In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: August 10, 2021
S21A0709. THORNTON v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Justice.
William Denzel Thornton appeals his convictions for malice
murder, armed robbery, and possession of a knife during the
commission of a felony in connection with the stabbing death of
Jullisa Cooke.1 Thornton argues that the evidence was insufficient
to support his armed robbery conviction; the trial court made
evidentiary errors by admitting a 911 call and testimony regarding
1 The crimes occurred on January 10, 2017. In February 2017, a Carroll County grand jury indicted Thornton for malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated battery, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. At a March 2018 trial, a jury found Thornton guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Thornton to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, a concurrent life sentence for armed robbery, and a five-year consecutive term for the knife-possession charge; the remaining counts were vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing purposes. Thornton filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Thornton’s motion for new trial. Thornton timely appealed; his case was docketed to this Court’s April 2021 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
bloodstain pattern analysis; and the trial court erred in denying his
request for a continuance, made during trial, so he could attempt to
access potentially exculpatory evidence on Cooke’s Facebook
account. We affirm because the evidence was sufficient for the jury
to conclude that Thornton was guilty of armed robbery; the trial
court’s evidentiary errors, if any, were harmless; and Thornton has
failed to establish that the trial court erred in denying his request
for a continuance.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
trial evidence showed the following. In January 2017, Cooke was
living with her aunt and uncle, Gail and Kimani Kimathi, in Carroll
County. Thornton lived with Eddie and Courtney Ford. In early
January, Cooke and Thornton broke up after dating for most of 2016.
Prior to breaking up, Thornton had become upset because Cooke’s
ex-boyfriend, Trey, had contacted her, and Thornton believed Cooke
was encouraging Trey to call her. Trey had been physically abusive
toward Cooke when they dated a few years prior.
Thornton asked Cooke to resume their relationship, but she
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refused and thereafter blocked Thornton from being able to call or
text her. Thornton sent Gail text messages in an attempt to talk to
Cooke. Gail responded that Cooke said that she did not want
Thornton calling her. Cooke confided in Gail that Thornton had been
abusive during their relationship.
On the morning of January 10, 2017, several neighbors saw a
white, older-model Mercedes car with body damage parked in the
street near Cooke’s house. Thornton drove such a car, and the body
damage on the car observed that morning was consistent with body
damage on Thornton’s car. One neighbor, Lynette Daniel, saw
Thornton ringing Daniel’s doorbell several times, at one point
jumping up and down. She also saw him wearing a tan or beige
hooded sweatshirt and carrying something in his hands while
walking between her home and the Kimathi residence. Daniel called
Cooke to let her know that Thornton was outside and appeared to be
agitated. Cooke replied that she was rushing to get to work and
would talk to Thornton once she got outside.
Cooke’s sister, who lived next door with Daniel, also heard the
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doorbell ring and saw Thornton’s white Mercedes parked outside.
Cooke’s sister said that the car was gone by 8:05 a.m. Around this
time, Thornton called Eddie to ask if Eddie was home, and Thornton
returned home sometime later that morning.
Around 9:00 a.m., Kimani was leaving his house for work when
he saw an envelope on the ground near the driver’s side of Cooke’s
car. After he bent down to see if anything else had blown under the
car, he saw Cooke slumped over in her car and blood spattered on
the inside of the passenger’s side door. Kimani called 911.
Meanwhile, Daniel looked for a pulse and found no signs of life from
Cooke. An autopsy revealed that Cooke had been stabbed 55 times,
and that stab wounds penetrated multiple organs, leading to her
death.
While police officers were on the scene, Daniel received two
video calls from Cooke’s cell phone. Police realized that Cooke’s
phone was missing and directed Daniel not to answer the calls; the
police believed Cooke’s killer had the phone and feared the killer
would realize the police had been called and destroy the phone,
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ending any ability to locate it. Police officers then went to the
townhome complex where Thornton was residing to search for
Cooke’s cell phone. Police officers began looking inside dumpsters
outside the complex, called the phone, and heard Cooke’s cell phone
vibrate from inside a trash bag.
The officers retrieved the cell phone, which had a shattered
screen, and also found inside the trash bag a gray hooded sweatshirt
with a large amount of blood on it, gray sweatpants, a pair of bloody
gloves, a knife with blood on the blade, and paper towels. A DNA
analysis revealed the presence of Cooke’s DNA on the knife, the
gloves, and the sweatshirt. Cooke’s stab wounds were consistent
with being stabbed with the recovered knife. Courtney testified that
the recovered sweatshirt, which had buttons at the top, was similar
to the type of sweatshirt Thornton wore. The pair of gloves were the
type issued to Thornton by his employer. Additionally, the paper
towels found in the trash bag had a pattern consistent with the kind
found inside Thornton’s residence.
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1. Thornton does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
related to his murder or knife-possession convictions, but he does
argue that the evidence was insufficient to support his armed
robbery conviction. Thornton was charged with taking Cooke’s cell
phone by the use of a knife, and he argues that there was no evidence
showing when or how Thornton obtained the cell phone, meaning
there were various possibilities as to how he came to possess the
phone that did not involve armed robbery. We disagree because the
jury was entitled to reject these other possibilities and find him
guilty of armed robbery.
When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of
federal due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the proper standard of review is whether a
rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (99 SCt
2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Under that standard, we view the
evidence in the “light most favorable to the verdict, with deference
to the jury’s assessment of the weight and credibility of the
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evidence.” Hayes v. State, 292 Ga. 506, 506 (739 SE2d 313) (2013)
(citation and punctuation omitted).
Under Georgia law, “[a] person commits the offense of armed
robbery when, with intent to commit theft, he or she takes property
of another from the person or the immediate presence of another by
use of an offensive weapon[.]” OCGA § 16-8-41 (a). To convict
Thornton, the State had to prove that his use of the knife occurred
prior to or contemporaneously with the taking of Cooke’s cell phone.
See Bates v. State, 293 Ga. 855, 857 (2) (750 SE2d 323) (2013); Fox
v. State, 289 Ga. 34, 36 (1) (b) (709 SE2d 202) (2011).
Because there is no direct evidence that Thornton committed
the armed robbery, to sustain his conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, the evidence must be “consistent with the hypothesis of
guilt” and “exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of
the guilt of the accused.” OCGA § 24-14-6. But not every hypothesis
is reasonable, and it is for the jury to determine whether an
alternative hypothesis is reasonable. See Johnson v. State, 307 Ga.
44, 48 (2) (834 SE2d 83) (2019). Where the jury is authorized to find
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the evidence sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save
that of the accused’s guilt, this Court “will not disturb that finding
unless it is insupportable as a matter of law.” Id.
The evidence was sufficient for the jury to have found that
Thornton had a knife and that he used the knife to take Cooke’s cell
phone away from her before killing her, or that he took the phone
right after killing her. Under either scenario, Thornton would be
guilty of armed robbery. See Johnson, 307 Ga. at 49 (2) (b)
(defendant would be guilty of armed robbery if he took victim’s
property after brandishing weapon); Bates, 293 Ga. at 857 (2) (“It is
well-settled that a defendant commits a robbery if he kills the victim
first and then takes the victim’s property.” (citation and punctuation
omitted)). Thornton argues that the evidence did not exclude other
reasonable theories that he did not commit armed robbery. But the
jury was entitled to reject Thornton’s hypotheses as unreasonable.
Thornton first argues that Cooke could have handed the
assailant her phone voluntarily and that an altercation ensued after
the assailant looked at her phone. But the evidence supports a
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finding that Thornton was carrying a knife at the time he
encountered Cooke outside her home. On the morning of Cooke’s
death, Daniel saw Thornton carrying something in his hands and
walking in an agitated manner. When Daniel called Cooke to tell her
about Thornton’s presence, Cooke said she was in a rush to get to
work. According to Cooke’s aunt, Cooke had been refusing
Thornton’s calls and asked that he not call her anymore. This
evidence shows that Cooke wanted nothing to do with Thornton, and
that the jury was authorized to conclude that she would not have
voluntarily handed her phone over to Thornton, as he suggests.
Thornton next argues that, even if Cooke did not hand over the
phone voluntarily, the evidence could have supported a finding that
he took the phone by force without displaying the knife. But
Thornton was described as being in an agitated state while lurking
outside of Cooke’s house before she went outside. Because, as
described above, the evidence showed that Thornton was carrying
something during the time he was in an agitated state, the jury was
entitled to find that Thornton was carrying a knife and that it was
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very unlikely that he put the weapon away before encountering
Cooke given his agitated state.
Thornton lastly argues that the State failed to prove that he
intended to commit the armed robbery. The State could prove intent
based on all of the circumstances connected to the offense, and it was
the jury’s responsibility to determine whether the State met its
burden. See OCGA § 16-2-6 (“A person will not be presumed to act
with criminal intention but the trier of facts may find such intention
upon consideration of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all
other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is
prosecuted.”); see also Thomas v. State, 320 Ga. App. 101, 104 (2)
(739 SE2d 417) (2013) (“The presence or lack of criminal intent is for
the jury to decide based on the facts and circumstances proven at
trial.”). The jury was authorized based on all of the evidence to
conclude that Thornton had the intent to rob Cooke and find him
guilty of armed robbery.
2. Thornton argues that the trial court erred by admitting into
evidence a recording of Kimani’s 911 call and testimony from a GBI
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agent regarding bloodstain pattern analysis. We need not decide
whether the trial court erred in admitting the evidence, because any
such error was harmless.
Erroneous evidentiary rulings warrant reversal only if the
error was harmful. See Moore v. State, 307 Ga. 290, 293 (2) (835
SE2d 610) (2019). For nonconstitutional rulings like those at issue
here, the test for determining whether an error was harmless is
whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the
verdict. See Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424, 431-432 (2) (d) (788 SE2d
433) (2016). In conducting that analysis, we review the record de
novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable jurors
to have done. See id. at 432 (2) (d).
As to the 911 call, Thornton argues that the recording did not
have any probative value because Kimani already testified about the
substance of his 911 call and the recording was presented only to
show Kimani’s grief, which Thornton argues served only to inflame
the jury’s passions. But as Thornton concedes, the 911 call was
largely cumulative of Kimani’s testimony. And the evidence of
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Thornton’s guilt was very strong. Thornton was seen outside Cooke’s
residence on the morning of her death, and a bloody knife, a bloody
hooded sweatshirt similar to the type he wore, and bloody gloves of
the kind his employer furnished to its employees, all of which tested
positive for the presence of Cooke’s DNA, were found together with
Cooke’s cell phone in a trash bag outside Thornton’s residence
shortly after Cooke’s murder. Given this strong evidence and the
cumulative nature of the 911 call, which Thornton notes fails to
show any of the circumstances of the killing, it is highly probable
that the error did not contribute to the verdicts. See Virger v. State,
305 Ga. 281, 294 (7) (a) (824 SE2d 346) (2019) (the admission of
other-acts evidence was harmless where it was cumulative of other
evidence and the evidence of guilt was strong); see also Anglin v.
State, 302 Ga. 333, 336 (2) (806 SE2d 573) (2017) (the erroneous
admission of hearsay evidence is harmless where “substantial,
cumulative, legally admissible evidence of the same fact is
introduced”).
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As to the bloodstain pattern analysis evidence, the disputed
testimony concerned a GBI agent’s opinion as to how a certain
bloodstain was formed. But this evidence had little, if any,
prejudicial impact. There was no dispute that Cooke was stabbed
numerous times, resulting in multiple bloodstains. The GBI agent’s
analysis of the bloodstain at issue did not provide any evidence of
Thornton’s guilt. Given that the complained of evidence did not
implicate Thornton, the jury was aware that Cooke’s multiple
stabbings would have caused several bloodstains, and the evidence
of Thornton’s guilt was strong, any error in admitting the GBI
agent’s testimony about the bloodstain pattern analysis was
harmless. See Robinson v. State, 308 Ga. 543, 550 (2) (b) (i) (842
SE2d 54) (2020) (admission of video recording of arrest was
harmless where the jury was aware that the defendant had been
arrested and the evidence of guilt was strong).2
2 Thornton makes no argument that all the evidentiary errors we assume today, though individually harmless, nevertheless harmed him when considered cumulatively, and no such cumulative prejudice is apparent to us on this record. See State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 18 (1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020) (“[A]
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3. Thornton argues that the trial court erred in denying his
request for a continuance so he could access Cooke’s Facebook
account. Thornton has not shown that the trial court abused its
discretion.
Prior to trial, the State obtained a data extraction of Cooke’s
cell phone and provided extracted information ⸺ text messages and
call logs ⸺ to Thornton, but the defense complained at trial that the
extraction did not produce information from applications like
Facebook. After Cooke’s cell phone was tendered into evidence at
trial, defense counsel asked that the phone be connected to the
internet so that he could access Cooke’s Facebook application, based
on Thornton’s belief that the application contained evidence of abuse
and threats from Cooke’s ex-boyfriends. Defense counsel said he
believed there was “potentially Brady[ 3] material” in Cooke’s
Facebook application because Thornton had seen Cooke’s Facebook
defendant who wishes to take advantage of the [cumulative error rule] should explain to the reviewing court just how he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of multiple errors.”).
3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963).
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content before, although counsel conceded that there might not be
any exculpatory evidence. Defense counsel stated that he was
unable to access that information through other means, because
Thornton did not have access to Facebook while incarcerated, and
counsel had not attempted to access Cooke’s phone previously
because the cell phone was damaged when police initially recovered
it, and he was unaware that the State had since repaired it. The
State argued that Thornton would have to follow a legal process to
obtain permission to access information on Cooke’s Facebook
account, noting that the State would typically send Facebook a letter
to preserve information and then seek a search warrant to get access
to a user’s account.
Based on the State’s representations, and a review of federal
statutes pertaining to accessing digitally-stored information, the
trial court denied Thornton’s request to use Cooke’s cell phone to
access the Facebook application, concluding that for Brady
purposes, Thornton had knowledge of the information he was
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seeking. Thornton then asked for a continuance to subpoena the
Facebook records, which the court denied.
Thornton now argues on appeal that the trial court erred in
denying his request for a continuance, stating that he should have
been given an opportunity to collect more information through
Facebook on “Trey,” Cooke’s ex-boyfriend who previously abused
her, and present evidence that he could have used to cross-examine
witnesses. He argues that the trial court’s denial amounted to a
Brady violation.
A trial court has broad discretion in granting or denying a
motion for continuance. See OCGA § 17-8-22. A party making a
request for a continuance must show due diligence. See OCGA § 17-8-20. We will not disturb a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for
continuance without a clear showing that the court abused its broad
discretion. See Phoenix v. State, 304 Ga. 785, 788 (2) (822 SE2d 195)
(2018). And for Thornton to show that he was entitled to a new trial
based upon the trial court’s denial of his motion for a continuance,
he must show that he was harmed by that denial. See id.
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Thornton has not shown that the trial court abused its
discretion or that he was harmed by the court’s ruling. In arguing
for access to Cooke’s cell phone, Thornton stated that he had seen
threatening messages from Cooke’s ex-boyfriend Trey on Cooke’s
Facebook account. Although Thornton claimed that he (and defense
counsel) attempted to access those records, he does not explain why
the method he claimed he needed a continuance to pursue ⸺
subpoenaing the records ⸺ was unavailable to him prior to trial,
precluding his ability to show that he was diligent in accessing
information on Cooke’s Facebook account.
Moreover, Thornton has not shown harm from the denial of the
requested continuance. Thornton conceded several times that the
purportedly threatening Facebook messages might not even be
stored in Cooke’s Facebook account. Thornton never provided any
evidence to support his claim that Cooke’s Facebook account
contained Brady material. At the motion for new trial hearing,
Thornton merely restated arguments from trial but did not present
any evidence or otherwise substantiate his claim that Cooke’s
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Facebook account actually contained relevant Brady material. The
jury already heard that Trey had physically abused Cooke when
they dated, so Thornton had available evidence with which to argue
that someone else could have committed the crimes. Although he
argues that accessing the Facebook information would have allowed
him to cross-examine witnesses, he does not identify what witnesses
he could have cross-examined more thoroughly or explain how the
cross-examination he did conduct was inadequate.4
By failing to substantiate his claim that Cooke’s Facebook
account had Brady material and by failing to specify how that
material would have mattered, Thornton’s claim of harm is nothing
but conjecture, and “mere speculation and conjecture that harm
occurred is not enough to show harmful error.” Wainwright v. State,
305 Ga. 63, 67-68 (2) (823 SE2d 749) (2019). Because Thornton only
speculates that he was harmed, and there was strong evidence of
4To the extent he alludes to his cross-examination of Gail, who testified that Cooke confided in her that Trey had physically abused her, Gail testified that she did not recall whether Cooke told her that Thornton had been upset because Trey had physically threatened Cooke prior to her death.
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Thornton’s guilt, this claim of error fails. See id. (defendant failed to
show harm from trial court’s denial of a continuance to wait for lead
counsel’s arrival where defendant pointed to no error in co-counsel’s
performance during lead counsel’s absence or deficiency in lead
counsel’s performance based on his absence); Phoenix, 304 Ga. at
788-789 (2) (defendant failed to show harm from denial of
continuance to obtain expert to evaluate certain evidence when the
evidence of guilt was overwhelming and there was no showing of
how expert’s testimony would have benefitted his defense).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Colvin, J., not participating.
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