NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: December 10, 2024
S24A1069. WESTON v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
Adrian Darnyell Weston was convicted of malice murder in
connection with the shooting death of Alex Tolbert.1 On appeal,
Weston challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction under OCGA § 24-14-6 and the trial court’s denial of his
motion for new trial on the “general grounds” under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, the
1 The crimes occurred on January 23, 2021. In March 2021, a Morgan
County grand jury indicted Weston for malice murder, felony murder, and
aggravated assault. At a November 2022 jury trial, Weston was found guilty of
all counts. The trial court sentenced Weston to serve life in prison without the
possibility of parole for malice murder; the remaining counts merged or were
vacated by operation of law. Weston filed a timely motion for new trial, which
he later amended. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, as
amended, on April 19, 2024. Weston filed a timely notice of appeal, and the
case was docketed to this Court’s August 2024 term and submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
evidence presented at trial showed as follows. On January 23, 2021,
Tolbert was shot and killed at a Madison hotel. Police found
Tolbert’s body partially blocking the entrance to the hotel room
where he was living at the time; he had been shot 11 times.
Investigators collected fourteen .22-caliber shell casings and three
bullets from the scene. During the investigation of Tolbert’s murder,
Weston was identified as a person of interest due to a history of
conflict between the men. Specifically, in May 2019, Tolbert stabbed
Weston in an altercation. Tolbert was arrested, indicted for
aggravated assault, and reincarcerated for a probation violation
related to a prior conviction. Tolbert was released from prison after
serving the balance of his sentence, and in July 2020, shortly after
his release, Tolbert visited the home of Jimmy Zanders, the uncle of
Weston’s then-girlfriend, where Weston frequently stayed. When
Tolbert knocked on the door, Weston answered and chased Tolbert
off the property. Weston called police about the incident and,
according to the responding officer, was “fixated on the fact that he
had been stabbed previously.” Weston’s then-girlfriend testified that
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Weston spoke to her multiple times over a long period of time
regarding the stabbing incident and his “aggravat[ion]” that Tolbert
had not served any jail time in connection with the assault.
Subsequent investigation revealed that, on the day of the
crimes, Weston was at the Zanders’ home and was overheard on the
phone telling his sister that he was going to kill Tolbert that night.
Weston was observed later that evening leaving the Zanders’ home
with his gun inside a bookbag and walking down a trail. The trail
connected the Zanders’ home and the hotel at which Tolbert was
shot, which are located approximately 400 yards apart. Weston
spoke to his then-girlfriend on the night of the crimes and told her
that “he did something, but he . . . didn’t want to tell details about
it” and that he “f**ked up.” Officers learned that Weston had
previously fired his gun near an outdoor firepit at the Zanders’
home. Testimony at trial established that Weston was the only
person who stayed at the Zanders’ home who possessed a firearm.
Four .22-caliber shell casings collected from the Zanders’ yard were
determined to have been fired from the same gun as the shell casings
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recovered at the crime scene.
Weston fled the state shortly after the crimes. He was arrested
in November 2021 while hiding in the attic of his sister’s residence
in Kansas. Weston phoned his sister from jail, telling her, “When I
was caught, I really wish you hadn’t talked to Mom. She knows it’s
over and done with now.” He also told his mother to “[k]eep [her]
f**king mouth shut.”
On appeal, Weston first asserts that the evidence recounted
above was insufficient to support his convictions as a matter of
Georgia statutory law. Specifically, he complains that the evidence
was circumstantial and did not exclude all reasonable hypotheses
other than his guilt. See OCGA § 24-14-6. “The fact that the evidence
of guilt was circumstantial does not render it insufficient.” Taylor v.
State, 313 Ga. 5, 8 (867 SE2d 88) (2021) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Instead, as we have explained, “[w]hen a conviction is
based on circumstantial evidence, the State must present sufficient
evidence to ‘exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of
the guilt of the accused.’” Hooks v. State, 318 Ga. 850, 853 (2) (b) (901
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SE2d 166) (2024) (quoting OCGA § 24-14-6). Of course, “not every
hypothesis is reasonable,” and there is no requirement that the
evidence “exclude every conceivable inference or hypothesis — only
those that are reasonable.” Clark v. State, 309 Ga. 473, 477 (847
SE2d 364) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in
original). It is for the jury to decide “[w]hether any alternative
hypotheses are reasonable and whether the circumstantial evidence
excludes any such hypotheses,” and “we will not disturb the jury’s
findings on those questions unless they are insupportable as a
matter of law.” Wilson v. State, 319 Ga. 550, 553 (1) (905 SE2d 557)
(2024) (citation and punctuation omitted).
At the outset, we note that Weston has failed to identify any
specific alternative hypothesis that, in his estimation, the State
failed to disprove. Instead, Weston centers his argument on the
assertion that the State failed to present enough persuasive or direct
evidence to establish his guilt and vaguely implies that some
unidentified person was responsible for Tolbert’s murder. To that
end, Weston makes much of inconsistencies in the testimony of
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various witnesses, but “it is axiomatic that resolving evidentiary
conflicts and assessing witness credibility are within the exclusive
province of the jury.” McCoy v. State, 315 Ga. 536, 543 (a) (883 SE2d
740) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). Weston’s complaints
about the State’s failure to present certain types of evidence,
including fingerprint or DNA evidence connecting him to the crime
scene, eyewitness testimony identifying him as the shooter, or a
confession, are equally unavailing because “there is no requirement
that [the State] prove its case with any particular sort of evidence,”
so long as the evidence presented is “competent.” Rodriguez v. State,
309 Ga. 542, 546 (1) (847 SE2d 303) (2020) (citation and punctuation
omitted). Deferring to the jury on these issues of evidentiary weight
and credibility, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient as a matter of Georgia statutory law concerning
circumstantial evidence to support Weston’s conviction for malice
murder.
At trial, the jury heard testimony that Weston, who was armed
with a gun, was observed shortly before the crimes walking toward
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the hotel at which Tolbert was shot and killed. Shell casings
recovered at the crime scene were fired from the same gun as shell
casings recovered at the Zanders’ residence where Weston
frequently stayed, and testimony at trial reflected that Weston was
the only person to have possessed and fired a gun at the Zanders’
residence. Weston made incriminating statements to several people
both before and after the crimes. Additionally, Weston fled the state
after Tolbert’s killing and concealed himself in his sister’s attic in an
attempt to avoid arrest, and there was a history of animosity
between Weston and Tolbert. This evidence was legally sufficient to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than Weston’s guilt. 2 See
OCGA § 24-14-6; Rodriguez, 309 Ga. at 546 (1) (circumstantial
evidence supporting a murder conviction included appellant’s
statements to multiple people that he would kill the victim, evidence
2 Weston also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the
felony murder and aggravated assault counts. That argument is moot,
however, because Weston was not sentenced on those counts; the felony
murder count was vacated by operation of law and the aggravated assault
count merged into the malice murder conviction for sentencing. See Frazier v.
State, 309 Ga. 219, 224 (1) n.7 (845 SE2d 579) (2020).
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placing appellant at or near the crime scene within walking distance
of his apartment, and evidence of a prior altercation between
appellant and the victim); Jenkins v. State, 313 Ga. 81, 88-89 (3) (868
SE2d 205) (2022) (flight from scene of crime, resistance to arrest,
and concealment generally is circumstantial evidence of guilt).
Accordingly, this claim fails.
2. Weston also argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying his motion for new trial on the general grounds, again
focusing on the circumstantial evidence of his guilt. See OCGA §§ 5-5-20 (authorizing grant of new trial if the trial judge concludes that
the jury’s verdict is “contrary to evidence and the principles of justice
and equity”) and 5-5-21 (authorizing grant of new trial if the trial
judge concludes that the jury’s verdict is “decidedly and strongly
against the weight of the evidence”). When a defendant raises the
general grounds in his motion for new trial, the trial court must
“exercise a broad discretion to sit as a ‘thirteenth juror’” and
“consider some of the things that he cannot when assessing the legal
sufficiency of the evidence, including any conflicts in the evidence,
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the credibility of witnesses, and the weight of the evidence.” Hinton
v. State, 312 Ga. 258, 262 (1) (c) (862 SE2d 320) (2021) (citation and
punctuation omitted). On appeal from the denial of such a motion,
this Court reviews “whether the trial court exercised its discretion
as the thirteenth juror, but the decision to grant a new trial on the
general grounds is vested solely in the trial court and is not subject
to our review.” Weems v. State, 318 Ga. 98, 102-103 (3) (897 SE2d
368) (2024).
Here, in its order denying Weston’s motion for new trial, the
trial court recognized its duty to sit as the thirteenth juror and
expressly indicated that it had considered all the evidence presented
at trial, including any conflicts in the evidence, the weight of the
evidence, and the credibility of the testifying witnesses. Based on
that review, the trial court concluded that the State proved Weston’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element of the crimes of
which he was convicted. “The court therefore ruled on the motion
based on its own independent review of the trial record and found
no discrepancy between the jury’s conclusions regarding the weight
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of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses and the court’s
own views of those matters.” Williams v. State, 307 Ga. 689, 691 (1)
(b) (838 SE2d 314) (2020). And because the trial court properly
exercised its discretion under OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21, Weston’s
argument “is otherwise not subject to review by this Court.”3 Weems,
3 Weston does not argue that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction as a matter of federal constitutional due process under Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). In the past, we often
reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of constitutional due
process when considering an appellant’s general-grounds claim. See King v.
State, 316 Ga. 611, 616 (2) n.8 (889 SE2d 851) (2023). But see, e.g., Caviston v.
State, 315 Ga. 279, 282-284 (1) (882 SE2d 221) (2022) (limiting generalgrounds analysis to evaluating whether trial court exercised its discretion);
Butts v. State, 297 Ga. 766, 772 (3) (778 SE2d 205) (2015) (same). But more
recently, many of us have begun to question the propriety of including a
Jackson sufficiency analysis within a general-grounds analysis and have
expressed interest in reexamining it in a case where the issue is properly
presented. See King, 316 Ga. at 616 (2) n.8 (“[M]any of us question whether it
is proper for this Court to import Jackson into an appellate review of the
general grounds (or to otherwise rely on Jackson as part of that analysis).”).
See also, e.g., White v. State, 319 Ga. 367, 374 (2) n.8 (903 SE2d 891) (2024).
Because Weston’s argument in this regard is confined to the nature and weight
of the evidence of his guilt but does not concern the constitutional sufficiency
thereof, we have conducted our analysis to address the argument raised,
without delving into unargued issues. Compare generally Davenport v. State,
309 Ga. 385, 392-399 (4) (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (announcing this Court’s
discontinuation of deciding federal constitutional sufficiency issues sua sponte
in non-death penalty cases and noting that “it is almost always a better course
to decide the appeal the parties bring us”); Scoggins v. State, 317 Ga. 832, 837
(1) (a) n.6 (896 SE2d 476) (2023) (noting that, post-Davenport, “instead of
considering all conceivable sufficiency-related issues, we limit our
consideration to only the argument that [the appellant] actually makes”).
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318 Ga. at 103 (3). See also Brock v. State, 319 Ga. 765, 772 (2) (b)
(906 SE2d 739) (2024) (“[T]he merits of a trial court’s discretion on
the general grounds are not subject to our review — that decision is
vested solely in the trial court.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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