*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
30-SEP-2025
02:31 PM
Dkt. 33 OP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII
---o0o---MĀLAMA KAKANILUA, an unincorporated association;
CLARE H. APANA; and KANILOA LANI KAMAUNU,
Petitioners/Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS,
COUNTY OF MAUI; and MAUI LANI PARTNERS, a domestic partnership,
Respondents/Defendants-Appellees.
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 2CC181000122)
SEPTEMBER 30, 2025
McKENNA, EDDINS, AND DEVENS, JJ.,
WITH GINOZA, J., DISSENTING AND CONCURRING,
WITH WHOM RECKTENWALD, C.J., JOINS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY DEVENS, J.
I. INTRODUCTION
The dispositive question raised in this appeal is whether a
motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to Hawaiʻi Rules of
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 60(b)(6) (eff. 2006) is a “tolling
motion” that extends the time to file a notice of appeal under
Hawaiʻi Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 4(a)(3) (eff.
2016). We answer in the affirmative.
This case arises from a dispute over the extension of a
grading and grubbing permit by the Director of the Department of
Public Works (Director), County of Maui (County) (collectively,
County Respondents), issued to Maui Lani Partners (MLP). The
permit was for excavation work at a residential development
project that has ancestral Hawaiian burial sites.
In March 2018, Mālama Kakanilua, an unincorporated
association, and its members, Clare H. Apana and Kaniloa Lani
Kamaunu (collectively, Petitioners) filed an action challenging
the validity of the permit extension against MLP and County
Respondents in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit (circuit
court).
In April 2018, County Respondents and MLP each filed a
motion to dismiss the case pursuant to HRCP Rule 12(b)(6) (eff.
2000). Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment.
Following a hearing on the motions, the circuit court granted
County Respondents’ and MLP’s motions to dismiss the complaint
on all counts without prejudice and consequently denied
2
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment. 1 The circuit court
entered final judgment on October 2, 2018.
On October 29, 2018, pursuant to HRCP Rule 60(b)(6),
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the circuit
court’s grant of the motions to dismiss as to Count III and
final judgment, which County Respondents and MLP opposed.
On January 25, 2019, the circuit court denied Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration and awarded costs to MLP.
On February 23, 2019, Petitioners filed a notice of appeal
with the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) appealing the
circuit court’s orders granting MLP’s bill of costs and denying
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and the final judgment
of dismissal without prejudice.
In a Summary Disposition Order (SDO), the ICA affirmed the
circuit court’s charge of costs and the denial of Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration. However, determining that
Petitioner’s notice of appeal was untimely, the ICA did not
reach the merits of Petitioners’ appeal of the circuit court’s
dismissal of Petitioners’ complaint. The ICA applied the
holdings from its prior decisions which treated an HRCP Rule
60(b) motion as extending the deadline to file an appeal under
HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) if the motion was filed within ten days of a
1 The Honorable Joseph E. Cardoza presided.
3
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
judgment. Those ICA decisions construed an HRCP Rule 60(b)
post-judgment motion as a timely HRCP Rule 59(e) motion when
filed within ten days of a judgment. In this case, because
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was filed after the tenday period, the ICA concluded that the motion did not “toll” the
deadline to file a notice of appeal, rendering Petitioners’
appeal untimely.
Petitioners ask this court to review for error whether
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to HRCP
Rule 60(b) extended or “tolled” the time in which Petitioners
could file a notice of appeal under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3). They
argue that pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(a)(3), an HRCP Rule 60(b)
motion for reconsideration is itself a “tolling motion” because
it is made pursuant to a rule moving the court “to reconsider,
alter or amend the judgment” and also specifies “the time by
which the motion shall be filed[.]” They assert that HRCP Rule
60(b)’s allotted time in which to file a motion for
reconsideration is specified as “within a reasonable time.”
Petitioners also argue that the ICA erred in affirming the
circuit court’s denial of their HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for
reconsideration.
On this record, we hold that the ICA erred in concluding
that Petitioners’ HRCP Rule 60(b) motion did not extend the time
4
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
to file a timely appeal under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3). HRAP
Rule 4(a)(3) specifically provides that a motion to “reconsider”
extends the time to file a notice of appeal until thirty days
after an order disposing of the motion is entered. HRCP Rule
60(b) also specifies the time in which a motion filed under that
rule must be filed as “within a reasonable time.” And as HRCP
Rule 60(b) also provides that the motion “does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation[,]” we hold that
when a Rule 60(b) motion is filed “within a reasonable time” and
prior to the deadline for a timely appeal as set forth by HRAP
Rule 4(a)(1) (eff. 2016), the Rule 60(b) motion extends the time
to appeal in accordance with HRAP Rule 4(a)(3). We also hold
that the ICA did not err when it affirmed the circuit court’s
denial of Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Circuit Court Proceedings
1. Petitioner’s Complaint
Petitioners filed their complaint asserting three causes of
action: injunctive relief (Count I), a quo warranto claim (Count
II), and declaratory judgment (Count III).
Petitioners alleged that in September 2014, MLP had applied
to County Respondents for a grading and grubbing permit, which
would allow MLP to excavate ground material at its Phase IX site
which was part of MLP’s larger residential project located in
5
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
the County’s Wailuku-Kahului Project District 1 (Maui Lani
Project). Petitioners alleged that MLP had prepared an
archaeological monitoring plan (AMP) for Phase IX of the Maui
Lani Project recommending archaeological monitoring at the
project site as highly warranted due to numerous primary burial
features and secondarily deposited human skeletal remains within
the Maui Lani landholdings. Petitioners further alleged that in
November 2014, the State Historic Preservation Division (SHPD)
accepted MLP’s 2013 AMP; and in December 2014, County
Respondents approved Grading Permit No. 20140191 (grading
permit) for Maui Lani Phase IX, which was valid until
December 8, 2017.
Petitioners alleged two relevant events took place in
November 2017: (1) in a separate but related action, the circuit
court entered a preliminary injunction on November 16, 2017,
which halted ground disturbing activity unless Petitioners were
notified forty eight hours in advance and their representative
could be present to view the work; and (2) on November 20, 2017,
County Respondents (a DPW administrator) granted MLP a one-year
extension of the grading permit to December 8, 2018.
Petitioners further claimed that in January 2018, they
wrote to the Director requesting recission of the grading permit
extension. Petitioners alleged that in February 2018, the
Director denied the rescission request after stating there was
6
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
good cause for the permit extension, and that SHPD had not
responded to the Director’s July 2017 letter concerning MLP’s
alleged non-compliance with the AMP.
In Count I of their complaint, Petitioners sought
injunctive relief against the Director’s renewal of MLP’s
grading permit for violation of Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) §
6E-42 (2009 & Supp. 2015) 2 and Maui County Code (MCC) § 20.08.080
2 HRS § 6E-42 provides:
(a) Except as provided in section 6E-42.2, before any agency or
officer of the State or its political subdivisions approves any
project involving a permit, license, certificate, land use
change, subdivision, or other entitlement for use, which may
affect historic property, aviation artifacts, or a burial site,
the agency or office shall advise the department and prior to any
approval allow the department an opportunity for review and
comment on the effect of the proposed project on historic
properties, aviation artifacts, or burial sites, consistent with
section 6E-43, including those listed in the Hawaii register of
historic places. If:
(1) The proposed project consists of corridors or large
land areas;
(2) Access to properties is restricted; or
(3) Circumstances dictate that construction be done in
stages,
the department’s review and comment may be based on a phased
review of the project; provided that there shall be a
programmatic agreement between the department and the project
applicant that identifies each phase and the estimated timelines
for each phase.
(b) The department shall inform the public of any project
proposals submitted to it under this section that are not
otherwise subject to the requirement of a public hearing or other
public notification.
(c) The department shall adopt rules in accordance with
chapter 91 to implement this section.
HRS § 6E-42.
7
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
(2017), 3 which purportedly required SHPD’s review and approval
prior to the Director’s extension of the grading permit’s
expiration date. In Count II, Petitioners sought a quo warranto
order and judgment on the claim that the Director acted ultra
vires and usurped the power of the Maui County Council when the
Director granted the grading permit extension “in the absence of
hardship or good cause.” And in Count III, they sought a
judicial declaration, in part, that the Director’s extension of
the grading permit exceeded the Director’s authority.
2. County Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss
In April 2018, County Respondents filed a motion to dismiss
Petitioners’ complaint with prejudice pursuant to HRCP Rule
12(b)(6), (1) for failure to state a claim and lack of
jurisdiction. As to Count I, County Respondents argued that
Petitioners’ application of HRS § 6E-42 and MCC § 20.08.080’s
requirement that the County consult with SHPD before the
Director initially approved or denied a permit application did
3 MCC § 20.08.080 (2017) provided:
Drainage, engineering slope hazard report, and erosion
control plans shall be submitted to the applicable soil and
water conservation district(s) and to the department of
land and natural resources’ state historic preservation
division for review and comment. Final approval or
disapproval by the County shall be made within ten days
after receiving their comments.
MCC § 20.08.080. This ordinance was amended in 2018, adding further language on the agency’s review of the proposed work.
8
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
not, as Petitioners contended, apply to the Director’s extension
of a permit’s expiration date; and further, no other authority
required the County to consult with SHPD when extending an
existing grading permit. County Respondents asserted that Count
I should be dismissed based on a clear misstatement of the law
and failure to identify an actual cause of action.
As to Count II, County Respondents argued that Petitioners’
quo warranto/ultra vires claim could not stand where the
Director acted within the scope of the County’s enumerated
powers; in this case, the Director had the power to extend
existing grading permits “in cases of hardship or for good
cause” pursuant to MCC § 20.08.110 (2017), a regulation passed
by the Maui County Council under powers granted to the Director
by the Maui County Charter and the State of Hawaiʻi. 4 Because
the Director’s action could not, as a matter of law, be subject
to quo warranto or an ultra vires action, County Respondents
asserted, they asked that the court dismiss Count II.
Finally, County Respondents argued that Count III’s request
for declaratory relief corresponded to Petitioners’ claims in
Counts I and II, and therefore should also be dismissed.
In sum, County Respondents asked the circuit court to
4 MCC § 20.08.110 on permit expiration provided: “Every grubbing or grading permit shall expire and become null and void one year after the date of issuance. However, the director may grant a time extension in cases of hardship or for good cause.” MCC § 20.08.110.
9
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
dismiss all counts with prejudice.
3. MLP’s Motion to Dismiss
On April 4, 2018, MLP filed a motion to dismiss
Petitioners’ claims pursuant to HRCP Rule 12(b)(6), arguing many
of the same points raised by the County Respondents in their
motion to dismiss. MLP asserted that the entire complaint
should be dismissed because (1) the relevant statutes, county
code provisions, and legal theories offered by Petitioners did
not support Petitioners’ claims; (2) “law of the case” from the
concurrent, related lawsuit, rendered the instant action
“unnecessary”; and (3) since MLP had not conducted any activity
at the site pursuant to a preliminary injunction entered in the
related lawsuit, Petitioners’ claim of imminent harm was
baseless. 5
As to Count I and its corresponding part of Count III, MLP
echoed County Respondents’ contention that there was no private
right of action to bring a claim enforcing alleged violations of
5 In support of its argument for dismissal of Count I, MLP’s attached exhibits included SHPD’s November 26, 2014 letter to the County’s Department of Public Works (DPW) relating to SHPD’s review of the grading permit, as well as MLP’s 2013 AMP. MLP’s 2013 AMP recommended archaeological monitoring at the Phase IX project site: “due to the numerous primary burial features and secondarily deposited human skeletal remains within the Maui Lani landholdings, archaeological monitoring is highly warranted.” SHPD’s letter indicated it had reviewed MLP’s permit application and additional submitted information. SHPD accepted MLP’s 2013 AMP and “concurred with the recommendation for archaeological monitoring based on the large number of human skeletal remains/burials encountered elsewhere in surrounding Maui Lani lands[.]” SHPD determined that “no historic properties would be affected by the proposed project so long as monitoring occurs pursuant to the approved plan.”
10
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
the County’s grading ordinances, as enforcement was at the
County’s discretion. Further, MLP asserted Count I should be
dismissed for absence of law to support Petitioners’ claim and a
failure to alleged sufficient facts.
As to the dismissal of the Count II quo warranto claim, MLP
argued that such a claim was improper in that Petitioners did
not challenge the Director’s authority to hold office, and “law
of the case” foreclosed Petitioners’ challenge of the Director’s
discretion to enforce the County’s grading ordinances.
3. Petitioners’ Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss
Petitioners filed an opposition to County Respondents’ and
MLP’s respective motions to dismiss. Petitioners reasserted
that Count I sought injunctive relief against the Director for
granting a grading permit extension in violation of HRS § 6E-42;
and that Count III was based on the Director’s alleged “acts in
excess of his authority” when the Director granted the grading
permit extension “in the absence of hardship or for ‘good
cause’” pursuant to MCC § 20.08.110. Petitioners clarified that
their claims were “not against MLP’s violations of a grading
ordinance ([MCC] § 20.08.110), but [were] against the Director
for acting in excess of the authority granted to him under the
grading ordinance and usurping the power of the Maui County
Council.” Petitioners further asserted a right of action in
their suit pursuant to HRS § 6E-13(b) (2009 & Supp. 2015), which
11
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
they argue provides for a person to bring an action in
environmental court seeking a restraining order or injunctive
relief against the State or its political subdivisions or
another person where an alleged violation of HRS Chapter 6E has
occurred. 6
4. Petitioners’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment on all the
counts of their complaint, which County Respondents and MLP
opposed.
5. Hearing on the Motions, Order and Judgment
At the May 25, 2018 hearing on the motions to dismiss and
the motion for summary judgment, the circuit court orally
granted County Respondents and MLP’s motions to dismiss
Petitioners’ complaint but without prejudice, rather than with
prejudice, as had been requested by the parties. The circuit
court then orally denied Petitioners’ motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the complaint was being dismissed.
6 HRS § 6E-13(b)(2009 & Supp. 2015) provided:
Any person may maintain an action in the [environmental
court] having jurisdiction where the alleged violation
occurred or is likely to occur for restraining orders or
injunctive relief against the State, its political
subdivisions, or any person upon a showing of irreparable
injury, for the protection of an historic property or a
burial site and the public trust therein from unauthorized
or improper demolition, alteration, or transfer of the
property or burial site.
HRS § 6E-13(b).
12
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Due to the potential impact of the court’s ruling on the
related litigation, in its July 24, 2018 Order Granting
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Without Prejudice, the circuit
court ordered the complaint dismissed without prejudice. The
circuit court found no regulatory or statutory authority
(including HRS § 6E-42 and/or MCC § 20.08.080) requiring the
Director consult with or receive input from SHPD on grading
permit extensions; therefore, Petitioners had failed to state a
claim in Count I. As to Count II, which alleged the Director
exceeded his authority in extending the grading permit’s
expiration date, the circuit court found that “the Director was
exercising his express discretionary authority, as provided
under the law, and did not exceed that authority.” Therefore,
the circuit court determined that Count II did not present a
viable quo warranto cause of action. The circuit court also
dismissed Count III, “as the conclusory allegations in Counts I
and II do not entitle [Petitioners] to [the] declaratory relief
requested.”
On October 2, 2018, the circuit court entered its judgment
of dismissal without prejudice. 7
7 On October 17, 2018, MLP filed a bill of costs, which Petitioners opposed.
13
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
5. Petitioners’ HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) Motion for
Reconsideration
On October 29, 2018, Petitioners filed a motion styled
“Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration and Relief From
Judgment.” They asked the circuit court “for reconsideration of
its Order of Dismissal filed July 24, 2018 and Final Judgment
filed, October 2, 2018, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Hawaiʻi
Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 7 of the Rules of the Circuit
Court of Hawaiʻi.” (Emphasis added.) Petitioners alleged there
was new law which supported a new argument, which could not have
been presented during the earlier adjudicated motion.
As to the alleged new law enabling their new argument
against the court’s grant of defendants’ motions to dismiss,
Petitioners submitted the then-recent publication of this
court’s opinion (dated October 9, 2018, as corrected October 15,
2018) in Bank of America v. Reyes-Toledo (Reyes-Toledo II), 143
Hawai‘i 249, 428 P.3d 761 (2018) as justifying relief from the
operation of the circuit court’s final judgment. Specifically,
Petitioners claimed that the motions to dismiss relied upon the
ICA’s decision in Pavsek v. Sandvold, 127 Hawai‘i 390, 279 P.3d
55 (App. 2012) as well as federal case law, in requesting that
the circuit court apply the “plausibility” pleading standard in
reviewing Petitioners’ complaint. Petitioners asserted that the
circuit court’s dismissal did not, but should now take into
14
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
consideration Reyes-Toledo II, as the decision abrogated Pavsek,
and expressly rejected the “plausibility” pleading standard, and
reaffirmed the “well-established” notice pleading standard of
our jurisdiction. Petitioners asked the circuit court “to
reconsider” its prior decision based on the new law and vacate
its order dismissing Count III and its final judgment.
County Respondents and MLP filed oppositions to
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The parties generally
contended, first, that this court’s decision in Reyes-Toledo II
clarified and reiterated Hawai‘i’s use of the notice pleading
standard, and did not articulate new law; and second, that the
circuit court’s reasoning in dismissing Petitioners’ complaint,
including Count III, was consistent with the application of
Reyes-Toledo II’s notice pleading standard.
6. Circuit Court Denies Petitioners’ Rule 60(b)(6) Motion
On January 25, 2019, the circuit court entered an order
denying Petitioner’s HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for
reconsideration. The circuit court noted that Petitioners were
asserting that the circuit court had erroneously “applied the
‘plausibility’ standard instead of the appropriate ‘notice
pleading’ standard” in dismissing Count III. In denying
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the circuit court
stated:
Although the original motion to dismiss was based, in part,
15
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
on [Pavsek], in dismissing Counts I and II, the [circuit
court] determined that these counts were not supported by
any “regulatory or statutory authority.” The [circuit
court] acknowledged that all well-pleaded facts were to be
accepted as true, but that the [circuit court] was not
required to accept conclusory allegations on the legal
effect of the events alleged. Count III requested
declaratory relief based on the conclusory allegations
contained in Counts I and II. Thus, Count III was
dismissed without prejudice. In dismissing Count III
without prejudice, the [circuit court] applied the “notice
pleading” standard that the [Reyes-Toledo II] court
reaffirmed has been the [Hawaiʻi] standard for seventy
years, i.e., the liberal “notice pleading” standard.
The same day, the circuit court entered an order awarding
MLP its costs.
B. ICA Proceedings
On February 23, 2019, Petitioners filed a notice of appeal
with the ICA. Petitioners appealed the circuit court’s orders
awarding costs to MLP and denying Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, and the judgment of dismissal of Petitioners’
complaint without prejudice.
1. Petitioners’ Opening Brief
Petitioners raised three points of error in their opening
brief, two of which are relevant here.
Petitioners argued the circuit court erred in dismissing
Count I of their complaint, based upon the court’s conclusion
that the Director was not required to consult SHPD before
“reissuing” MLP’s grading permit. Petitioners maintained that
the Director’s action violated the constitutional protections of
Petitioners’ traditional and customary practices.
16
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Petitioners also asserted that the circuit court erred in
denying their motion to reconsider the court’s dismissal of
Count III. Counts II and III, Petitioners noted, “held in
common the allegation that no ‘good cause’ existed to authorize
the Director’s extension of MLP’s grading permit” pursuant to
MCC § 20.08.110. Petitioners argued that the circuit court
erred in failing to apply the correct standard of review in
deciding the HRCP Rule 12(b)(6) motions of dismissal of Counts
II and III, and in basing its dismissal on the complaint’s
“conclusory allegations on the legal effect of the events
alleged” in Counts I and II without specifying “which facts
constituted ‘conclusory allegations’ as to Count III.” Instead,
Petitioners contended, Count III stated a claim and gave
adequate notice to withstand dismissal; they asserted that their
complaint met the notice standard of pleading pursuant to HRCP
Rule 8(a)(1) (eff. 2000) in setting forth all that was required:
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief” and a demand for relief.
Thus, Petitioners maintained that the circuit court should
have granted their motion for reconsideration.
2. County Respondents’ Answering Brief
In their answering brief, County Respondents argued, in
relevant part, that the circuit court properly dismissed
Petitioners’ Count I claim, as HRS § 6E-42 and the county code
17
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
did not require the Director to consult with SHPD before
extending the grading permit. County Respondents contended that
MCC § 20.08.110 “provides the Director with the discretion to
grant or deny time extensions based on good cause and/or
hardship, without setting forth any further procedure.”
In response to Petitioners’ final point of error, County
Respondents observed that Petitioners’ focus on the circuit
court’s denial of their HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for
reconsideration was a framework in which Petitioners primarily
raised arguments against the circuit court’s grant of the HRCP
Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. County Respondents asserted
that the circuit court did not err in dismissing Petitioners’
Count II quo warranto claim and the corresponding parts of Count
III because Petitioners pled no facts which rendered the
Director’s discretionary acts as ultra vires. County
Respondents further argued that Petitioners’ HRCP Rule 60(b)(6)
motion for reconsideration was not properly before the circuit
court due to Petitioners’ failure to raise new law or new
argument in their motion.
3. MLP’s Answering Brief
MLP’s answering brief, in relevant part, asserted that the
circuit court properly applied the notice pleading standard when
the court dismissed Count III; and did not err in denying
Petitioners’ HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration on
18
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
that count. As the County Respondents had asserted, MLP also
argued that Reyes-Toledo II was not new argument or new law to
support an HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion, because that decision
upheld the long-standing “notice pleading” standard in Hawaiʻi.
And Count III, MLP argued, was dismissed because there was no
viable cause of action in Counts I and II, and Petitioners’
“conclusory allegations did not entitle [Petitioners] to
relief.”
4. Petitioners’ Reply Briefs
In their reply briefs, Petitioners reiterated that the
Maui County Code required the Director to conform to HRS Chapter
6E’s requirements, giving Count I of Petitioners’ complaint a
basis in law (citing HRS § 6E-42 and MCC § 19.500.080 (2017)); 8
and that Petitioners pled sufficient facts regarding the good
cause requirement for the Director to approve the grading permit
8 MCC § 19.500.080 (2017) provides:
The director of public works shall determine whether applications
for grading, electrical, plumbing, sign, and other construction
and development permits issued by the director conform to
requirements of this title, chapter 6E of the Hawaii Revised
Statutes, and any other development regulation or law of the
county or the State of Hawaii. No grading, electrical, plumbing,
sign, or other construction or development permit shall be issued
unless the director of public works or the director’s authorized
representative certifies that the construction or development
being requested by the application conforms to the provisions of
this title.
MCC § 19.500.080.
19
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
extension under MCC § 20.08.110 to sustain Count II’s quo
warranto claim.
5. ICA’s Summary Disposition Order
The ICA issued its decision on March 15, 2024, affirming
the circuit court’s orders and final judgment, concluding in
relevant part that the ICA did not have appellate jurisdiction
over Petitioners’ appeal of the circuit court’s judgment
dismissing the complaint. Mālama Kakanilua v. Dir. of the Dep’t
of Pub. Works, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2024 WL 1134051, at *2-5
(Haw. App. Mar. 15, 2024) (SDO). The ICA determined that
Petitioners’ appeal was untimely, since it was filed well after
HRAP Rule 4(a)(1)’s thirty-day deadline, and Petitioners’ HRCP
Rule 60(b)(6) motion did not “toll” the deadline for the time to
appeal because it was not filed within ten days of the final
judgment. Id. at *3. And as to Petitioners’ appeal of the
circuit court’s denial of their HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the
ICA determined the circuit court did not abuse its discretion,
and thus affirmed the circuit court. 9 Id. at *4-5.
9 We note that the ICA correctly stated our requirement that “[a] party seeking relief under HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) after the time for appeal has run must establish the existence of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ that prevented or rendered them unable to prosecute an appeal.” Id. at *5, citing Hawaiʻi Hous. Auth. v. Uyehara, 77 Hawaiʻi 144, 148-49, 883 P.2d 65, 69-70 (1994) (emphasis added). However, the ICA misapplied the “extraordinary circumstances” standard to the facts of this case, as Petitioners filed their HRCP Rule 60(b) motion before the time for appeal had run. See also In re Hana Ranch Co., 3 Haw. App. 141, 147, 642 P.2d 938, 942 (1982).
20
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
We accepted Petitioners’ application for writ of certiorari
and held oral argument in this matter.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Interpretation of Court Rules
We review the interpretation of a court rule de novo.
State v. Choy Foo, 142 Hawaiʻi 65, 72, 414 P.3d 117, 124 (2018)
(citing Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 120 Hawaiʻi 181, 197,
202 P.3d 1226, 1242 (2009)). And “[w]hen interpreting rules
promulgated by the court, principles of statutory construction
apply.” Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawaiʻi 325, 331,
104 P.3d 912, 918 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
B. HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) Orders
Having a “very large measure of discretion,” a trial
court’s ruling on an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion “will not be set
aside unless we are persuaded that under the circumstances of
the particular case, the court’s refusal to set aside its order
was an abuse of discretion.” James B. Nutter & Company v.
Namahoe, 153 Hawaiʻi 149, 161, 528 P.3d 222, 234 (2023) (cleaned
up).
21
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
IV. DISCUSSION
A. An HRCP Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration is a “tolling
motion” pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) and extends the
deadline under HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) to file a notice of
appeal.
Petitioners assert that the ICA gravely erred in holding
that Petitioners’ HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration,
filed twenty-seven days after the circuit court entered final
judgment, did not “toll” or extend the time to file an appeal
pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(a)(3).
MLP and County Respondents counter that HRCP Rule 60(b)
motions are not “tolling motions” but may be construed as HRCP
Rule 59 motions for purposes of triggering the extension of time
to file an appeal under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) if the HRCP Rule 60(b)
motion is filed within ten days of the entry of judgment.
We agree with Petitioners.
This court’s policy favors hearing cases on the merits
whenever possible, including on appeal. Alexander & Baldwin,
LLC v. Armitage, 151 Hawaiʻi 37, 54, 508 P.3d 832, 849 (2022).
The history of our case law indicates that the underlying
purpose of the ICA’s treatment of HRCP Rule 60(b) motions as
HRCP Rule 59(e) motions, when such motions were filed within ten
days of a judgment, was to prevent harsh results, expand a
party’s access to justice, and have their case reviewed on the
merits. This was important when HRAP Rule 4(a)(4) (eff. 1984)
22
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
specifically listed which rules, delineated by rule number,
provided for motions that could extend or “toll” the time to
appeal. HRCP Rule 60(b) was not one of those rules listed. But
HRAP Rule 4(a)(4) and its descendant HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) have been
amended over time. The 1999 amendment of HRAP Rule 4(a),
relevantly, eliminated the list of specific rule numbers and
instead designated post-judgment “tolling” motions by describing
their substance, which now included motions that “[seek] to
reconsider, vacate, or alter the judgment, or [seek] attorney’s
fees or costs.” 10 HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) (eff. 2000) (emphasis
added). Thus, construing an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion for
reconsideration as another type of motion (e.g. an HRCP Rule
59(e) motion) in order to bring it under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3)’s
“tolling” clause is no longer required given HRAP Rule 4(a)’s
amendment and this court’s case law, which has long recognized
that a valid motion for reconsideration can be filed pursuant to
HRCP Rule 60(b).
Based upon our reading of the plain language of the
applicable rules, and for the following reasons, we hold that an
HRCP Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration extends the deadline
10 The 2006 amendment added further substantive post-judgment motions to HRAP Rule 4(a)(3)’s definition of “tolling motions”: a motion for judgment as a matter of law; a motion to amend findings or make additional findings; and a motion for new trial. HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) (eff. 2006). The amendment removed motions to vacate from the list of qualifying “tolling” motions. Id.
23
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
and time to file a notice of appeal pursuant to HRAP Rule
4(a)(3) “until 30 days after entry of an order disposing of the
[post-judgment] motion.” HRAP Rule 4(a)(3). And reading these
rules in pari materia, we hold that in order for an HRCP Rule
60(b) motion to extend or “toll” the time to appeal, it must be
filed by the deadline for appeal pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(a)(1).
1. HRCP Rule 60(b) specifies the time by which a motion
under the rule shall be filed as “within a reasonable
time,” triggering an HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) extension of
time to file a notice of appeal.
HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) currently provides in relevant part:
If any party files a timely motion for judgment as a matter
of law, to amend findings or make additional findings, for
a new trial, to reconsider, alter or amend the judgment or
order, or for attorney’s fees or costs, and court or agency
rules specify the time by which the motion shall be filed,
then the time for filing the notice of appeal is extended
for all parties until 30 days after entry of an order
disposing of the motion. The presiding court or agency in
which the motion was filed shall dispose of any such postjudgment motion by entering an order upon the record within
90 days after the date the motion was filed. If the court
or agency fails to enter an order on the record, then,
within 5 days after the 90th day, the clerk of the relevant
court or agency shall notify the parties that, by operation
of this Rule, the post-judgment motion is denied and that
any orders entered thereafter shall be a nullity.
HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) (emphases added).
HRCP Rule 60(b) provides in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . (6) any
other reason [not subsections (1)-(5)] justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be
made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2),
and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order,
or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment
or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to
24
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or
to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.
HRCP Rule 60(b) (emphases added).
The ICA in the instant case relied primarily on its prior
decisions interpreting the interplay between HRCP Rule 60(b),
HRCP Rule 59(e), and HRAP Rule 4(a)(3), with a history rooted in
the principle of preventing harsh results, enabling access to
justice and removing barriers arising from a party’s procedural
issues, to obtain an appellate review on the merits. In its
decision, the ICA cited to its interpretation of HRAP Rule
4(a)(4) in Simbajon v. Gentry, 81 Hawaiʻi 193, 914 P.2d 1386
(App. 1996), which followed the ICA’s decision in Simpson v.
Department of Land & Natural Resources, in construing and
transforming an HRCP Rule 60(b) post-judgment motion into an
HRCP Rule 59(e) motion for purposes of “tolling” the time to
appeal under HRAP Rule 4(a). Simpson, 8 Haw. App. 16, 21, 791
P.2d 1267, 1271 (App. 1990), (overruled on other grounds by
Kaniakapupu v. Land Use Comm’n, 111 Hawaiʻi 124, 139 P.3d 712
(2006)). In Simbajon, the ICA held that plaintiffs had timely
filed their notice of appeal because (following Simpson) “the
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order tolled the 30–
day limitations period and thus extended the time to file the
notice of appeal under HRAP Rule 4(a)(4).” 81 Hawaiʻi at 196,
914 P.2d at 1389.
25
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
At the time Simbajon and Simpson were decided, HRAP Rule
4(a)(4) specifically designated only HRCP Rules 50(b), 52(b),
59, and Hawaiʻi Family Court Rules (HFCR) Rule 59 motions as
providing that “the time for appeal for all parties shall run
from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or
denying any other such motion.” Under HRCP Rule 60(b), Simpson
had filed a motion for reconsideration of the circuit court’s
order granting the agency’s motion to dismiss. Id. Despite
HRAP Rule 4(a)(4) not enumerating HRCP Rule 60(b) as a “tolling
motion,” the ICA determined that “Simpson’s motion may be
treated as a motion under HRCP Rule 59(e)” to count as a
“tolling motion,” thus extending Simpson’s time to appeal. Id.
at 21-22, 791 P.2d at 1271-72.
Citing to Simpson, the ICA subsequently stated in Lambert
v. Lua that a “HRCP Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment
may toll the period for appealing a judgment or order, but only
if the motion is served and filed within ten (10) days after the
judgment is entered.” 92 Hawaiʻi 228, 234, 990 P.2d 126, 132
(App. 1999).
The ICA has continued to interpret and treat an HRCP Rule
60(b) motion filed within ten days of judgment as a “tolling
motion” under various amended iterations of HRAP Rule 4(a).
See, e.g., Citicorp Mortg., Inc. v. Bartolome, 94 Hawaiʻi 422,
430, 16 P.3d 827, 835 (App. 2000) (reasserting that an HRCP Rule
26
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
60(b) motion may be treated as an HRCP Rule 59(e) motion for
purposes of HRAP Rule (4)(a)(3) tolling if made within ten days
of the entry of judgment); Dubois v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners
of 2987 Kalakaua, No. 26129, 2006 WL 1109763, at *2-3 (Haw. App.
April 27, 2006) (SDO) (affirming appellate jurisdiction on the
basis that “[a] HRCP Rule 60 motion filed within 10 days after
entry of the judgment is treated as a motion to alter the
judgment and extends the time for appealing the judgment.”); and
Mendez v. Mendez, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2015 WL 233271, at *1
(Haw. App. January 16, 2015) (SDO) (holding that because
appellant’s motion for reconsideration “was not filed within ten
days of the Divorce Decree, [the motion] could only be
considered pursuant to HFCR Rule 60(b), and thus was not a
timely tolling motion.”).
MLP and County Respondents argue that this court has cited
approvingly to the ICA’s decisions treating an HRCP Rule 60(b)
motion as a “tolling motion” under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) when filed
within ten days of a judgment. However, we have not expressly
addressed this issue. For example, in Association of
Condominium Homeowners of Tropics at Waikele v. Sakuma, whether
an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion extended the time to file an appeal
pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) was not an issue before this
court. 131 Hawaiʻi 254, 318 P.3d 94 (2013) (superseded by the
2016 amendment to HRAP Rule 4(a)(3), on other grounds). That
27
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
case involved a timely filed HRCP Rule 59 motion and presented
this court with the issue of when HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) tolling
would end, thus starting the thirty-day period for a timely
appeal, in the absence of a court order disposing of the Rule 59
motion. Id. at 256, 318 P.3d at 96.
In Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Amasol, Justice
Nakayama, concurring in part with the majority, stated as dicta
in a footnote that “[b]ecause HRCP Rule 60(b) motions are not
tolling motions, HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) does not apply[.]” 135
Hawaiʻi 357, 360 n.1, 351 P.3d 584, 587 n.1 (2015) (Nakayama, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In as much as the
dissent there agreed with the majority that HRAP Rule 4(a)(3)
did not apply to the Amasol case, whether HRCP Rule 60(b)
“tolled” the time for appeal under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) was not an
issue in that appeal.
At the time of Sakuma and Amasol, HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) (eff.
2015) provided in relevant part that if a party “files a timely
motion . . . to reconsider, alter or amend the judgment or
order, . . . the time for filing the notice of appeal is
extended until 30 days after entry of an order disposing of the
motion[.]” HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) (emphasis added). With the 2016
amendment, again, HRAP Rule 4(a)(3)’s phrase designates socalled “tolling” motions as those made pursuant to a rule that
“specif[ies] the time by which the motion shall be filed[.]”
28
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Whether HRCP Rule 60(b) “tolled” the time to appeal was not
at issue in Cole v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu (In re Cole), a
case in which this court interpreted HRAP Rule 4(a)(3)’s “third
clause” as addressing “the situation where the court fails to
enter an order by the 90th day.” 154 Hawaiʻi 28, 31, 543 P.3d
460, 463 (2024). We noted that the rule’s “first two clauses
are plain,” setting forth that a party has thirty days to file
an appeal after entry of a circuit court’s order on a postjudgment motion, and that the circuit court must dispose of that
post-judgment motion within ninety days after it is filed. Id.
But we did not interpret the rule’s “tolling” clause that
requires such a rule providing for the filing of a motion
“specify the time by which the motion shall be filed” in order
to trigger HRAP Rule 4(a)(3)’s extension of time to appeal.
HRAP Rule 4(a)(3).
We do so now. Here, plainly read, HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) does
not require that a rule providing for the filing of a postjudgment motion designate an enumerated time period in days,
months, or years in order to qualify as “specify[ing] a time by
which the motion” is timely. The rule simply requires that a
post-judgment motion’s rule “specify a time” by which that
motion is deemed timely. The relevant focus and important term
is “time,” and whether a rule expresses a time period that makes
a motion timely. We observe a clear distinction in our post29
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
judgment rules between those that designate a period of time
where the motion is timely and those which do not. For example,
HRCP Rule 54(d), which provides for requests of costs and
attorneys’ fees, does not specify any time by which such a
request must be filed.
To the extent that our past affirmations of the ICA’s
construal of a motion filed pursuant to HRCP Rule 60(b) as a
tolling motion when filed within the ten-day deadline of HRCP
Rule 59(e) conflict with our holding in this opinion, they are
overruled. We hold that HRCP Rule 60(b)’s “within a reasonable
time” designation specifies the time for filing a timely motion
to reconsider a judgment. 11 And this meets HRAP Rule 4(a)(3)’s
requirement to trigger an extension of time by which to file a
notice of appeal.
The dissent concludes that an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion is not
a “tolling motion” because it is not a motion for
reconsideration in name and does not specify a time in which
such motion shall be filed. The dissent focuses on the title of
HRCP Rule 60 as providing for motions for “relief from judgment
or order.” While we have noted that “the HRCP do not expressly
11 We also include HFCR Rule 60(b), which requires “[t]he motion shall be made within a reasonable time,” and Hawaiʻi Probate Rules (HPR) Rule 36(b), requiring the “petition shall be made within a reasonable time,” as triggering HRAP Rule 4(a)(3)’s extension of time to appeal under the provisions of this opinion.
30
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
afford a party the right to file a motion for reconsideration,”
we have nonetheless recognized for over two-and-a-half decades
that a motion for reconsideration can be filed pursuant to HRCP
60 (motion for relief from judgment or order). 12 Cho v. State,
115 Hawaiʻi 373, 382, 168 P.3d 17, 26 (2007) (cleaned up)
(emphasis added); see also, Soderlund v. Admin. Dir. of the
Courts, 96 Hawaiʻi 114, 119, 26 P.3d 1214, 1219 (2001); Bank of
Hawaii v. Kunimoto, 91 Hawaiʻi 372, 374 n.1, 984 P.2d 1198, 1200
(1999).
The holdings of this court make clear that a motion filed
under HRCP Rule 60 can be considered as a motion for
reconsideration. Although the plain language of HRCP Rule 60
does not contain a ten-day deadline for timeliness, the cases
relied upon by the dissent graft HRCP Rule 59’s ten-day deadline
into HRCP Rule 60 for purposes of HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) “tolling.”
However, HRCP Rule 60 already has its own specified time for
timely motions, i.e., “within a reasonable time.”
In the instant case, Petitioners’ motion asked the circuit
court to reconsider its order dismissing their complaint and the
court’s final judgment, and sought vacatur as relief.
12 We noted in Cho that HRAP Rule 40(a) is titled as providing for a “motion for reconsideration,” and HFCR Rule 59(b) provides for “New trials; reconsideration or amendment of judgment and orders.” HRAP Rule 40(a); HFCR Rule 59(b). 115 Hawaiʻi at 382, 168 P.3d at 26.
31
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Petitioners titled their motion “Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Reconsideration and Relief From Judgment,” and stated that the
motion was being brought not only pursuant to HRCP Rule 60(b),
but also under Rule 7 of the Rules of the Circuit Courts of the
State of Hawaiʻi, which requires a movant to state the grounds
for the motion and to set forth the relief sought. (Emphasis
added.) At the very beginning of the motion, Petitioners
clearly stated that they were moving for “reconsideration.”
They then cited case law explaining that the purpose of a motion
for reconsideration is to raise new evidence and/or argument
which could not have been presented during the earlier
adjudicated motion and not to relitigate old matters.
Petitioners thereafter offered the then-recent publication of
Reyes-Toledo II as purported new law, providing new argument
about the pleading standard that Petitioners alleged the circuit
court did not apply in reviewing the defendants’ HRCP Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Finally, Petitioners asked the
circuit court, upon reconsideration of its judgment, to vacate
its order dismissing the suit without prejudice.
As held by this court, a motion for reconsideration can be
filed pursuant to HRCP Rule 60. A post-judgment motion under
HRCP Rule 60(b) is timely if filed within a reasonable time.
Thus, under the plain language and plain meaning of HRAP Rule
4(a)(3), which specifically refers to a motion “to reconsider”
32
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
as a post-judgment motion that extends the time to appeal, we
hold that an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion independently, and without
need to construe it as an HRCP Rule 59(e) motion, qualifies as a
motion extending the time to file an appeal.
2. An HRCP Rule 60(b) motion may extend the deadline to
file a notice of appeal under HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) if
filed within thirty days after judgment pursuant to
HRAP Rule 4(a)(1).
HRCP Rule 60(b) expressly provides that “[a] motion under
this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment
or suspend its operation.” HRCP Rule 60(b). Respondent parties
have expressed concern with respect to the importance of the
finality of a decision, given that HRCP Rule 60(b)(4), (5), and
(6) motions may be made “within a reasonable time,” which may
exceed the year deadline that limits timely motions brought
under HRCP Rule 60(b)(1), (2), & (3). 13 Id. The concern is
valid and not lost on this court, as HRCP Rule 60(b) provides an
important avenue for a party to request a court’s
reconsideration of a judgment, sometimes years after that
judgment was entered. In each case, the assessment of what
constitutes “a reasonable time” for the timeliness of a Rule
60(b) motion is determined and based on the facts and
circumstances unique to each case.
13 This sentence of HRCP Rule 60(b) states, “The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.”
33
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
In James B. Nutter & Company v. Namahoe, this court
discussed how the specific circumstances of a case should be
weighed in determining whether an HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for
reconsideration, filed years after judgment had been entered,
was made “within a reasonable time” so as to make that motion
timely. This court stated:
[o]ur case law sets a high bar. In Uyehara, Uyehara filed
his Rule 60(b) motion over three-and-a-half years after the
entry of the order. Uyehara claimed that his delay in
filing was “not unreasonable because, throughout this
period, [Uyehara] was attempting to obtain counsel.” This
court concluded, however, that “even under the more relaxed
time limitations of HRCP Rule 60(b)(6), it is unreasonable
for Uyehara to claim that three and one-half years is a
reasonable time expenditure for obtaining an attorney.”
[S]ee Aiona v. Wing Sing Wo Co., 45 Haw. 427, 432, 368 P.2d
879, 882 (1962) (“There must be an end to litigation
someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not
to be relieved from.”)
Here, Namahoe has demonstrated extraordinary
circumstances that would justify waiting more than three
years from the filing of the Decree of Foreclosure — and
more than two years from the filing of the Order Confirming
Sale — to file his Rule 60(b) motion. Namahoe recounted
that he had “no memory of being served or signing a paper
that I was served,” and that he was receiving care for an
illness. . . . This inquiry is fact-specific and determined
on a case-by-case basis. Here, Namahoe has shown that the
delay was warranted due to his personal circumstances which
were, in significant part, generated by [plaintiff’s]
conduct.
153 Hawaiʻi at 169-170, 528 P.3d at 242-243 (quoting Uyehara, 77
Hawaiʻi at 149, 883 P.2d at 70) (cleaned up).
In In re Cole, we noted that “[w]e believe that a sound
rule does not permit an appellant to revive a case decided
(final judgment-wise) years before. An ideal rule promotes
finality and sets an easy-to-understand notice of appeal
deadline.” 154 Hawaiʻi at 32, 543 P.3d at 464 (emphasis added).
34
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
The important case-by-case, fact-specific determination of when
an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion has been filed “within a reasonable
time” should not conflict with finality, especially for purposes
of HRCP Rule 60(b)’s function as a “tolling motion” pursuant to
HRAP Rule 4(a)(3).
Therefore, reading HRCP Rule 60(b)’s clause on finality,
and the rule’s provision that a motion for reconsideration is
timely when filed “within a reasonable time,” in pari materia
with HRAP Rule 4(a)(1) and (3), we hold that for purposes of
serving as a “tolling motion,” an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion extends
the time in which to file a notice of appeal pursuant to HRAP
Rule 4(a)(3), if the motion for reconsideration is filed within
thirty days of the entry of judgment. 14
B. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Petitioners’ HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners assert that the ICA gravely erred in
“incorrectly appl[ying] the abuse of discretion standard” when
it affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Petitioners’ HRCP Rule
60(b)(6) motion for reconsideration of the final judgment
14 This holding is consistent with our precedent on the finality of judgments and preclusion, where this court has reiterated that “under Hawaiʻi law, there would be no final judgment for claim preclusion purposes unless the time for filing appeals has passed or appeals have been exhausted.” Saplan v. U.S. Bank N.A., 154 Hawaiʻi 181, 189 n.8, 549 P.3d 266, 274 n.8 (2024). See also James W. Glover, Ltd. v. Fong, 42 Haw. 560, 574 (Terr. 1958) (“[a] judgment is final where the time to appeal has expired without appeal being taken.”).
35
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
dismissing Count III without prejudice. Petitioners contend
that the circuit court’s denial of their motion was “informed by
an erroneous view of the law.”
On the record before us, we construe the circuit court’s
denial of Petitioners’ HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion for
reconsideration as based on the absence of new law. Further,
the trial court noted in denying Petitioners’ motion that it had
considered and applied Reyes-Toledo II’s notice pleading
standard. To that extent, we conclude the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
As stated, HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) provides in relevant part
that “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for . . . any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.” HRCP Rule 60(b)(6). We have held
that the purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to allow
parties to present new evidence or new arguments that could not
have been presented during the earlier adjudicated motion.
Ass’n of Apt. Owners of Wailea Elua v. Wailea Resort Co., 100
Hawaiʻi 97, 110, 58 P.3d 608, 621 (2002). “Reconsideration is
not a device to relitigate old matters or to raise arguments or
evidence that could and should have been brought during the
earlier proceeding.” Id. (citation omitted). The appellant has
36
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
the burden of establishing abuse of discretion when a court
denies an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion, and a strong showing is
required. Pennymac Corp. v. Godinez, 148 Hawaiʻi 323, 327, 474
P.3d 264, 268 (2020) (quotation and citation omitted).
Reyes-Toledo II reaffirmed our “well-established historical
tradition of liberal notice pleading” ensuring citizens’ access
to justice and our courts. 143 Hawaiʻi at 262, 428 P.3d at 774.
Our opinion in that case merely added to our liberal notice
pleading precedent, upheld “[f]or approximately seventy
years[.]” Id. Citing to Reyes-Toledo II’s publication as the
basis of their motion, Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
did not present new arguments or new law which could not have
been presented earlier in the adjudication. The circuit court
stated that in dismissing Count III of Petitioners’ complaint,
the court applied the notice pleading standard reaffirmed in
Reyes-Toledo II. Petitioners have not met their burden of a
strong showing to establish that the circuit court abused its
discretion when there was no new law to be applied by the
circuit court.
Therefore, we affirm the ICA’s decision in its result only.
Based on our reasoning above, we hold the circuit court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration, insofar as the HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) motion did
not present new law for the circuit court to apply.
37
*** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
In light of our decision here, the ICA should have reached
the merits of Petitioners’ appeal contesting the circuit court’s
granting of the motions for dismissal. The ICA has appellate
jurisdiction to review de novo whether the circuit court erred
in granting MLP’s and County Respondents’ HRCP Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss. See Reyes-Toledo II, 143 Hawaiʻi at 257-62,
428 P.3d at 769-74; HRCP Rule 8.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the ICA’s April 12, 2024
Judgment on Appeal is vacated in relevant part, and the case is
remanded to the ICA for further proceedings consistent with the
opinion.
Lance D. Collins /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna for petitioners
/s/ Todd W. Eddins
Kristin K. Tarnstrom
(Kenton S. Werk on the /s/ Vladimir P. Devens brief) for respondent
Director of the Department
of Public Works, County of
Maui
Gregory W. Kugle
(David H. Abitol on the
the brief) for respondent
Maui Lani Partners
38