State v. Guild
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. STEPHEN GUILD
(SC 21023)
Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,
Alexander and Dannehy, Js.
Syllabus
The acquittee, who had been found not guilty of certain crimes by reason of mental disease or defect, was committed to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board in 1999, for a period not to exceed twenty years. The acquittee’s commitment was extended multiple times since the expiration of his initial term of commitment. In 2022, the state filed a petition to extend the acquittee’s commitment pursuant to statute (§ 17a-593 (c)). The acquittee moved to dismiss the state’s 2022 petition on the ground that the commitment procedure set forth in § 17a-593 (c) violated his right to equal protection under the United States constitution, but the trial court denied the acquittee’s motion to dismiss and, in 2023, granted the state’s petition, extending the acquittee’s commitment for two more years, until 2025. The acquittee then appealed from the trial court’s 2023 order extending his commitment until 2025. In 2024, prior to oral argument before this court, the state filed another petition with the trial court, which, if granted, would have extended the acquittee’s commitment beyond 2025. In response to that petition, the board filed a report recommending that the trial court deny the state’s 2024 petition because the acquittee was no longer a danger to himself or others. The state ultimately withdrew its 2024 petition, which resulted in the acquittee’s discharge from the jurisdiction of the board while this appeal was pending, in March, 2025. Held:
Because the acquittee was discharged from the custody of the board during the pendency of this appeal, the appeal was rendered moot.
Contrary to the acquittee’s claim, the collateral consequences doctrine did not save the acquittee’s appeal from being dismissed as moot, as the 2023 commitment order constituted an extension of several, prior commitments beyond the acquittee’s initial twenty year term that all stemmed from one acquittal, and this court did not see how the 2023 order materially increased the stigma associated with his commitment or gave rise to a reasonable possibility that it would cause him to suffer adverse collateral consequences in the future.
Moreover, the acquittee could not prevail on his claim that this court should not dismiss the appeal because it presented issues that were capable of repetition, yet evading review, as there was no strong likelihood that a substantial majority of cases challenging an extension of commitment would become moot before appellate litigation could be concluded.
State v. Guild
Nevertheless, because the acquittee was precluded from fully litigating the correctness of the 2023 commitment order through no fault of his own, insofar as such a challenge was rendered moot by virtue of the state’s withdrawal of its 2024 petition to extend his commitment, this court vacated the trial court’s 2023 order to avoid the possibility of any lingering or remote consequences from that order.
Argued December 4, 2024—officially released August 19, 2025
Procedural History
Petition for an order extending the acquittee’s commitment to the Psychiatric Security Review Board,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
of Middlesex, where the court, Oliver, J., denied the
acquittee’s motion to dismiss the petition; thereafter,
the case was tried to the court, Oliver, J., which issued
an order granting the petition, from which the acquittee
appealed. Appeal dismissed; order vacated.
Kevin Semataska, assistant public defender, with
whom was James B. Streeto, senior assistant public
defender, for the appellant (acquittee).
Jonathan M. Sousa, assistant state’s attorney, with
whom, on the brief, was Michael A. Gailor, state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
MULLINS, C. J. This appeal requires us to consider
whether the release of an insanity acquittee1 from the
custody of the Psychiatric Security Review Board
(board) moots his pending appeal challenging the trial
court’s order extending his commitment to the board
that was issued on July 11, 2023 (2023 commitment
order). In this appeal, the acquittee, Stephen Guild, has
raised several factual and constitutional challenges to
his continued commitment under General Statutes
1
‘‘An insanity acquittee is any person found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dyous, 307 Conn. 299, 301 n.1, 53 A.3d 153 (2012); see also General Statutes § 17a580 (1).
State v. Guild
§ 17a-593 (c). While this appeal2 was pending, on
December 2, 2024, the state filed a new petition that
would have extended the acquittee’s commitment to
the custody of the board beyond the acquittee’s discharge date of March 20, 2025 (2024 petition). After
conducting a hearing on the 2024 petition pursuant to
§ 17a-593 (d), the board filed a report dated January
22, 2025, in which it found that the acquittee was no
longer a danger to himself or others as to require supervision by the board and recommended that the trial
court deny the state’s petition for further commitment.
The state did not challenge the board’s finding, and
it withdrew the 2024 petition, which resulted in the
acquittee’s discharge from the custody of the board on
March 20, 2025.
These events, which occurred during the pendency
of this appeal, have rendered this appeal moot. Put
simply, given that the acquittee has been released from
the custody of the board on March 20, 2025, we cannot
grant him any practical relief from the 2023 commitment
order. Further, the acquittee has not established that
there are any legally cognizable collateral consequences
resulting from the 2023 commitment order, or that this
is a matter that is capable of repetition, yet evading
review. The acquittee was, however, precluded from
fully litigating the correctness of the 2023 commitment
order through no fault of his own, insofar as it was
rendered moot when the state withdrew the 2024 petition. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal but vacate the
2023 commitment order.
The record reveals the following relevant facts and
procedural history. In October, 1997, the acquittee
stabbed and slashed his father multiple times, causing
him to suffer critical injuries. The state charged the
2
The acquittee appealed from the 2023 commitment order to the Appellate Court, and we granted his motion to transfer the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-2.
State v. Guild
acquittee with numerous offenses, including attempted
murder and assault in the first degree. The acquittee,
who had previously been diagnosed with schizophrenia
and an alcohol use disorder, raised the defense that he
was not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect
(insanity). The trial court rendered a judgment acquitting him of those charged index offenses3 by reason of
insanity. On March 5, 1999, the court committed the
acquittee to the custody of the board for a period not
to exceed twenty years. See General Statutes § 17a-582
(e) (1) (A) (maximum commitment period is maximum
sentence of index offense). The board ordered that the
acquittee be confined in what was then the Whiting
Forensic Division (Whiting) of the Connecticut Valley
Hospital (hospital), which was the board’s maximum
security facility. Since the expiration of the acquittee’s
initial term of commitment in March, 2019, the trial
court has extended the acquittee’s commitment several
times, either by the agreement of the parties during the
pendency of litigation, or by finding, after conducting
evidentiary hearings, that there was clear and convincing evidence that the acquittee remained ‘‘a person with
psychiatric disabilities . . . to the extent that his discharge . . . would constitute a danger to himself or
others . . . .’’4 General Statutes § 17a-593 (c).
3
‘‘[T]he psychiatric profession refers to the offenses that led to an acquittee’s arrest as index offenses.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Foster, 353 Conn. 1, 6 n.5, A.3d (2025).
4
Specifically, the state first filed a petition for continued commitment in November, 2018, which was prior to the expiration of the initial term of commitment in March, 2019. The board filed a report pursuant to § 17a-593 (d), recommending that the trial court grant the petition and extend the commitment for no more than three years. The acquittee subsequently moved to dismiss that petition on the ground that § 17a-593, as applied to him, violated his right to equal protection under the United States constitution. The trial court, Keegan, J., denied that motion to dismiss. The acquittee then filed an interlocutory appeal from the denial of the motion to dismiss, which the Appellate Court dismissed for lack of a final judgment in 2022. See State v. Guild, 214 Conn. App. 121, 122–23, 132, 279 A.3d 222 (2022).
While that appeal was pending, the state filed a revised petition for continued commitment, and the board filed a report recommending the continued
State v. Guild
The acquittee was confined under maximum security
conditions at Whiting from 1999 until 2010. Following
some struggles in the early years of his commitment
with inconsistent engagement with therapy and his
medicinal regimen, which caused his psychosis and para
noia to remain actively symptomatic, the acquittee’s
condition improved. In December, 2010, the board
granted the hospital’s application to transfer the acquittee from Whiting to its less restrictive inpatient placement,
Dutcher Enhanced Security Service (Dutcher).
The acquittee received more freedom in the years
following his transfer to Dutcher. His privileges began
with staff supervised community outings and permission to move unescorted around hospital grounds. After
holding a hearing in October, 2013, the board granted
the acquittee temporary leave from Dutcher to participate in day treatment services at the Rushford Center
(Rushford) in Meriden, which is a community-based and
staff supervised treatment facility. Finally, the acquittee
progressed to overnights in the community, with support and supervision from Rushford, in 2015. Following
a hearing in June, 2016, the board granted the acquittee
conditional release from the hospital to the Meriden
commitment of the acquittee because there was clear and convincing evidence that the acquittee remained a person with psychiatric disabilities and that his release would constitute a danger to himself or others.
During the pendency of the proceedings concerning the appeal from the denial of the initial motion to dismiss, and with the agreement of the parties regarding the acquittee’s best interests, the trial court ordered various extensions of the acquittee’s commitment without prejudice, but acknowledged the importance of public safety, ranging from several weeks to one year, on February 22, 2019, May 10, 2019, June 20, 2019, June 10, 2020, September 10, 2020, and November 17, 2020. On September 28, 2021, the trial court granted a joint motion by the state and the acquittee for a continuation of his commitment by agreement for a period not to exceed March 20, 2023. In October, 2022, the state filed the petition for continued commitment that resulted in the 2023 commitment order that is the subject of this appeal. In its 2023 commitment order, the trial court granted the state’s petition, extending the acquittee’s commitment for a period of two years, to March 20, 2025.
State v. Guild
area, and he was discharged from the hospital to the
supervision of Rushford in September, 2016. See General Statutes §§ 17a-588 and 17a-589.
Compliant with his medicinal and treatment regimen
under Rushford’s supervision, the acquittee progressed
well while living in the community. He eventually
obtained gainful employment at a warehouse. As a
result of his progress, the board modified several of his
conditions of release to grant him additional privileges
and independence, including permission to operate a
motor vehicle.
In 2020, the acquittee had a setback when he began
to experience increased anxiety that was attributable
to social isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic. By
October, 2020, the acquittee had expressed numerous
paranoid and delusional beliefs to his conditional release
supervisors and had also violated several of his conditions of release. Although the acquittee did not act violently during his delusional episodes, his treatment
team, in consultation with Jessica Matyka, the acquittee’s
conditional release supervisor, determined that ‘‘his
risk had escalated’’ and that he should be hospitalized
for increased supervision and observation. Following
that assessment by his treatment team, the acquittee
was voluntarily readmitted to Whiting on October 22,
2020. He remained at Whiting for approximately eight
months, until June, 2021.
In June, 2021, the acquittee returned to the community on conditional release. Since that time, he has lived
independently in a leased apartment in Meriden. He has
remained compliant with his medicinal regimen and
has continued to participate in therapy. The acquittee
has also developed coping strategies, including participating in various social groups and attending Alcoholics
Anonymous meetings. His moods have been stable, and
he has not had any reported increases in paranoia, rigidState v. Guild
ity, or irritability. He is still gainfully employed at a
warehouse and participates in a variety of social activities, both at Rushford and in the community. On the
basis of the acquittee’s progress, the board granted the
acquittee additional modifications to his conditions of
release. Those modifications included decreasing the
frequency of testing for drugs and other substances,
reducing curfew checks, and granting the acquittee permission to operate a motor vehicle within a twenty mile
radius for limited purposes, such as for visiting family,
playing golf, shopping, and traveling to and from his
place of employment and treatment locations. In 2022,
the board also granted the acquittee permission to suspend his mandatory health and wellness group visits,
so that he could attend his own social activities instead.
In October, 2022, the state filed the petition for continued commitment that is the subject of this appeal. See
General Statutes § 17a-593 (c) (state must file petition
to extend commitment at least 135 days before commitment expiration date). The board subsequently filed a
report with the trial court pursuant to § 17a-593 (d),
recommending that the court grant the petition for a
period not to exceed two years.
The acquittee moved to dismiss the petition, claiming
that § 17a-593, as applied to him, violated his right to
equal protection under the United States constitution
because his continued commitment under that statute
imposes a greater burden on his liberty than those procedures applicable to civilly committed inmates. The
trial court, Oliver, J., denied the acquittee’s motion to
dismiss, concluding that it was bound by the Appellate
Court’s rejection of a similar equal protection challenge
in the companion case to this appeal. See State v. Foster,
217 Conn. App. 476, 506, 289 A.3d 191 (2023), aff’d, 353
Conn. 1, A.3d (2025).
Following an evidentiary hearing, on July 11, 2023,
the trial court granted the state’s petition for continued
State v. Guild
commitment and issued the 2023 commitment order.
In the 2023 commitment order, the court found that
the state had met its burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the acquittee’s release from
the board’s jurisdiction would constitute a danger to
himself or others. See General Statutes § 17a-593 (c)
and (g); see also, e.g., State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 425,
645 A.2d 965 (1994). The court relied primarily on the
recurrence of the acquittee’s delusions that necessitated
his hospitalization in 2020. The court also acknowledged
that the acquittee’s ‘‘delusional and paranoid thinking
can be controlled with medications’’ but expressed concern about the likelihood of a violent response to a
perceived threat in the event that the acquittee stopped
taking his medication. The court explained that, because
the acquittee ‘‘has not lived unsupervised since 1997
. . . it is unknown if he would continue to abide by his
medical and therapeutic regimen without supervision.’’
Emphasizing that its ‘‘primary consideration’’ under the
statutory scheme ‘‘is the protection of society’’ and that
its ‘‘secondary concern is the safety and well-being of
the acquittee’’; General Statutes § 17a-593 (g); the trial
court found that ‘‘the state ha[d] carried its burden by
clear and convincing evidence.’’ Accordingly, the trial
court extended the acquittee’s commitment for two
more years, to March 20, 2025. This appeal from the
2023 commitment order followed.
Oral argument was held before this court on December 4, 2024. First, the acquittee claimed that clear and
convincing evidence did not support the trial court’s
finding of dangerousness under § 17a-593 (g). Second,
the acquittee argued that the trial court violated his
equal protection rights under article first, § 20, of the
Connecticut constitution and the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution by following the
standard set forth in § 17a-593 (g), which identifies the
protection of the public as its primary consideration,
State v. Guild
rather than the civil commitment standard in General
Statutes § 17a-498 (c) (3), which focuses on whether
the acquittee is a danger to himself or others and
requires the court to order the least restrictive placement available.
On December 2, 2024, two days prior to oral argument
before this court, the state filed the 2024 petition with
the trial court, which, if granted, would have extended
the acquittee’s commitment to the custody of the board
beyond March 20, 2025. In response to the 2024 petition,
on January 23, 2025, the board filed a report pursuant
to § 17a-593 (d), recommending that the trial court deny
the state’s petition for continued commitment because
the acquittee was no longer a danger to himself or
others.
On March 11, 2025, the state withdrew the 2024 petition, advising the trial court of its view that the acquittee was no longer a danger to himself or others. Specifically,
in its letter withdrawing the 2024 petition, the state
relied on the board’s findings that the acquittee had (1)
‘‘remained clinically stable and adherent to the conditions of his release,’’ (2) ‘‘remained engaged in therapy
and all aspects of treatment while working in the community, and . . . maintained his sobriety,’’ and (3)
‘‘maintain[ed] a stable living environment, [was] gainfully employed, [and] independently administer[ed] his
own medication . . . .’’ As a result of the state’s withdrawal, the acquittee was discharged from the custody
of the board on March 20, 2025. After counsel informed
us that the state had withdrawn the 2024 petition, we
ordered the parties to file simultaneous supplemental
briefs addressing the following question: ‘‘Will the discharge of the acquittee from the custody of the board
on March 20, 2025, following the expiration of his term
of commitment on that date, render moot his appeal
challenging that commitment?’’
State v. Guild
‘‘[M]ootness implicates [this] court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and is thus a threshold matter for us to
resolve before we may reach the merits of an appeal.
. . . It is well settled that an actual controversy is an
essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions,
disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from
the determination of which no practical relief can follow. . . . An actual controversy must exist not only at
the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the
pendency of the appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude
an appellate court from granting any practical relief
through its disposition of the merits, a case has become
moot.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) 7 Germantown Road, LLC v. Danbury, 351
Conn. 169, 176, 329 A.3d 927 (2025). ‘‘In determining
mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the [parties] in any way.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wendy V. v. Santiago, 319 Conn. 540, 545, 125 A.3d 983 (2015).
In his prayer for relief in this appeal from the 2023
commitment order, the acquittee seeks a judgment
directing the trial court to deny the state’s petition to
extend his commitment, which ultimately would have
led to his release from the custody of the board. The
relief requested from this court is no longer available
because the acquittee was released from the board’s
custody on March 20, 2025. That intervening event has
rendered this appeal moot. See, e.g., State v. Kalman,
88 Conn. App. 125, 141–43, 868 A.2d 766 (challenge
to commitment of acquittee to board under maximum
security conditions was rendered moot when, during
pendency of appeal, board granted hospital’s application to transfer insanity acquittee to less restrictive
setting), cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 44 (2005);
State v. Guild
Peart v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, 41 Conn.
App. 688, 689, 691, 678 A.2d 488 (1996) (same).
The acquittee argues that this appeal should not be
dismissed as moot because of the collateral consequences doctrine, and because it also falls within the
capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to
the mootness doctrine. We disagree.
Under the collateral consequences doctrine, ‘‘a case
does not necessarily become moot by virtue of the fact
that . . . due to a change in circumstances, relief from
the actual injury is unavailable. We have determined
that a controversy continues to exist, affording the
court jurisdiction, if the actual injury suffered by the
litigant potentially gives rise to a collateral injury from
which the court can grant relief.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Gomes, 337 Conn. 826, 839–40,
256 A.3d 131 (2021).
‘‘[F]or a litigant to invoke successfully the collateral
consequences doctrine, the litigant must show that
there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collateral consequences will occur. . . . This standard provides the necessary limitations on justiciability underlying the mootness doctrine itself. [When] there is no
direct practical relief available from the reversal of the
judgment . . . the collateral consequences doctrine
acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether
a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future. The reviewing court therefore
determines, based [on] the particular situation, whether
. . . the prejudicial collateral consequences are reasonably possible.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,
840; see, e.g., State v. McElveen, 261 Conn. 198, 208,
802 A.2d 74 (2002). It requires more than speculation
or conjecture to establish a reasonable possibility that
such a collateral consequence will occur. See, e.g.,
United Illuminating Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory
State v. Guild
Authority, 350 Conn. 660, 674, 325 A.3d 900 (2024);
State v. McElveen, supra, 208.
To establish that his claim falls within the collateral
consequences doctrine, the acquittee relies on State v.
Jerzy G., 326 Conn. 206, 162 A.3d 692 (2017), and on
other cases from this court, which, he contends, allow
for ‘‘a presumption of collateral consequences based
[on] the impact of an adverse ruling [on] future litigation
or [on] an individual’s reputation.’’ The acquittee argues
that (1) ‘‘there is no question that an erroneous finding
of ongoing danger, as recent as 2023, carries stigma
that could cast a shadow on [his] efforts to lead a
productive life’’ after his discharge from the custody
of the board, and that (2) a decision from this court
determining that he ‘‘was entitled to . . . discharge in
2023’’ would provide a ‘‘more accurate’’ representation
of his ‘‘stability’’ and lack of dangerousness. The acquittee further argues that, as recognized by the Superior Court
in In re Probate Appeal of Kandjrika, Docket No.
NNH-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2018 WL 7046892, *7 (Conn.
Super. December 11, 2018), the Department of Mental
Health and Addiction Services (department) ‘‘maintains
a database of individuals who are using or have used its
services’’ and that he ‘‘likely will remain in this database, even if [he] no longer utiliz[es] [the department’s] services,’’ giving him ‘‘an interest in removing the stain
of an erroneous finding that he remained dangerously
mentally ill.’’
We acknowledge, as the acquittee argues, that our
collateral consequences case law recognizes reputational harm and stigma as an injury that may qualify as
a collateral consequence under certain circumstances.
Most paradigmatically, such collateral consequences
often result from criminal convictions, which carry with
them other legal disabilities in addition to the obvious
restrictions on the convicted person’s freedom in the
form of incarceration, parole, probation, and the like.
State v. Guild
See, e.g., State v. Jerzy G., supra, 326 Conn. 208, 225–26
(probable cause to believe that deported defendant
committed sexual assault that led to pending charge
was itself ‘‘stain’’ on reputation that would allow for
appeal from trial court’s order terminating defendant’s
participation in accelerated rehabilitation program and
ordering his rearrest on pending charge); State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1, 10 n.9, 44 A.3d 794 (2012) (‘‘[because]
collateral legal disabilities are imposed as a matter of
law [as a result] of a criminal conviction, a case will
not be declared moot even [when] the [defendant’s]
sentence has been fully served’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Putman v. Kennedy, 279 Conn. 162,
164–65, 172, 900 A.2d 1256 (2006) (expiration of domestic violence restraining order did not render appeal from
that order moot because ‘‘being the subject of a court
order intended to prevent or stop domestic violence
may well cause harm to the reputation . . . of the
defendant’’). We also agree with the acquittee that involuntary commitment to a psychiatric hospital on the
ground that a person is a danger to oneself or others,
which is a fact that might well be documented in the
department’s database, carries the potential for reputational stigma. See, e.g., State v. Metz, supra, 230 Conn.
412–13; In re B.B., 826 N.W.2d 425, 429–30 (Iowa 2013).
Nevertheless, we conclude that the collateral consequences doctrine does not save the acquittee’s appeal
from mootness in the particular circumstances of this
case because he has not established that the 2023 commitment order will carry the reasonable possibility of
a collateral consequence.5 We recognize the theoretical
5
The acquittee focuses his arguments on reputational stigma. We note, however, that an involuntary commitment, including one resulting from an insanity acquittal, may result in the impairment of certain rights, including permanent firearms ownership restrictions applicable to those ‘‘adjudicated as a mental defective’’ or ‘‘committed to a mental institution’’ under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) (4). See, e.g., United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Buffaloe, 449 F.2d 779, 780 (4th Cir. 1971).
State v. Guild
possibility that the extension of commitment at issue
in this appeal may still carry collateral consequences,
such as additional reputational harm, or possibly may
risk creating a perception of ‘‘one more strike’’ against
the acquittee in a subsequent case; State v. McElveen,
supra, 261 Conn. 216 n.14; despite the fact that it does
not create additional, concrete legal disabilities. See,
e.g., State v. Gomes, supra, 337 Conn. 828, 837–38,
844–45 (defendant’s deportation during pendency of his
appeal did not render appeal moot given reputational
injury from assault conviction); State v. Jerzy G., supra,
326 Conn. 221–22 (observing that ‘‘other potential
sources of prejudice’’ do not defeat finding of collateral
injury unless they are ‘‘necessarily dispositive,’’ such
as permanent ban from reentering this country due to
prior conviction); see also, e.g., State v. McElveen, supra, 216 n.14, 217–18 (criminal conviction that stemmed
from conduct leading to revocation of defendant’s probation that was at issue in otherwise moot appeal created ‘‘similar prejudicial collateral consequences’’ but
was merely ‘‘one more strike against the defendant and
[did] not eliminate the collateral consequences arising
from the judgment revoking his probation’’).
Unlike criminal convictions or findings that reasonably can be expected to cause reputational stigma in
the first instance, however, the 2023 commitment order
at issue in this appeal is an extension of several prior
commitments beyond the initial twenty year term, all
resulting from the same original source, in this case, a
single judgment of acquittal as to all of the index
offenses by reason of insanity, rather than from separate, factual predicates. See footnote 4 of this opinion
and accompanying text. The extension of commitment
reflects a determination of limited duration by the trial
court that the need for further supervision had not yet
terminated. This determination no doubt infringed on
the acquittee’s liberty interests until the expiration of
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the extended commitment, but we fail to see how it
materially increased the stigma associated with his
commitment as an insanity acquittee or gave rise to a
reasonable possibility of causing him adverse collateral
consequences in the future. To the contrary, ‘‘[e]very
collateral consequence that can be identified already
existed as a result of [the acquittee’s] previous adjudications . . . .’’ In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 363, 910 N.E.2d 74 (2009); see, e.g., id., 362–63 (applying caseby-case analysis but concluding that involuntary commitment lacked collateral consequences when ‘‘[the]
respondent has had multiple [prior] involuntary commitments’’). But cf. In re B.B., supra, 826 N.W.2d 432
(observing that ‘‘a series of recent, successive involuntary commitments that were either not appealed or
upheld on appeal might effectively remove any stigma
resulting from a later involuntary commitment proceeding’’ but concluding that appeal was not moot because
‘‘a single and remote prior involuntary commitment’’
thirteen years before is not ‘‘sufficient to eliminate the
stigma resulting from the adjudication in [the] case’’).
Accordingly, we conclude that the collateral consequences doctrine does not save the acquittee’s appeal
from mootness.6
6
We acknowledge the acquittee’s concern that the trial court’s uncorrected finding of dangerousness in the 2023 commitment order may, in the event of a subsequent civil commitment proceeding, result in ‘‘an overreaction by a Probate Court, and an unmerited, potentially lengthy involuntary commitment.’’ We disagree that this concern presents a collateral consequence that saves this appeal from mootness. First, the report that the board filed, pursuant to § 17a-593 (d), in connection with the 2024 petition, which recommended the acquittee’s release, has a rehabilitative effect by serving as affirmative evidence that he is no longer a danger as contemplated by § 17a593 (c) and (g). See, e.g., State v. Kalman, supra, 88 Conn. App. 143, 144 (concluding that ‘‘there [were] no collateral legal consequences’’ to trial court’s order committing insanity acquittee to maximum security setting because ‘‘the weight of the [trial] court’s findings . . . [was] greatly dissipated by the board’s evaluation and determination that the acquittee no longer require[d] maximum security confinement’’); Peart v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, supra, 41 Conn. App. 692 (concluding that ‘‘the board’s findings that [the insanity acquittee] was an escape risk and [that
State v. Guild
We next turn to the acquittee’s contention that we
should not dismiss this appeal because it presents
issues that are capable of repetition, yet evading review.
See, e.g., Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 382–83, 660 A.2d
323 (1995). It is well established that ‘‘[t]he mootness
doctrine does not preclude a court from addressing an
issue that is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
. . . [F]or an otherwise moot question to qualify for
review under the capable of repetition, yet evading
review exception, it must meet three requirements.
First, the challenged action, or the effect of the challenged action, by its very nature must be of a limited
duration so that there is a strong likelihood that the
substantial majority of cases raising a question about
its validity will become moot before appellate litigation
can be concluded. Second, there must be a reasonable
likelihood that the question presented in the pending
case will arise again in the future, and that it will affect either the same complaining party or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that party can be said to act
he] wore symbols of white supremacy,’’ justifying maximum security commitment, will not have collateral legal consequences, given board’s subsequent grant of transfer to less restrictive hospital, making it ‘‘clear . . . that the findings made by the trial court in its memorandum [of decision] did not adversely affect the [acquittee]’’). Second, whether such a civil commitment proceeding will occur at all is a matter of speculation and conjecture, especially given the board’s most recent report in connection with the 2024 petition. In the event that such a proceeding may occur at some point in the future, the appellate review process is available to remedy any potential ‘‘overreaction’’ by a Probate Court. See, e.g., United Illuminating Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, supra, 350 Conn. 663, 673–75 (no reasonable possibility of collateral consequences for electric distribution company given representation by government agency’s counsel that agency had no intention of relying on proceedings that agency had initiated to address deficiencies in company’s preparedness and response to tropical storm in any future storm investigations and in light of determination by agency that company had corrected most cited deficiencies). Finally, ‘‘[a]lthough it flows from, rather than contributes to, our mootness analysis . . . because we are directing the vacatur of [the 2023 commitment order] . . . any possibility of collateral consequences attendant to, or arising from, that order is eliminated.’’ (Citation omitted.) Id., 674 n.8.
,
State v. Guild
as surrogate. Third, the question must have some public
importance. Unless all three requirements are met, the
appeal must be dismissed as moot.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) CT Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dept. of
Education, 346 Conn. 1, 13, 287 A.3d 557 (2023).
We agree with the acquittee that his appeal raises
significant legal issues regarding § 17a-593 (c) that, by
their nature, are of limited duration, such that they may
sometimes evade appellate review. Nevertheless, the
acquittee’s capable of repetition, yet evading review
argument founders on the durational element because
the time required to adjudicate these matters is not so
limited that there is a strong likelihood that appellate
review will be unavailable in the substantial majority of
cases. This durational factor ‘‘reflects the functionally
insurmountable time constraints present in certain
types of disputes. . . . Paradigmatic examples are
abortion cases and other medical treatment disputes.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Emma F., 315
Conn. 414, 425, 107 A.3d 947 (2015); see also, e.g., id.,
428 (‘‘[s]heer public importance . . . cannot remedy a
failure to satisfy the other components of the capable
of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). As
the acquittee observed in his primary brief, unlike cases
in which the challenged action would expire before an
appeal could be addressed, there is no time limitation
on the length of a continued commitment inherent in
§ 17a-593 (c) or any other statutory provision. Thus,
because there is no limitation on how long an extension
of commitment could be, and, as in this case, the state
and an acquittee may well consent to further extensions
during the course of an appeal, there is no strong likelihood that a substantial majority of cases challenging
an extension of commitment will become moot before
appellate litigation can be concluded.
State v. Guild
Moreover, to the extent that a commitment extension
in a particular case is short enough that mootness may
be expected to occur during the ordinary course of
appellate review, existing procedures may be utilized
to facilitate timely appellate review of such an extension. See, e.g., CT Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dept. of
Education, supra, 346 Conn. 18–19 (noting that parties
may ‘‘[enlist] the help of the appellate courts’’ to ensure
that case is ‘‘live,’’ including resort to expedited review
procedures, such as petitions to Chief Justice pursuant
to General Statutes § 52-265a); In re Emma F., supra,
315 Conn. 426–27 (discussing expedited review procedures for ‘‘appellate relief,’’ including ‘‘implementing an
expedited briefing, argument, and decision procedure’’).
Neither the collateral consequences doctrine nor the
capable of repetition, yet evading review exception allows
us to reach the merits of this appeal, and, therefore,
we must dismiss the appeal as moot. Nevertheless, we
agree with the acquittee’s contention that we should
‘‘remove the stain’’ of the otherwise moot 2023 commitment order, and we now consider whether to vacate it.7
‘‘Vacatur is commonly utilized . . . to prevent a
judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from
spawning any legal consequences. . . . In determining
whether to vacate a judgment that is unreviewable
because of mootness, the principal issue is whether the
party seeking relief from [that] judgment . . . caused
the mootness by voluntary action. . . . A party who
seeks review of the merits of an adverse ruling, but is
frustrated by the vagaries of circumstance, ought not
in fairness be forced to acquiesce in the judgment. . . .
The same is true when mootness results from unilateral
action of the party who prevailed below.’’ (Internal quo7
Although the acquittee’s request that we ‘‘remove the stain’’ of the 2023 commitment order is not entirely clear, potentially because our supplemental briefing order did not raise the subject, we construe his request as asking us to vacate that order.
,
State v. Guild
tation marks omitted.) United Illuminating Co. v. Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, supra, 350 Conn.
675. Application of the doctrine of vacatur eliminates
the possibility, ‘‘however remote’’ or ‘‘unlikely,’’ that an otherwise moot decision might implicate some ‘‘lingering’’ or ‘‘residual’’ harm for the appellant, despite the
lack of reasonably possible collateral consequences
that otherwise would save the appeal from mootness.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Private Healthcare
Systems, Inc. v. Torres, 278 Conn. 291, 304, 898 A.2d
768 (2006); see also, e.g., United Illuminating Co. v.
Public Utilities Regulatory Authority, supra, 677.
In this respect, we find instructive the Appellate
Court’s recent decision in In re Rabia K., 212 Conn.
App. 556, 275 A.3d 249 (2022). In In re Rabia K., a child
protection appeal, the Appellate Court concluded that
a respondent mother’s appeal from a neglect finding
was rendered moot when the trial court revoked the
commitment of the child to the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families; id., 558; meaning that,
‘‘[b]ecause the underlying case ha[d] been closed and
[the child] ha[d] been returned to the care and custody
of the respondent, an actual controversy no longer
exist[ed].’’ Id., 561. The Appellate Court then determined that there were no collateral consequences to
save the appeal from mootness because there was no
reasonable possibility that ‘‘an adjudication of neglect
could be used against [the respondent] in a future child
protection proceeding,’’ given that the child was about
to turn eighteen years old. Id., 562.
Nevertheless, recognizing that the appeal had been
rendered moot by no fault of the respondent, the Appellate Court concluded that, ‘‘under the unique circumstances of [that] case . . . vacatur [was] appropriate
in order to avoid the possibility—however remote—of
collateral consequences for the respondent . . . .’’ Id.;
see also, e.g., In re Yassell B., 208 Conn. App. 816,
State v. Guild
822–25, 267 A.3d 316 (2021) (vacating Connecticut trial
court’s decision affording full faith and credit to New
York court’s determination that appellant was not legal
father of child when his appeal was rendered moot by
resolution of underlying neglect proceeding because
appellant ‘‘did not cause [the] appeal to become moot
through any voluntary action,’’ and because ‘‘it would
be unfair to [the appellant] to bind him to a judgment
that he ha[d] challenged but, through no fault of his
own, [could not] contest’’), cert. denied, 340 Conn. 922,
268 A.3d 77 (2022).
Although the acquittee has not established that the
2023 commitment order presents a reasonable possibility of collateral consequences under the facts of this
case, the vagaries of time and the improvement in his
mental health have operated to preclude him from challenging that order through no fault of his own, given
the state’s withdrawal of the pending 2024 petition in
response to the report that was filed by the board pursuant to § 17a-593 (d). Acknowledging that the state has
acted with the utmost candor and professionalism in
withdrawing the 2024 petition in light of the board’s
report; see Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8 and commentary; we nevertheless believe that the acquittee
should be relieved of any possibility of any lingering
or remote consequences from the 2023 commitment
order, requiring that we vacate that order.8
8
Recognizing the public interest in judicial precedents, we typically have been more apt to vacate erroneous Appellate Court decisions than trial court decisions because of their binding precedential effect. See, e.g., In re Jorden R., 293 Conn. 539, 557–58, 979 A.2d 469 (2009); Private Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Torres, supra, 278 Conn. 303–305; In re Candace H., 259 Conn. 523, 527 and n.5, 790 A.2d 1164 (2002); see also, e.g., State v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 308 Conn. 140, 145 and n.6, 60 A.3d 946 (2013). Because they lack binding precedential value, we have been less apt to vacate trial court decisions in moot appeals, unless some preclusive effect was identified. See, e.g., In re Emma F., supra, 315 Conn. 431–33. In the present case, the concerns identified by the acquittee tend to be more preclusive than merely precedential in nature, rendering vacatur of the 2023 commitment
State v. Guild
The appeal is dismissed and the July 11, 2023 commitment order is vacated.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
order appropriate. See, e.g., In re Yassell B., supra, 208 Conn. App. 824 n.3; see also, e.g., State v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, supra, 145.