NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: November 19, 2024
S24Y1244. IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTIAN AARON COOMER.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of Special Master Adam M. Hames, who
recommends accepting the amended petition for voluntary discipline
by Respondent Christian Aaron Coomer (State Bar No. 184995) and
imposing a two-year suspension nunc pro tunc to August 16, 2023.
In the petition, Coomer admitted violating Rules 1.7 (a),1 1.8 (a),2 1.8
1 Rule 1.7 (a) provides, in relevant part, that a “lawyer shall not[, in the
absence of informed consent,] represent or continue to represent a client if
there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s own interests . . . will materially
and adversely affect the representation of the client.”
2 Rule 1.8 (a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall neither enter into a business
transaction with a client if the client expects the lawyer to exercise the lawyer’s professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, nor shall the
lawyer knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other
pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(c),3 and 1.16 (d)4 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct
(“GRPC”) as found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d), in connection with
Coomer’s legal representation of and business transactions with an
elderly client that benefitted Coomer or his family. The Bar agrees
that the proposed discipline is appropriate and that the Court
should accept his petition for voluntary discipline. Because the
record supports the admitted violations, and the proposed two-year
1. the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are
fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted
in writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood
by the client;
2. the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given
a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in
the transaction; and
3. the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the
essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the
transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in
the transaction.”
3 Rule 1.8 (c) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not prepare an instrument
giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, grandparent,
child, grandchild, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.”
4 Rule 1.16 (d) provides “[u]pon termination of representation, a lawyer
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s
interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the
client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been
earned.”
2
suspension falls within the broad range of discipline we have
imposed for previous violations of the same rules at issue here, we
accept the petition and impose the proposed two-year suspension
nunc pro tunc to August 16, 2023.
Procedural History
Coomer was appointed to serve as a Court of Appeals judge in
2018 and was the subject of an inquiry by the Judicial Qualifications
Committee (“JQC”), which resulted in two prior opinions of this
Court culminating in Coomer’s removal from the bench. See Inquiry
Concerning Coomer, 315 Ga. 841 (885 SE2d 738) (2023) (“Coomer I”)
(establishing the proper time frame and the standard for reviewing
Coomer’s actions); Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 316 Ga. 855 (892
SE2d 3) (2023) (“Coomer II”) (removing Coomer from the bench).
On April 24, 2023, shortly after this Court issued its opinion in
Coomer I, the State Bar filed a formal complaint in State
Disciplinary Board Docket (“SDBD”) Nos. 7500 and 7693, which
generally tracked the client-related allegations in the JQC matter
3
and contended in relevant part that Coomer violated GRPC 1.7 (a),5
1.8 (a), and (c), and 1.16 (d). On February 14, 2024, six months after
the issuance of this Court’s opinion in Coomer II, Coomer filed his
first petition for voluntary discipline, making admissions as to some
rule violations and seeking as discipline a one-year suspension nunc
pro tunc to August 16, 2023. The State Bar opposed the first petition,
and on June 1, 2024, Coomer filed the amended petition for
voluntary discipline at issue here. An evidentiary hearing was held
before the Special Master on June 3, 2024, at which the Bar
tendered deposition testimony from Coomer’s client and Coomer
testified and offered letters in support of his petition. Although
neither party has filed exceptions to the Report and
Recommendation, Coomer has filed a brief in this Court urging that
the Court accept the report and impose the requested discipline.
5 The Bar’s formal complaint also charged two other rule violations, but
the Bar has reasonably explained its decision to forgo further proceedings on
those two charges. As to one of the counts, the Bar explained that the evidence
established that the misconduct better fit other counts that Coomer was
admitting; as to the other count, the Bar stated that the evidence “could be
inconsistent with the required elements.”
4
Facts Underlying the Admitted Violations
The relevant facts, as apparently accepted by the parties and
the Special Master, are that Coomer was admitted to the State Bar
of Georgia in 1999, and, during the relevant time, ran a solo practice
in Cartersville, Georgia, while also attaining the rank of Lt. Colonel
in the Air Force Reserves and serving in the Georgia House of
Representatives between 2011 and 2018. In February 2015, Coomer
agreed to represent James Filhart, then 73 years old, in obtaining a
guardianship or conservatorship over Filhart’s girlfriend, and he
advised Filhart that the representation would cost around $20,000
to $30,000. During the course of the representation, Coomer learned
that Filhart was suffering from depression and was under the care
of a licensed psychologist. Coomer was successful in this
guardianship action and charged Filhart a total of around $80,000
for his work. But despite Filhart’s requests, Coomer failed to provide
an itemized invoice for the representation or to turn over his file to
Filhart in a timely manner. Nevertheless, Coomer continued to
5
represent Filhart with respect to administration of the
guardianship/conservatorship and other legal matters.
In January 2017, Filhart prepared a document that identified
his psychologist as the residual beneficiary of his estate and
included a list of specific bequests, including that Coomer receive
Filhart’s musical instruments and $100,000. In March 2018, Filhart
executed a Last Will and Testament that Coomer had prepared and
presented to him (“March 2018 Will”). That will identified Coomer
as the executor, trustee, and a beneficiary, and it provided that
Filhart’s estate should be held in trust with lifetime income paid to
Filhart’s girlfriend and that, upon her death, the remaining assets
should be distributed by Coomer in his discretion to various
beneficiaries, including Coomer himself.
In late 2017, Coomer began to borrow money from Filhart. In
December 2017, Filhart loaned $80,000 to CAC Holdings, LLC,
(“CAC”), a limited liability company of which Coomer was the sole
member. Commer presented Filhart a promissory note (“First
Promissory Note”), promising to repay the loan in monthly
6
installments with the last installment due in December 2038 (at
which time Filhart would be approximately 96 years old). Although
the First Promissory Note refers to a “deed to secure debt of even
date herewith,” no such deed to secure debt was ever executed,
meaning that the loan was unsecured.
CAC satisfied the First Promissory Note on March 8, 2018, but
contemporaneously Filhart executed a second promissory note that
had been prepared and presented to him for execution by Coomer
(“Second Promissory Note”). Under the terms of the Second
Promissory Note, Filhart loaned $159,000 to CAC, which agreed to
repay the loan in monthly installments with the last installment due
in April 2048 (at which time Filhart would be approximately 106
years old). As with the First Promissory Note, the Second
Promissory Note referred to a “deed to secure debt of even date
herewith,” even though no such deed to secure debt had been
executed, and, as a result, that loan also was unsecured. Then, in
September 2018, Filhart and CAC executed a third promissory note
for an additional $130,000 loan to CAC (“Third Promissory Note”).
7
Like the other notes, this note was unsecured and was prepared and
presented to Filhart for execution by Coomer. It provided for
repayment in a single payment due on January 1, 2026.
The Bar contended that, at the time of the execution of each of
the three promissory notes referenced above, Coomer failed to
explain to Filhart (1) the significance of the fact that the loans were
unsecured; (2) the significance of the fact that the notes were made
by CAC as opposed to Coomer personally; (3) the significance of the
fact that Coomer made no personal guarantee of the loans; (4) that
the terms of each of the notes were more favorable to Coomer than
the terms available from a commercial lender; and (5) the financial
status of CAC, the borrower. Coomer admitted that he did not
discuss with Filhart the issues of security or guaranty at the time
the loans were signed but asserted that Filhart knew the loans were
unsecured and would be made without personal guaranty.
Additionally, in June 2018, Coomer prepared and presented to
Filhart an Irrevocable Living Trust (“Living Trust”), which
designated Coomer as trustee and beneficiary, and which provided
8
Coomer with unfettered discretion to direct funds from the Living
Trust, even while Filhart was alive. In September 2018, Coomer was
appointed to the Georgia Court of Appeals. After the appointment
was announced but before Coomer was sworn in, Filhart executed a
new Last Will and Testament that Coomer had prepared and
presented to him (“September 2018 Will”). The September 2018 Will
was almost identical to the earlier will, except that it identified
Coomer’s wife, rather than Coomer, as the executor and trustee.
By early 2019, the relationship between Coomer and Filhart
had deteriorated,6 see Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 859, and Filhart sent
an email in January 2019 demanding repayment of the loans. By
2020, Filhart had filed both a lawsuit and a Bar complaint against
Coomer. Coomer testified at the evidentiary hearing before the
Special Master that he was current on all payments due under the
loans while they were active and that, eventually, he paid off both
of the outstanding loans and forwarded Filhart’s file to him. Coomer
6 Filhart testified that the relationship soured when he learned that he
owed $11,000 in taxes from the gains on the stocks he sold to fund a loan to
Coomer.
9
also resolved Filhart’s lawsuit with a payment of $50,000 in
damages. Filhart was not reimbursed for the legal fees he incurred
in obtaining relief. Filhart’s complaints, in part, led to the JQC
matter that resulted in Judge Coomer’s suspension from the Court
of Appeals in January 2021 and ultimately his removal from office
in August of 2023. See Coomer II, 316 Ga. at 856-857.
Evidence in Mitigation/Aggravation
After conclusion of the JQC matter, the Bar proceeded with the
underlying disciplinary case and the Special Master held a hearing
to take testimony as to aggravating and mitigating factors. At that
hearing, Coomer testified that, prior to this situation, he had no
disciplinary history of any kind but that, as a result of his
interactions with this client, he was not only suspended and
removed from the Court of Appeals, but his career in the Air Force
Reserves — where he believed himself to be on track to be promoted
to full Colonel — was also effectively ended as he was encouraged to
retire from the active reserves. Coomer testified that since his
removal from the bench, he has actively refrained from practicing
10
law, declining all offers or invitations to do so in anticipation of a
disciplinary process that would require him to be suspended for
some period of time. Coomer testified that he takes full
responsibility for his bad judgment; he expressed remorse for his
actions; and he apologized to everyone who was affected by those
actions, including his client. Coomer stated that, since his removal
from the bench, he has been trying to atone for his actions by
donating both money and time to a variety of charitable activities,
including a charity in Ukraine that helps displaced children; a
school in the Palestinian West Bank; his church’s food bank; Toys
for Tots; a benevolence committee that supports retired missionaries
and retired ministers; a Bartow County retired men’s group; and
various veteran service organizations, including Vet to Vet of
Georgia (which provides services to disabled vets) and the Birdwell
Foundation (which is focused on preventing suicide among veterans
who suffer from PTSD and related mental illness).7 Coomer testified
7 Coomer stated that he was involved in some of these activities before
2023, but that his work with the veteran’s groups and the retired men’s groups
began after he was removed from the bench.
11
that he has kept up with his continuing legal education
requirements and has signed up for courses relevant to the issues
he faced in this matter. In an effort to show good character, Coomer
introduced eleven letters/statements from clients and former
colleagues in the House of Representatives. The letters unanimously
vouch for Coomer’s moral character and reputation for honesty and
integrity.
At the hearing, the Bar admitted Filhart’s May 30, 2024,
deposition testimony given for this disciplinary matter.8 In that
deposition, Filhart said that he moved to Georgia from Michigan in
December 2006; that he hired Coomer in 2015 to represent him in
the guardianship case; and that he was satisfied with the result
Coomer achieved in that case, though he was not satisfied with the
cost. Filhart said that Coomer initially estimated the cost of the case
to be somewhere between $20,000 and $30,000, but, after it was
over, Coomer told him that it would be an additional $50,000.
8 Filhart was unable to testify in person because of his poor health.
12
Although Filhart did not think that the fee for the guardianship case
was reasonable (and might not have pursued the guardianship case
had he known the cost), he paid the additional money because he
promised to do so. Filhart said that Coomer never provided him with
billing records or anything that would show how much time he spent
on the case. Filhart says that it was his idea to bequest his musical
instruments to Coomer and that he also had a bank account that
was set to transfer to Coomer on Filhart’s death. He said that he was
alone in life and had no one else to leave his money to since Coomer
told him that it could be unethical to leave it to his psychologist.
Filhart testified that he filed his grievance against Coomer once he
realized that Coomer was looking out only for himself, and that he
now believes that Coomer took advantage of him. Filhart said that,
although Coomer has now repaid the loans, he had to pay a new
attorney to obtain repayment and lost a “pretty good chunk” of what
was recovered in the process. In response to questions from Coomer’s
counsel, Filhart agreed that Coomer has “redeemable qualities”;
13
that Coomer is entitled to a “second chance”; and that Coomer “just
made a mistake,” which he is unlikely to repeat.
The Special Master’s Report and Recommendation
In his Report and Recommendation, the Special Master noted
that in his amended petition for voluntary discipline, Coomer
acknowledged that he violated various GRPC rules. Coomer
admitted violating Rule 1.7 (a) when, during a legal representation,
he borrowed money from Filhart and drafted two wills and a trust
for him in which Coomer or his wife was designated as
executor/trustee and he was designated as an alternate beneficiary.
Coomer also admitted to violating Rule 1.8 (a) when through his
single-member LLC, Coomer borrowed money on the terms set forth
in the three separate promissory notes. Coomer also admitted that
he violated Rule 1.8 (c) by preparing the March 2018 Will identifying
himself as the executor, trustee, and alternate beneficiary; by
preparing the Living Trust on Filhart’s behalf and designating
himself as alternate trustee and successor beneficiary; and by
preparing Filhart’s September 2018 Will identifying Coomer’s wife
14
as the executor and trustee and keeping himself as an alternate
beneficiary. Finally, Coomer admitted that he violated Rule 1.16 (d)
by failing to deliver Filhart’s file to him in a timely manner when he
requested it. The Special Master noted that the Bar did not disagree
with any aspect of Coomer’s admissions.
With regard to the recommended sanction, the Special Master
noted that the maximum penalty for a single violation of Rule 1.7 (a)
is disbarment and the maximum penalty for a single violation of
Rules 1.8 (a), 1.8 (c), and 1.16 (d) is a public reprimand. In
determining the appropriate discipline, the Special Master
considered the primary purposes of disciplinary actions to protect
the public from unqualified attorneys and to protect the public’s
confidence in the profession, see In the Matter of Blitch, 288 Ga. 690,
692 (706 SE2d 461) (2011), and the American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”),
which require examination of “[1] the duty violated; [2] the lawyer’s
mental state; [3] the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s
misconduct; and [4] the existence of aggravating or mitigating
15
factors.” See In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232)
(1996). The Special Master recognized that each disciplinary case
must be decided on its own facts and that the level of punishment
“rests in the sound discretion of” this Court. See In the Matter of
Cook, 311 Ga. 206, 218 (3) (a) (857 SE2d 212) (2021).
The Special Master then concluded that Coomer violated the
duties he owed to his clients and to the profession generally, see ABA
Standards §§ 4.3, 7.0; that Coomer acted knowingly with respect to
these rule violations, see ABA Standards, “Definitions” (defining
knowledge as the “the conscious awareness of the nature or
attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result”); and that
Coomer’s actions not only raised the possibility of potential injuries,
but also caused Filhart to suffer actual injuries as he was forced to
pay unexpected income tax as a result of funding a loan to Coomer,
and to hire an attorney, at his own cost, to recover repayment of
Coomer’s improper loans. Therefore, the Special Master concluded
that a suspension was the presumptive discipline in this case. See
16
ABA Standard 4.32 (suspension “generally appropriate when a
lawyer knows of a conflict of interest and does not fully disclose to a
client the possible effect of that conflict and causes injury or
potential injury to a client”); see also ABA Standards 4.12
(suspension generally appropriate where lawyer knew or should
have known that he was dealing with a client’s property improperly
and causes injury or potential injury).
Turning to aggravating and mitigating factors, the Special
Master found in aggravation that Coomer acted with a dishonest
and selfish motive, see ABA Standard 9.22 (b); that his actions
involved a pattern of misconduct rather than a single, isolated
incident since Coomer wrote and rewrote Filhart’s wills and received
three favorable loans from Filhart, see ABA Standard 9.22 (c); and
that Coomer’s actions were not the result of inexperience but rather
were intentional acts by a lawyer who had substantial experience in
the practice of law, see ABA Standard 9.22 (i). But the Special
Master found most important the fact that Coomer’s client was a
vulnerable victim, see ABA Standard 9.22 (h), noting that, while
17
Filhart must have had a certain level of sophistication to accumulate
the wealth he did, it was “abundantly clear that he trusted Coomer
[and that] Coomer preyed on that trust and took advantage of []
Filhart.”
In mitigation, the Special Master noted that Coomer has no
prior disciplinary history and that the actions appear to have been
“an aberration begat by opportunity and not representative of
Coomer’s practice.” See ABA Standard 9.32 (a). The Special Master
concluded that Coomer expressed genuine remorse that recognized
the consequences not just for himself, but also for the other people
who had been harmed by his actions. See ABA Standards 9.32 (l).
The Special Master further noted that Coomer had demonstrated
that he is otherwise a person of good character and reputation, see
ABA Standard 9.32 (g), not only through the eleven letters he
introduced, which praised him as a person of integrity and good
character, but also through the actions he had taken to atone for his
18
mistakes, both to the person wronged and to others through his
significant involvement with a variety of charitable organizations.9
In terms of the appropriate discipline, the Special Master
observed that, although he was concerned that a recommendation of
suspension might be seen as favoritism to a former judge of the
Court of Appeals and former member of the General Assembly with
“powerful friends,” such a potential perception should not result in
Coomer getting treated more harshly than any other lawyer who
had committed the same violations. He then considered that the
parties have agreed to the discipline proposed in Coomer’s amended
petition for voluntary discipline and that the range of discipline
imposed for similar types of disciplinary infractions varies widely in
9 The Special Master expressed concern and/or skepticism as to the
application of ABA Standards 9.32 (d) (timely good faith effort to make
restitution or to rectify the consequences of misconduct), (e) (cooperative
attitude toward proceeding), and (k) (imposition of other penalties or
sanctions), and, thus left unclear what, if any, weight he gave to those factors.
But we need not consider whether those factors apply here since we ultimately
agree that, under the particular facts of this case, and even without
consideration of those factors, Coomer’s requested sanction of a two-year
suspension is an appropriate sanction to impose for Coomer’s admitted
violations of the GRPC.
19
Georgia. See In the Matter of Oellerich, 278 Ga. 22 (596 SE2d 156)
(2004) (disbarring attorney with no prior disciplinary history who
received unsecured $120,000 loan from client on terms favorable to
attorney, was unremorseful and had not made restitution); In the
Matter of Queen, 277 Ga. 348 (594 SE2d 323) (2003) (30-month
suspension for attorney with no prior discipline, who violated the
conflict rules by entering into a financial relationship with client);
In the Matter of Kunda, 306 Ga. 109 (829 SE2d 65) (2019) (twelvemonth suspension imposed for violations of Rule 1.7, 1.8 (c) and 1.15
(I) upon a petition for voluntary discipline, where attorney, with no
prior disciplinary history acted under a conflict of interest but made
restitution and was remorseful). Ultimately, after taking all of the
above considerations into account, the Special Master recommended
that the Court accept Coomer’s amended petition for voluntary
discipline and suspend his law license for two years for his violations
of the GRPC. Finally, in terms of whether the suspension should be
imposed nunc pro tunc, the Special Master agreed with the Bar that
Coomer had met the requirements to have the sanction entered nunc
20
pro tunc in that he gave sworn testimony that he had not practiced
law since August 16, 2023 (when he was removed as a judge), despite
opportunities to do so, and had refrained from practicing law in
contemplation of these disciplinary matters.10 In the Matter of
Onipede, 288 Ga. 156, 157 (702 SE2d 136) (2010).
Conclusion
Based on our review of the record, the Special Master’s findings
of fact are supported by the record, as is his analysis of the duties
violated, Coomer’s mental state, and the potential for and actual
injury caused by Coomer’s misconduct. In the light of the various
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and particularly the
State Bar’s agreement that the proposed discipline was “appropriate
and sufficient,” we agree with the Special Master’s overall
conclusion that a two-year suspension nunc pro tunc to August 16,
2023, is an appropriate sanction in this case.
10 We note that Coomer represented that he ceased practicing law upon
his appointment to the Court of Appeals such that, upon his removal from that
position (from which point he refrained from taking on new legal work) there
were no additional steps he needed to take to comply with Bar Rule 4-219 (b).
21
The special master noted that this suspension may seem
inconsistent to some with our conclusion that the same underlying
conduct regarding Filhart required Coomer’s removal as a judge, but
concluded that it would be unfair to treat Coomer more harshly
merely to avoid such a perception. We agree, and three key points
dispel that apparent inconsistency. First, Coomer’s JQC charges
went beyond the Filhart matter to include a number of campaign
finance violations. Second, this voluntary resolution is supported by
the Bar; if we rejected it as too light, the Bar would then be in the
position of having to prosecute charges (some of which it
acknowledges the evidence may not support) and seek penalties
higher than it believes are necessary and sufficient to serve the goals
of the disciplinary process. Although that may be necessary in some
cases, we conclude that it is not so here, where the proposed
voluntary discipline falls within the range of discipline we have
imposed for similar violations in other cases.
Finally, the Code of Judicial Conduct holds Georgia judges to a
higher standard than the standard the Rules of Professional
22
Conduct imposes on Georgia lawyers. Rightly so. “The judiciary’s
judgment will be obeyed only so long as the public respects it, and
that respect will not long survive judges who act in a manner that
undermines public confidence in their judgment and integrity.”
Inquiry Concerning Coomer, 316 Ga. at 855-856. Although part of
the public interest served by regulating the practice of law includes
sustaining public confidence in the legal system, that important
interest is not as acute when regulating lawyers as it is for judges.
And that interest must be balanced against lawyers’ fundamental
right under the Georgia Constitution to “to pursue a lawful
occupation of their choosing free from unreasonable government
interference.” Raffensperger v. Jackson, 308 Ga. 736, 740 (2) (843
SE2d 576) (2020).
Accordingly, Christian Aaron Coomer is hereby suspended
from the practice of law for a period of two years nunc pro tunc to
August 16, 2023. Because there are no conditions on Coomer’s
reinstatement other than the passage of time, there is no need for
him to take any action either through the State Bar or through this
23
Court to effectuate his return to the practice of law. Instead, the
suspension based on this opinion will expire by its own terms on
August 16, 2025. See In the Matter of Franklin, 299 Ga. 4, 7 (785
SE2d 535) (2016). Coomer is reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar
Rule 4-219 (c).
Petition for Voluntary Discipline Accepted. Two-Year
Suspension. All the Justices concur, except Bethel and Colvin, JJ.,
not participating.
24