UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OLHA NOHA, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-01956 (UNA)
)
ALEXANDER W. DARCHIEV, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Currently before the court is Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and
Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. Plaintiff’s IFP
Application is granted and, as explained below, the Court dismisses this matter without prejudice.
Plaintiff, a resident of Maryland, sues the Embassy of Russian Federation and several of
its officials. See Compl. at 1–3. The Complaint alleges only “Holodomor genocide Ukraine,” see
id. at 4, and nothing else––the remainder of the pleading is blank, see generally id. Pro se litigants
must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C.
1987). Federal Rule 8(a) of requires a complaint to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the
grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79
(2009); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that
defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive
answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown
v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). Here, as presented, neither the Court nor Defendants can reasonably be expected to identify Plaintiff’s claims, nor has Plaintiff established
this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Although Plaintiff has also, in the interim, submitted numerous subsequent notices
containing additional blurbs of information and exhibits, ostensibly intended to amend or
supplement the Complaint, see, e.g., Notices, ECF Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14; Motion to Amend,
ECF No. 15, these proposed additions fail to comply with Federal Rule 15(a) or D.C. Local Civil
Rule 7(i) or 15(i), and to that same end, “Plaintiff’s [C]omplaint is not the legal equivalent of a
LEGO set, something to be recreated,” at her whim and in piecemeal fashion, see Whitman v. Dep’t
of Army, No. 21-03163, 2023 WL 3844603, at *2 (D.D.C. June 5, 2023). In any event, Plaintiff’s
additional submissions are difficult to discern and largely broadly challenge Russia’s actions in
the Russo-Ukrainian War, and even if these submissions were procedurally sound, they do not
assist in making Plaintiff’s intended claims any more cognizable.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has sued the Russian Embassy and its officials. But “in a suit
involving a foreign state, a plaintiff must satisfy subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA
[Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] before the court can reach claims under the Alien Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.” Soudavar v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 67 Fed. App’x 618, 619-20 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (citing Saltany v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 440–41 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). The FSIA is the
“sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts,” Argentine Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 (1989), and provides that a foreign state is
immune from the jurisdiction of the United States courts unless an exception applies, Roeder v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 646 F.3d 56, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted), or an existing international agreement provides otherwise, Peterson v. Royal Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, 416 F.3d 83, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (conferring foreign state immunity “[s]ubject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a party at
the time of enactment of this Act”). “Claims against foreign sovereigns that do not fall within the
ambit of a FSIA exception are barred.” Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 812 F. 3d 127, 141 (D.C.
Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), rev’d on other grounds, Fed. Rep. of
Germany v. Philipp, 141 S.Ct. 703 (2021). Notably, embassies qualify as a “foreign state” under
the FSIA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a); Jouanny v. Embassy of France in the United States, 220 F.
Supp. 3d 34, 38-39 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Howe v. Embassy of Italy, 68 F. Supp. 3d 26, 32–33
(D.D.C. 2014) (collecting cases)), and individual defendants sued in their official capacities as an
officer of a foreign state are also “entitled to the same sovereign-immunity protections under the
FSIA that are afforded to the foreign state,” Nikbin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 517 F. Supp. 2d
416, 430 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Jungquist v. Sheikh Sultan Bin Khalifa Al Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020,
1023, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1997); El–Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
Belhas v. Ya’Alon, 466 F. Supp. 2d 127, 130–31 (D.D.C. 2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)).
Plaintiff presents boilerplate assertions contending that Defendants are without absolute
immunity. See Notice, ECF No. 14. She does not cite to a particular exception but broadly notes
that international courts have found that Russia “violated international law,” and committed
“human rights abuses.” See id. In citing “international law,” insofar as Plaintiff may be referring
the “expropriation exception,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), she has failed to draw any commercial
nexus between Defendants’ alleged actions and the United States. And insofar as Plaintiff attempts
to invoke the “terrorism exception,” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A, it is inapplicable here. Section 1605A
applies only if the state was formally designated by the United States as a sponsor of terrorism at
the time of the alleged act of terrorism, or if it was later designated as a sponsor because of the
relevant act(s). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605A(2); Singh v. Commonwealth of Australia, 521 F. Supp. 2d 91, 92–93 (D.D.C. 2007). However, Russia has not been designated by the United States as a
state sponsor of terrorism at the time of the alleged acts, nor is it yet so designated. See 50 U.S.C.
App. § 2405(j); 22 U.S.C. § 2371; see also https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/ (list
of designated state sponsors of terrorism) (last visited August 4, 2025).
Finally, Plaintiff has failed to establish standing. “Article III of the United States
Constitution limits the judicial power to deciding ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” In re Navy
Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). “One element
of the case-or-controversy requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they have standing to
sue.” Comm. on Judiciary of U.S. House of Representatives v. McGahn, 968 F.3d 755, 762 (D.C.
Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). A party has standing for purposes of Article III if
he has “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. at 763 (quoting
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). Plaintiff’s Complaint and supplemental
materials lack any factual allegations showing that she sustained (or is likely to sustain) an injury
resulting from Defendants’ alleged conduct.
For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, ECF No. 15, is
denied as futile, and her remaining Motions, ECF Nos. 3, 4, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, are all denied
as moot.
A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: August 5, 2025 __________/s/_________________
JIA M. COBB
United States District Judge