below, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting
a mistrial and therefore did not err in denying Rios’s plea in bar.
“The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, says that
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‘[n]o person shall be . . . subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb.’ Jeopardy attaches when the jury has
been impaneled and sworn.” Blake v. State, 304 Ga. 747, 749 (822
SE2d 207) (2018) (cleaned up). Among other things, “[t]he Double
Jeopardy Clause . . . affords a criminal defendant a valued right to
have his trial completed by a particular tribunal.” Oregon v.
Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671-672 (102 SCt 2083, 72 LE2d 416) (1982).
Even after jeopardy has attached, “trial courts may declare a
mistrial over the defendant’s objection, without barring retrial,
whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into
consideration, there is a manifest necessity for doing so.” Blake, 304
Ga. at 749 (citation and punctuation omitted). See also United
States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606-607 (96 SCt 1075, 47 LE2d 267)
(1976) (if “a mistrial has been declared without the defendant’s
request or consent,” “the question whether under the Double
Jeopardy Clause there can be a new trial . . . depends on whether
‘there is a manifest necessity for the [mistrial]’”) (citation and
10
punctuation omitted). 1 On the other hand, “when a defendant moves
for or consents to a mistrial, jeopardy continues and a retrial is
allowed.” Medina v. State, 309 Ga. 432, 435 (844 SE2d 767) (2020)
(citing Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 326 (133 SCt 1069, 185
LE2d 124) (2013)). If, however, the defendant’s motion for a mistrial
was the result of prosecutorial misconduct “intended to goad the
defendant into moving for a mistrial,” a retrial may be barred.
Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676 (punctuation omitted). Accord State v.
Jackson, 306 Ga. 626, 631 (831 SE2d 798) (2019) (“Although the
Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause generally does not bar
the State from retrying a case after a mistrial is granted at the
defense’s request due to prosecutorial misconduct, a retrial may be
barred where the misconduct was intended to goad the defendant
into moving for a mistrial.”); Yarbrough v. State, 303 Ga. 594, 596
1 We note that “[i]n determining whether a second trial is permitted on the same charges following a mistrial, our case law has treated all forms of double jeopardy claims, whether under the Constitution of the United States, under the Georgia Constitution, or under the Georgia Code, in a manner consistent with case law from the United States Supreme Court regarding the Fifth Amendment.” Carman v. State, 304 Ga. 21, 25 (815 SE2d 860) (2018). Rios makes no argument for different treatment here.
11
(814 SE2d 286) (2018) (same).
Here, Rios contends that he “did not consent to the mistrial,”
and as a result asks us to review the trial court’s grant of a mistrial
under the “manifest necessity” standard. See Blake, 304 Ga. at 749.
For its part, the State contends that Rios effectively joined Carter’s
motion for mistrial by asking for dismissal and therefore asks us to
evaluate whether Rios’s motion for mistrial was the result of the
prosecutor intentionally goading him into moving for a mistrial. See
Yarbrough, 303 Ga. at 596. However, we need not resolve this issue
because Rios’s claim fails even if we accept his argument that he did
not consent to the mistrial and that we should therefore apply the
manifest necessity standard.
Under the manifest necessity standard, “a mistrial is
appropriate when there is a ‘high degree’ of necessity” for declaring
one. Harvey v. State, 296 Ga. 823, 831 (770 SE2d 840) (2015)
(citation and punctuation omitted).
Whether such necessity exists is to be determined by
weighing the defendant’s right to have his trial completed
before the particular tribunal against the interest of the
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public in having fair trials designed to end in just
judgments; and the decision must take into consideration
all the surrounding circumstances.
Blake, 304 Ga. at 749 (citation omitted). Trial courts “are to exercise
a sound discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all
the circumstances[] which would render it proper to interfere.”
Carman v. State, 304 Ga. 21, 26 (815 SE2d 860) (2018) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
Although the trial judge is not required to make explicit
findings of manifest necessity nor to articulate on the
record all the factors which informed the deliberate
exercise of his discretion, the record must at least show
that the trial court actually exercised its discretion. And
although trial courts should give careful, deliberate, and
studious consideration to whether the circumstances
demand a mistrial, with a keen eye toward other, less
drastic, alternatives, a court’s rejection of other
alternatives is a proper exercise of the court’s discretion—
and not an abuse—if reasonable judges could differ about
the proper disposition.
Id. (citations and punctuation omitted).
Here, the record shows that the trial court exercised its
discretion and considered the relevant circumstances before
granting a mistrial. Indeed, when the prosecutor informed the trial
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court and defense counsel about Burdick’s fourth report, Rios’s
counsel said that “the information we’ve just received is vital to our
defense” and that “we simply cannot go forward even if this is
excluded.” Likewise, Carter’s counsel emphasized the importance of
the fourth report and expressed serious doubt about the trial moving
forward, stating “I don’t see how to be able to salvage the case at this
point.” Faced with newly disclosed evidence that Rios asserted was
“vital” to his defense—an assessment with which both Carter and
the State agreed—the trial court identified the significance of the
fourth report and recognized the potential threat this late-breaking
evidence posed to both Rios and Carter and to the public interest in
“having fair trials designed to end in just judgments.” Blake, 304
Ga. at 749. See also Carman, 304 Ga. at 30 (concluding that a trial
court’s concern for the defendant’s adequate representation due to
one of his counsel’s emergency absence from trial supported the
grant of a mistrial, and explaining that this constituted a “concern
for the interest of justice” that “properly encompasses a
consideration of the interest not only of the defendant but also of the
14
public”).
Moreover, the record shows that the trial court consulted with
the parties about potential alternatives to a mistrial. Among other
things, it raised whether a continuance was possible to allow time
for the defense to evaluate the new evidence. But Carter’s counsel
indicated that he was unsure when his expert would be able to
evaluate the fourth report and that a continuance of some
unspecified but potentially lengthy period of time might be
necessary. Rios’s counsel likewise stated that she did not “have time
right now to evaluate what they have presented to me.” By granting
a mistrial, the trial court implicitly rejected the idea that a
continuance was feasible under these circumstances.
The record also shows that the trial court heard from the
parties about whether exclusion of the fourth report was possible.
The prosecutor stated that he was ready to try the case with the
evidence excluded, but—as recounted above—both Rios’s counsel
and Carter’s counsel rejected that possibility, including because—
according to Carter’s counsel—Burdick (the firearms examiner)
15
“would have to . . . lie in order to be able to exclude this report and
[] still testify and us have a thorough cross-examination based upon
our theories of the case.”
Finally, even though the protection against double jeopardy
that Rios asserts is designed to protect a defendant’s “valued right”
“to have his trial proceed to acquittal or conviction before” the jury
that was “sworn and impaneled” to try his case, Meadows v. State,
303 Ga. 507, 511 (813 SE2d 350) (2018) (cleaned up), the record
shows that Rios emphatically communicated to the trial court that
he did not want his case to proceed to a conclusion before the jury
chosen for his trial.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in granting a mistrial in Rios’s case under the
manifest necessity standard, and accordingly did not err by denying
Rios’s plea in bar. See Washington, 434 U.S. at 515-516 (affirming
the trial judge’s grant of a mistrial for manifest necessity, in part,
because the trial judge “gave both defense counsel and the
prosecutor full opportunity to explain their positions on the
16
propriety of a mistrial. We are therefore persuaded by the record
that the trial judge acted responsibly and deliberately, and accorded
careful consideration to respondent’s interest in having the trial
concluded in a single proceeding.”). Compare Meadows, 303 Ga. at
513-516 (concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in
granting a mistrial “in the interest of juror safety” when, among
other things, “[n]either the court nor counsel asked whether [the
juror] felt unsafe or intimidated by the other jurors or by anything
else, and the juror expressed no such concern” and where the court
“fail[ed] to consider alternatives to declaring the mistrial”).
Case No. S21A0402
3. Carter contends that double jeopardy bars his retrial and
that the trial court therefore erred in denying his plea in bar. We
disagree.
As noted above, because Carter requested a mistrial, “the
principle of double jeopardy generally will not bar a retrial unless
the defendant demonstrates that the prosecution intentionally
goaded the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” Yarbrough, 303
17
Ga. at 596.
To that end, the defendant must show that the State was
purposefully attempting through its prosecutorial
misconduct to secure an opportunity to retry the case, to
avoid reversal of the conviction because of prosecutorial
or judicial error, or to otherwise obtain a more favorable
chance for a guilty verdict on retrial. The key issue is not
whether the prosecutor acted improperly, or even how
egregious the misconduct was, but rather, what objective
the prosecuting attorney was trying to achieve. Unless a
prosecutor was trying to abort the trial, his or her
misconduct will not prohibit a retrial.
Id. (cleaned up). Moreover, “[w]hether the prosecutor intended to
goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial is a question of fact
that will not be overruled unless clearly erroneous.” Jackson, 306
Ga. at 632. “A trial court’s findings of fact will not be deemed to be
clearly erroneous if there is any evidence to support them, and this
holds true even if the findings are based upon circumstantial
evidence and the reasonable inferences which flow from them.” Id.
(citation and punctuation omitted).
We have also held that, with regard “to the double jeopardy
issue of whether there was intentional prosecutorial misconduct
designed to produce a mistrial,” the intent or misconduct of state or
18
government actors other than the prosecutor cannot be attributed or
imputed to the prosecutor. State v. Traylor, 281 Ga. 730, 732 (642
SE2d 700) (2007). “For double jeopardy to apply, it is not sufficient
that an intent to instigate a mistrial was possessed only by an agent
of the State whose scope of employment and authority differs from
the prosecutor.” Id. at 733.
Although Carter presents several arguments related to his
double jeopardy claim, they essentially amount to a contention that
the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor did not engage in
intentional misconduct intended to goad him into moving for a
mistrial. In this regard, Carter correctly notes that forensic
ballistics was a key issue in the case, that the prosecutor had asked
Burdick to examine the ballistics evidence gathered at the crime
scene, and that the prosecutor, shortly before trial, contacted
Burdick to inquire if any further ballistics reports were outstanding.
In light of these facts, Carter presumes that the prosecutor must
have intentionally failed to follow up with Burdick until the day
before he was scheduled to provide expert testimony at trial, and
19
contends that this Court should consider this alleged failure an act
of prosecutorial misconduct—including an intentional violation of
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963).
Carter also contends that, given the prosecutor’s experience, he
should not be allowed to “shift responsibility” for the failure to have
produced the fourth report before trial to a firearms examiner.
Finally, Carter contends that the fourth report was damaging to his
defense and that the State would benefit from it at a retrial, which
supports an inference that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct to
goad Carter into moving for a mistrial.
The record, however, undercuts Carter’s claims. Critically, the
trial court credited the prosecutor’s explanation about his effort to
determine whether other ballistics reports existed and his
explanation about the delay in disclosing Burdick’s fourth report. 2
2 Carter appears to contend that we should not consider the prosecutor’s explanation of the discovery error because it was based on hearsay statements by the firearms examiner. But even if it were hearsay evidence, Carter did not object at trial on this ground and does not enumerate any error regarding it on appeal, and hearsay evidence that is not objected to at trial “shall be legal evidence and admissible.” OCGA § 24-8-802.
20
Based on that explanation, the trial court found that the prosecutor
had not “intentionally suppressed any evidence”; that the GBI had
“inadvertently, somehow through this weirdly fangled computer
stuff,” not uploaded the fourth report; and that “[t]here’s been no
prosecutorial misconduct.” Even Carter’s counsel expressed that he
did not “believe that this was something, necessarily, that was done
by the State intentionally. I know that they were checking [with the
firearms examiner’s office]. And if there was a computer error, there
was a computer error.” Moreover, Carter’s assertion that the State
would benefit from a retrial is belied by the prosecutor’s willingness
to proceed with the trial without the fourth report and also by
Carter’s assertion in his plea in bar that the “misconduct of the
State” was its “failure . . . to deliver exculpatory evidence prior to
trial” (emphasis supplied); and in any event, because of the
shortened trial, it is unclear from the record which party (if any)
would “benefit” the most from the mistrial.
Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial court’s
finding that the prosecutor did not “instigate[] any alleged
21
misconduct” was clearly erroneous. See Jackson, 306 Ga. at 632. 3
Indeed, the record supports the trial court’s findings that the
prosecutor’s failure to disclose Burdick’s fourth report before trial
was inadvertent and the result of a computer error at the GBI, and,
that, as a result, the prosecutor did not intend to goad Carter into
moving for a mistrial. See id.
For these reasons, the trial court did not err in rejecting
Carter’s double jeopardy claim and in denying his plea in bar. See
Yarbrough, 303 Ga. at 597 (holding that the trial court did not
clearly err in finding that the prosecutor did not intend to goad the
defendant into moving for a mistrial where the trial court observed
the prosecutor’s demeanor and the record showed that the
prosecutor gestured toward the defendant during a witness’s
testimony in a “frustrated attempt” to get the witness to identify the
defendant and not to cause a mistrial); Traylor, 281 Ga. at 732-733
3 Moreover, even if Burdick engaged in misconduct in failing to identify his fourth report (a determination we decline to address today), any such misconduct could not be imputed to the prosecutor. See Traylor, 281 Ga. at 732-733.
22
(holding that the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s plea
in bar because an investigator’s alleged misconduct, absent
instigation by the prosecutor, could not be imputed to the
prosecutor); Weems v. State, 269 Ga. 577, 580 (501 SE2d 806) (1998)
(holding that, because the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor
did not engage in misconduct was supported by the record and
because any alleged misconduct by a detective could not be imputed
to the prosecution, the trial court did not err in denying the
defendant’s plea in bar based on prosecutorial misconduct intended
to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial). Accordingly, we
affirm the denial of Carter’s plea in bar.
Judgments affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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