NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: December 20, 2022
S22A1187. BALLINGER, Warden v. WATKINS.
PINSON, Justice.
During Joseph Watkins’s murder trial, a juror conducted a
“drive test” during a break in deliberations to see whether the
defendant could have been physically present at the time and place
the victim was shot. The next day, the jury voted to convict Watkins
of felony murder and other crimes, and he was sentenced to life in
prison. Years later, Watkins’s counsel learned about the juror’s
misconduct and filed the habeas petition in this case. The habeas
court ultimately granted relief on the juror-misconduct claim and
two other grounds. We conclude that Watkins has shown that the
juror’s misconduct caused him actual prejudice—for at least that
juror, her drive test “proved” a key and heavily disputed piece of the
State’s burden of proof against Watkins—and we affirm the grant of
habeas relief on the juror-misconduct claim.
1. Background
(a) Trial and Convictions
(i) On January 11, 2000, Isaac Dawkins was shot once in the
head as he was driving his white pickup truck north on Highway 27
from Floyd College, south of Rome, Georgia. He died the next day.
The physical evidence of the crime was limited: a lead bullet core
recovered from Dawkins’s body during the autopsy, a 9mm cartridge
case found near the crime scene, and a bullet fragment found inside
Dawkins’s car that had markings consistent with having been fired
from a 9mm firearm. No firearm was found.
On the evening of the shooting, Wayne Benson was also driving
north on Highway 27. He noticed a small blue car driving erratically
and interacting with a white pickup truck about a half mile north of
Floyd College. After losing sight of the vehicles “[f]or a few minutes”
and traveling about a mile to a mile-and-a-half down the road,
Benson saw a “flash of some kind” before the white truck drove
across the median, into southbound traffic, and then onto the far
2
shoulder. Benson pulled over and called 911 to report the accident,
and emergency services were dispatched at 7:19 p.m. No one else
witnessed the incident or reported a vehicle interacting with the
white truck.1
(ii) During that same time, Watkins allegedly was at home in
northeast Floyd County, getting ready to drive to see his girlfriend,
who lived 45 minutes south in Cedartown. While getting into his
own white pickup truck, Watkins called his girlfriend at 7:15 p.m.
The call lasted for 4 minutes and 23 seconds and originated in an
area covered by the Kingston cell tower—the only cell tower that
covered Watkins’s house. Watkins’s girlfriend testified that he
arrived in his white pickup truck at her house—south of the crime
scene—around 8:00 p.m.
1 One other witness, Barry Mullinax, a jailhouse informant who spent
time with Watkins’s codefendant Mark Free at a diversion center, also claimed
to have seen the accident, but his testimony not only was internally
inconsistent but also contradicted a statement he previously gave to
investigators after the accident; it appeared that he was actually describing a
different shooting that occurred on Highway 20 West around the same time.
3
The parties’ expert witnesses agreed that Watkins’s cell phone
could not have been located at or near Floyd College when Watkins
called his girlfriend at 7:15 p.m. because that area was not covered
by the Kingston cell tower. The parties’ experts relied on maps and
models of various cell towers in the area when explaining their
opinions to the jury. The maps, which included shaded areas
corresponding to the different cell towers, did not show the exact
bounds of the cell towers based on street names or the exact location
of the crime. Neither expert witness was able to provide an exact
street location where the Kingston cell tower’s coverage ended.
The State argued at trial that Watkins still could have been
physically present at the scene when Dawkins was shot (just before
Benson’s 911 call at 7:19 p.m.). The State explained that Watkins
could have made the phone call at 7:15 p.m. from the absolute last
point within the Kingston tower’s coverage while driving south
toward the crime scene,2 then turned around into the northbound
2Although the expert witnesses had not identified an exact point where
the Kingston cell tower’s coverage ended, the State pointed to the intersection
4
lanes (the direction in which Dawkins was traveling) and arrived at
the crime scene, all in the four minutes between the call to his
girlfriend and the emergency-services dispatch from Benson’s 911
call. Based on this theory, Watkins then would have needed to turn
around again to continue driving south to his girlfriend’s house and
arrive there within 45 minutes of the call he placed to her at 7:15
p.m. No evidence about distances or travel times between the
relevant locations was presented. The State’s theory also did not
account for the fact that Watkins arrived at his girlfriend’s house in
his white pickup truck but the only eyewitness saw a blue car
interact with Dawkins’s truck.
Defense counsel argued that Watkins’s phone call could not
have been initiated from where Benson saw the blue car first
interacting with Dawkins’s truck near Floyd College. Both parties’
expert witnesses agreed. Given the 7:15 p.m. phone call, defense
of Chulio Road and Highway 411 as the starting point from where Watkins
could have driven to the crime scene while calling his girlfriend.
5
counsel argued that Watkins simply could not have been in the blue
car at the relevant times and locations.
(iii) The State’s theory of the case was that Watkins “despised
Isaac Dawkins” because Dawkins had dated Watkins’s ex-girlfriend,
and much of the testimony presented by the State concerned various
incidents and arguments between Dawkins and Watkins. The State
also presented testimony from a number of witnesses about
incriminating statements made by Watkins, but nearly all of those
witnesses were heavily impeached.3
3 For example, Tiffany Sledge testified that Watkins said he “would get
that son-of-a-b***h, Isaac, if it was the last thing he had to do and kill him,”
but she was Watkins’s former coworker who the jury could have believed cut a
deal to testify to benefit her boyfriend who was facing drug charges. Winford
Ellis, a jailhouse informant, allegedly told the State earlier that Watkins was
“laughing because [investigators] were out diving in Swan Lake all day, you
know, dragging the lake” when Watkins said “[the murder weapon is] in a lake
but it’s not in that lake,” but Ellis denied making these statements at trial and
said he had made it all up. Corey Jacobs, who was in jail at the time of
Watkins’s trial, said he overheard Watkins “just bragging about shooting
Isaac” in a home improvement store’s parking lot, but he also said he attended
Pepperell High School with Watkins, yet Watkins did not attend Pepperell.
Josh Flemister had previously told police officers that Watkins told him to say
that Watkins was with him all day the day of the shooting, but he testified at
trial that he made that up, explaining that the police intimidated him because
he was underage and drunk at the police station. And Chad Redden, who was
dating Watkins’s and Dawkins’s ex-girlfriend at the time and previously dated
Watkins’s sister, said Watkins “told me if I had waited a couple of more months
6
The State also sought to link Watkins to Dawkins’s shooting by
presenting the jury with evidence about two deceased dogs. The first
dog was the Dawkins family’s pet, which was shot between the eyes
and killed while chained in a pen in Dawkins’s backyard about three
months before Dawkins’s death. Two witnesses testified that they
had heard from Watkins’s co-defendant, Mark Free, that Watkins
was involved in the shooting of the dog. Free denied making either
statement.
The second dog was found by Dawkins’s father several months
after his son’s death. While visiting Dawkins’s grave, his father
found a trash bag containing the remains of an unknown deceased
dog about 15 feet away from the grave that, based on the presence
of flies and a bad odor around the remains and around the grave,
seemed like it had previously been placed on Dawkins’s grave. Like
Dawkins’s dog, the dog on the grave had been shot between the eyes.
The only evidence presented at trial potentially connecting the
[before talking to the police] for him to get out of all this trouble, I would end up just like Isaac.”
7
second dog to Watkins was the testimony of a jailhouse informant
discussing a conversation he had with Free about the dogs, and Free
again disputed that testimony.
(iv) The jury found Watkins not guilty of malice murder, but
guilty of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault,
aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission
of a crime, and stalking. He was sentenced to serve life in prison for
felony murder, five years consecutive for the possession count, and
12 months for stalking.
After his motion for a new trial was denied, Watkins appealed,
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and certain evidentiary
rulings. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. See
Watkins v. State, 276 Ga. 578 (581 SE2d 23) (2003).
(b) Initial Post-Conviction Proceedings
In 2004, Watkins filed a state habeas petition raising claims of
actual innocence and ineffective assistance of counsel. The habeas
court denied Watkins’s petition in 2011, and this Court denied his
application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal. See Watkins
8
v. Martin, S12H0816 (Oct. 15, 2012). Watkins then brought the
same claims in a federal habeas petition, which the district court
denied. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in turn
denied his request for a certificate of appealability.
(c) Second State Habeas Petition
(i) In 2017, Watkins filed a second state habeas petition,
raising three claims based on evidence newly discovered by his legal
team: (1) a juror-misconduct claim based on an independent drive
test conducted by a juror to test the State’s theory against the cellphone evidence presented; (2) a Brady4 claim based on a .22-caliber
bullet that was found inside the dog found near Dawkins’s grave but
never turned over to the defense team; and (3) a Napue5 claim based
on false or misleading testimony that the State allowed one of its
witnesses to give, which omitted information about the .22-caliber
bullet found in the same dog.6 The State moved to dismiss and, after
4 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (83 SCt 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963).
5 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (79 SCt 1173, 3 LE2d 1217) (1959).
6 Watkins initially raised two additional claims—one based on an alleged
drive test conducted by Fulton County Police Department and one based on
ineffective assistance of counsel—but both claims were abandoned.
9
a non-evidentiary, argument-only hearing, the habeas court
dismissed Watkins’s petition as untimely and successive. Watkins
applied to this Court for a certificate of probable cause to appeal,
which the Court granted. See Watkins v. Ballinger, S19H0061 (July
1, 2019). On appeal, this Court concluded that the habeas court had
erred in dismissing the petition on procedural grounds because
Watkins “alleged facts showing grounds for relief which could not
reasonably have been raised in his original habeas petition and
which could not have been discovered by the reasonable exercise of
due diligence.” Watkins v. Ballinger, 308 Ga. 387, 397 (2) (840 SE2d
378) (2020). We thus reversed the dismissal order and remanded the
case for further proceedings. See id.
(ii) On remand, the habeas court held a three-day evidentiary
hearing. Among other evidence, Watkins presented the testimony of
Juror Rogena Cordle. Cordle testified that she had been confused by
the cell-phone evidence presented at trial. So, after the first day of
deliberations on Saturday, despite the trial court’s explicit
instructions to not “go measuring distances or stopping by the scene
10
and investigating on your own,” 7 she decided to do a drive test to see
whether Watkins could have arrived at the scene of the crime
around the time Dawkins was shot—7:18 or 7:19 p.m. based on the
time of the emergency-services dispatch from Benson’s 911 call—
after making the phone call to his girlfriend from the Kingston
tower’s coverage area at 7:15 p.m.
The next day, a Sunday, Cordle used her car clock to time how
long it took her to drive northbound on Highway 27 from the area of
the crime to the intersection of Chulio Road and Highway 411. As
Cordle acknowledged at the habeas hearing, she drove the route
backwards from end point to start point, her car clock did not
indicate seconds, and she did not account for the time that it would
have taken for Watkins to turn around from traveling south through
the edge of the (supposed) Kingston cell-tower coverage area to head
back north in the direction of the crime. Nor did she account for the
testimony that the shooter had been seen traveling from the south
7Cordle testified that she either did not remember or did not hear this
admonition.
11
in tandem with Dawkins for “a few minutes” and at least a mile
before the shooting. And she did not know exactly where the crime
had occurred or where the Kingston cell tower’s coverage ended.
Nonetheless, based on her drive test, she determined that Watkins
could have been where Dawkins was shot at the relevant time.
On Monday morning, the day after Cordle’s drive test, the jury
voted to convict Watkins. While Cordle testified that she did not
remember telling other jurors about her drive test, she said it was
“possible” she told Watkins’s legal team in 2017 that she had told a
male juror about her test. But she affirmatively testified that she
“kn[e]w [she] told another male juror on Monday morning that I
thought that it was possible that [Watkins] could have traveled the
distance in the allotted time.”
Juror Rosemary Munton Evans, who testified that she suffered
memory loss following a recent heart attack, “[v]ery vaguely”
remembered telling Watkins’s legal team in July of 2021 that a
female juror told her that she had done a drive test during a break
in the deliberations. Juror Kandy Brown testified that she did not
12
remember much about the case, but “I just remember somebody
saying they did an independent study,” although she could not recall
if the person was male or female. Juror Steven Broome did not recall
anything about a juror conducting an independent investigation, but
he also misremembered key details about the case. Juror Alice
Pearson also had no recollection of a juror saying she had done her
own experiment.
(iii) In April 2022, the habeas court granted Watkins’s habeas
petition on three grounds: (1) Cordle’s drive test and her reporting
of its results to other jurors violated Watkins’s due-process and
confrontation rights; (2) the prosecution failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady; and (3) the prosecution
presented and failed to correct false or misleading testimony in
violation of Napue.
As a threshold matter, the habeas court found that these
claims were neither untimely nor barred by Watkins’s failure to
raise them in his prior habeas petition. See OCGA § 9-14-51. A
habeas petition may be filed within four years from “[t]he date on
13
which the facts supporting the claims presented could have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence,” OCGA § 9-14-42
(c) (4), and grounds raised for the first time in a second or successive
habeas petition are not waived if the court “finds grounds for relief
asserted therein which could not reasonably have been raised in the
original or amended petition,” OCGA § 9-14-51. As relevant here,
the court found that Watkins had no reason to have known about
Cordle’s drive test—the factual predicate for his juror-misconduct
claim—before his counsel learned about it in July of 2016, and he
filed the petition within a few months, so the claim “could not
reasonably have been raised” in his original habeas petition, and his
second petition was filed well within four years from the date on
which the factual predicate could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
On the juror-misconduct claim, the habeas court concluded
that Watkins had established a violation of his rights under the
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution,
and Article I, Section I, Paragraphs I and XIV of the Georgia
14
Constitution. The court explained that “it is clear that the evidence
derived from [Cordle’s] drive test constitutes extraneous
information,” which “was considered by her while deliberating the
verdict and was likely considered by the other jurors who learned
about it too.” The court next reasoned that, although prejudice from
such juror misconduct would be presumed on direct appeal, Watkins
was required to show actual prejudice in a habeas proceeding. The
court ultimately determined that Watkins established actual
prejudice. First, the court found that the extraneous information
was obtained from a test designed specifically by the juror to test
critical evidence, which was conducted against explicit instructions
from the trial court and was also “riddled with inaccuracies.”
Second, the court found that the information did reach the jury,
citing the testimony of Cordle, who herself acknowledged that she
had told a male juror either about the drive test or how her opinion
had shifted based on her drive test, and the testimony of the two
jurors who remembered hearing about another juror conducting an
“independent study.” Finally, the court found that the State’s case
15
“was far from overwhelming,” which also weighed in favor of finding
actual prejudice. Based on this review, the court concluded that
Watkins established that he was actually prejudiced by the
extraneous evidence, and so the court granted him a writ of habeas
corpus based on his juror-misconduct claim.
The State appealed.
2. Analysis
In reviewing the grant of a petition for habeas corpus, we
accept the habeas court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, and we
independently apply the law to the facts. See Luckie v. Berry, 305
Ga. 684, 691 (2) (827 SE2d 644) (2019). For reasons we explain
below, we agree with the trial court that Watkins’s juror-misconduct
claim warrants habeas relief. We thus affirm on that basis, so we
need not address the other two grounds on which relief was granted.
(a) We start with a brief preliminary matter: whether
Watkins’s juror-misconduct claim is properly addressed in a habeas
corpus proceeding. Our statute governing post-conviction habeas
16
corpus, OCGA § 9-14-42, limits the kinds of claims a petitioner may
bring in a habeas petition. To seek habeas relief under that statute,
a petitioner must assert “that in the proceedings which resulted in
his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the
Constitution of the United States or of this state.” OCGA § 9-14-42
(a).
Watkins’s juror-misconduct claim fits that bill. Not every
instance of juror misconduct is necessarily an error of constitutional
dimensions. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (II) (102
SCt 940, 71 LE2d 78) (1982) (“[D]ue process does not require a new
trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially
compromising situation. . . . [I]t is virtually impossible to shield
jurors from every contact or influence that might theoretically affect
their vote. Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide
the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever
watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the
effect of such occurrences when they happen.”). But Watkins claims
that a juror gathered information from outside the trial—we have
17
typically called this information “extra-judicial” or “extraneous”—
which was prejudicial to Watkins’s defense and brought it into the
jury room. This particular kind of juror misconduct can violate a
defendant’s “right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against
[him]” under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which applies to the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hammock v. State, 277 Ga.
612, 613 (2) (592 SE2d 415) (2004). See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S.
363, 364 (87 SCt 468, 17 LE2d 420) (1966) (explaining that the Sixth
Amendment was “made applicable to the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”).8 We have explained
8 Federal cases are in accord. See Parker, 385 U.S. at 364–365 (holding
that a bailiff’s statements to several jurors regarding the defendant’s guilt
were prejudicial and violated the defendant’s rights of confrontation and crossexamination); Ward v. Hall, 592 F3d 1144, 1175 (II) (E) (11th Cir. 2010)
(explaining that a jury’s use of extra-judicial information—here, a bailiff’s
response to a juror about whether life in prison without parole was a
sentencing option—violates the Sixth Amendment because “[i]ntegral to th[e
Sixth Amendment] right is the requirement that a jury base its verdict on the
evidence presented at trial”); Oliver v. Quarterman, 541 F3d 329, 334 (III) (A)
(5th Cir. 2008) (noting, in the context of a juror reciting passages from the Bible on obeying the law and punishing murderers to a small group of jurors during
deliberations, that external influences on a jury are a potential violation of the Sixth Amendment); United States v. Perkins, 748 F2d 1519, 1533–1534 (IV) (C)
18
that the constitutional right to confront witnesses is implicated by
jurors who do extra-judicial research—like visiting the crime
scene—because they “bec[o]me, in a real sense, unsworn witnesses
against the [defendant] in violation of the Sixth Amendment.”
Watkins v. State, 237 Ga. 678, 684 (229 SE2d 465) (1976) (relying on
Parker, 385 U.S. at 364). And “the rights of confrontation and crossexamination are among the fundamental requirements of a
constitutionally fair trial.” Id. (quoting Parker, 385 U.S. at 365). See
also id. at 685 (“[T]he intentional gathering of extra judicial
evidence, highly prejudicial to the accused, by members of the jury
and the communication of that information to the other jurors in the
closed jury room is inimical to our present jury trial system.”). So
Watkins has asserted a constitutional claim that is cognizable in
habeas.9
(11th Cir. 1984) (noting that “[t]he sixth amendment guarantee of a trial by
jury requires the jury verdict to be based on the evidence produced at trial,”
where a juror stated during deliberations that he knew the defendant and
disputed the defendant’s testimony of where a person relevant to the trial
lived).
9 The State conceded at oral argument that the alleged juror misconduct
here rose to the level of a constitutional violation if the habeas court’s factual findings were upheld.
19
(b) A constitutional claim grounded in jurors’ exposure to extrajudicial information ultimately turns on whether the defendant was
prejudiced by the exposure. See Hammock, 277 Ga. at 613 (2) (“[A
defendant’s] constitutional right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against [him] . . . is violated when a juror gathers and
relays extra-judicial information that is so prejudicial that the
verdict must be deemed ‘inherently lacking in due process.’” (citation
and punctuation omitted)); Ward v. Hall, 592 F3d 1144, 1178–1180
(II) (E) (11th Cir. 2010) (“ultimate inquiry” for claim that juror was
exposed to “extraneous information” is whether the outside
“intrusion affect[ed] the jury’s deliberations and thereby its verdict”
(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (113 SCt 1770,
123 LE2d 508) (1993))). In this context, we have said that “a new
trial will be granted if ‘there is a reasonable possibility that the
improper evidence collected by jurors contributed to the conviction,’”
because a verdict based on such extra-judicial information is
“‘inherently lacking in due process.’” Hammock, 277 Ga. at 613–614
(2) (quoting Bobo v. State, 254 Ga. 146, 146, 148 (1) (327 SE2d 208)
20
(1985); Williams v. State, 252 Ga. 7, 8 (1) (310 SE2d 528) (1984)).
Below, the habeas court placed the burden on Watkins to show
actual prejudice, reasoning that although prejudice from a juror’s
exposure to extra-judicial information would be presumed on direct
appeal, see Harris v. State, 314 Ga. 51, 53 (2) (875 SE2d 649) (2022),
it was Watkins’s burden as a habeas petitioner to prove actual
prejudice, see Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 828 (2) (b) (493 SE2d
900) (1997).10 Watkins argues before us that he is entitled to a
10 The habeas court’s determination that Watkins must prove actual
prejudice would seem to be well grounded in a habeas petitioner’s typical
burden to show both cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bar
for claims raised in habeas proceedings. See OCGA § 9-14-48 (d) (providing
that habeas relief is unavailable absent “a showing of cause” for the failure to
properly assert or preserve claims of error and “actual prejudice”). As we
explained in Greer v. Thompson, 281 Ga. 419 (637 SE2d 698) (2006), “[e]ven if
the law presumes prejudice for certain errors when they are timely raised, a
convicted defendant who . . . is seeking to overcome a procedural bar . . . does
not have the benefit of that presumption of prejudice, and must instead meet
the actual prejudice test.” Id. at 421–422 (citation and punctuation omitted).
See also Whatley v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Ctr., 927 F3d
1150, 1186 n.60 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Even outside the ineffective assistance of
counsel context, the Supreme Court of Georgia has made clear that ‘a convicted
defendant seeking to overcome a procedural bar is not entitled to the benefit of
a presumption of prejudice that would otherwise apply.’ Instead, the defendant
must show actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bar.” (quoting Todd,
268 Ga. at 828 (2) (b))).
We note that below, neither the parties nor the habeas court addressed
OCGA § 9-14-48 (d) or the threshold cause-and-prejudice showing it requires
21
presumption of prejudice, and that the State had the burden to rebut
that presumption by showing that the exposure was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. But Watkins wins either way: even
assuming he must prove actual prejudice to prevail on his jurormisconduct claim, he has.
As a general matter, showing actual prejudice means showing
“not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of
prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial
disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional
dimensions.” Todd, 268 Ga. at 828 (2) (b) (quoting United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (IV) (102 SCt 1584, 71 LE2d 816) (1982)).
And specific to juror misconduct, we have explained that a court
to overcome that provision’s procedural bar. We see no apparent reason why
this showing of cause and prejudice would not be required here. But we need
not decide whether that showing was required, or whether the State waived
that issue by failing to raise it below or before us. The State does not challenge on appeal the habeas court’s conclusion that the juror-misconduct claim could
not reasonably have been raised before Cordle’s drive test came to light in
2016; that finding would also establish cause. See Todd, 268 Ga. at 825 (2) (a)
(cause to overcome procedural bar may be established where “the factual or
legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel” at trial or on
appeal (citation and punctuation omitted)). And as we explain below, Watkins
has established actual prejudice from Cordle’s drive test.
22
assessing prejudicial impact properly considers “the type of extrajudicial information at issue (e.g., whether the information
concerned sentencing or the underlying substantive law),” “how the
extra-judicial information might have been relevant to the issues
decided by the jury,” and “whether the record evidence suggested
that this . . . information would affect the jury’s decision on guilt or
innocence.” Harris, 314 Ga. at 56 (2) n.4 (cleaned up).
Here, the habeas court did not err in concluding that Watkins
established actual prejudice from Cordle’s unauthorized drive test.
That conclusion follows in large part from the drive test’s
significance in relation to the evidence that was properly before the
jury. That evidence showed that Watkins’s call to his girlfriend at
7:15 p.m. pinged off of a cell tower that did not cover the crime scene,
and the 911 dispatch received the call about Dawkins’s shooting at
7:19 p.m. Naturally, this evidence called into question whether
Watkins could even have been physically present when Dawkins
was shot. The State argued that he could have made it to the crime
scene in time if he had made his call just before reaching the
23
southernmost boundary of the cell tower’s coverage; traveled for
some unknown distance to at least one mile south of the crime scene;
turned around to drive north on Highway 27; “interacted” with
Dawkins’s truck in a blue car while traveling the distance back to
the crime scene; and a little later, shot Dawkins before Benson called
911. But no evidence was introduced as to the time, distances, or any
other specifics of this hypothetical route. We need not speculate
about whether this was a significant sticking point in the State’s
case, at least for Cordle: her drive test was designed and carried out
specifically to address this key issue. In short, there is little question
that the extra-judicial information here was highly pertinent to a
critical substantive issue in the case.
Given the significance of the drive test, we cannot say the
habeas court erred in concluding that it caused Watkins actual
prejudice. Putting aside its serious flaws, the drive test “worked to
[Watkins’s] actual and substantial disadvantage,” Todd, 268 Ga. at
828 (citation and punctuation omitted), because it “proved” to at
least one juror (Cordle) that Watkins could have been physically
24
present when Dawkins was shot, clearing up and satisfying a key
and heavily disputed question of fact necessary to meet the State’s
burden of proof against Watkins. See Hammock, 277 Ga. at 614 (2)
(concluding that there was prejudice when a juror sought to “fill in
the gap left by the blood splatter expert’s testimony” by conducting
measurements in her own house similar to those made at the crime
scene); Watkins, 237 Ga. at 683 (concluding prejudice existed when
“two jurors made an unauthorized visit to the scene of the crime and
gauged the time it took to drive from there to appellant’s house”).
That prejudice conclusion gains further support from the sequence
of events: deliberations began on a Saturday and concluded without
reaching a verdict that evening; Cordle conducted her drive test on
Sunday; and on Monday morning, the jury voted to convict Watkins.
See Bobo, 254 Ga. at 148 (1) (explaining that prejudice was shown
in part because “the vote shifted in favor of conviction after the
improper evidence was introduced into the deliberations”). Although
we cannot know exactly what moved the needle for the jury between
25
Saturday and Monday,11 this timing is consistent with the
conclusion that the extra-judicial information here contributed to
the verdict. See United States v. Perkins, 748 F2d 1519, 1534 (IV)
(C) (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that “[t]he likelihood of prejudice on the
jury is obvious” when “a jury which for many hours had remained
hopelessly deadlocked” then reached a verdict after the introduction
of the extra-judicial information in question).
The State does not dispute that Cordle conducted the drive test
or that she determined, based on that test, that Watkins could have
been physically present when Dawkins was shot. Instead, the State
argues that the habeas court clearly erred in finding that Cordle
shared her drive test or its results with the other jurors. But even
assuming all of the findings that Cordle shared anything with other
11 Although jurors may testify about whether they were exposed to
“extraneous prejudicial information” or any improper “outside influence,” they
may not testify about “the effect of anything upon the jury deliberations or any
other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent
from the verdict . . . or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection
therewith.” OCGA § 24-6-606 (b). Consistent with that limitation, the habeas
court noted that Watkins did not ask jurors about, and the court expressly did
not consider, “the subjective effect of the extraneous evidence on the jury’s
verdict.”
26
jurors were clear error—a doubtful conclusion on this record12—
Watkins has still shown actual prejudice because there is no dispute
that the extra-judicial information here was introduced to and
affected at least one juror: Cordle herself. A guilty verdict in a
criminal case requires a unanimous vote, see Glass v. State, 250 Ga.
736, 737 (300 SE2d 812) (1983) (explaining that “a criminal
defendant has a right to a unanimous jury verdict” unless the
defendant waives that right); Ramos v. Louisiana, ___ U.S. ___ (140
SCt 1390, 206 LE2d 583) (2020) (explaining that the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial requires a unanimous verdict to
convict a defendant of a serious offense in state court and in federal
court), so showing that even one juror based a verdict on extrajudicial information can establish prejudice. See Turpin v. Todd, 271
12 As we recounted above, one juror testified at the habeas hearing that
she remembered “somebody said they did an independent study.” Another
testified that she vaguely remembered “[s]omebody talking about [a drive
test].” Cordle testified, “I know I told another male juror on Monday morning
that I thought that it was possible that [Watkins] could have traveled the
distance in the allotted time.” And when asked at the hearing if she told anyone
about the driving test specifically, she testified, “I don’t think I did,” but she “may have” previously said that she told a male juror about the drive test. The
habeas court found the testimony of these jurors to be credible.
27
Ga. 386, 389 (519 SE2d 678) (1999) (upholding the habeas court’s
finding of actual prejudice based in part on the fact that “there was
a substantial probability that at least one juror would have voted for
life imprisonment” instead of the death penalty but for the improper
communication with the bailiff).13 Just so here.
In sum, the habeas court did not err in concluding that Watkins
has shown that Cordle’s improper drive test caused him actual
13 The State cites a handful of decisions in which we rejected jurormisconduct claims based in part on the finding that the juror exposed to extrajudicial information did not share it with other jurors. But our holding in each
of those cases was grounded in a determination that no juror’s verdict was
affected by the extra-judicial information at issue. See Burney v. State, 309 Ga.
273, 292–294 (5) (845 SE2d 625) (2020) (on direct appeal, holding that the State
rebutted the presumption of prejudice where a juror who had looked up the
definitions of “malice” and “malice murder” on her cell phone did not share the
results of her searches with the jury or make any argument about what she
read in deliberations, the trial court recharged the jury after the alleged
misconduct, and there was no evidence that any of the jurors “relied upon
anything other than the court’s instructions in reaching their verdicts”);
Hodges v. State, 302 Ga. 564, 568–569 (4) (807 SE2d 856) (2017) (on direct
appeal, holding that the State rebutted the presumption of prejudice from a
juror’s referring to a dictionary application during deliberations, where the
juror testified that the search had no impact on her as a juror, and there was
no evidence she shared any of her search results with other jurors); Pass v.
State, 273 Ga. 534, 535–536 (2) (543 SE2d 719) (2001) (rejecting jurormisconduct claim based on juror seeing a defense witness interacting with the
defendant’s family members, where all jurors “submitted affidavits that the
verdict was based solely on the evidence presented in the courtroom and not
on any extra-judicial event,” and “there was no intentional gathering of extrajudicial evidence by members of the jury and no showing that what one juror
witnessed was communicated to the other jurors”).
28
prejudice. See Hammock, 277 Ga. at 614 (2); Bobo, 254 Ga. at 148;
Watkins, 237 Ga. at 683–685. We therefore affirm the habeas court’s
grant of habeas relief based on Watkins’s juror-misconduct claim.
Because that ground alone warrants habeas relief, we need not
address the remaining grounds on appeal.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
29