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Ridgewood Timber Corporation, Derrick Spinks, and Mary Jo Spinks v. Ronnie Haddock and Stepheny Hebert

2025-10-22

Summary

Holding. The court reversed the circuit court's grant of a prescriptive easement to the Haddocks because their adverse use of the road lasted only approximately two years after Ridgewood's 2021 purchase and objection, falling short of Arkansas's required seven-year statutory period, and because the prior landowners had no notice that the use was hostile rather than permissive.

Ridgewood Timber Corporation and co-owners appealed a trial court decision that granted the Haddocks a prescriptive easement to use a road crossing Ridgewood's property to access their landlocked land. The Haddocks claimed they had used the road openly and continuously for over fifteen years without permission. However, the appellate court found that although the Haddocks' use was open and visible for many years, there was no evidence the prior property owners knew or should have known the use was adverse until Ridgewood purchased the property in 2021. Once Ridgewood took ownership and objected to the use, only about two years of genuinely hostile use followed, which falls short of the seven-year statutory period required for a prescriptive easement to arise.

The court also rejected Ridgewood's alternative constitutional argument regarding the easement crossing Kenneth Jones's property, finding that this issue was raised for the first time on appeal and therefore could not be considered.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether use of a road for over fifteen years can ripen into a prescriptive easement when the use became adversarial only after a new owner's objection
  • Whether the seven-year statutory period for prescriptive easements applies when prior owners had no actual or constructive knowledge of hostile intent
  • Whether permissive use, even if long-standing, can transform into adverse use based solely on the passage of time without overt acts putting the owner on notice

Procedural posture

The case was appealed from a Stone County Circuit Court bench trial decision granting a prescriptive easement in favor of the Haddocks against Ridgewood's property.

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 493

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION I

No. CV-24-493

RIDGEWOOD TIMBER Opinion Delivered October 22, 2025 CORPORATION, DERRICK SPINKS,

AND MARY JO SPINKS APPEAL FROM THE STONE

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

APPELLANTS [NO. 69CV-23-47]

V. HONORABLE HOLLY MEYER,

JUDGE

RONNIE HADDOCK AND STEPHENY

HEBERT

APPELLEES REVERSED

STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

Appellants, Ridgewood Timber Corporation, Derrick Spinks, and Mary Jo Spinks

(collectively, “Ridgewood”), appeal the March 28, 2024, Stone County Circuit Court order

granting a prescriptive easement in favor of the appellees, Ronnie Haddock and Stepheny

Hebert (collectively, “the Haddocks”). Specifically, Ridgewood argues the circuit court erred

in granting the Haddocks a prescriptive easement because (1) the hostile use of the road

lasted for only two years; and (2) the easement also runs through the property of Kenneth

Jones, an unnamed party, in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under

the United States Constitution. We reverse.

The road in question is accessible from a county road and runs through Ridgewood’s

property and onto the Haddocks’ property. The Haddocks alleged in their petition that they and their family members had used the roadway in an open, notorious, hostile, and adverse

manner for a continuous period in excess of fifteen years, such that their use had ripened

into a roadway of prescription. The Haddocks claimed Ridgewood prevented their use of the

road. The Haddocks requested that the circuit court find an easement by implication of

necessity, a prescriptive easement, and a recorded easement. Ridgewood moved to dismiss

the Haddocks’ petition.

On September 7, 2023, a hearing was held on Ridgewood’s motion. The circuit court

stated, “I agree with your contention that the county court has jurisdiction over easements

by necessity, and I think that the plaintiff has conceded here today that there is no recorded

easement over your property save that generic language in deeds about subject to easements

and so forth. So as to the necessity and the recorded easement, I tend to buy where you’re

at. But I think this case is really about prescriptive easement, which is a fact question.” At

the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court denied Ridgewood’s motion to dismiss,

stating, “[W]e have narrowed the issue down to, at this time, prescriptive easement is the

claim. And when we begin the actual trial, Ms. Briese, if there’s something different, it needs

to be very clear in the pleadings so that defense counsel has adequate notice of that in

preparation for the case.”

On January 10, 2024, the bench trial began, and the Haddocks moved forward on

the prescriptive-easement claim only. Their testimony established that they had purchased a

piece of landlocked property in Stone County, Arkansas, in 2006. They testified they always

used this road to access the property, passing through land owned by Simorg South Forests

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LLC (Ridgewood’s predecessors in title), Kennth Jones, and Chip Doss. In July 2015, the

Haddocks purchased Doss’s land, which sat directly above theirs. The Haddocks now owned

a large piece of “L-shaped” landlocked property. After the 2015 purchase, the Haddocks

continued to use the road as they always had. The Haddocks testified that in fifteen years of

use, they never spent money on maintaining the road, only ensuring it was “passable” for

their vehicle. The Haddocks testified they had never asked for or been given permission to

use the road, and they had never had anyone try to limit their use of the road until

Ridgewood’s purchase of the property in 2021.

After Ridgewood’s purchase, the Haddocks’ use of the road continued as usual for

several months until Ridgewood constructed a gate that blocked the entrance to the road.

The Haddocks testified they placed their lock on the gate, left a note for Ridgewood

explaining what they had done, and continued using the road. However, a few months later,

the Haddocks called Ridgewood complaining about hunting-club members who leased

Ridgewood’s land. Derrick Spinks, co-owner of Ridgewood, testified he informed the

Haddocks that the titles and deeds to his land did not contain a record of an easement, and

as far as he knew, the Haddocks did not have an easement and needed to cease using the

road. Subsequently, the relationship between the Haddocks and Ridgewood become hostile,

with the Haddocks complaining of damage to their vehicles caused by nails in the road and

trees blocking the entrance to their property.

At the conclusion of all the evidence, the circuit court took the issue under

advisement and requested additional information regarding the chains of title from the

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parties’ properties. On March 28, 2024, the circuit court entered a final order granting a

prescriptive easement in favor of the Haddocks. That order stated, in pertinent part:

6. The Court finds the testimony credible supporting Plaintiff kept the roadway

passable for regular use for many years.

7. The geography of the surrounding area also demonstrates that the prescriptive

easement was the most practical route due to creeks, mountains, and other natural

obstacles to access which corroborates the Plaintiffs’ testimony that they regularly

used the route.

8. Since 2021, Defendant’s and Defendant’s lease have become demonstrably hostile

to Plaintiffs’ use. However, Plaintiffs openly and notoriously used the roadway for

many years prior to 2021. Thus, satisfying the requisite for acquiring a prescriptive

easement.

On April 3, 2024, Ridgewood filed a motion for a new trial, which was deemed

denied.

This court reviews equity matters de novo on the record but will not reverse a finding

of the lower court unless it is clearly erroneous. See Owners Ass’n of Foxcroft Woods, Inc. v.

Foxglen Assocs., 346 Ark. 354, 57 S.W.3d 187 (2001). A finding is clearly erroneous when,

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left

with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. at 361, 57 S.W.3d at

192. In reviewing a circuit court’s findings, we give due deference to that court’s superior

position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their

testimony. Carson v. Cnty. of Drew, 354 Ark. 621, 128 S.W.3d 423 (2003). Disputed facts and

determinations of witness credibility are within the province of the fact-finder. Id. at 624–

25, 128 S.W.3d at 425.

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A prescriptive easement may be gained by one not in fee possession of the land by

operation of law in a manner similar to adverse possession. Wilson v. Schuman, 90 Ark. App.

201, 205 S.W.3d 164 (2005). In Arkansas, it is generally required that one asserting an

easement by prescription show by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her use has

been adverse to the true owner and under a claim of right for the statutory period. Id. The

statutory period of seven years for adverse possession applies to prescriptive easements. Id.

Overt activity on the part of the user is necessary to make it clear to the owner of the

property that an adverse use and claim are being exerted. Owners Ass’n of Foxcroft Woods, Inc.,

346 Ark. 354, 57 S.W.3d 187. Mere permissive use of an easement cannot ripen into an

adverse claim without clear action, which places the owner on notice. Carson, 354 Ark. 621,

128 S.W.3d 423. Some circumstances or act in addition to, or in connection with, the use

that indicates the use was not merely permissive is required to establish a right by

prescription. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the

evidence that there has been adverse, not permissive, use of the land in question. Id.

Arguing that their use of the road over several decades was adverse, the Haddocks rely

on the following principle as stated by the supreme court:

Where there is usage of a passageway over land, whether it began by permission or

otherwise, if that usage continues openly for seven years after the landowner has

actual knowledge that the usage is adverse to this interest or where the usage

continues for seven years after the facts and circumstances of the prior usage are such

that the landowner would be presumed to know the usage was adverse, then such

usage ripens into an absolute right.

Fullenwider v. Kitchens, 223 Ark. 442, 446, 266 S.W.2d 281, 283 (1954).

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Although the evidence showed the Haddocks had openly used the roadway for more

than seven years, time alone will not suffice to transform permissive use into legal title.

Baysinger v. Biggers, 100 Ark. App. 109, 265 S.W.3d 144 (2007). There must be some

circumstances in addition to length of use to show that the use was adverse. Id. In Baysinger,

there was no circumstance, such as use by the general public, to establish that the landowner

knew or should have known that the use was hostile. We noted that the only evidence at

trial was that the plaintiff had begun using the road to access his property in 1961 and that

there had been no objection.

Similarly, here, by the Haddocks’ own testimony, there had been no objection to their

use of the road until Ridgewood purchased the property in 2021. Even if the Haddocks’ use

of the road was adverse to Ridgewood beginning in 2021 when Ridgewood purchased the

property, this usage falls short of the seven years required to ripen into a prescriptive

easement. There was no evidence that the road had been used by the general public or that

the Haddocks had committed overt acts to put the prior landowners on notice that an

adverse use and claim of right were being exerted. See Wilson, 90 Ark. App. 201, 205 S.W.3d

164. Accordingly, their usage did not ripen into an absolute right as in Fullenwider. Further,

the use of wild, unenclosed, and unimproved land, such as this road, is presumed to be

permissive until the persons using the land for passage, by their open and notorious conduct,

demonstrate to the owner that they are claiming a right of passage. Stone v. Halliburton, 244

Ark. 392, 425 S.W.2d 325 (1968). Under this record, the circuit court was clearly erroneous

in granting a prescriptive easement in favor of the Haddocks. We reverse.

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Alternatively, Ridgewood argues that the circuit court erred in granting a prescriptive

easement to the Haddocks because the easement runs through the property of Kennth Jones,

an unnamed party to this appeal, which violates Jones’s rights under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United State Constitution. However, Ridgewood failed to make this

argument before the circuit court. It is well settled that this court will not address an issue

raised for the first time on appeal, even a constitutional argument. Barker v. State, 2014 Ark.

467, 448 S.W.3d 197.

Reversed.

THYER and WOOD, JJ., agree.

Benton Gann, for appellants.

Law Office of Shannon Briese, PLLC, by: Shannon Briese, for appellees.

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