NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: May 31, 2023
S23Y0123. IN THE MATTER OF CRAIG S. BONNELL.
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter is before the Court on a Notice of
Discipline seeking a public reprimand for Craig S. Bonnell (State
Bar No. 067267), based on his abandonment of a client. According to
the Bar’s notice of service, Bonnell, who has been a member of the
Bar since 2001, was served personally with the Notice of Discipline.
Because Bonnell failed to file a Notice of Rejection, he is in default,
has waived his right to an evidentiary hearing, and is subject to such
discipline and further proceedings as may be determined by this
Court. See Bar Rule 4-208.1 (b). However, because it is not clear
from the limited record before this Court that a public reprimand
would be a sufficient discipline under these circumstances and
because the limited record does not make clear what might be the
appropriate level of discipline, we reject this Notice of Discipline.
The facts, as deemed admitted by Bonnell’s default, are that,
on July 1, 2019, a client retained Bonnell and paid him $5,000 to
assist her in her efforts to be appointed as a guardian/conservator
for her ex-husband. On July 3, 2019, Bonnell filed – on behalf of the
client and her daughter – a petition seeking the appointment of an
emergency guardian and/or emergency conservator. On the same
day, Bonnell presented the petition to a probate judge and engaged
in an ex parte conversation with the judge concerning the merits of
the petition. The judge then entered an order appointing counsel for
the client’s ex-husband, ordering that he submit to a medical
examination, scheduling a hearing for July 8, 2019, and appointing
the client and her daughter as pre-hearing emergency conservators
for the ex-husband. Bonnell delivered the filed petition and the order
to the client and informed her that she could take custody of her exhusband.
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However, Bonnell failed to effect proper service of the petition
on the ex-husband, and when, the next day, the client went to her
ex-husband’s residence and attempted to take custody of him, the
police were present and refused to allow her to take custody of him.
The ex-husband’s counsel obtained an emergency hearing for July 5,
2019, at which counsel and an appointed guardian ad litem argued
that service had not been perfected and requested that the probate
judge recuse herself because of the ex parte communication that had
occurred between the judge and Bonnell on July 3. The judge agreed
that proper service of the petition had not been effected, cancelled
the hearing that had been scheduled for July 8, dismissed the
petition that Bonnell had filed, and recused herself from any future
proceedings.
Bonnell told the client that he would re-file the petition the
next day, but he failed to do so, and he failed to respond to her
subsequent inquiries regarding the status of the matter. After the
client retained a new attorney and made numerous attempts to
obtain her file from Bonnell, he failed to provide it to her and her
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new attorney. Additionally, despite numerous requests from the
client, Bonnell has failed to provide a detailed bill or any accounting
of his costs, fees, and expenses. Finally, no guardian or conservator
has been appointed for the ex-husband, despite a doctor’s
recommendation that such would be appropriate.
The Bar alleged that, by his misconduct, Bonnell had violated
the following provisions of the Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct (“GRPC”), found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d): (1) Rule 1.1, by
failing to perfect service of the petition and by failing to file a second
petition after he told the client that he would do so; (2) Rule 1.4 (a)
(4), by failing to respond to the client’s requests for updates
regarding the status of the matter following the dismissal of the
petition; (3) Rule 1.15 (I) (c), by failing to provide the client with a
detailed bill or any accounting of costs, fees, and expenses, despite
her requests; and (4) Rule 1.16 (d), by failing to provide the client
with her file or with an accounting that would show whether she
was entitled to a refund. The maximum available sanction for a
single violation of Rules 1.1 and 1.15 (I) is disbarment, and the
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maximum available sanction for a single violation of Rules 1.4 and
1.16 is a public reprimand.
The Bar asserts that a public reprimand is appropriate because
Bonnell has “violated multiple Rules that authorize the imposition
of a public reprimand and one Rule that authorizes the imposition
of disbarment,” apparently failing to realize that he has actually
violated two Rules with a maximum available sanction of
disbarment and two Rules with a maximum available sanction of a
public reprimand. The Bar further states that it found there to be
no mitigating circumstances and that Bonnell has been subject to
prior discipline, in the form of a Letter of Admonition in 2017. But
the Letter of Admonition is not a part of the record in this case.
Despite Bonnell’s default, because of a number of errors and
uncertainties in the Bar’s presentation of this matter, we do not
have sufficient information to impose discipline at this stage.
Although Bar Rule 4-208.1 provides that, when sanctioning a
respondent in default on a Notice of Discipline, this Court “is not
bound by the State Disciplinary Board’s recommendation and may
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impose any level of discipline it deems appropriate,” the present
record does not contain all of the facts that might be relevant to an
assessment of the appropriate level of discipline. We have held that
we may decline to exercise our discretion under Bar Rule 4-208.1 to
impose discipline at variance with the Bar’s recommendation and
may instead reject the Bar’s Notice of Discipline. See In the Matter
of Wadsworth, 307 Ga. 311 (835 SE2d 632) (2019).
As noted, the Bar’s filing misidentifies the number of
provisions of the GRPC that Bonnell has violated that carry a
maximum potential sanction of disbarment. It is also unclear from
the Bar’s filing how aggravating Bonnell’s prior 2017 discipline
should be, as the Bar provides no information regarding the
misconduct that led to the imposition of discipline in that matter.
Additionally, it is unclear at this stage whether Bonnell might owe
the client any restitution.
Moreover, the Bar presents no authority suggesting that a
public reprimand is appropriate discipline for Bonnell’s misconduct.
This Court has repeatedly disbarred attorneys in the last several
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years for matters that appear to be materially similar to this one,
involving the abandonment of a single client, a failure to respond
adequately in the disciplinary proceedings, substantial experience
in the practice of law, and no more than one prior instance of
discipline. See, e.g., In the Matter of Graham, 306 Ga. 380 (829 SE2d
67) (2019); In the Matter of Mays, 303 Ga. 152 (810 SE2d 478) (2018);
In the Matter of Miller, 302 Ga. 366 (806 SE2d 596) (2017). We do
not suggest hereby that disbarment is necessarily the appropriate
sanction in this matter; we do, however, suggest that, in any future
attempts to seek to discipline Bonnell for the misconduct at issue
here, the Bar should either seek a sanction more commensurate with
the sanctions imposed by this Court in other similar cases or should
more adequately explain why a lesser sanction is appropriate. We
caution that, should the Bar seek the imposition of a more serious
sanction on Bonnell than the one sought here, he should be given a
renewed opportunity to respond to any such filing by the Bar.
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Accordingly, despite Bonnell’s default, we reject the Bar's
notice of discipline.
Notice of Discipline rejected. All the Justices concur.
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