NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: November 19, 2024
S24Y1267, S24Y1268. IN THE MATTER OF ESTON WILLIAM
HOOD, JR. (two cases)
PER CURIAM.
These disciplinary matters are before the Court on the
consolidated Report and Recommendation of the State Disciplinary
Review Board, adopting the Report and Recommendation of Special
Master Catherine Koura, and recommending that this Court accept
the petition for voluntary discipline filed by Respondent Eston
William Hood, Jr. (State Bar No. 940463), and suspend him from the
practice of law for a period of one year for his misconduct in two
client matters. We conclude that a one-year suspension is an
insufficient sanction in light of Hood’s admitted violations of several
of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”), see Bar Rule
4-102 (d), including admissions that he made false statements not
only to opposing counsel and courtroom personnel but also to the
Bar. Nevertheless, because Hood is willing to accept a suspension of
up to two years, we accept his petition for voluntary discipline, and
we suspend Hood’s license to practice law for a period of two years.
In 2021, the State Bar filed formal complaints in State
Disciplinary Board Docket (“SDBD”) Nos. 7407 and 7470 against
Hood, who has been a member of the Georgia Bar since 2009. Hood
acknowledged service of both formal complaints and filed timely
answers in both matters. Then, in September 2023, after engaging
in negotiations with the Bar, Hood filed a petition for voluntary
discipline1 addressing both cases, admitting that he committed some
of the Rule violations alleged in the formal complaints, but denying
others; requesting a six-month suspension for his conduct; but
asserting that he was willing to accept a suspension between six
months and two years. The Bar responded, addressing only the Rule
violations admitted by Hood, raising no objections to the petition,
1 Hood later amended his petition for voluntary discipline solely to
include one inadvertently omitted character reference.
2
and arguing that Hood’s law license should be suspended for a
period of time ranging between six months and two years.
With regard to SDBD 7407,2 the following facts are established
by the record. In late 2018 or early 2019, Hood agreed to represent
a client against whom a default judgment, totaling $5,710, had been
entered in DeKalb County Magistrate Court in favor of the client’s
former tenant, who was attempting to recover her security deposit.
Prior to retaining Hood, the landlord client had submitted a letter
to the court, which the court treated as a motion to set aside the
default judgment and set a hearing on the motion for February 28,
2019. Although Hood was aware on February 28, 2019, that his law
license had been suspended for failure to respond to the State Bar’s
notice of investigation in an unrelated matter,3 he appeared with the
client at the courthouse on that day. When asked by the tenant’s
counsel outside of the courtroom whether he represented the
2 SDBD No. 7407 corresponds to Case No. S24Y1267.
3 In Case No. S19Y0653, this Court suspended Hood from January 18,
2019, until March 4, 2019, because of his failure to file an adequate response
to a notice of investigation related to State Disciplinary Board File No. 180108.
3
landlord, he responded vaguely and did not tell opposing counsel of
his suspension. Instead, he abruptly left the courthouse after falsely
advising the tenant’s counsel and a courtroom deputy that he had a
family emergency. On March 4, 2019, this Court lifted the
suspension and reinstated Hood to the practice of law. Two days
later, Hood filed an entry of an appearance and filed an answer and
counterclaim, even though default judgment had already been
entered against his client.
Shortly after Hood filed his entry of appearance, the tenant’s
counsel filed a grievance with the State Bar. In Hood’s written
response to the grievance, he reasserted that he left the February 28
hearing due to a “family emergency” and submitted a “work/school
excuse letter” from a hospital, stating that Hood was seen and
treated in the hospital’s emergency department on April 7, 2019, and
could return to work on April 9, 2019. The letter did not reference
either February 28, 2019, or any emergency that occurred on that
date.
4
In the meantime, on May 2, 2019, the magistrate court issued
its written order, denying the motion to set aside for failure to
establish a statutory basis for doing so. Hood sought to appeal that
order to superior court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari.
However, the superior court dismissed the petition and imposed an
award of attorney fees against Hood for $5,351.60, based on Hood’s
“substantially frivolous” filing. Hood’s effort to challenge that order
by filing a motion for new trial was also unsuccessful and resulted
in the imposition of additional fees against Hood.4
4 In connection with Hood’s attempts to challenge the orders of the
magistrate and superior courts, the State Bar charged Hood with violating
Rule 3.1, which provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly advance claims or
defenses that are unwarranted under existing law. Although Hood argued in
his petition for voluntary discipline that his filings were not frivolous and that he had not violated Rule 3.1, the Special Master concluded that Hood did
violate Rule 3.1. Because we are considering this matter on Hood’s petition for
voluntary discipline and the maximum sanction for a violation of Rule 3.1 is a
public reprimand and would not ultimately change the level of discipline to be
imposed, we have not considered any Rule 3.1 violation in our analysis.
5
In his petition for voluntary discipline, Hood admitted that by
this conduct he violated Rules 5.5 (a),5 8.1 (a),6 and 8.4 (a) (4)7 of the
GRPC, all of which carry a maximum penalty of disbarment. The
Special Master agreed, concluding that Hood violated Rule 5.5 (a) by
appearing in court with his client while his law license had been
suspended and by failing to advise all relevant parties of his
suspension; that he violated Rule 8.1 (a) by falsely claiming in his
response to the grievance that he had left court due to a family
emergency and by submitting false evidence in support of that claim;
and that he violated Rule 8.4 (a) (4) by misrepresenting to the
tenant’s counsel and courtroom personnel the reason for his abrupt
departure from court and by failing to notify them of his suspension.
5 Rule 5.5 (a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not practice law in a
jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that
jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.”
6 Rule 8.1 (a) provides, in relevant part, that “a lawyer . . . in connection
with a disciplinary matter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of
material fact.” (emphasis supplied).
7 Rule 8.4 (a) (4) provides that “[i]t shall be a violation of the [GRPC] for
a lawyer to . . . engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation.”
6
With regard to SDBD No. 7470,8 the record shows the
following. In 2015, Hood was retained to represent a client that had
filed, through other counsel, a lawsuit against three defendants in
Cobb County related to the foreclosure of real property. After the
original attorney withdrew, Hood entered an appearance in January
2015. The sole hearing scheduled in the matter after Hood entered
his appearance was an August 24, 2015 hearing related to a motion
for summary judgment filed by one defendant. Hood was notified of
the hearing but did not file a conflict letter or seek a continuance,
and neither he nor his client attended the hearing. On August 27,
2015, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and subsequently granted the other defendants’ motions
to dismiss, thereby concluding the lawsuit.
When Hood’s client learned that Hood had not appeared at the
hearing and that his lawsuit had been dismissed, he filed a
grievance against Hood. In Hood’s response to the grievance, he
8 SDBD No. 7470 corresponds to Case No. S24Y1268.
7
represented that there had been multiple hearings held in the
matter and that he had attended each of those hearings. In his
petition for voluntary discipline, Hood admitted that his response to
the grievance was contrary to the record in the civil action, which
showed that the summary judgment hearing was the only hearing
scheduled during the time that Hood represented the client. Hood
also admitted that he failed to timely respond to the notice of
investigation issued by the Bar with respect to this matter.9
In his petition for voluntary discipline, Hood admitted that by
this conduct he violated Rules 1.3,10 8.l (a), and 9.311 of the GRPC.12
9 As a result of his failure to respond, this Court suspended Hood’s law
license on June 26, 2020. That suspension, Hood’s second for failing to respond
to a notice of investigation, was lifted on July 28, 2020. See Case No. S20Y1361.
10 Rule 1.3 provides that a “lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client. Reasonable diligence as used in this
rule means that a lawyer shall not without just cause to the detriment of the
client in effect willfully abandon or willfully disregard a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.”
11 Rule 9.3 provides that “[d]uring the investigation of a matter pursuant
to these Rules, the lawyer complained against shall respond to disciplinary
authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules.”
12 As both the Bar and the Special Master focused solely on the admitted
violations and as the charged but unadmitted Rules violations would not
substantively change the level of discipline to be imposed, we once again have
not considered any of the unadmitted Rules violations in our analysis.
8
The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 9.3 is a public
reprimand, while the maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 1.3
and 8.1 (a) is disbarment. The Special Master agreed that Hood
violated these Rules, concluding that Hood violated Rule 1.3 by
failing to attend the scheduled oral argument and by willfully
disregarding the case; that he violated Rule 8.1 (a) by
misrepresenting to the Bar that he attended multiple hearings in
his client’s case; and that he violated Rule 9.3 by failing to respond
to the notice of investigation.
In addressing the proper level of discipline for the violations in
both cases, the Special Master correctly noted that this Court
generally looks to the American Bar Association’s Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) to provide “guidance
in determining the appropriate sanction” in lawyer disciplinary
cases. In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (470 SE2d 232)
(1996). The ABA Standards recommend consideration of the duty
violated, the lawyer’s mental state, the potential or actual injury
caused by the lawyer’s misconduct, and the existence of aggravating
9
or mitigating factors. In considering these factors, the Special
Master concluded that Hood violated the duty he owed to his clients,
the public, and the legal system, as well as the duty he owed as a
professional. See ABA Standards 4.4 (lack of diligence), 5.1 (failure
to maintain personal integrity), 6.1 (false statements, fraud, and
misrepresentations), and 7.1 (addressing in part, the unauthorized
practice of law). Further, the Special Master concluded that Hood
violated his duty to his clients either knowingly or negligently and
that the remainder of his violations were knowingly or intentionally
committed. The Special Master further determined that Hood’s
violations caused actual harm to his clients, the courts, and the
public; that Hood’s violations of Rules 8.1 (a) and 8.4 (a) (4)
demonstrated a lack of integrity; and that his violation of Rule 1.3
was properly considered to be the abandonment of a client.
In considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the
Special Master determined that the following factors applied in
aggravation: prior disciplinary history, in that, in 2019, Hood
received a Formal Letter of Admonition, a form of confidential
10
discipline, for violations of Rules 1.3 and 1.4 that involved
allegations similar to those raised herein;13 multiple offenses,
because this matter involves two grievances; and substantial
experience in the practice of law.14 See ABA Standard 9.22 (a), (d),
and (i).15 In mitigation, the Special Master determined that Hood’s
13 The Special Master explained that the confidential discipline was
imposed because Hood delayed the deposition of his client; dismissed his
client’s case without prejudice and then refiled it to avoid a sanction; failed to notify his client of his actions; failed to perfect proper service, which resulted in his client’s case being dismissed; failed to inform his client of the dismissal; and after the client hired new counsel, failed to respond to client’s request to
obtain her file. See Bar Rule 4-208 (waiving the confidentiality of confidential
discipline in the event of a subsequent disciplinary proceeding and allowing
that information to be used in aggravation of discipline).
14 At the time of the misconduct, Hood had been practicing law at least
six years. See In the Matter of York, 318 Ga. 784, 787 (900 SE2d 614) (2024)
(noting application of ABA Standard 9.22 (i) where attorney had been
practicing for six years at the time of the misconduct).
15 The Special Master also determined that ABA Standard 9.22 (j)
(indifference to making restitution) applied because Hood’s landlord client had
to pay significant sanctions and fees based on Hood’s filings and the record
contained no evidence to demonstrate that Hood reimbursed her. However, our
review of the record shows that the sanctions imposed for Hood’s frivolous
filings were imposed only on Hood. Accordingly, we do not consider this factor
in aggravation. The Special Master further concluded that ABA Standards 9.22
(b) (dishonest or selfish motives), 9.22 (e) (bad-faith obstruction of the
disciplinary proceeding), and 9.22 (f) (submission of false statements during
the disciplinary process) applied in aggravation. The application of each of
these aggravating factors was based on the false statements that Hood
admittedly made to the Bar, opposing counsel, and court officers — which also
formed the basis for several of the violations of the GRPC that he admits
11
good character was a mitigating factor, relying on eight letters from
lawyers, elected officials, and Hood’s friends, who each attest to
Hood’s general good character. See ABA Standard 9.32 (g).16
The Special Master noted that this Court has suspended and
disbarred attorneys who have committed violations similar to the
ones Hood has admitted to committing. See In the Matter of Iwu, 303
Ga. 539, 540-541 (813 SE2d 336) (2018) (accepting petition for
voluntary discipline and imposing a three-year suspension where
attorney, with no prior disciplinary history, practiced law while
ineligible to do so and then made false statements to the Bar during
the disciplinary process); In the Matter of Brantley, 299 Ga. 732, 735
herein. However, we do not consider these three factors in aggravation of
discipline because this Court generally declines to rely on conduct in
aggravation of discipline when the same specific conduct is also charged as a
violation of the GRPC. See, e.g., In the Matter of Cleveland, 317 Ga. 515, 518
n.13 (893 SE2d 692) (2023); In the Matter of Eddings, 314 Ga. 409, 418 n.3 (877
SE2d 248) (2022).
16 The Special Master also determined that ABA Standard 9.32 (d) (goodfaith effort to make restitution) applied in mitigation because, in 2023, Hood
fully refunded the attorney fee and filing fee to his client in SDBD No. 7470.
But we decline to apply this mitigating factor because Hood did not make the
reimbursement until long after the disciplinary process began. See In the
Matter of Brantley, 311 Ga. 61, 65 (855 SE2d 625) (2021) (“The fact that [an
attorney] has made restitution carries no mitigating weight given that she did
so only after the initiation of disciplinary proceedings.”).
12
(791 SE2d 783) (2016) (imposing 180-day suspension with conditions
for reinstatement for violations of various Rules including 5.5 (a),
8.1 (a), and 9.3 in connection with five disciplinary matters where
there were significant factors in mitigation); In the Matter of Favors,
283 Ga. 588, 588-589 (662 SE2d 119) (2008) (accepting petition for
voluntary discipline and imposing three-year suspension where
attorney, with no prior disciplinary history, converted client funds
and made false statements to her client and the Bar). After weighing
all the various factors, the Special Master concluded that Hood’s
violations of Rules 1.3, 5.5 (a), 8.1 (a), 8.4 (a) (4), and 9.3 warranted
a one-year suspension of his license to practice law.
Hood timely filed exceptions to the Report and
Recommendation of the Special Master. In his exceptions, Hood
specifically “stipulated and agreed” that his petition for voluntary
discipline “remains of full force and effect in the event the Georgia
Supreme Court ultimately impose[s] a discipline in the range of a
suspension between six-months to two-years.” The State Bar filed a
response in opposition and recommended the imposition of a one13
year suspension. The Review Board concluded that the Special
Master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law were supported by
the record, and it agreed with the Special Master’s findings and
conclusions related to the application of the framework for analyzing
disciplinary matters and related to the level of discipline to be
imposed. Accordingly, the Review Board recommended that Hood be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. Neither
Hood nor the Bar filed exceptions in this Court. Moreover, Hood filed
an express waiver of his right to file exceptions to the Review Board’s
Report and Recommendation.
We have carefully reviewed the entire record in this case and
conclude that a one-year suspension is an insufficient level of
discipline under the facts of this case. This Court has repeatedly
recognized that “[m]aking false statements to the Bar during the
disciplinary process is a very serious matter which typically results
in, at least, a significant suspension from the practice of law.” Iwu,
303 Ga. at 540-541 (citation omitted). See also In the Matter of
O’Brien-Carriman, 291 Ga. 27, 27-29 (727 SE2d 93) (2012)
14
(accepting petition for voluntary discipline, imposing 18-month
suspension for sharing fees with non-lawyer and making false
statements in disciplinary process, where lawyer had no prior
disciplinary record, there was no harm to lawyer’s clients, and there
were significant mitigating factors; we noted that we rejected initial
petition for voluntary discipline that sought three-month
suspension, in part because such a sanction was insufficient in light
of false statements); In the Matter of Shehane, 276 Ga. 168, 169-170
(575 SE2d 503) (2003) (disbarring lawyer who abandoned a client;
made misrepresentations to the client; and made false
representations and submitted fabricated documents to the Bar
during disciplinary proceedings; we noted that we had rejected
petition for voluntary discipline that sought one-year suspension
and explained that “[m]aking deliberate statements of falsehood . . .
to the investigative process established by this Court to aid in the
regulation of the practice of law in Georgia is not tolerated”).
By virtue of his admission that he violated Rule 8.1 (a) in both
SDBD Nos. 7407 and 7470, Hood has admitted that he knowingly
15
made false statements to the Bar in his responses to two separate
disciplinary matters. And, in addition, he admitted to violating Rule
8.4 (a) (4), which also involves engaging in professional conduct
involving dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation. This pattern of
misconduct warrants a sanction more significant than a one-year
suspension, particularly where Hood has a prior disciplinary
history. Nevertheless, Hood has agreed to a suspension of up to two
years, and we conclude that a two-year suspension is necessary in
this case to discipline Hood for his professional misconduct, deter
other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct, and inform the
public that the courts will maintain the ethics of the profession. See
In the Matter of Breault, 318 Ga. 127, 136 (897 SE2d 385) (2024)
(“The sanction imposed for disciplinary infractions should be one
that is sufficient to penalize the offender for his wrongdoing, deter
other attorneys from engaging in similar behavior, and inform the
general public that the courts will maintain the ethics of the
profession.”).
16
Accordingly, it is ordered that Eston William Hood, Jr., be
suspended from the practice of law for two years. The suspension
based on this opinion will take effect as of the date this opinion is
issued and will expire by its own terms two years later. Because
there are no conditions on Hood’s reinstatement other than the
passage of time, there is no need for Hood to take any action either
through the State Bar or through this Court to effectuate his return
to the practice of law. Hood is reminded of his duties pursuant to
Bar Rule 4-219 (b).
Petition for voluntary discipline accepted; two-year suspension.
All the Justices concur.
17