Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 494
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-24-624
Opinion Delivered October 22, 2025
NATALIE INMON
APPEAL FROM BENTON COUNTY
APPELLANT CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 04DR-23-869]
V.
HONORABLE DOUG SCHRANTZ, JUDGE
RODNEY DAVIS
APPELLEE AFFIRMED
STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge
Appellant Natalie Inmon appeals from the Benton County Circuit Court’s April 15,
2024 divorce decree that awarded primary custody of the parties’ minor daughter (MC) to
appellee Rodney Davis. Appellant argues that the circuit court erred (1) in finding it was in
the child’s best interest for Davis to have primary custody; (2) in restricting the child’s contact
with Inmon’s new romantic partner, Sam Couch, during her visitation; and (3) in restricting
Inmon from leaving the child in the care of Couch’s family members during visitation. We
affirm.
I. Standard of Review
Our standard of review in child-custody matters is well settled. This court reviews
custody cases de novo, but we will not reverse the circuit court’s findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. Styles v. Styles, 2024 Ark. App. 435, at 3, 699 S.W.3d 693, 698. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. Id. Due deference is given to the circuit court’s superior position to determine
the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Id. As to issues of
law, however, we give no deference to the circuit court; rather, we review issues of law de
novo. Id.
II. Facts and Procedural History
Inmon and Davis have a long history as a couple, which includes two marriages. They
share two daughters: MacKenzie, who was born during their first marriage and has reached
the age of majority; and MC, who was born on April 29, 2020. The parties were married for
a second time on September 5, 2021, and separated on May 26, 2023.
On May 26, 2023, Inmon took MC, left the marital home in Scott, Lonoke County,
and moved into the home of Sam Couch in Gravette, Benton County. Inmon filed her
complaint for divorce, alleging general indignities, on May 31, 2023. Davis filed his
counterclaim for divorce, alleging general indignities, on September 18, 2023. Both parties
requested primary custody of MC.
When Inmon left in May 2023, she did not tell Davis where she was going and cut
off almost all contact between MC and Davis until October 2023, when the circuit court
entered a first temporary custody order. The first agreed order granted Inmon temporary
custody of MC and allowed Davis supervised visitation. An agreed second temporary custody
order was entered on January 11, 2024, and an amended version of that order was entered
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the next day, January 12. The amended second order granted Inmon and Davis joint custody
for rotating weekly periods and placed specific limitations on how third parties could be
involved in MC’s care, including specific requirements that custody exchanges could not be
carried out by third parties absent a verifiable emergency and that neither party should leave
the child with a third party overnight.
The circuit court held a final hearing on the divorce and custody decree on April 5,
2024. The testimony at that hearing was the basis for the circuit court’s orders now on
appeal. A summary of the relevant testimony follows.
The parties’ adult daughter MacKenzie testified at length, and her testimony formed
a significant basis for the circuit court’s custody rulings upon —the court’s finding that her
testimony was more credible than that of Inmon. MacKenzie, who lived with her parents
until she left home for college in August 2021 and remained close with both parents,
expressed serious concerns about how unstable Inmon’s life had become since her separation
from Davis.
First, MacKenzie testified to the manner in which Inmon separated from Davis.
MacKenzie testified that in the period shortly before Inmon left Davis, Inmon often dropped
MC off with MacKenzie at her apartment in Fayetteville, and eventually, she realized Inmon
was leaving MC with her to meet up with Sam Couch. On the day in May 2023 when Inmon
left Davis, Inmon and MC visited MacKenzie in Fayetteville, but at the end of the visit,
Inmon told MacKenzie that she was turning her cell phone off and could be reached only
through Couch. After that visit, MacKenzie struggled to reach her mother by phone because
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Inmon often did not answer, and when she did answer, Couch could be heard in the
background telling her to hang up. In order to see her mother and sister, MacKenzie had to
visit them at Couch’s home even though she was uncomfortable visiting there. Couch made
her feel uneasy because he had “been creepy towards [her] in a sexual manner,” including
slapping her “butt” on more than one occasion and taking photos of her in her swimsuit
without her knowledge or permission.
Second, MacKenzie testified to Inmon’s two-decades-long dependency on
prescription pills—a habit that continued after MC’s birth and took a worrying turn once
Inmon separated from Davis. MacKenzie testified that when MC was born in April 2020,
Inmon was released a few days before MC because MC was held in the hospital for
observation for signs of withdrawal from the hydrocodone and nicotine that Inmon used
during the pregnancy. The day Inmon was released, MacKenzie drove Inmon home from
the hospital, but on the way home they made a stop so that Inmon could buy pills from one
of her friends. After MC came home, MacKenzie noticed her mother, who had been loving
and involved during MacKenzie’s own childhood, acting withdrawn and distant from MC.
MacKenzie also often observed Inmon under the influence of prescription pills that made
Inmon “very tired” to the point that she would fall asleep on the couch with a cigarette in
her hand and burn holes in the couch and blankets.
MacKenzie testified that when Inmon moved in with Couch, Inmon’s substance use
escalated. Couch had a habit of taking pills and drinking alcohol. Inmon also continued
using pills and “picked up a very heavy drinking habit,” with the couple consuming “big
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gallon jugs of Crown” multiple times a week. MacKenzie testified that Couch controlled
Inmon’s pills and intermingled them with his own medication. She understood that Inmon
and Couch were taking more pills than they had both been prescribed because they would
run out before the end of the month and purchase pills from friends. MacKenzie also
observed physical changes in Inmon that she attributed to signs of overdose, including
frequent vomiting and changes in Inmon’s pupils.
Even more concerning was that Inmon and Couch were often under the influence
when MC was with them. MacKenzie testified that Couch would often drive under the
influence with MC in the vehicle, and Inmon was sometimes too intoxicated to care for MC.
MacKenzie also related two specific instances of her mother’s increasingly inappropriate,
risky behavior. On one occasion, MacKenzie received text messages containing disturbing
nude photos of Inmon that were sent from Inmon’s phone, and when confronted with the
photos, her mother could not give MacKenzie a satisfactory explanation. In another
incident, MacKenzie was babysitting MC at Couch’s home when Inmon and Couch
returned home highly intoxicated. Inmon stripped off her clothes in the living room and
got down on her hands and knees. MC then got on Inmon’s back to ride her like a horse.
Couch called MacKenzie into the room to show her what was happening and make jokes
about her mother’s nude body. MacKenzie said that Inmon apologized the next day and
said she had no memory of what happened the night before.
MacKenzie also testified that Inmon and Couch often left MC overnight at the home
of Couch’s parents, sometimes for three days together, so they could go drinking. According
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to MacKenzie, MC had spent so much time with Couch’s parents that she was confused as
to their relationship to her and had begun calling them “Nanny” and “Paw Paw.”
MacKenzie testified that Davis, on the other hand, provided a good environment for
her sister, and MC seemed comfortable and happy in his home. Although she admitted that
Davis used marijuana in the past, MacKenzie testified that he does not use drugs or drink
alcohol and had never been abusive to her or her mother. She also testified that while her
mother had been more involved in her childhood as a stay-at-home mom, her father was her
biggest “cheerleader.”
In her testimony, Inmon denied many parts of MacKenzie’s testimony, called
MacKenzie lying and vindictive, and tried to paint Davis as the problem parent. With regard
to her drug and alcohol habits, Inmon testified that she had a stroke in 2014, was on
disability as a result of her stroke, and holds prescriptions for hydrocodone, blood-pressure
medication, anxiety medication, and sleep medication. Inmon testified that she takes her
medications only as prescribed and denied abusing pills or alcohol. Inmon denied or
claimed to have no memory of the incidents MacKenzie had recounted of her acting
inappropriately while intoxicated.
Inmon, however, admitted to certain parts of MacKenzie’s testimony. She admitted
that she took her prescription for opioids during her pregnancy with MC and admitted that
on the day she was discharged from the hospital, while MC remained behind for observation,
she borrowed pills from a friend. She also admitted to borrowing and trading pills with
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friends on other occasions and admitted that she once passed out with a cigarette in her
mouth and burned a blanket.
Inmon likewise admitted to preventing Davis from seeing MC in person and to not
accepting Davis’s calls for five to six months after she moved in with Couch. She testified
that during that time, Davis had contact with MC only on three occasions when she allowed
MacKenzie and MC to video call Davis from Couch’s home. She also admitted using
MacKenzie as a go-between in her disputes with Davis during the separation.
Inmon characterized Davis as controlling and violent. She testified that the only
reason she borrowed pills from friends was because Davis controlled her pills and doled them
out in exchange for household chores. Inmon testified that Davis’s home was not safe for
MC because Davis held a medical marijuana card and regularly kept and used marijuana in
the home. Additionally, she testified that Davis bred, raised, and sold pit bull dogs on the
property, and when she left, Davis had 23 dogs. Although she admitted she herself loved
and cared for the dogs, she testified that she did not feel that it was safe for MC to be around
so many dogs.
Inmon testified that Davis has a violent temper and would often choke or slap her
and had thrown her around and slammed her into things. She testified that once while they
were arguing, Davis “slung” a “back scratcher” at her face that caused bruising and bleeding
and left a scar. A photograph of Inmon that showed blood coming from her forehead was
admitted as an exhibit. She testified MacKenzie was a witness to many of Davis’s violent
attacks, and Davis once caused MacKenzie to bleed when he hit her on the bridge of her
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nose with a phone during an argument. Inmon also said that Davis kept guns in the home
and had brandished the weapons near Inmon and threatened to shoot her. What is more,
Inmon blamed her departure from the marital home on Davis’s explosive temper. She
testified that a week before she left Davis, he had dragged her down the hall by her hair after
she refused him sex. She further testified that she left after Davis “kicked her out” and
packed up her belongings.
Inmon, however, had never called the police in response to Davis’s violent attacks or
sought medical attention for her injuries. She also admitted that during her interviews and
visits with the attorney ad litem, she never told the attorney ad litem about Davis’s alleged
physical abuse or the story that he kicked her out.
As to her new family situation, Inmon testified that she had known Couch and his
family since childhood, and she and Couch planned to marry. She described Couch as being
loving and a good “daddy” figure to MC. She denied that Couch was ever inappropriate
with MacKenzie or MC. She conceded that Couch did slap MacKenzie on the “butt” one
time, but she tried to explain it away as a joke that MacKenzie blew out of proportion. She
testified that MC and Couch’s parents have a loving relationship, and they treated MC like
a grandchild. Inmon also asserted that she does not leave MC with Couch’s parents as often
as MacKenzie had represented.
For his part, much of Davis’s testimony was focused upon his plan for how he would
care for MC if she was placed in his custody. Davis, who is a full-time truck driver for a
lumber yard, testified that he had lived in Scott for 10 years; his mother, JoAnn, lives close
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by; and his extended family also live in Scott or in nearby North Little Rock. He has a
consistent work schedule Monday through Friday from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Davis testified
that he planned for his mother to care for MC while he was at work until MC turned four
years old, at which point he would enroll her in prekindergarten at his church. When asked
about his plan to maintain MC’s relationship with Inmon if he was given primary custody,
Davis testified that he would help facilitate visitation with Inmon but that he did not approve
of MC spending the night at Couch’s home.
Davis admitted that he has a 2007 conviction for selling marijuana but testified he
had not been arrested since. He testified that he no longer has a medical marijuana card
and had not used marijuana in two years and further stated that he does not drink alcohol,
smoke, or abuse drugs. He also denied Inmon’s stories of physical abuse and denied that his
pit bulls are a danger to MC.
Davis testified that Inmon has a long history of using pills and had been abusing pills
more frequently in the five years before she left him. He testified that on the night before
she left, Inmon was on the couch watching television when she lost consciousness and began
foaming at the mouth and throwing up. Davis said that after this, he realized how much
Inmon had been buying, trading, and abusing pills. He testified that after MC was born,
Inmon was distant and would leave MC in her crib or in a playpen and would sometimes
pass out on the couch. His mother, JoAnn, had been very involved in MC’s life and would
often care for MC when Inmon needed help.
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Davis denied kicking Inmon out of the marital home and confirmed that after Inmon
left, he did not see MC for almost six months. He testified that during this time, he had
trouble contacting Inmon by phone because she would either not answer his calls, or Couch
would interfere with their conversations. He testified that he was only able to contact MC
through MacKenzie until the court ordered visitation.
Davis testified that once he was awarded supervised visitation, his visits with MC were
disrupted by Couch’s family. Specifically, during the first few months of supervised
visitation, MC was brought to visitation by Couch’s parents, who tried to film him during
visitation and who “hollered,” “cussed,” and struggled to get MC to end the visits when she
cried about leaving Davis. Eventually Inmon and Couch also began attending visitation
along with Couch’s parents, and the disruptive behavior continued. He also said that Inmon
wore sunglasses and slurred her words during those visitations.
JoAnn Davis corroborated Davis’s testimony. JoAnn testified that she had been one
of MC’s primary caregivers for most of the child’s life. From the time when MC was around
12 months old, JoAnn noticed that Inmon was sad and tired and began checking in on
Inmon and MC around midday each day. Either JoAnn or Inmon would contact each other
by phone, and JoAnn would come over to relieve Inmon and take MC to her home for the
rest of the day. Often when JoAnn arrived, MC had not been bathed or fed. Usually, Inmon
would not invite her inside, but what JoAnn could see of the home was a mess. When she
was allowed inside, JoAnn usually found MC standing in her crib or in a playpen in front of
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the television while Inmon was on her phone or laptop. JoAnn testified that she thought
Davis was good with MC, and she was willing and able to help him with MC’s care.
At the close of the parties’ testimony, the court asked Buffie Merryman, the attorney
ad litem, to give her custody recommendation. Merryman stated that she had visited MC in
both parents’ homes and had found MC to be bright, funny, charming, and talkative. She
felt that MC was comfortable with both parents. She was concerned, however, by how
Inmon had hastily moved MC out of the marital home to move her in with a new, strange
man and his family, and she was concerned by the stories that Inmon and Couch were
abusing pills and alcohol. Merryman also felt that Inmon had made efforts to alienate MC
from Davis and his family and replace them with Couch and his parents.
Merryman stated that joint custody would not be practical and recommended primary
custody in Davis with Inmon having standard visitation. She also recommended no
overnight visitation with MC in the home where Inmon cohabited with Couch and that MC
not be taken overnight to the homes of people to whom she was not related. When pressed
by the judge, Merryman agreed that she had concerns about Couch. She said she thought
that he was controlling and that he bullied Inmon. She also stated that in her own phone
interviews and visits with Inmon, Couch was always present, and she felt that Couch
influenced Inmon’s answers and had tried to intimidate Merryman herself. She said that
she did not have any allegations or proof before her that Couch had been inappropriate with
MC, but she trusted Mackenzie’s instincts about Couch.
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The circuit court then made several rulings from the bench. The court awarded
primary custody to Davis, with Inmon granted alternating weekend visitation. Explaining
its reasoning, the court stated that despite the preference for joint custody in Arkansas, there
was clear and convincing evidence joint custody would not work in this case. As a threshold
matter, the court noted MC was approaching school age, and with the parties living over
three hours apart, joint custody would not be feasible once MC began prekindergarten. In
addition, the parents’ contentious relationship since their separation and Inmon’s efforts to
alienate MC from Davis had proved that joint custody would not work.
The court listed its reasons for not awarding primary custody to Inmon. First, the
court noted that Inmon’s position was that she should get primary custody based upon her
allegations of Davis’s domestic abuse, but he found her testimony lacked “any credibility”
because Inmon did not raise her abuse allegations until the hearing and, tellingly, did not
make the allegations in her divorce pleadings or in her interviews and visits with the attorney
ad litem. The court was also very concerned about Inmon’s problem with drugs and alcohol
and the very serious potential consequences of those habits. Further, the court was not
convinced Inmon would facilitate a relationship between MC and Davis if she was granted
custody due to her behavior since the parties’ separation. Notably, the court called into
question Inmon’s decision to abruptly relocate MC to Northwest Arkansas so that she could
conduct an affair with Sam Couch; her efforts to cut off contact between Davis and MC;
and her choice to encourage MC to call Couch “daddy” and treat Couch’s parents like
grandparents. The court was also concerned that Inmon had established a pattern of passing
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off her parenting responsibilities to others and was repeating that pattern by frequently
leaving MC at the home of Couch’s parents overnight and for extended periods of time.
As to Davis, the court noted that placing MC in his custody was also not a perfect
choice because Davis has a “bit of a past that will follow him always” and because the court
was uncomfortable with Davis keeping 23 pit bulls around a small child. But the judge stated
that he was very impressed by the testimony given on Davis’s behalf by MacKenzie, “a totally
credible” young lady who was in a difficult spot of having to choose between her parents.
The court was convinced of MacKenzie’s concern for the best interest of her little sister and
gave considerable weight to her opinion that Davis should be given primary custody.
The judge closed his remarks from the bench by placing two conditions upon Inmon’s
visitation privileges—that MC have no contact with Couch and that MC not be left in the
care of Couch’s family members. The judge expressed his concern that Inmon’s choice to
cohabitate with Couch was not setting a good example for a small child, but more than that,
he was quite concerned by “the other things that come along with Sam Couch.”
On April 15, 2024, the circuit court entered the decree of divorce, which restated the
court’s findings and reasoning for awarding primary custody to Davis. The order stated
specifically that “[t]he minor child shall have no contact with Sam Couch,” and “[t]he minor
child shall not be left in the care of the family members of Sam Couch.”
Inmon filed a motion for reconsideration on April 17, 2024, asking that the decree
be amended to remove the condition of no contact with Sam Couch because the “no
contact” order was improperly issued without a statutory basis under the Arkansas Domestic
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Abuse Act; Inmon was residing with Couch as his fiancée; and they intended to marry. The
circuit court issued a letter ruling on April 19, 2024, stating that the court was denying the
motion because the “no contact” provision of the decree was meant to prohibit improper
cohabitation. On April 25, 2024, the circuit court entered its order denying the motion for
reconsideration. In the order, the court pointed out that the condition prohibiting contact
with Couch was meant “to protect the child from exposure to improper cohabitation” and
was not a “no contact” order under the Domestic Abuse Act.
Inmon now appeals from the divorce decree and the order denying her motion for
reconsideration.
A. Child Custody
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 2023) provides that, in
an action for divorce, the award of custody of a child born of the marriage shall be made
without regard to the sex of a parent but solely in accordance with the welfare and best
interest of the child. The best interest of the children is the polestar in every child-custody
case; all other considerations are secondary. Styles v. Styles, 2024 Ark. App. 435, at 21–22,
699 S.W.3d 693, 708. On appeal of custody matters, due deference is given to the circuit
court’s superior position to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. Our supreme court has
held that there is no other case in which the superior position, ability, and opportunity of
the circuit court to observe the parties carries greater weight than one involving the custody
of minor children. Taylor v. Taylor, 345 Ark. 300, 47 S.W.3d 222 (2001).
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As a threshold matter, we note the circuit court found that although joint custody is
generally favored in Arkansas, joint custody was not appropriate in this case because the
distance between the parties’ homes made joint custody impractical and the parties had
demonstrated their unwillingness to make joint custody work through their hostility toward
each other and inability to cooperate in co-parenting MC. Inmon does not challenge this
finding on appeal.
Inmon argues that the circuit court improperly decided not to award her custody as
a punishment for her decision to relocate to Northwest Arkansas when she had always been
MC’s primary caregiver and therefore should have been given priority over Davis.
It is evident from the record that Inmon’s relocation to Northwest Arkansas was not
the circuit court’s sole reason for denying her custody. Although the issue of which parent
has been the primary caretaker is relevant and worthy of consideration, it is not in and of
itself determinative of custody. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 2019 Ark. App. 416, at 6, 588
S.W.3d 38, 42. The circuit court was concerned not just with Inmon’s relocation and the
resulting distance between the parties’ homes but also with the instability in Inmon’s life
since the separation.
The circuit court found that Inmon had attempted to alienate MC from her father
by abruptly moving MC away from her father, grandmother, and extended family in Scott
and into the home and family of her new love interest, Sam Couch, while shutting Davis out
from any contact with MC. The court also found that Inmon had a pattern of passing the
care of MC off onto others, and that since moving in with Couch, she had repeated that
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pattern by leaving MC in the overnight care of Couch’s parents for several days each week.
What is more, in light of MacKenzie’s testimony and Inmon’s own admissions, the circuit
court concluded that Inmon had a serious, longstanding substance-abuse problem that had
reached a dangerous level since she had moved in with Couch. The court was clearly
concerned that Inmon’s drug and alcohol habit was a risk to MC’s safety and expressed
concern about awarding Inmon custody, stating, “I don’t want to wake up one morning and
read in the newspaper a problem with this little girl . . . I’ve got . . . one of those sixth sense
concerns.” Given the record before us and the deference due to the circuit court as factfinder in custody proceedings, we cannot say the circuit court committed clear error.
Inmon also argues that in awarding Davis primary custody, the circuit court
improperly considered certain matters while ignoring other unrebutted proof that living with
Davis would not be in MC’s best interest. Inmon’s arguments are nothing more than a
request that we reweigh the evidence and evaluate it differently than did the circuit court.
This is something we will not do. Hamerlinck v. Hamerlinck, 2022 Ark. App. 89, at 15, 641
S.W.3d 659, 667. Essentially, Inmon recounts the testimony that she deems to have been
in her favor and argues that if the circuit court had given that evidence proper weight, it
would have ruled in her favor. Specifically, Inmon argues that the circuit court improperly
considered the attorney ad litem’s recommendation. Inmon also argues that the court
ignored her own testimony and the unrebutted testimony of her friend Robin Bradley that
Davis is violent and that his home is a dangerous place for MC.
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Inmon’s argument against the circuit court’s considering the attorney ad litem’s
recommendation is a thinly disguised complaint that Inmon was unhappy with the ad litem’s
recommendation. Inmon now argues that the attorney ad litem’s recommendation was
hearsay, but Inmon’s counsel at the hearing did not object to the attorney ad litem’s giving
her recommendation before the circuit court; therefore, this argument is not preserved for
this court’s review on appeal. Sutton v. Falci, 2024 Ark. App. 46, at 8, 683 S.W.3d 593,598.
Even so, our supreme court has held that an attorney ad litem’s recommendations are
admissible in custody proceedings under Arkansas Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 15. Tracy v. Dennie, 2012 Ark. 281, at 6–7, 411 S.W.3d 702, 706–07. Moreover, the
circuit court, sitting as fact-finder in domestic-relations proceedings, is capable of separating
out hearsay and evaluating the evidence. In re Adoption of K.F.H., 311 Ark. 416, 424, 844
S.W.2d 343, 347 (1993).
As to the testimony that Davis is violent, our courts should not take lightly testimony
that a parent has a violent temper or that a parent keeps or handles firearms in the home
around a young child. But the circuit court was able to observe the parties in the hearing
and gave deep and thoughtful consideration to the facts and arguments presented by the
parties regarding best interest. The court was clear in its rulings that it did not find Inmon’s
testimony that Davis is violent and abusive credible because she had belatedly raised the issue
for the first time at the hearing, had never reported the alleged abuse to law enforcement or
sought medical help, and, most surprisingly, had never mentioned the abuse to MC’s
attorney ad litem. Moreover, while Bradley’s testimony was not addressed in the circuit
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court’s findings, it is worth pointing out that while Bradley testified that she witnessed Davis
attempt to incite a fight with another parent at a school event many years before the hearing,
she did not testify to witnessing Davis being violent toward either Inmon or their children.
Having reviewed the entire record, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that
the circuit court made a mistake in awarding primary custody of MC to Davis. Therefore, we
affirm the circuit court’s custody decision.
B. Visitation Limitations on Sam Couch
Inmon also challenges the circuit court’s decision to prohibit Sam Couch, her new
romantic partner, from being present during her visitation with MC. Inmon argues that the
circuit court’s ruling was a “no-contact order” issued without a valid statutory basis under
the Arkansas Domestic Abuse Act and was based on insufficient evidence and outdated views
toward cohabitation.
The main consideration in determining visitation is the best interest of the children,
and we will not reverse the circuit court’s findings pertaining to visitation unless they are
clearly erroneous. Styles, 2024 Ark. App. 435, at 25–26, 699 S.W.3d at 710. We do not find
clear error in the circuit court’s decision and affirm.
Inmon’s attempt to cast the divorce decree as a no-contact order is a
mischaracterization of the court’s ruling. As the circuit court pointed out in its order denying
Inmon’s motion for reconsideration, the court’s ruling that MC should not have contact
with Couch is a condition of Inmon’s visitation, not a statutory no-contact order under the
Domestic Abuse Act. In its rulings from the bench, the circuit court expressed concern not
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only about Inmon’s cohabitation with Couch setting a poor example for MC but also about
whether exposing MC to Inmon’s relationship with Couch was beneficial to her well-being.
There was testimony at the hearing that Couch was controlling and bullying toward Inmon
and that when she was with Couch, Inmon tended to abuse pills and alcohol and engage in
other risky and inappropriate behavior. In custody matters, the circuit court has the
authority to restrict visitation between a child and a person who is part of their parent’s life
based upon considerations for the well-being of the child. Styles, 2024 Ark. App. 435, at 39,
699 S.W.3d at 717; see also Moix v. Moix, 2013 Ark. 478, 430 S.W.3d 680.
Inmon argues that the circuit court’s decision was based solely upon outdated social
views against cohabitation outside of marriage and was a violation of Inmon’s and Couch’s
right to free association under the United States Constitution. Again, we cannot agree.
We need not address the constitutional argument raised in Inmon’s brief. Inmon
herself admits that she did not raise the argument in the proceedings below, and our courts
have held that in custody matters, “if a case can be resolved without reaching a constitutional
argument, it is our duty to do so.” Moix, 2013 Ark. 478, at 9, 430 S.W.3d at 685.
Under the longstanding public policy of the courts in this state, a parent’s
extramarital cohabitation with a romantic partner in the presence of children or a parent’s
promiscuous conduct or lifestyle has never been condoned. See, e.g., Alphin v. Alphin, 364
Ark. 332, 219 S.W.3d 160 (2005); Taylor v. Taylor, 353 Ark. 69, 110 S.W.3d 731 (2003);
Campbell v. Campbell, 336 Ark. 379, 985 S.W.2d 724 (1999). There is no blanket rule that a
court must include a non-cohabitation provision in custody and visitation orders any time a
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parent is involved in extramarital cohabitation with a romantic partner, and the courts have
begun to recognize that sometimes modern families no longer fit the traditional mold. See
Moix, supra. But the primary consideration is always the best interest of the child, and “it is
a case by case determination, whether it’s a bad thing or a good thing in a particular case” to
allow a child contact with his or her parent’s romantic partner. Moix, 2013 Ark. 478, at 10,
430 S.W.3d at 686. “[T]he purpose of non-cohabitation provisions are to promote a stable
environment for the children and not merely to monitor a parent’s sexual conduct.” Id. As
noted above, the circuit court’s restriction on Couch being part of Inmon’s visitation was
motivated by more than just an interest in maintaining traditional social norms against
cohabitation. The testimony in the record evidenced that Couch had been a poor influence
on Inmon, and the couple’s behavior while MC was in their care was often not in MC’s best
interest.
Taking a closing shot, Inmon argues that the circuit court’s ruling against
cohabitation has essentially been nullified because she and Couch married on April 23,
2024, and on that alone, the visitation ruling should be reversed. We cannot reverse on that
basis. Nothing in the record before us shows that Inmon made the circuit court aware of
the change in her marital status. The only evidence the circuit court had to base its rulings
on was Inmon’s own testimony at the April 4, 2024 hearing that she and Couch were
engaged and intended to marry at some unspecified point in time. While the circuit court’s
April 25, 2024 order denying the motion for reconsideration was entered two days after
Inmon and Couch’s alleged wedding date, the circuit court had already issued a letter ruling
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on April 19 2024, stating the court’s reasons for denying the motion. And the record does
not reflect that Inmon amended her motion for reconsideration to inform the court of her
marriage or otherwise notified the court of her change in circumstances. Indeed, there is no
proof in the record on appeal that Inmon and Couch are, in fact, married. Inmon and
Couch may petition the circuit court for a change in the visitation conditions, but this court
cannot grant Inmon that relief. We hold that, on this record, the circuit court did not clearly
err in finding that it was in the child’s best interest to restrict contact with Couch.
C. Visitation Limitations on Sam Couch’s Family
Inmon argues for her final point on appeal that for all the same reasons the circuit
court should not have prohibited MC’s contact with Couch, the circuit court also erred in
prohibiting Inmon from leaving MC in the care of Couch’s family members during her
visitation. This argument, too, was not preserved for appeal. Inmon did not object to this
condition when the circuit court made its bench rulings during the hearing. Moreover,
Inmon filed a motion for reconsideration and amendment of the decree for the sole purpose
of challenging the limitation placed on Couch’s contact with MC. But Inmon did not raise
the limitation concerning Couch’s family members either in that motion for
reconsideration or otherwise in the record. For this reason, we will not address the argument
for the first time on appeal. Sutton, supra.
However, we acknowledge that if the issue were appealable, there is evidence in the
record to support the circuit court’s ruling. Even though there is no evidence that Couch’s
family members were a danger to MC’s well-being, the circuit court was troubled by Inmon’s
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efforts to alienate MC from Davis and her other biological family and replace them with
Couch’s family. With regard to Couch’s parents, Davis testified that when Couch’s parents
brought MC to his supervised visitation sessions early in the separation, they were disruptive
to the visitation. The circuit court was also bothered by Inmon’s pattern of passing off her
parenting responsibilities to others, and it was evident that Inmon was repeating that
pattern by using Couch’s parents as frequent overnight caregivers for MC. Therefore, the
circuit court’s decision to limit which caregivers Inmon can use during her visitation was
not clearly in error.
Affirmed.
THYER and WOOD, JJ., agree.
Tim Cullen, for appellant.
Kamps & Griffis PLLC, by: Adrienne M. Griffis, for appellee.
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