In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: January 18, 2023
S23Y0306. IN THE MATTER OF CHANDRA McNEIL NORTON.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and
recommendation of the Special Master, Charles David Jones, filed
pursuant to Bar Rule 4-106 (e). The Special Master recommends
that this Court disbar Respondent Chandra McNeil Norton (State
Bar No. 498550), who has been a member of the Bar since 1993, for
her violations of Rules 8.4 (a) (2) and 9.1 (a) (2) found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).
The record before us shows that in November 2020, Norton
pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, see 18
USC § 1349, in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia for defrauding the federal government of nearly
$8 million in Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loans. Her conviction went unreported to the State Bar of Georgia. Upon
learning of her conviction, the State Bar initiated disciplinary
proceedings under Bar Rule 4-106; this Court appointed a Special
Master, see Case No. S22B1122 (appointed June 28, 2022); and the
Special Master then conducted a hearing, at which Norton testified
regarding her conduct and offered evidence in mitigation.
Norton then filed a brief in support of a two-year suspension.
In her brief, Norton argued that although a felony conviction can
serve as a basis for disbarment pursuant to Rule 8.4 (a), it does not
necessarily demand disbarment. See In the Matter of Ortman, 289
Ga. 130 (709 SE2d 784) (2011) (holding that this Court should “never
foreclose[] the possibility that a lesser punishment than disbarment
might be appropriate where the circumstances and mitigating
factors are sufficient to justify a lesser penalty”); In the Matter of
Suttle, 288 Ga. 14 (701 SE2d 154) (2010) (attorney who pled guilty
to real estate fraud was suspended rather than disbarred); In the
Matter of Haugabrook, 278 Ga. 721 (606 SE2d 257) (2004) (guilty
plea to two counts of filing false tax returns; one year suspension).
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She claimed that in arriving at the punishment to be imposed,
disciplinary cases are largely governed by their own particular facts,
see In the Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (277 SE2d 36) (1981),
and that the mitigating factors here support suspension. In
particular, she noted that prior to her knowledge of the federal
investigation or prosecution, she approached the government to
return the monies obtained from the PPP; that she acknowledged
and accepted full responsibility for her actions and that she was
cooperating with federal authorities; and that in approaching the
government, she did not seek special requests, waivers, departures,
or extra consideration from the government in exchange for her
proffer or cooperation. In addition, Norton noted that she has never
before been subject to a complaint or disciplinary action with the
Bar; that she had never before been convicted of any crimes; and
that she did not practice law as her primary profession, which was
one of the main reasons she was unaware of her responsibility to
contact the Bar upon her guilty plea. She further noted that she has
now fully cooperated with the Bar in this proceeding and is
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extremely remorseful for her actions. In addition, Norton noted that
she has a commendable reputation in the community, as evidenced
by the numerous letters of support from family and friends that she
included with her brief. Norton also listed as evidence of her good
reputation that she was a Board Member for an adoption agency and
a charitable organization supporting youth in Atlanta and Memphis;
that she is a sponsor and volunteer for several other youth
organizations; and that she is also an adoptive parent and
permanent guardian for an at-risk minor. Moreover, she noted that
she was convicted in her role as a citizen, not an attorney, and that
there were little to no aggravating factors in this case.
The State Bar responded that disbarment was appropriate,
given that this Court routinely imposes disbarment (or accepts
voluntary surrender of licenses, which is tantamount to disbarment)
in cases involving felony convictions for financial crimes. See In the
Matter of Celello, 308 Ga. 339 (840 SE2d 349) (2020) (voluntary
surrender of license for attorney convicted of conspiracy to commit
securities fraud); In the Matter of Fudge, 301 Ga. 793 (804 SE2d 59)
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(2017) (voluntary surrender of license for attorney convicted of
conspiracy to commit bank fraud); In the Matter of Houser, 299 Ga.
284 (787 SE2d 689) (2016) (disbarring attorney convicted of
conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud, payroll tax fraud, and failure
to file income taxes); In the Matter of Thompson, 297 Ga. 790 (778
SE2d 226) (2015) (disbarring attorney convicted of conspiracy, bank
fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud). In addition, the Bar contended
that the cases relied upon by Norton to support a two-year
suspension were distinguishable, because Ortman involved a felony
conviction for a violent crime; Haugabrook involved purely personal
conduct arising from the respondent’s failure to accurately report
his personal income for certain tax years, whereas this case affected
other individuals and entities; and Suttle involved unusual
circumstances, not present here, that warranted a lesser sanction
than disbarment. See In the Matter of Temple, 299 Ga. 854, 855-856
(792 SE2d 322) (2016) (“The Suttle opinion referenced the facts that
Suttle was a young lawyer who did not prepare the closing
documents used in the fraudulent real estate transactions, that he
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was not the closing lawyer scheduled to preside at the closings but
was called in on short notice, that nothing on the face of the
documents indicated mortgage fraud, and that he was arrested
before the closing was completed in a manner that would have
revealed the fraud to him. Note also that Suttle pleaded guilty under
North Carolina v. Alford[, 400 U.S. 25 (91 SCt 160, 27 LE2d 162)
(1970)], and continued to assert his actual innocence to the criminal
charges.” (footnote omitted)). Moreover, the Bar stated that the fact
remained that Norton failed to report her conviction to the Bar for
over a year in violation of the ethics rules and that as a licensed
attorney, she had to comply with all of the Georgia Rules of
Professional Conduct, not just the ones that she was aware of. The
Bar further argued that the aggravating factors in this case, which
it asserted included Norton’s dishonest or selfish motive, pattern of
misconduct in submitting at least 11 false and fraudulent PPP loan
applications and related conduct over the course of several months,
multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceedings by failing to report her conviction, and substantial
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experience in the practice of law, outweighed any of the mitigating
factors.
The Special Master then issued this report and
recommendation of disbarment. In his report, the Special Master
made the following findings of fact. Norton has spent most of her
professional life serving as a water and sewer contractor for the City
of Atlanta and DeKalb County, Georgia, although she has also
practiced some law handling domestic, transactional, and personal
injury cases. Norton is currently president and CEO of CamKen and
is tasked with overseeing the operations of the company,
maintaining client relationships, procuring projects, and ensuring
that such projects are successfully executed. She is also responsible
for navigating the local, state, and federal regulatory environment
on behalf of the company. In addition, she has experience in
registering the company as a minority business enterprise and
participating as a member of joint venture partnerships with out-ofstate entities. Her company at one time was one of the top 25
contractors in the City of Atlanta, and CamKen earned
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approximately $80 million in revenue over 23 years in the
contracting business.
The Special Master found that in the summer of 2020, the
federal government charged Norton with one count of conspiracy to
commit wire fraud for conduct which included, but was not limited
to, submitting false and fraudulent PPP applications, using the
funds she received for personal expenses, and conspiring to defraud
and obtain money and property by false and fraudulent pretenses,
all of which resulted in a loss of approximately $7.8 million dollars
to the PPP program. On November 12, 2020, she pled guilty in
federal court to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, which is a felony.
As of the date of this opinion, Norton has not yet been sentenced.
The Special Master then concluded that she violated Rule 8.4
(a) (2), by pleading guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and
that for purposes of Rule 8.4 (a) (2), a conviction includes a guilty
plea, regardless of whether a sentence has been imposed. See Rule
8.4 (b) (1) and 1.0 (e). In addition, the Special Master concluded that
Norton violated Rule 9.1 (a) (2), by failing to report her conviction to
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the Bar. The maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 8.4 (a) (2) is
disbarment, while the maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 9.1
(a) (2) is a public reprimand.
In determining the appropriate level of discipline, the Special
Master considered the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions. See In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652 (470 SE2d 232)
(1996) (ABA Standards are instructive in determining the
appropriate level of discipline); ABA Standard 3.0 (providing that in
imposing a sanction, courts should consider the duty violated; the
lawyer’s mental state; the potential or actual injury caused by the
lawyer’s misconduct; and the existence of aggravating or mitigating
factors). Regarding Norton’s mental state and the injury she caused,
the Special Master found that her conduct was knowing and
intentional, as evidenced by her guilty plea, and that her conduct
resulted in significant injury, a loss of almost $8 million to the PPP
program. The Special Master noted that ABA Standard 5.11
provides that disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer
engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which
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includes fraud, or any other intentional conduct involving fraud that
seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice. And
while Norton argued for a suspension, the Special Master pointed
out that ABA Standard 5.12 provides that suspension is generally
appropriate when a lawyer engaged in criminal conduct which does
not include fraud. The Special Master determined that Norton pled
guilty to a felony involving a serious financial crime and intentional
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation,
and that the seriousness of this crime did not justify a suspension.
Regarding the aggravating factors, the Special Master
considered Norton’s dishonest or selfish motive given that she
personally benefitted from her misconduct; her pattern of
misconduct, given that she submitted at least 11 false and
fraudulent PPP loan applications and her related conduct took place
over the course of several months; and the multiple offenses, given
that her conduct consisted of multiple offenses of dishonest,
deceitful, and fraudulent conduct. See ABA Standards 9.22 (b), (c),
and (d). In addition, the Special Master considered her bad faith
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obstruction of the disciplinary process by intentionally failing to
comply with the disciplinary rules by not self-reporting her
conviction to the Bar, and her substantial experience in the practice
of law. See ABA Standards 9.22 (e) and (i). As to the latter point,
Norton contended in her brief before the Special Master that her
inexperience in the law (because she does not practice law as her
primary profession), should be considered in mitigation, but the
Special Master concluded that this is not the type of case in which
experience in the practice of law has any relevance to misconduct.
The Special Master stated that some duties and obligations – in this
case, to not lie, defraud, or deceive – should be understood by every
citizen and every lawyer, however new to the Bar. See In the Matter
of Manning-Wallace, 287 Ga. 223, 227 (695 SE2d 237) (2010)
(Nahmias, J., concurring). In addition, the Special Master
determined that regardless of the amount of time a lawyer has been
practicing, she ought to know not to engage in certain types of
conduct, including conspiring to commit wire fraud. See In the
Matter of Saunders, 304 Ga. 824, 825 n. 2 (822 SE2d 235) (2018); In
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the Matter of Jones, 293 Ga. 264, 267 n. 8 (744 SE2d 6) (2013).
As for mitigating factors, the Special Master considered the
absence of a prior disciplinary record and Norton’s character and
reputation, noting that Norton submitted 19 letters in support from
various individuals attesting to her reputation and character. See
ABA Standards 9.32 (a) and (g). The Special Master found that,
without question, Norton had given her time and money towards
worthy causes. In addition, the Special Master considered her
remorse, noting that at the hearing on this case, Norton accepted
responsibility for her actions. See ABA Standard 9.32 (l).
In conclusion, the Special Master determined that the
appropriate level of discipline for Norton’s conduct is disbarment,
see In the Matter of Stoner, 246 Ga. 581 (272 SE2d 313) (1980)
(holding that appearance of convicted attorney continuing to
practice does more to disrupt public confidence in the legal
profession than any other disciplinary problem), and noted that this
Court routinely imposes disbarment, or accepts a voluntary
surrender of license which is tantamount to disbarment, as
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discipline in cases involving felony convictions for financial crimes.
See Celello, 308 Ga. at 339; Fudge, 301 Ga. at 793; Houser, 299 Ga.
at 284; Thompson, 297 Ga. at 790. The Special Master determined
that Norton’s lack of disciplinary history combined with the
character evidence she presented was outweighed by the
seriousness of her crime and other aggravating factors, and observed
that even in cases involving significant mitigating factors, this Court
has disbarred attorneys who were convicted of felonies involving
fraud and dishonesty. See, e.g., In the Matter of Vickers, 291 Ga. 354
(729 SE2d 355) (2012) (disbarring attorney convicted of conspiracy
to defraud the United States and wire fraud who presented
mitigating factors of no prior disciplinary history, good character,
reputation and involvement in the community, isolated incident of
wrongdoing, remorse, cooperation, and compliance with terms of his
probation); In the Matter of Skandalakis, 279 Ga. 865 (621 SE2d
750) (2005) (disbarring attorney convicted of making a false
statement who presented mitigating factors of no prior disciplinary
history, cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, remorse, no
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harm to client, and isolated incident); In the Matter of Calhoun, 268
Ga. 675 (492 SE2d 514) (1997) (disbarring attorney convicted of
money laundering and aiding and abetting who presented
mitigating factors of addiction to prescription drugs and alcohol,
family health problems, good character, and rehabilitation). In sum,
the Special Master stated that eroding confidence in the legal
profession is something that all lawyers must take seriously, and
that while there is no doubt that Norton has done good things for
family, friends, and the community, her guilty plea and failing to
report it to the Bar seriously adversely reflects on her fitness to
practice law, is a violation of the law, and in turn, is a violation of
the Bar Rules, all of which points to a more severe sanction than
suspension.
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties’
arguments, we agree with the Special Master that despite the
mitigating circumstances in this case, disbarment is the appropriate
sanction and is consistent with similar cases involving felony
convictions for financial crimes. See, e.g., Houser, 299 Ga. at 284;
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Thompson, 297 Ga. at 790. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the
name of Chandra McNeil Norton be removed from the rolls of
persons authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Norton is
reminded of her duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).
Disbarred. All the Justices concur.
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