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State v. Myers
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CORNEL MYERS
(SC 20799)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Alexander, Dannehy, and Moll, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted of murder in connection with the stabbing death of the victim,
the defendant’s former girlfriend, the defendant appealed to this court. Prior
to trial, the trial court denied in part the defendant’s motion to introduce
third-party culpability evidence relating to the victim’s neighbor, A. The trial
court specifically excluded a video that A had sent to the victim and related
text messages, a voicemail that A had left for his girlfriend after the police
interviewed him about the victim’s murder, evidence of A’s prior misconduct,
and evidence of a decline in A’s mental health in the weeks following the
victim’s murder. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had
abused its discretion in excluding the foregoing evidence and that its exclusion violated his constitutional rights to due process, to present a complete
defense, and to confrontation. Held:
Even if this court assumed that the trial court had abused its discretion in
excluding the proffered evidence, any error was evidentiary rather than
constitutional in nature, and the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of
demonstrating that the error was harmful.
Any claimed error in the exclusion of the proffered evidence did not deprive
the defendant of his constitutional rights because, even though the excluded
evidence concerned A’s relationship with the victim and his behavior following the murder, it was not central to the defendant’s third-party culpability
defense, and the defendant nevertheless was able to present to the jury
substantial evidence and argument in support of that defense.
Moreover, this court had a fair assurance that the trial court’s exclusion of
the proffered evidence did not affect the jury’s verdict given the overall
strength of the state’s case and the weakness of the defendant’s third-party
culpability defense, and the fact that most of the evidence supporting the
defendant’s third-party culpability defense was admitted and considered by
the jury.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion
for a mistrial after the prosecutor asked a police detective during redirect
examination whether defense attorneys generally have an opportunity to
review evidence and to request that it be sent to the state forensic science
laboratory for testing and whether he had received such a request from
defense counsel in this particular case.
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State v. Myers
Although the defendant claimed that the prosecutor had improperly shifted
the burden of proof to the defense and that this impropriety denied him of a
fair trial, the defendant failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s questions
were prejudicial in light of the entire trial, as they did not suggest that the
defense was obligated to submit evidence to the state forensic science
laboratory for testing, and the trial court, in its initial, curative, and final
instructions to the jury, made clear that the state had the burden of proving
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Argued December 2, 2024—officially released August 12, 2025
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of murder and home invasion, brought to
the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex,
where the court, Oliver, J., denied in part the defendant’s motion in limine; thereafter, the case was tried
to the jury before Oliver, J.; verdict and judgment of
guilty of murder, from which the defendant appealed
to this court. Affirmed.
Erica A. Barber, assistant public defender, for the
appellant (defendant).
Timothy J. Sugrue, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, were Michael A. Gailor, state’s
attorney, and Jason Germaine, supervisory assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
ALEXANDER, J. A jury found that the defendant,
Cornel Myers, murdered his former girlfriend (victim)1
after she attempted to end their romantic relationship.
On appeal from the judgment of conviction of murder
in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) excluded
certain third-party culpability evidence pertaining to
the victim’s neighbor, and (2) denied his motion for a
1
In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through
whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
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State v. Myers
mistrial when the prosecutor’s questioning of a witness
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant.
We disagree and affirm the judgment of conviction.
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. On September 7, 2018, the defendant murdered
the victim in her apartment in Middletown. The defendant and the victim had been romantically involved
from October, 2017, until the end of July, 2018. In July,
2018, Donna Smith, the defendant’s former girlfriend,
contacted the victim via Instagram to inform her that
the defendant had been dating both of them at the same
time. Smith, along with the defendant’s former wife,
Roxanne Anderson, shared with the victim additional
disturbing information about the defendant with the
victim, which ultimately caused the victim to end the
relationship.
Despite the victim’s multiple, unequivocal communications that their relationship was finished, the defendant called and texted the victim repeatedly, from the
time of their breakup until her murder, often using
‘‘spoof’’ numbers.2 The victim called the police, who
instructed the defendant not to contact the victim again.
The defendant nonetheless continued to contact her.
On Monday, September 3, during a text message conversation, the defendant wrote: ‘‘I will not fall in love again
fuck that shit nobody else will never get that chance
to hurt me again fuck that I’m hurting them first.’’
(Emphasis added.) Although the victim continued to
reject all of the defendant’s pleas to resume their relationship, she allowed him into her apartment on Tuesday, September 4, and they had sexual intercourse. The
next day, she expressed regret over the encounter and
reaffirmed her position that the relationship was over.
2
A ‘‘spoof’’ application allows a caller whose phone number has been
blocked to substitute another phone number for the blocked number, thus
circumventing the block.
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State v. Myers
The defendant ignored the victim’s requests that he
leave her alone. From Wednesday, September 5, to Friday, September 7, he persisted in texting and calling
her from a spoof number, telling her that he planned
to take her on a ‘‘date’’ on Friday. After midnight, early
on September 7, the victim responded to the defendant:
‘‘You’ve been texting me, calling me, and showing up
at my door for five hours straight. . . . Stay away from
me.’’ She then stopped responding to his messages.
At 12:35 p.m. on September 7, the defendant purchased a bouquet of flowers from a supermarket. He
left the bouquet outside the victim’s door, along with
a handwritten note that read: ‘‘To [the victim] From
Cornel. Dinner at 8 p.m. Love you.’’ The defendant texted
and called the victim throughout the day from both his
actual number and a spoof number; the victim did not
respond. The defendant’s texts and calls continued while
the victim was socializing after work with colleagues,
who observed her frustration as her phone was inundated with calls that ‘‘were not stopping.’’ The victim
left her colleagues at around 10 p.m. and returned to
her apartment complex at 10:17 p.m. Within minutes
of her arrival, the defendant attacked the victim in her
apartment. He beat the victim and stabbed her repeatedly, cutting her throat and breaking multiple knives
in the process.3
3
A responding police officer testified that, upon viewing the victim’s body
at the crime scene, he believed that she was ‘‘totally decapitated.’’ A broken
blade remained lodged in the victim’s neck. A serrated knife with a black
handle and a black handle with no blade were at the foot of the victim’s
bed. Two additional bloody knives were found elsewhere in the apartment,
one in a trash can and another in the kitchen sink.
Susan S. Williams, an associate medical examiner with the Office of the
Chief Medical Examiner, determined that the victim’s cause of death was
sharp force injury of the neck and torso. All of the muscles of the victim’s
neck, known as ‘‘strap muscles,’’ had been cut; none remained intact. The
spinal cord, internal jugular vein, carotid artery, larynx, and esophagus had
also been cut. The victim suffered a total of nineteen stab wounds.
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State v. Myers
During the attack, at approximately 10:20 p.m., Kassidy Menezes, an assistant property manager at the
apartment complex where the victim lived, was walking
in the parking lot of the complex when she heard the
victim screaming from her third floor apartment. Menezes rushed to a friend’s nearby apartment to call the
police. Mark Adduci, the victim’s downstairs neighbor,
also heard the victim screaming, along with the sounds
of ‘‘someone . . . being tossed around in the room,
hitting walls . . . .’’ Adduci texted a friend about the
sounds that he heard from the victim’s apartment. He
left his apartment, stood in the stairwell, and continued
to listen to these sounds. After calling the police, Menezes returned to the area and saw Adduci standing in
the stairwell, craning his head toward the victim’s third
floor apartment door. From that location, Adduci could
hear someone in the victim’s apartment, opening and
closing drawers and moving furniture, and these sounds
continued after he returned to his apartment.
After receiving calls about the disturbance, the police
arrived and knocked on all the doors in the building,
including Adduci’s, but he did not answer. Unable to
locate the source of the screams, the police left.
The defendant remained in the victim’s apartment.
At around 11 p.m., the defendant called Smith several
times. When she finally answered, the defendant asked
her: ‘‘[A]re you happy at what happened?’’ Smith hung
up. He also called Anderson, but she ignored the calls.
The defendant proceeded to write a note about the
victim’s death on a typed letter that the victim had
earlier prepared to send to a New York court in response
to a traffic ticket.4
At approximately 3:30 a.m., the defendant called 911
to report that his girlfriend was not breathing. Stephen
4
Two additional, lengthier letters, also in the defendant’s handwriting,
were later found in the victim’s apartment.
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State v. Myers
Froberg, a Middletown police officer, was dispatched to
the scene. Upon arriving, he saw the defendant standing
outside of the victim’s building, on the phone. The
defendant led Froberg to the victim’s apartment and
directed him to her bedroom, where the victim’s body
was located, with her knees on the floor and her upper
body leaning against the foot of the bed. A large amount
of blood had soaked into the mattress beneath her head
and upper body. After assessing the victim’s condition
and finding no pulse, Froberg radioed for additional
assistance. Froberg patted the defendant down for
weapons and instructed him to sit down outside the
apartment. The defendant, whose hands and clothing
were covered with dried blood, remained calm during
the entire time the police were at the scene.
Police officers detained the defendant as a possible
suspect. He consented to searches of his car and apartment, and provided three voluntary interviews over
three consecutive days, each time waiving his Miranda5
rights. During those interviews, the defendant provided
conflicting accounts of his relationship with the victim
and his movements on the night of the murder. In
between the interviews, the police observed the defendant, still covered with the victim’s blood, ‘‘laughing
and smiling’’ during a phone call and telling the person
he was speaking with that ‘‘he was in jail for the weekend because of his girlfriend.’’
The state charged the defendant with murder in violation of § 53a-54a (a) and home invasion in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-100aa (a) (1) and (2). The case
was tried to a jury, which found the defendant guilty
of murder but not guilty of home invasion. The trial
court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s
verdict and imposed a total effective sentence of fifty5
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Page 6 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
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State v. Myers
seven years of imprisonment. This direct appeal followed. See General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3).
I
At trial, the defendant presented a third-party culpability defense as to the victim’s neighbor, Adduci. On
appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly excluded some evidence that he proffered in support of his third-party culpability defense. In addition
to contending that the exclusion of this evidence was
an abuse of discretion, the defendant argues that it
violated his constitutional rights to due process, to present a complete defense, and to confront the witnesses
against him.
The record reveals the following additional relevant
facts and procedural history. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine alerting the court of his
intention to introduce third-party culpability evidence
related to Adduci. The defendant identified several categories of third-party culpability evidence, which included
Adduci’s (1) presence near the crime scene, (2) avoidance of the police, (3) initial misrepresentations to the
police regarding his relationship with the victim, (4)
knowledge of the victim’s injuries, (5) September 8, 2018
voicemail to Melody Thiel, his then girlfriend, after he was
questioned by the police in connection with the victim’s
murder, (6) history of violence against women, and (7)
behavior following the victim’s murder.
After a pretrial hearing, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision addressing each category of evidence that the defendant had proffered. The court
concluded that some evidence satisfied the threshold
for admissibility for third-party culpability evidence;
see generally State v. Hedge, 297 Conn. 621, 634–35, 1
A.3d 1051 (2010); and would be allowed ‘‘after a more
detailed and clear proffer outside the presence of the
jury.’’ This evidence included (1) Adduci’s presence
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State v. Myers
near the crime scene, (2) his knowledge of injuries to
the victim ‘‘that [were] not known to the general public,’’
(3) his initial representations to the police that he did
not know the victim well, (4) evidence that he and the
victim had socialized and exchanged text messages,
and (5) a ‘‘series of hostile and vulgar texts’’ he had
sent the victim when their friendship ended.
The trial court, however, excluded some evidence
relevant to the defendant’s claims on appeal. First, it
excluded a video Adduci had sent the victim and others
on July 31, 2018, and related text messages. In the video,
Adduci appears to be in distress, lying shirtless on the
floor and shaking next to a jar of pickles, mumbling
phrases like ‘‘night with you,’’ and ‘‘electrolyte imbalance.’’ The defendant describes the video as ‘‘truly
bizarre’’ and argues that it demonstrated that Adduci
had lied to the police when he told them that he did
not know the victim very well and had an ‘‘obsessive
fixation with the victim . . . .’’ In response to the video,
the victim first texted only a question mark. Adduci
responded: ‘‘Mike will [be] here in [three] minutes. It’s
imbalance. I’ll be fixed fast.’’ The victim then texted:
‘‘Call 911.’’ Adduci responded: ‘‘I’m naked on the floor
with a bottle of pickles any other time this might [be]
fun.’’ The victim wrote back: ‘‘Ok . . . I don’t know
what that means. This is all very strange. And starting
to creep me out tbh. Ok [M]ark, bye, hope you feel
better.’’ When Adduci informed the victim that he would
call Thiel and have her bring him electrolytes, the victim
texted: ‘‘This is fucking weird. Please don’t text me
anymore, seriously. Hope you feel better.’’ Seven
minutes later, she added: ‘‘This whole situation is really
starting to freak me out. And I feel like you’re really
pushing boundaries. I really hope everything is ok—I
am honestly very nervous around you the more encounters we do have and you texting me videos of yourself
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State v. Myers
shaking on the floor while I’m at work is extremely
uncomfortable.’’
Second, the trial court excluded a voicemail Adduci
left for Thiel after the police had interviewed him about
the victim’s murder. In that voicemail, Adduci told Thiel
that she needed to unblock his number so that they
could talk before she arrived home. He explained to
her that he had become a suspect in the victim’s murder
and that the police were asking if both Adduci and Thiel
were romantically involved with the victim. He further
instructed her: ‘‘Don’t go home.’’
Third, the trial court excluded two instances of
Adduci’s prior misconduct, which the defendant argued
demonstrated a history of violence against women.6
The defendant alleged that, in 2012, Adduci grabbed a
woman by the neck and pushed her to the ground. He
also offered a police report detailing an incident that
occurred shortly after the victim’s murder, in which the
police were called because Adduci, while intoxicated,
was banging on a female neighbor’s door and yelling.
Fourth, the trial court excluded evidence of a decline
in Adduci’s mental health in the weeks following the
victim’s murder. The defendant proffered two October,
2018 police reports pertaining to Adduci, one in response
to a disturbance and the other for a wellness check. In
both reports, officers indicated that Adduci was drinking excessively, self-harming, and expressing that he
was depressed because of the victim’s homicide.
A
We proceed by assuming, without deciding, that the
trial court abused its discretion by excluding this collec6
In his motion in limine, the defendant represented that Adduci had
‘‘several domestic violence arrests and convictions on his criminal record.’’
There is no support in the record for the defendant’s claim that Adduci’s
history of violence against women resulted in criminal convictions.
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State v. Myers
tive evidence. The defendant contends that the exclu7
sion of this collective evidence violated his constitutional
rights to confront Adduci and to a fair trial. In response,
the state argues that any error by the trial court was
not constitutional in nature because, under State v.
Jordan, 329 Conn. 272, 287 n.14, 186 A.3d 1 (2018), no
constitutional violation occurs when ‘‘the trial court’s
exclusion of evidence . . . did not prevent the defendant from presenting other evidence that supported his
theory of [defense].’’ We agree with the state. Even if
we assume that the evidence was excluded improperly,
we cannot conclude that this error was constitutional
in nature.
‘‘Whether the admission of the contested [evidence]
was constitutional error or merely evidentiary error will
dictate which party bears the burden of proof as to
harm and the extent of that burden.’’ State v. Sinclair,
332 Conn. 204, 214, 210 A.3d 509 (2019). ‘‘[I]f an [evidentiary] impropriety is of constitutional proportions, the
state bears the burden of proving that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . When an
improper evidentiary ruling is not constitutional in
nature, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Osimanti, 299 Conn. 1, 16, 6
A.3d 790 (2010).
7
The defendant contends that the trial court’s rulings were an abuse of
discretion because the court applied an incorrect legal standard in its general
approach to assessing third-party culpability evidence. He argues that, once
a direct connection had been established as to third-party culpability with
respect to some of the evidence, all of the evidence pertaining to Adduci
should have been admitted. Given our conclusion that any evidentiary error
was harmless, we need not consider the merits of these evidentiary
arguments.
We also need not consider the state’s contention that these claims were
not preserved for appellate review because the defendant failed to make
additional proffers during the trial. We assume, without deciding, that the
defendant’s evidentiary claims are preserved. See, e.g., State v. Altajir, 303
Conn. 304, 314, 33 A.3d 193 (2012).
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State v. Myers
‘‘[T]he federal constitution require[s] that criminal
defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense. . . . The sixth amendment . . . [guarantees] the right to offer the testimony
of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, [and] is in plain terms the right to present a
defense, the right to present the defendant’s version of
the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so that
it may decide where the truth lies. . . . When defense
evidence is excluded, such exclusion may give rise to
a claim of denial of the right to present a defense.
. . . Although exclusionary rules of evidence cannot
be applied mechanistically to deprive a defendant of
his rights, the constitution does not require that a defendant be permitted to present every piece of evidence
he wishes.’’ (Footnote added; internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Andrews, 313 Conn. 266, 275, 96 A.3d
1199 (2014); see also State v. West, 274 Conn. 605, 622–23
n.26, 877 A.2d 787 (right to present defense is based
on sixth amendment principles and applicable to states
through due process clause of fourteenth amendment),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1049, 126 S. Ct. 775, 163 L. Ed. 2d
601 (2005). Whether a trial court’s exclusion of evidence
offered by a criminal defendant deprives him of his
constitutional right to present a defense ‘‘is a question
that must be resolved on a case by case basis. . . .
The primary consideration in determining whether a
trial court’s ruling violated a defendant’s right to present
a defense is the centrality of the excluded evidence to
the claim or claims raised by the defendant at trial.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 276. We also
consider the nature and quantum of other evidence that
the defendant was able to present in support of his
theory of defense to determine whether he has had a
meaningful opportunity to challenge the state’s case,
including the veracity and reliability of its witnesses.
See, e.g., State v. Jordan, supra, 329 Conn. 287 n.14;
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State v. Myers
State v. Devalda, 306 Conn. 494, 520–21, 50 A.3d 882
(2012); State v. Osimanti, supra, 299 Conn. 16–17.
In the present case, the defendant argues that the
excluded evidence was central to his third-party culpability defense and that he was ‘‘unable to present strong
evidence of [Adduci’s] guilt’’ or to question Adduci about
such evidence. We disagree. The excluded evidence,
although related to Adduci’s relationship with the victim
and his behavior following her murder, was not central
to the defendant’s third-party culpability defense, and
the defendant was nevertheless able to present a substantial portion of the evidence that he had proffered in
his motion in limine. Defense counsel cross-examined
Adduci at length about his relationship with the victim
and actions after her murder, introducing facts to the
jury that allowed it to draw inferences relating to his
reliability and potential motives. See, e.g., State v.
Devalda, supra, 306 Conn. 520–21. Adduci testified, on
direct examination for the state, that he had developed
a brief friendship with the victim after her dishwasher
had leaked water into his apartment in June, 2018.8
They had exchanged phone numbers and communicated often. On one occasion, Adduci texted the victim
to ask if Thiel could come upstairs to see her cats.
He misread the victim’s reply, leading to an argument.
Adduci testified that he visited the victim twice and
that the victim came to his apartment once to socialize
with Thiel on his deck. The jury, therefore, heard evidence of Adduci’s relationship with the victim that was
8
Defense counsel called Adduci’s credibility into question when Adduci
testified that he did not recall ‘‘downplaying’’ the extent to which he knew
the victim to the police. Defense counsel introduced Adduci’s initial statement that he had given to the police the morning following the victim’s
murder, in which he stated that he ‘‘knew the [victim] . . . as a neighbor,
but not personally.’’ The statement was offered for substantive purposes
pursuant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753, 513 A, 2d 86, cert. denied,
479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986).
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State v. Myers
more extensive than what Adduci had initially represented to the police.
The defendant also was able to present evidence of
Adduci’s romantic interest in the victim, her rejection
of his overtures, and the profane text messages that
ended their friendship. Adduci testified that he once
visited the victim late at night and directly expressed
his romantic interest but that she had declined and told
him not to ask again. The friendship between Adduci
and the victim ended on bad terms in early August,
2018, when, after the victim ignored his texts for several
days, he accused the victim and Thiel of talking about
him behind his back.9 On August 6, he texted the victim,
in quick succession: ‘‘[Thiel] said something outside on
the deck a lie that’s what this is,’’ ‘‘[y]ou have ignored
me all week,’’ and ‘‘[s]omething happened.’’ The victim
responded: ‘‘What are you talking about?’’ Adduci then
told her: ‘‘[G]o fuck yourself and this lovely friendship,’’
and called her ‘‘a total fucking asshole,’’ ‘‘a fucking
loser,’’ and ‘‘a fucking robot.’’ He further texted: ‘‘I’d
cheat on [you] too,’’ and ‘‘[n]ow I block [you] stupid
cunt.’’10 At trial, Adduci testified that this was the last
time the two had communicated. On the night the victim
9
During the week after Adduci sent the excluded video, Adduci sent the
victim several additional text messages, which she did not answer. On August
3, 2018, he texted: ‘‘[You] home?’’ On August 4, he texted: ‘‘I guess you
weren’t home did I do something wrong?’’ A few hours later, he texted:
‘‘Can [you] tell me what I did wrong please I’ve always been respectful to
[you] except for my misunderstanding of that text message.’’
10
The victim texted in response: ‘‘You don’t know me, but I agree . . . I
don’t wanna know you either.’’ A few minutes later, the victim texted: ‘‘You
have no right to call me an asshole or cunt. I have never wished anything
on you but peace and [well-being]. I have never asked anything of you, but
you have of me. When you did ask for help, I responded through our messages
and in person. I do believe I did help you. So you can call me a cunt, you
can call me a child, you can call me an asshole and you can call me a loser,
you can call me a robot, and regardless, I still respect you and uphold you
as a neighbor. I have never done anything to disrespect you ever. I have
never called you a bad name or disrespected you in any way. This behavior
is completely unacceptable.’’ After this point, the victim blocked Adduci. 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 13
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State v. Myers
was murdered, Adduci sent text messages to a friend
about the screams and sounds he heard coming from
the victim’s apartment shortly after listening from the
stairwell; he commented that it ‘‘[s]ounded like a murder’’ and that ‘‘she’s a bitch anyways.’’
The jury also heard evidence that Adduci avoided the
police following the victim’s murder. On both direct
and cross-examination, Adduci admitted that he did not
call the police when he heard the victim’s screams or
answer the door when the police knocked because he
did not want to get involved in the matter and assumed
the police would ‘‘figure it out.’’ The following morning,
he again did not answer his door when the police were
canvassing the neighbors.11 Defense counsel also inquired
about the source of Adduci’s knowledge that the victim’s
‘‘throat was cut’’ and ‘‘her head was falling off . . . .’’
Adduci testified that he had heard this from a neighbor.12
Additionally, there was evidence before the jury that
the police had brought Adduci in for questioning and
obtained a search warrant to collect his DNA. Finally,
evidence was presented that Adduci was a bodybuilder,
who was capable of exerting the type of force required
to inflict the victim’s injuries. During closing argument,
defense counsel argued extensively that Adduci, and
not the defendant, was responsible for the victim’s murder. Because the jury had for its consideration a sub11
Shortly thereafter, however, Adduci left his apartment and spoke with
detectives outside. They asked him to identify himself, and he did. He
‘‘appeared slightly upset’’ and was ‘‘very soft spoken,’’ but related information
regarding what he had heard and seen the previous night, and he agreed to
provide a sworn statement. He allowed the officers into his apartment and
permitted them to examine his cell phone and to take pictures of the text
messages he had sent at the time he heard the screams.
12
Other neighbors were similarly aware of this otherwise undisclosed
information. Menezes testified that she was alerted to the murder when one
neighbor, Stephanie Young, called her to tell her that the victim had been
‘‘nearly decapitated.’’ Menezes had not spoken to Adduci, and, to her knowledge, neither had Young. Menezes testified that Young told her that she had
heard this information directly from the police.
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stantial quantity of evidence and argument supporting
the defendant’s third-party culpability defense, we conclude that the defendant was not deprived of his constitutional rights to present a defense, to due process, or
to confront Adduci. See State v. Osimanti, supra, 299
Conn. 17. This renders any error in excluding the proffered third-party culpability evidence purely evidentiary
in nature.
B
‘‘When an improper evidentiary ruling is not constitutional in nature, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful. . . . [W]hether
[an improper ruling] is harmless in a particular case
depends [on] a number of factors, such as the importance of the [evidence] in the [defendant’s] case, whether
the [evidence] was cumulative, the presence or absence
of evidence corroborating or contradicting the [evidence] on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall
strength of the prosecution’s case. . . . Most importantly, we must examine the impact of the . . . evidence
on the trier of fact and the result of the trial. . . . [T]he
proper standard for determining whether an erroneous
evidentiary ruling is harmless should be whether the
jury’s verdict was substantially swayed by the error. . . .
Accordingly, a nonconstitutional error is harmless when
an appellate court has a fair assurance that the error did
not substantially affect the verdict.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Fernando V., 331 Conn. 201,
215, 202 A.3d 350 (2019).
We conclude that the defendant has failed to meet
his burden of proving that the jury’s verdict was substantially swayed by any error in excluding the proffered third-party culpability evidence. Most of the
defendant’s proffered third-party culpability evidence
was admitted and considered by the jury. Even if the
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trial court had admitted all of the excluded evidence,
we have a fair assurance that it would not have affected
the jury’s verdict. With respect to the overall strength
of the prosecution’s case, the state presented ample
evidence establishing the defendant’s guilt, including
DNA evidence linking the defendant to the crime scene,
his handwritten notes found in the victim’s apartment
after the murder, hundreds of phone calls and text messages from the defendant to the victim in the hours and
days before the murder, and his conflicting statements
about his relationship with the victim.
In reviewing the overall strength of the evidence that
the state presented at trial to prove the defendant’s
guilt, we note first that the physical evidence at the
crime scene—inside the victim’s apartment—inculpated only the defendant, not Adduci. The responding
officers observed that the defendant had dried blood
on his hands and clothing. The defendant’s pants had
a very large, dark, dried blood like stain on the back
right inner thigh. On the front right pant leg, there were
large, dark, blood like stains spattered around the knee
and inner thigh areas, along with smudges below the
knee and on the upper thigh. The right sleeve of the
defendant’s long sleeved T-shirt had a large, pinkish
stain, close to the cuff, extending approximately one
quarter of the way up the forearm, wrapping around
the sleeve. When these items were forensically tested,
the blood matched the victim’s DNA. Additionally, the
defendant’s DNA was found on the victim’s fingernail
near the victim’s defensive wounds.
Second, three documents handwritten by the defendant were found at the victim’s apartment after the
murder. A note, left on the coffee table, was superimposed over a letter that the victim had written to a court
in New York in connection with a pending traffic ticket.
That note read: ‘‘I did not do it again I did not do it.
Roxan[ne] [Anderson] and Donna [Smith], you guys are
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the reason for this.’’ On the back of this same note were
Anderson’s and Smith’s full names and phone numbers,
and the scrawled message, ‘‘you guys are the cause of
this . . . you did [not] leave my relationship alone I
hope you lad[ies] are happy now that [is] the reason
why I do it I write this so you know everyone is gonna
really think I kill her this what you want from me to
get in trouble she wouldn’t be by herself.’’ (Emphasis
added.) A longer letter, unsigned and undated, but written in the same handwriting as the note on the coffee
table, was found in the dining room. Titled, ‘‘I AM
SORRY,’’ the letter begged for forgiveness and a second
chance, admitted ‘‘fuck[ing] up,’’ and expressed love
for the victim. At trial, Smith testified that the handwriting on both the note and the letter was consistent with
that of the defendant. The police found an additional
letter several months later that made similar statements.
The defendant claims that the two letters ‘‘were obviously penned on an earlier date.’’ The defendant, however, told the police that he wrote all three notes or
letters while he was on the phone interacting with the
911 dispatcher, while simultaneously trying to call his
cousin on a separate phone.13
Third, the phone and text message records demonstrate that the defendant refused to accept that the
victim had ended their relationship. The defendant sat
for hours outside the victim’s apartment, called her
hundreds of times from blocked and ‘‘spoof’’ numbers,
and ignored both her demands and police directives
not to contact her. On the night of the victim’s murder,
the victim’s colleagues witnessed her becoming so overwhelmed with calls and texts that she told them she
was planning to obtain a restraining order against the
defendant. Phone records show that the defendant placed
twenty-eight calls to the victim that night between 7:48
13
The defendant also claimed that he wrote the three notes or letters
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and 9:39 p.m.; at that point, the calls stopped, which
coincides with the time the defendant told the police
he walked through the victim’s apartment building.14
Fourth, the text message records do not support the
defendant’s statements about his relationship with the
victim. The defendant told the police that he was in the
victim’s apartment because he had an ‘‘extra key’’ and
that it was ‘‘routine’’ for him to visit the victim unannounced and to get into bed with her while she was
sleeping in the middle of the night.15 This story is inconsistent with text messages indicating that the defendant
regularly sought the victim’s permission to enter her
apartment.16 It is also clear from the text messages that
the victim no longer wanted any relationship with the
defendant.17 Nonetheless, in his first interview with the
14
In his first interview with the police, the defendant told officers that
he had stayed at his home, which was located in the same apartment complex
as the victim’s apartment, all evening. He explained that he spent his time
smoking marijuana and sleeping, until his alarm went off at 3 a.m. to go to
the victim’s apartment. When informed that a witness had seen him in the
parking lot of the apartment complex around 9:30 p.m., he changed his
story, adding that he went out to the dumpsters and walked through the
victim’s building to pick up his mail.
15
The defendant’s claim that he had an extra key to the victim’s apartment
is further contradicted by the fact that no such key was ever located by the
police. The victim informed Smith that the defendant no longer had a key
and that she refused to return that key to the defendant when he asked for
it on August 27, 2018.
16
A review of the record indicates that, on September 4, 2018, when the
victim allowed the defendant to come to her apartment, he texted her, ‘‘I’m
at the door.’’ On thirteen other occasions, the defendant sought the victim’s
permission to come to her apartment. The victim denied all of his requests,
except, on August 25, when he asked to borrow an ice pack, and she threw
it down to him from her deck. There is evidence in the record that the
defendant had a practice of showing up uninvited at the victim’s door, which
the victim informed him ‘‘scared’’ her, and which she repeatedly told him
not to do.
17
On August 26, 2018, several weeks after the victim had broken up with
the defendant, the victim texted the defendant, in response to messages he
sent her from a spoof number: ‘‘It’s funny how the person I loved can stalk
me and harass me to the point where I feel like I need to move away and
change my number.’’ A review of the text message records shows that,
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police, the defendant told officers that he and the victim
were ‘‘get[ting] back together’’ and were working on
their relationship, ‘‘taking things slow.’’ In contrast, in
a later interview, he told officers that it was ‘‘a relief’’
to no longer be dating the victim and that he was grateful
to Smith and Anderson for getting him out of the relationship. In sum, the state presented a very strong case
with a significant amount of evidence establishing the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
By contrast, the defendant’s third-party culpability
defense was weak, and the admission of the excluded
evidence would not have substantially swayed the jury’s
verdict. The strongest and most significant evidence,
according to defense counsel, was that Menezes saw
Adduci in the general vicinity of the victim’s apartment
a few minutes after she heard the victim’s screams. She
did not see any blood on his person or clothing, or in
the stairwell or hallway. For Adduci to have killed the
victim, he would have had to attack her to induce the
screams that Menezes heard, use and break multiple
knives over the course of the attack, cause extensive
injuries to the victim that produced a significant quantity of blood, clean the blood from his clothing and
body—all while taking measures to prevent his DNA
from being discovered in the apartment—and then compose himself to be seen in the stairwell standing completely still, appearing to be listening to a disturbance
that was no longer occurring, upon Menezes’ return a
few minutes later.
Investigators found no forensic evidence linking
Adduci to the actual scene of the crime, in contrast to
that linking the defendant, whose DNA was found on
the victim’s fingernail and whose clothes and hands
were covered with the victim’s dried blood. See, e.g.,
to ask her for sex and to go on dates. She rejected his requests twenty-six
times between August 26 and September 3. The week before her murder,
the victim asked the defendant to stop contacting her eleven times.
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State v. West, supra, 274 Conn. 627 (fingerprints found
at periphery of crime scene lacked close and direct
relationship with actual crime, and, ‘‘because there [were]
so many likely explanations for the prints aside from the
mere possibility that they were left by an unidentified
perpetrator,’’ they lacked probative value for third-party
culpability purposes); see also State v. Simmons, 352
Conn. 556, 573, A.2d (2025) (‘‘the connection
between the evidence of third-party culpability and the
crime charged must rest on grounds beyond mere proximity’’). Adduci’s presence in the stairwell of the building where he lived, shortly after multiple neighbors
heard violent screams, does not, without more, support
a finding that he caused them. But see State v. Cerreta,
260 Conn. 251, 262, 796 A.2d 1176 (2002) (evidence
that third party’s hair and fingerprints were found on
victim’s body was exculpatory and probative, raising
more than bare suspicion that someone other than
defendant may have committed crime).
Further, some of the excluded evidence was similar
to evidence the jury already had before it. See, e.g.,
State v. DeJesus, 260 Conn. 466, 484–86, 797 A.2d 1101
(2002). The jury heard evidence that Adduci knew the
victim personally and had developed a friendship with
her, in which he overshared information. The inappropriate video that Adduci had sent to the victim, therefore, may have amplified Adduci’s oversharing, but it
would not have introduced any new category of evidence. The jury knew that Adduci avoided the police
and that, at one point, the police had investigated him
as a possible suspect. The excluded voicemail to Thiel,
therefore, conveyed similar facts to those already before
the jury.
When evaluating harmless error, we must also consider the quality of the excluded evidence. See, e.g.,
State v. Massaro, 347 Conn. 200, 217, 296 A.3d 782
(2023). Evidence that Adduci’s mental health deteriorated in the weeks following the victim’s murder was
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only tangentially related to the victim’s murder and the
third-party culpability defense. Similarly, Adduci’s prior
acts of violence against women were unrelated to the
victim’s murder. One incident took place six years earlier with a different person and involved conduct different from that connected to the victim’s murder. The
other act, which occurred after the victim’s murder,
was a complaint that he banged loudly on a neighbor’s
door—again, unrelated and dissimilar to the victim’s
murder. This excluded evidence was, at best, tangential
and added little for the jury to consider in determining
if Adduci, and not the defendant, had committed the
victim’s murder.
Given the overall strength of the state’s case, combined with the fact that the jury had before it the strongest evidence in support of the defendant’s third-party
culpability defense, we have a fair assurance that the
exclusion of this evidence did not affect the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant has
failed to establish that any assumed error was harmful.
II
The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant
during the redirect examination of Jeffrey Laskowski,
a police detective. The defendant argues that the alleged
impropriety deprived him of a fair trial because it ‘‘was
severe and went to the central issue in the case,’’ namely,
his claim that the police had mishandled the investigation of the victim’s murder. We disagree.
The following additional facts and procedural history
are relevant to this claim. On the final day of the state’s
evidence, Laskowski testified that, when police officers
searched the dumpsters outside of the victim and
Adduci’s building on September 9, 2018, they found a
plastic bag containing wet towels with brownish stains.
The officers seized the towels as potential evidence and
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transported them to the police station, where they were
dried but not tested for blood or sent to the state forensic science laboratory (lab). During cross-examination,
defense counsel pressed Laskowski to explain why the
towels had been seized as evidence but were not sent
for testing. Laskowski testified that, when the officers
searched the dumpster immediately following the victim’s murder, the towels were not present. On the basis
of an interview with a resident of the apartment complex, the officers determined that the towels were likely
placed in the dumpster on September 9, two days after
the victim was murdered. Laskowski testified that detectives determined that it was not necessary to send the
towels for testing because, once they had dried, the
brownish stains no longer appeared to be blood stains.
During redirect examination, the prosecutor then asked
whether defense attorneys have an opportunity to review
evidence and to request that materials be sent to the
lab for testing. Laskowski responded that they do. The
prosecutor’s final question to Laskowski was whether
he had received such a request from defense counsel.
Laskowski testified that he had not.
Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel
argued that Laskowski’s testimony may have given the
jury the impression that the defense was obligated to
have the evidence tested and that the defendant had
the burden to produce evidence or to disprove his guilt.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial. The trial court
denied the motion for a mistrial on the ground that it
was ‘‘too extreme a remedy’’ and disagreed that Laskowski had testified that it was the defense’s burden to
produce or test evidence.
When the jury returned, the trial court gave it the
following instruction: ‘‘[T]here was just some testimony
that defense counsel had the opportunity to request
testing of certain items of evidence. This testimony
should not be taken by you as any indication that the
defense has the obligation or burden to do so, or that
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the defendant has to prove his innocence, or lack of
guilt. Please recall my earlier instruction[s], when this
case began, that the state alone bears the burden to
prove the defendant’s guilt, if it can, beyond a reasonable doubt. The defense does not have the burden to
produce any evidence, or to prove lack of guilt, and
that burden of proof never shifts to the defense.’’ In its
final charge to the jury, the court reiterated that ‘‘the
state alone bears the burden of proof’’ and that ‘‘[t]he
defendant does not have to prove his innocence.’’ The
court further instructed the jury that the failure of the
police to test physical evidence could be considered
when determining if there was a reasonable doubt as
to the defendant’s guilt.
It is well established that we review a trial court’s
ruling on a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Holley, 327 Conn. 576, 628, 175
A.3d 514 (2018). ‘‘[Although] the remedy of a mistrial
is permitted under the rules of practice, it is not favored.
[A] mistrial should be granted only as a result of some
occurrence [during] the trial of such a character that
it is apparent to the court that because of it a party
cannot have a fair trial . . . and the whole proceedings
are vitiated. . . . If curative action can obviate the prejudice, the drastic remedy of a mistrial should be
avoided. . . . On appeal, we hesitate to disturb a decision not to declare a mistrial. The trial judge is the
arbiter of the many circumstances [that] may arise during the trial in which his function is to assure a fair and
just outcome. . . . The decision whether to grant a
mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial
court.’’18 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Ortiz, 280 Conn. 686, 702, 911 A.2d 1055 (2006).
18
The defendant argues that we should apply plenary review to this mistrial
claim because it arises from a claim of prosecutorial impropriety. We disagree. ‘‘[W]hen a mistrial is sought on the ground that a prosecutor’s
improper remarks violated the defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law the same standard applies. . . . The burden on the defendant
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In determining whether a mistrial was required
because of a potentially prejudicial event during the
trial, we also consider ‘‘whether the trial court’s curative
instructions remedied any prejudice that might have
occurred.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Cook, 262 Conn. 825, 842, 817 A.2d 670 (2003). In the
absence of any indication to the contrary, the jury is
presumed to have followed the trial court’s curative
instructions in reaching its verdict. See, e.g., State v.
Outlaw, 350 Conn. 251, 284, 324 A.3d 107 (2024).
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. The defendant has not demonstrated that the prosecutor’s questions were prejudicial in light of the entire
proceeding. As the trial court observed, the prosecutor’s
questions did not suggest that the defense was obliged
to send materials to the lab for testing, and the court’s
curative instruction omitted any reference to the fact
that the defendant had that opportunity.19 In its initial,
curative, and final instructions, the court was clear that
the burden of proof lies with the state. With no indication to the contrary, we presume that the jury followed
each of those instructions in its deliberations, which
mitigated any prejudice that may have resulted from
the challenged questions. The trial court, therefore, did
not abuse its discretion by not ordering the drastic
remedy of a mistrial.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
entire proceeding.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ortiz, 280
Conn. 686, 703, 911 A.2d 1055 (2006); see also State v. James G., 268 Conn.
382, 420, 844 A.2d 810 (2004) (‘‘[this court has] afforded deference to trial
courts in deciding whether to deny a defendant’s motion for a mistrial that
is based on prosecutorial misconduct’’).
19
Defense counsel objected to the trial court’s draft instruction, which
referenced the opportunity of the defense to test evidence. The court
removed this reference from its curative instruction to the jury, although
defense counsel did not agree to that curative instruction.