NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: November 5, 2024
S24A0884. POUNDS v. THE STATE.
WARREN, Justice.
William C. Pounds III was convicted of malice murder and
other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Kendra
Jackson.1 On appeal, Pounds contends, among other things, that
1The crimes occurred on June 12, 2015. In December 2015, a Bibb
County grand jury indicted Pounds for malice murder, felony murder, and
aggravated assault. Pounds was tried from October 18 to 24, 2017. The jury
found Pounds guilty of all counts, and on October 25, the trial court sentenced
him to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder. The
aggravated assault count merged with the malice murder count for sentencing.
The trial court purported to merge the felony-murder count into the malicemurder conviction, but the felony-murder count was actually vacated by
operation of law. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 371-372 (434 SE2d 479)
(1993).
Pounds filed an untimely motion for new trial, which the trial court
purported to deny even though it lacked jurisdiction to do so; the trial court
then granted Pounds an out-of-time appeal, and Pounds filed a notice of appeal.
But because the untimely motion for new trial ripened upon the grant of the
out-of-time appeal and was thus still pending, we held that the notice of appeal
had not ripened and dismissed the appeal, noting that if the trial court entered
the trial court committed several evidentiary errors and that his
trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. For
the reasons explained below, we affirm.
1. The evidence presented at Pounds’s trial showed the
following. Jackson and Pounds met in early 2000 and began a longterm relationship. In September 2005, Pounds met and became
romantically involved with another woman, Vicinda Crawford. For
the next 10 years, Pounds maintained romantic relationships with
an order denying the motion, the notice of appeal would ripen. See Pounds v.
State, 309 Ga. 376, 385 n.12 (846 SE2d 48) (2020) (“Pounds I”).
On remand, on March 17, 2021, the trial court purported to dismiss the
motion for new trial, and on July 19, 2023, the trial court granted Pounds an
out-of-time appeal. Pounds’s second appeal was then transmitted to this Court
as if his notice of appeal had ripened. However, neither the 2021 or the 2023
order recognized that Pounds I’s holding—that the motion for a new trial was
procedurally proper and remained pending—was the law of the case, see OCGA
§ 9-11-60 (h); neither order resolved the motion for new trial on the merits; and
thus neither order was effective to allow the notice of appeal to ripen under the
law-of-the-case effect of Pounds I. Accordingly, on February 6, 2024, we issued
an order vacating the March 17, 2021 and July 19, 2023 orders, dismissing
Pounds’s second appeal, and directing the trial court to enter an order resolving
the pending motion for new trial on the merits. We again explained that if the
trial court entered an order denying that motion for new trial, Pounds’s notice
of appeal would ripen.
On remand, on March 7, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying
the motion for new trial on the merits. Pounds’s notice of appeal ripened, and
the case was docketed to the August 2024 term of this Court and submitted for
a decision on the briefs.
2
both women. During that period, both women became aware of the
other’s relationship with Pounds. Yet Pounds was repeatedly able
to convince each woman that he had left the other and wanted to be
with her. Throughout this ten-year period, Pounds became engaged
to each woman, sometimes to both at once.
On Sunday, May 31, 2015—“Pastor Appreciation Day” at the
church where Pounds was the pastor—Pounds brought Jackson
with him to church, and Crawford came separately to church to
surprise him. At the church, the two women saw each other and
began text messaging each other after the service. These texts led
the women to discover that Pounds was cheating on each woman
with the other, despite presently being engaged to be married to
Crawford. Through their text messages, Crawford and Jackson
consoled each other over their situation with respect to Pounds.
Crawford, however, remained engaged to Pounds. The two set a
wedding date of June 12, 2015.
In the early morning hours of the day of June 12, 2015—the
date Crawford and Pounds had set for their wedding—Pounds was
3
not with Crawford, but with Jackson. Pounds called 9-1-1 from his
house and reported that Jackson had committed suicide. After
calling 9-1-1, Pounds turned Jackson’s body over and “started to try
and resuscitate her.” Jackson was later found unresponsive in an
upstairs bedroom, having died of a single, contact gunshot wound to
the right side of the head.
Pounds first spoke to police at around 12:30 a.m. on the day of
the shooting. Pounds said the couple had an argument during which
he told Jackson he no longer wanted to be in a relationship with her;
Jackson then told him that “if we’re going to separate, then one of
us is going to have to leave the world”; Jackson walked over to
Pounds’s dresser and picked up a handgun and pressed it to her
head; and Pounds “attempted to lunge at her” to prevent her from
shooting herself, but he “was too late.” Soon after, Pounds told a
first responder “that he was downstairs and he heard a shot, and he
went upstairs and that’s where he had found” Jackson. At around
1:00 a.m., Pounds called a friend, Joey Mullinax, and told Mullinax
that he had come home early from a trip to Dallas, had argued with
4
Jackson about her infidelities, and that Jackson “had grabbed his
pistol and shot herself.”
Later, Sergeant Shelley Rutherford arrived at the scene and
spoke to Pounds, who said he and Jackson were lying in bed together
when the conversation turned into an argument about their
relationship; Jackson got up, dressed, came to his side of the bed,
and grabbed his gun from his chest of drawers; she then went to the
foot of the bed and pointed the weapon at him; Pounds initially
thought she was going to shoot him, and he went under the covers;
and he then moved to the end of the bed and tried to grab the gun,
touching it before it went off.
At around 5:30 a.m., Pounds gave the Sergeant a formal
statement that was transcribed. Pounds stated that on the day of
the shooting, he began talking to Jackson about ending their
relationship; she began screaming; Jackson kept repeating that if
she could not have Pounds, neither one of them would live; he tried
to talk her down; when he tried to grab the gun, she turned it from
pointing at him to herself; he remembered hearing one gunshot; and
5
he then put on his pants, called 9-1-1, turned Jackson over as
instructed, and tried to resuscitate her. Pounds initially said that
Jackson had the gun in her left hand and her pocketbook in her right
hand, but later said that it was possible that she had the gun in her
right hand.
Six days after the shooting, during a follow-up interview,
Pounds demonstrated to Sergeant Rutherford how the shooting
occurred. According to Pounds, he was kneeling on the bed and
Jackson was standing in front of him, pointing the gun at him and
holding it “in between the two of them.” Pounds then grabbed the
gun, causing the gun to go off and Jackson and Pounds to fall off the
bed together. In Pounds’s demonstration, he indicated that the gun
was not touching Jackson’s head. This was the first time Pounds
stated that he had also fallen to the floor. On August 14, 2015, about
two months after the shooting, Pounds was arrested.
At trial, the State’s expert in crime-scene reconstruction and
blood-pattern analysis testified that he saw “no evidence that
[Jackson] had the gun in her hand” and “fire[d] the fatal gunshot.”
6
The expert testified that, based on the blood coagulation he
observed, “it’s not difficult to say it had to have been at least 10
minutes” that Jackson was laying facedown before Pounds turned
her over and that, in his opinion, “there was seven and a half
minutes between the injury and the 911 call.” The expert added that
he was “confident [Jackson] was not standing” when she was shot
and that her head was below the level of the bed at the time of the
shooting.
The State also called several witnesses, including a friend who
testified about Pounds’s infidelities and the conflicting stories
Pounds told him about what happened leading up to Jackson’s
death, and two of Jackson’s coworkers, who testified that Jackson
“loved her life,” had spoken about “future plans that she had made
with [Pounds] or friends and family members,” and had once stated
that if it was ever said Jackson committed suicide, “don’t believe it.”
In addition, the State also called Jackson’s daughter to testify that,
around 2007 or 2008, Pounds had hit Jackson and given her a black
eye, and, around 2009, Pounds “came into [Jackson’s] house and . . .
7
kicked the front door in,” forced Jackson into his car, and “drove
away” with her.
Pounds testified at trial in a manner consistent with portions
of his pre-trial communications with police, including by testifying
that he had hidden under the covers when Jackson pulled out a gun.
Unlike in two of his earlier accounts to police, however, Pounds
testified that when he came out from under the covers, Jackson was
pointing the gun at herself. And unlike in his three earlier accounts
to police, he testified that he begged her not to shoot herself as he
moved towards her, and that he lunged off the bed and put his
“hands on her hands” while she was holding the gun.
2. Pounds argues that the evidence was not sufficient as a
matter of constitutional due process to support his conviction for
malice murder.2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (99
2 To the extent Pounds challenges the verdicts on all three counts,
Counts 2 (felony murder) and Count 3 (aggravated assault) are moot because
those counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. See Malcom, 263 Ga.
at 372. See also Anderson v. State, 299 Ga. 193, 196 n.4 (787 SE2d 202) (2016)
(explaining that a defendant is not “convicted” on counts that are vacated or
that merge with other offenses for sentencing purposes, and challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support those non-existent convictions are moot).
8
SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). In reviewing this claim, “we view
all of the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to
the verdicts and consider whether any rational juror could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes
of which he was convicted.” Moulder v. State, 317 Ga. 43, 46-47 (891
SE2d 903) (2023). “We leave to the jury the resolution of conflicts or
inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and
reasonable inferences to be derived from the facts.” Perkins v. State,
313 Ga. 885, 891 (873 SE2d 185) (2022) (citation and punctuation
omitted).
The evidence at Pounds’s trial, viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdicts, authorized the jury to find Pounds guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. A person commits
malice murder if “he unlawfully and with malice aforethought,
either express or implied, causes the death of another human being.”
OCGA § 16-5-1 (a). Among other things, the evidence showed that
Pounds and Jackson had a tumultuous and, at times, violent
relationship; Crawford, Pounds’s fiancée, testified that she and
9
Pounds were engaged and that Pounds had planned to marry her on
the same day as Jackson’s death; Pounds offered multiple,
conflicting accounts of what had happened before the shooting and
what his involvement was; and two of Jackson’s coworkers testified
that Jackson “loved her life,” had spoken about her “future plans,”
and had once stated if anyone was ever to say that she committed
suicide, “don’t believe it.”3 Additionally, the jury heard testimony
from the State’s blood-coagulation and crime-scene reconstruction
expert, who testified that, based on the evidence at the scene of the
shooting, he concluded that after Jackson had been shot, Pounds left
Jackson laying facedown “for at least 10 minutes” before Pounds
turned her over, and that there “was seven and a half minutes
between the injury” and the time Pounds called 9-1-1. The State’s
expert further testified that there was no evidence Jackson “had the
3 In Division 3, we assume, without deciding, that the trial court
erroneously admitted the testimony from Jackson’s coworkers pursuant to
OCGA § 24-8-803 (3) and OCGA § 24-8-807. But when performing sufficiency
review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, even if the evidence was
admitted erroneously. See Thomas v. State, 308 Ga. 26, 28 (838 SE2d 801)
(2020) (“[A] sufficiency review under Jackson considers all evidence, whether
admissible or not”).
10
gun in in her hand” or that she was “in a standing position” when
she was shot. To the contrary, the State’s expert testified that he
found “evidence that would suggest it’s not likely” that Jackson was
“in possession of the weapon at th[e] moment” she was shot.
Presented with this evidence, a reasonable jury could find
Pounds guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder. See
Davenport v. State, 309 Ga. 385, 389 (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (evidence
presented was constitutionally sufficient to support defendant’s
convictions for malice murder when the State’s forensic pathology
expert and crime scene investigation expert both determined the
cause of death to be homicide, rather than suicide); Suits v. State,
270 Ga. 362, 362-364 (507 SE2d 751) (1998) (evidence presented was
constitutionally sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for
malice murder when the defendant claimed that he tried to stop
victim from committing suicide, but defendant had previously given
the police conflicting accounts of what had happened before the
shooting).
3. Pounds contends that the trial court abused its discretion
11
by admitting under OCGA § 24-8-803 (3) (Rule 803 (3)) out-of-court
statements that Jackson made to her coworkers, Laquisha Jordan
and Jackie Bush. Assuming without deciding that the trial court
abused its discretion when it admitted Jackson’s statements to
Jordan and Bush under Rule 803 (3), we conclude that any error in
doing so was harmless.
(a) Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” OCGA § 24-8-801 (c).
Hearsay is generally inadmissible, but it may be admitted if any of
several statutory exceptions applies. See OCGA § 24-8-802; State v.
Hamilton, 308 Ga. 116, 121 (3) (839 SE2d 560) (2020). One such
exception is Rule 803 (3), which allows for the admission of a
statement of a declarant’s “then existing state of mind, emotion,
sensation, or physical condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design,
mental feeling, pain, and bodily health.” OCGA § 24-8-803 (3). This
Court has not meaningfully addressed the state-of-mind exception
to the hearsay rule under our current Evidence Code except to
12
pretermit whether evidence would have been admissible under that
exception. See Lynn v. State, 310 Ga. 608, 618 (852 SE2d 843) (2020)
(pretermitting whether a witness’s testimony would have been
admissible under the state-of-mind exception under Rule 803 (3) and
concluding that the evidence “did not prejudice [the defendant] given
the strength of the evidence against him”).
(b) Prior to trial, the State sought a ruling admitting several
statements that Jackson had made to close friends about her future
plans with friends and family members. Over Pounds’s objection,
the trial court decided to admit those statements under Rule 803 (3).
At trial, Jordan, who worked with Jackson and had been friends
with her since 2010, testified that, a few months before Jackson was
shot and killed, Jordan told Jackson that someone in Jordan’s life
had a “bout with suicide,” that Jordan would never commit suicide,
and that if Jackson “ever heard that about [Jordan], don’t believe it.”
Jackson “said the same thing”: “you know how much I love life, you
know how much I love my kids, you know how much, you know, we
have just plans for things, so that—if anybody ever told you that [I
13
committed suicide], you make sure you look in to it.”
Like Jordan, Bush also testified regarding Jackson’s outlook
and plans for the future. Bush and Jackson were long-time friends,
but lost touch with each other a few years before Jackson’s death.
Bush testified that she had reconnected with Jackson in April 2015,
a few months before Jackson was shot. Bush had two children at
that point and was pregnant with a third child. She testified that
Jackson was surprised that Bush had two children and that Jackson
was “kind of sad” that she had “missed out on those types of events
in our lives together.” Bush added that “this was . . . our opportunity
to have that experience together, so [Jackson] was excited to know”
the gender of the baby Bush was having and “wanted to be a part of
shopping and helping to decorate his nursery.”
Assuming without deciding that the trial court’s admission of
Jackson’s and Bush’s statements under Rule 803 (3) was an abuse
of discretion, we conclude that any error in admitting these
statements was harmless. Under the nonconstitutional harmlesserror standard, we examine “whether it is highly probable that the
14
error did not contribute to the verdict” by “review[ing] the record de
novo and weigh[ing] the evidence as we would expect reasonable
jurors to have done so.” Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 80 (829 SE2d
142) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, the evidence showed that Pounds was the only other
person present at the time of the shooting, suggesting that either
Jackson shot herself or that Pounds shot her. To disprove Pounds’s
defense theory that Jackson died by suicide, the State presented
evidence from an expert in crime-scene reconstruction and bloodpattern analysis that there was “no evidence that [Jackson] had the
gun in her hand” and “fire[d] the fatal gunshot,” that Pounds had
waited nearly 10 minutes after the shooting before turning
Jackson’s body over or calling 9-1-1, and that Pounds provided
contradictory accounts of how Jackson died. In light of all of this
evidence against Pounds, we conclude that it is highly probable that
any error in admitting the out-of-court statements that Jackson
made to Jordan and Bush regarding Jackson’s state of mind did not
contribute to the verdict, and was therefore harmless. See Nundra
15
v. State, 316 Ga. 1, 9-10 (885 SE2d 790) (2023) (concluding that,
because of the strength of the evidence against the defendant, “the
risk that evidence [improperly admitted] would lead the jury to
convict [the defendant] for some reason other than guilt was fairly
low”). Accordingly, this enumeration of error fails.4
4. Pounds contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting certain other-acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b)
(Rule 404 (b)). See OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) (“Evidence of other . . . acts
shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person . . . [i]t
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not
limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident”).
4 We also note that, over Pounds’s objection, the trial court admitted the
statements under OCGA § 24-8-807 (Rule 807) (the “residual exception” to the
rule against hearsay). In fact, it did so before admitting them under Rule 803
(3). But see State v. Hamilton, 308 Ga. 116, 124 n.10 (839 SE2d 560) (2020)
(cautioning trial courts that “the residual exception applies only to
statement(s) not specifically covered by any law”) (emphasis original) (citation
and punctuation omitted). But even assuming that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting the hearsay statements under Rule 807, Pounds’s claim
still fails under the nonconstitutional harmless-error standard, and does so for
the same reasons that his claim fails with respect to his argument about Rule
803 (3).
16
Specifically, the trial court admitted testimony from Chelsey
Brunson, Jackson’s daughter, that Pounds hit Jackson and caused
her to suffer a black eye approximately eight years before Jackson’s
death, and that Pounds kicked Jackson’s front door in and “drove
away” with her approximately six years before Jackson’s death. The
State offered this evidence for the purpose of showing Pounds’s
“feelings for [Jackson], the nature of their relationship, [Pounds’s]
mindset and intent and the time of the alleged criminal act” and for
the purpose of refuting Pounds’s defense of suicide, and the trial
court admitted it over Pounds’s objection.
Pounds contends that the other acts the State introduced at
trial occurred eight years prior to his trial5 and were therefore so
remote in time that their probative value was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Hood v. State,
299 Ga. 95, 102 (786 SE2d 648) (2016) (explaining that “the part [of
5 Unlike Brunson, Pounds asserts that both acts occurred eight years
before Jackson’s death. Because we assume, without deciding, that the trial
court erred in admitting this other-acts evidence, it is not necessary to resolve
the discrepancy in timing with respect to those acts.
17
the Rule 404 (b) analysis] that looks to the probative value of
evidence determined to be relevant . . . requires analysis of the other
acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-403”). See also OCGA § 24-4-403
(“Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.”); Rooks v. State, 317 Ga. 743, 757 (893 SE2d 899) (2023)
(noting that one of the “[f]actors to be considered in determining the
probative value of other act evidence offered to prove intent” is “its
temporal remoteness”) (citation and punctuation omitted). The
State responds that the evidence of “domestic violence between the
parties” was probative of “the nature of the relationship between the
parties, shed[] light on [Pounds’s] conduct toward the victim, was
offered to rebut Pounds’s defense theory that Jackon died by suicide,
and that “an eight-year lapse in time does not render the evidence
inadmissible, but instead goes to its weight and credibility for the
jury to determine.”
18
We need not decide whether the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting evidence of these prior acts, because any
error in admitting it was harmless. As we discussed in Division 4
above, “[t]he test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error
is whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to
the verdict.” Baker v. State, 318 Ga. 431, 448 (899 SE2d 139) (2024)
(citation and punctuation omitted). And as we also discussed above,
the jury was presented with ample evidence of Pounds’s guilt.
Pounds admitted that he was alone with Jackson when she died, the
jury heard testimony from the State’s expert in crime-scene
reconstruction and blood-pattern analysis that there was “no
evidence that [Jackson] had the gun in her hand” or “fire[d] the fatal
gunshot,” and the physical evidence indicated that Pounds waited
nearly 10 minutes after Jackson was shot to roll her over and call 9-1-1. And the strength of this evidence, combined with the fact that
Pounds told multiple stories about what occurred prior to the
shooting, outweighed any prejudice from Brunson’s testimony that
on two occasions several years before the charged crime, Pounds
19
acted violently toward Jackson. See Davenport, 309 Ga. at 389-390
(concluding that any error by the trial court in admitting evidence
that the defendant abused his ex-wife more than 20 years before the
victim’s death was harmless because “the evidence presented
against [the defendant], though circumstantial, was very strong”);
Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 147, 152-154 (805 SE2d 873) (2017)
(concluding that any error by the trial court in “admitting evidence
of [the defendant’s] violent acts against two ex-girlfriends” was
harmless, in part, because the defendant “admitted that [the victim]
had died in his presence and “[t]he physical evidence contradicted
[the defendant’s claim that he had tried to revive [the victim]”). We
therefore conclude that it is highly likely that the admission of
Brunson’s testimony did not affect the jury’s verdicts, and Pounds’s
claim fails.
5. Pounds contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by admitting “character” evidence against Pounds. Specifically, he
complains that the trial court should not have allowed “Joey
Mullinax . . . [to] testif[y] that [Pounds] once commented to him
20
about having multiple relationships with women” other than
Jackson and Crawford. Pounds argues that “[w]hether [he] had
relationships with other women had no relevance to the issues at
trial and could only go to putting [him] in a bad character light.” .
It is unclear from Pounds’s brief on appeal whether he
challenges the admission of this testimony as not relevant under
OCGA § 24-4-401 (Rule 401), as inadmissible other-acts evidence
under Rule 404 (b), or both; he cites no statutes or cases to support
this enumeration of error. The trial court’s ruling was likewise
unclear, but the trial transcript suggests that the trial court
admitted the evidence under Rule 404 (b). 6 But because Pounds
cites no legal authority and offers no legal analysis to support this
claim of error, we conclude that he has abandoned it. See Supreme
Court Rule 22 (1) (“Any enumerated error not supported by
argument or citation of authority in the brief shall be deemed
6 With respect to this ruling, the trial court stated: “If that’s the extent
of the question, [counsel], I’ll let you ask it, but I don’t want to hear anymore
else about it.” And the ruling was made in response to argument that the
evidence was not merely “bad character” evidence, but that it “fits the motive
of our case.” The Georgia Evidence Code was not discussed or cited.
21
abandoned.”). See also Collins v. State, 312 Ga. 727, 748 (864 SE2d
85) (2021) (bald assertion that testimony was “‘inadmissible hearsay
intentionally solicited by the State’” was deemed abandoned because
appellant neither “cite[d] Georgia’s Evidence Code nor offer[ed] legal
analysis to support his contention on appeal”).
6. Pounds contends that the trial court abused its discretion in
ruling that one of the State’s witnesses, Ross Gardner, was qualified
to give expert testimony about blood coagulation. As with his fifth
enumeration of error, Pounds cites no legal authority and offers no
legal analysis to support this claimed error, so we conclude that he
has abandoned it. See Supreme Court Rule 22 (1); see also Sauder
v. State, 318 Ga. 791, 816 n.21 (901 SE2d 124) (2024) (under
Supreme Court Rule 22 (1), when an appellant “makes no specific
argument and cites no authority to support any of the[ir] claims, . .
. we do not address them”).
7. Pounds contends that his counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance when he failed to object to a certain juror
remaining on the jury. Pounds’s claim fails.
22
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient,
and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the
defendant. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-695
(104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984); Hill v. State, 319 Ga. 250, 257
(9 SE2d 101) (2024). To satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant
must demonstrate that his attorney “performed at trial in an
objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and
in the light of prevailing professional norms.” Romer v. State, 293
Ga. 339, 344 (745 SE2d 637) (2013). See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687-688. To satisfy the prejudice prong, a defendant must establish
a reasonable probability that, in the absence of counsel’s deficient
performance, the result of the trial would have been different. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Pounds argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to object to a certain juror remaining on the
jury after the juror revealed that she knew Jackson’s stepmother.
After the State rested, the juror informed the trial court that she
23
had recently realized that she knew Jackson’s stepmother because
the two had worked together some time ago for the same supervisor,
although they did not “really speak . . . much” anymore but
“maybe . . . see each other’s posts on Facebook.” During questioning
outside the presence of the jury, the trial court asked the juror if that
relationship would affect her ability to listen to the evidence
presented at trial or her ability to be fair and impartial. The juror
said that she “would make the decision that I feel is right, because
someone’s life to me is more important than a friendship ultimately,”
and she agreed that while it might be difficult, she “could render a
decision based on the evidence in this case and not [the]
relationship.” She also stated that although she might be
“sympathetic personally,” she knew “the right thing to do for me
would be to make the right decision based on what I think it is,” and
that “[e]ven though I might still feel bad about it, . . . I would feel
even worse about making the wrong decision.” Pounds’s trial
counsel testified that he made “a strategic decision” not to request
that the juror be removed from the jury, in part, because he “like[d]
24
jurors that feel the gravity of the case” as opposed to jurors “who
[will] cavalierly convict your client.” The trial court later denied a
new trial on this ineffectiveness claim on the basis that the juror at
issue had explained that her relationship with Jackson’s stepmother
would not have an effect on her ability to be fair and impartial, and
trial counsel elected not to attempt to remove the juror “as a matter
of trial strategy.”
Pounds has not established that trial counsel’s failure to object
to the juror remaining on the jury constituted deficient performance.
A trial court may replace a juror with an alternate when, as relevant
here, the juror “upon other good cause shown to the court is found to
be unable to perform his duty.” OCGA § 15-12-172.7 But “the court
has broad discretion to determine whether it is appropriate to
remove a juror.” Ware v. State, 305 Ga. 457, 462 (826 SE2d 56) (2019)
(citation and punctuation omitted). As we have previously
7 OCGA § 15-12-172 provides in full: “If at any time, whether before or
after final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies, becomes ill, upon
other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his duty,
or is discharged for other legal cause, the first alternate juror shall take the
place of the first juror becoming incapacitated.”
25
explained, “[a] conclusion on an issue of juror bias is based on
findings of demeanor and credibility which are peculiarly in the trial
court’s province.” Bridges v. State, 314 Ga. 395, 398 (877 SE2d 261)
(2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).
The juror at issue in this case made specific statements to the
trial court expressing her intention to make an impartial decision
even though she had worked with Jackson’s stepmother, and the
trial court was authorized to conclude that the juror could be fair
and impartial. Pounds has “offered no reason to discredit those
responses,” and the juror’s relationship with Jackson’s stepmother
therefore “afforded no basis” for her removal. See id. at 165. See
also, e.g., Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 124-126 (868 SE2d 764)
(2022) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
failing to excuse a juror for cause who stated during voir dire that,
despite “her cousin’s conviction for armed robbery and her exboyfriend’s shooting . . . she would attempt to separate those issues
from anything she heard in this case and would do her best to be
fair”); Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 723 (739 SE2d 332) (2013)
26
(holding that there was no abuse of discretion when the trial court
denied a motion to strike a prospective juror for cause who stated
during voir dire that he “tended to be analytical, that he could be
fair about the case, and that his relationship with the victim’s
brother would not consciously affect his ability to be impartial”).
Given that Pounds has offered no other reason this juror
should be disqualified, we cannot say that trial counsel’s
performance was objectively unreasonable, and therefore deficient,
in this regard. Pounds’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
thus fails. See Neal v. State, 313 Ga. 746, 752 (873 SE2d 209) (2022)
(concluding that, because a juror provided credible responses to the
trial court affirming her impartiality, the defendant failed to show
that his counsel was deficient in failing to move to strike the juror).
8. In his final enumeration, Pounds correctly contends, and the
State concedes, that the trial court erred when it failed to vacate the
felony murder count and instead purported to merge it with the
malice murder count. See Worthen v. State, 304 Ga. 862, 864-865
(823 SE2d 291) (2019). “This error in nomenclature was harmless,
27
however, because [Pounds] was not convicted of or sentenced for the
felony murder count[].” Id. at 865. As a result, we need not take
any action on this claim.
9. Finally, we consider whether the combined prejudicial effect
of the errors we assumed warrants a new trial. In our review of
Pounds’s claims, we have assumed, without deciding, that the trial
court abused its discretion in admitting Jordan’s and Bush’s
testimony about Jackson’s out-of-court statements under Rule 803
(3) and Rule 807 and in admitting Brunson’s testimony about
Pounds’s prior acts under Rule 404 (b). Pounds has not claimed
cumulative error and therefore has not made any specific argument
as to why these errors in combination prejudiced his defense, and
we see none. See White v. State, 319 Ga. 367, 398 n.17 (903 SE2d
891) (2024).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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