NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: October 4, 2022
S22Y1159. IN THE MATTER OF TRENT LEE COGGINS.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of Special Master Jack J. Helms, Jr., who
recommends that the Court accept the petition for voluntary
discipline filed by respondent Trent Lee Coggins (State Bar No.
173299) pursuant to Bar Rule 4-227 (c) after the filing of a formal
complaint. Coggins asks that the Court impose a suspension of six
months, nunc pro tunc to September 1, 2021, for his admitted
violations of Rules 1.15 (I) (a) – (b), and 1.15 (II) (a) – (c), of the
Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).
The maximum penalty for a violation of Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II)
(a) and (b) is disbarment. The maximum penalty for a violation of
Rule 1.15 (II) (c) is a public reprimand.
In his report, the Special Master made the following findings
of fact:
Coggins, who has been a member of the Bar since 2001, owned
his own law practice and represented clients in commercial and
residential real estate transactions, acting at times as a closing
attorney and receiving and disbursing client and third-party funds
required to be held in an IOLTA account. Coggins maintained two
IOLTA accounts with Guardian Bank of Valdosta (“Guardian
Bank”).
On May 27, 2016, Coggins acted as the closing attorney on the
sale of four residential lots owned by Palm Beach Development, LLC
(“PBD”), which were part of a 41-lot parcel owned by PBD. At the
time of the sale, Coggins’s client was and remains the sole member
of PBD.
Several years prior to the sale, in 2010, the client borrowed
$136,555.24 from a third party (the “Loan”). Although Coggins was
not involved in either the origination or the closing of the Loan,
Coggins understood that the Loan was secured by PBD’s ownership
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interest in the 41-lot parcel and that his client had provided the
third party with a security deed to the 41 lots as collateral for the
Loan.
Additionally, prior to the May 2016 closing, Coggins was
present and overheard a telephone conversation between his client
and the third party in which they discussed applying the proceeds
of the sale of the four lots towards repayment of the Loan. Coggins
believed that the third party would release the four lots from the
security deed upon application of the proceeds of the sale of those
lots toward repayment of the Loan. Indeed, in connection with this
disciplinary matter, the third party represented to the State Bar
that he agreed to accept the proceeds of the sale of the four lots as
payment towards the debt. Coggins’s client also affirmatively
represented in an affidavit to the State Bar that, at the time of the
May 2016 closing, he was under the impression that a written
release was sent to the third party. The client further represented
to the State Bar that, in June 2017, the third party acknowledged
having received a release. However, notwithstanding the client’s
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representations to the State Bar, Coggins admits that the record in
this case does not include a written release, and no such release ever
existed.
Following the closing on May 27, 2016, Coggins deposited
$49,898.91 into one of his IOLTA accounts at Guardian Bank, which
amount represented the gross proceeds from the sale of the four lots.
On the same day, Coggins wrote several checks from this IOLTA
account in connection with the closing, including Check No. 5016 in
the amount of $33,096.94 made payable to the third party, which
Coggins understood would be applied as partial repayment of the
Loan. According to the third party, sometime after the closing in
2016, he attempted to negotiate Check No. 5016 at a Regions Bank,
but the teller informed him that the IOLTA account did not have
sufficient funds for the check to be honored.
More than a year later, in June 2017, the third party contacted
Coggins’s client and requested a replacement check, representing
that Check No. 5016 had been dishonored by the bank due to the
length of time that had elapsed since it was issued. The client told
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the third party that he would request a replacement check from
Coggins, but the client did not do so.
Almost three years later, on May 14, 2019, the third party,
through counsel, sent Coggins a written demand to replace Check
No. 5016, maintaining that the check had been dishonored for
insufficient funds. Coggins contacted the third party’s counsel and
offered to tender the amount of the check—i.e., $33,096.94—
immediately, but the third party refused the offer, purportedly in
order to pressure Coggins’s client to repay the full amount due on
the Loan.
On May 30, 2019, the third party commenced foreclosure
proceedings against the 41-lot parcel, setting July 2, 2019, as the
date of the non-judicial foreclosure sale. The day before the sale,
Coggins, on behalf of his client, wired $208,853.15 from his IOLTA
account to the third party in full settlement of the Loan. The third
party and Coggins’s client agreed that $33,096.94 of the $208,853.15
would satisfy the net proceeds due to the third party in connection
with the May 27, 2016 closing of the four lots.
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While the issue of whether Check No. 5016 was actually
dishonored by the bank remains in dispute,1 Coggins admitted that
on 35 occasions between December 2016 and June 2019, the average
daily balance of his IOLTA account dropped below $33,096.94, such
that he would have had insufficient funds to cover the obligation to
the third party in connection with the May 27, 2016 closing.
According to Coggins, the shortfall in funds in his IOLTA account on
those occasions was caused by his lack of understanding of proper
trust account management, which resulted in his failure to maintain
a ledger of every transaction and a failure to reconcile the IOLTA
account on a regular basis.
Coggins also admitted that between June 2019 and October
2019, he transferred unearned client funds from the IOLTA account
into his business operating account, which he used in support of his
other business interests that were at risk of financial collapse.
1 According to an affidavit of an employee of Guardian Bank submitted
in connection with these disciplinary proceedings, the bank has no record of
Check No. 5016 having ever been presented through the bank’s tracking
system, and thus, it was never dishonored.
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Coggins explained that, in 2019, he was involved in a high-profile
development project in his community that unexpectedly required
an infusion of capital, and his only two options were either to go into
default with the project sponsors—facing a very public
embarrassment and damage to his reputation—or borrow funds
from the IOLTA account. Coggins acknowledged that he made the
wrong choice and explained that he did so based on his fear of being
humiliated in the community where he has lived, raised a family,
and practiced law for over 20 years. The parties acknowledged that
Coggins had made restitution for each unauthorized transfer from
the IOLTA account and that all parties have been made whole.
The Special Master concluded that Coggins admitted that he
violated Rule 1.15 (I) (a) by failing to maintain third-party funds and
other client funds in his IOLTA account at all times and keep those
funds separate from his own funds, and by failing to keep and
preserve complete records of those funds held in his IOLTA account.
In addition, Coggins admitted that he violated Rule 1.15 (I) (b) when
he disregarded the third party’s interest in the $33,096.94 by not
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maintaining it at all times in the IOLTA account and by not keeping
it separate from his personal funds. Moreover, Coggins admitted to
violating Rule 1.15 (II) (a) by administering part of the funds held
for the third party in his IOLTA account to someone other than the
third party without authorization. He also admitted to violating
Rule 1.15 (II) (b) by depositing personal funds into the IOLTA
account; holding personal funds in his IOLTA account beyond the
time when they were earned; failing to maintain a ledger for the
IOLTA account showing the balances held for each client or third
person; and withdrawing funds from the IOLTA account for personal
use that were not earned fees debited against the account of a
specific client and recorded as such. Finally, Coggins admitted that
he violated Rule 1.15 (II) (c) in that the funds he held in the IOLTA
account were not available for the third party to withdraw upon
request without delay.
The Special Master stated that he relied on the ABA Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions for guidance in determining the
appropriate level of punishment in this disciplinary case, see In the
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Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652 (470 SE2d 232) (1996), noting that he
would consider the duties violated (as recited above), Coggins’s
mental state, the actual or potential injury caused by his
misconduct, and the aggravating and mitigating factors. See ABA
Standard 3.0.
As for Coggins’s mental state, the Special Master concluded
that Coggins admitted that he knowingly and intentionally misused
client and third-party funds to prevent the failure of his business
venture, but that some of his violations also arose from his failure to
appreciate the importance of trust account management according
to the requirements of Rules 1.15 (I) and 1.15 (II), which sounded in
negligence.
As for the actual or potential injury caused, the Special Master
concluded that given the third party’s apparent inaction for three
years, it did not appear that he had suffered any actual injury in
2016 when he may or may not have attempted to negotiate Check
No. 5016; however, even assuming that he never tried to cash the
check, the Special Master concluded that the third party still
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suffered some actual injury when the $33,096.94 went unpaid for a
period of time following his counsel’s specific, written demand for
payment. As for potential injury, the Special Master also noted that
Coggins admitted that the third party was exposed to potential
financial harm by virtue of Coggins not maintaining sufficient funds
to cover Check No. 5016 at all relevant times; that the owners of the
four lots were also exposed to injury when the third-party’s counsel
initiated non-judicial foreclosure against those properties; and that
the deficit in the trust account had the potential to undermine the
integrity of the significant funds Coggins held on deposit for
numerous clients and third persons between 2016 and 2019.
As for aggravating factors, the Special Master considered
Coggins’s substantial experience in the practice of law and his
dishonest and selfish motive in using client funds to pay for his
business interests. See ABA Standard 9.22 (b) and (i). As for
mitigating factors, the Special Master considered Coggins’s personal
problems—primarily his lapse of judgment in fearing public
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humiliation2—which the Special Master concluded provided a
limited degree of mitigation, and the fact that Coggins made a
timely, good faith effort to make restitution and rectify the
consequences of his misconduct. See ABA Standard 9.32 (c) and (d).
In addition, the Special Master noted that Coggins had submitted
character references that attested to his professionalism, integrity,
and commitment to public services and that he had shown genuine
remorse. See ABA Standard 9.32 (g) and (l).
As for the level of discipline, the Special Master determined
that, while this Court “views trust account violations as
exceptionally serious” and the maximum penalty for any “single
violation” of Rules 1.15 (I) or 1.15 (II) is disbarment, disbarment is
generally reserved for the most egregious circumstances. In the
Matter of Coulter, 304 Ga. 81, 83 (816 SE2d 1) (2018). See also, e.g.,
In the Matter of Hunt, 304 Ga. 635 (820 SE2d 716) (2018) (concluding
that disbarment was appropriate where multiple aggravating
2 We question whether the fear of public humiliation from financial
losses is truly a mitigating circumstance, but given the other mitigating
circumstances, it does not change the result here.
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factors existed and the attorney, who was entrusted with a minor’s
settlement proceeds, spent the entire sum on personal and business
expenses); In the Matter of Wathen, 290 Ga. 438 (721 SE2d 899)
(2012) (holding that disbarment was appropriate where no
mitigating factors and numerous aggravating factors were found,
and the attorney settled a claim without the client’s authority and
converted the settlement proceeds for the attorney’s personal use).
The Special Master concluded that, in marked contrast, where
the totality of the circumstances supported less severe discipline,
this Court has without hesitation imposed a suspension or
reprimand for trust account violations. See, e.g., In the Matter of
Terrell, 291 Ga. 91 (727 SE2d 499) (2012) (imposing six-month
suspension where attorney settled case for $98,250 and deposited
funds into IOLTA account but failed to maintain sufficient funds to
cover obligation during six-month period; attorney provided prompt
restitution, lacked prior discipline, and references supported
attorney’s good character); In the Matter of Summers, 278 Ga. 57
(597 SE2d 364) (2004) (six-month suspension imposed where
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attorney held client funds in IOLTA account for over four years,
during which time the account at times contained insufficient funds
to cover the obligation, but attorney made restitution, cooperated
with State Bar, and expressed remorse); In the Matter of Drucker,
274 Ga. 536 (556 SE2d 129) (2001) (imposing six-month suspension
where attorney converted client settlement funds and ignored
numerous client requests for funds, but where attorney had repaid
the funds, had no prior disciplinary history, and personal and
emotional factors were present); In the Matter of deRosay, 268 Ga.
868 (494 SE2d 339) (1998) (imposing six-month suspension where
attorney wrote checks to himself against IOLTA account but made
complete restitution, filed petition for voluntary discipline and was
cooperative, expressed remorse, had no disciplinary record, and
demonstrated mitigating personal issues).
Here, the Special Master concluded that Coggins’s misconduct,
although certainly serious, was mitigated by a number of
considerations that tended to offset or deemphasize the aggravating
factors, including his restitution, general acceptance of
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responsibility, remorse, and lack of any prior disciplinary history.
Thus, the Special Master determined that a six-month suspension
was appropriate. Moreover, the Special Master concluded that it
would be appropriate for the suspension to be imposed nunc pro tunc
to September 1, 2021, the date that Coggins stopped practicing law,
by closing his law office and his trust accounts, and withdrawing
properly from all representations. Coggins appended to his Petition
for Voluntary Discipline sworn evidence that documented the
termination of his law practice. See In the Matter of Onipede, 288
Ga. 156, 157 (702 SE2d 136) (2010) (“[W]hen an attorney requests
[discipline] nunc pro tunc, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to
demonstrate that [he] voluntarily stopped practicing law, the date
on which [his] law practice ended, and that [he] complied with all
the ethical obligations implicated in such a decision, such as
assisting clients in securing new counsel and facilitating the
transfer of client files and critical information about ongoing cases
to new counsel.”). The State Bar indicates that it does not oppose
the imposition of a six-month suspension, nunc pro tunc to
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September 1, 2021.
We have reviewed the record and agree that a six-month
suspension, nunc pro tunc to September 1, 2021, is an appropriate
sanction for Coggins’s violations. Accordingly, we hereby accept
Coggins’s petition for voluntary discipline and order that Coggins be
suspended from the practice of law nunc pro tunc to September 1,
2021. Given that Coggin’s six-month suspension would now be
completed, he is also hereby reinstated.3
Petition for voluntary discipline accepted. Six-month
suspension nunc pro tunc; reinstated. All the Justices concur.
3 However, given Coggins’s lack of understanding of proper trust account
management, we urge him to utilize the State Bar’s Law Practice Management
Program and other resources designed to prevent a future failure to meet the
professional obligations of a Georgia lawyer.
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