NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: June 21, 2023
S23A0507. THE STATE v. BRINKLEY.
PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
Demarcus Brinkley is charged with the kidnapping, attempted
rape, and murder of Mariam Khalid Abdulrab. After the police
identified him as a suspect for those crimes, Brinkley fled, leading
officers in a high speed car chase. During the chase, Brinkley
apparently told his mother on the phone that he did not want to pull
over because he did not want to go back to prison.1 The trial court
granted Brinkley’s pretrial motion to exclude this statement under
OCGA § 24-4-403 (“Rule 403”), and the State appealed. See OCGA §
5-7-1 (a) (5). Because the trial court misapplied the Rule 403
standard, we vacate its order and remand for further consideration
under the correct standard.
1The precise statement is not clear from the record, but this does not
affect our analysis here.
The trial court granted Brinkley’s motion to suppress in a
written order. Its full analysis was as follows:
It is “universally conceded that the fact of an accused’s
flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest,
concealment, assumption of a false name, and related
conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of
guilt, and thus of guilt itself.” The Georgia Supreme Court
has often held [that] “any statement or conduct of a person,
indicating a consciousness of guilt, where such person is, at
the time or thereafter, charged with or suspected of a crime,
is admissible against him upon his trial for committing it.”
However, in this indictment, the Defendant is not
charged with Fleeing or Attempting to Elude and the
prosecution failed to make a causal connection between this
alleged statement and the present allegations against the
defendant. Further, under Rule 403, the Court finds that
absent a causal connection between the statement and the
SPECIFIC allegations against the defendant, the probative
value of the statement is outweighed by both the prejudicial
effect and the risk of confusion of issues.
Accordingly, the defense’s motion is GRANTED.
(Emphasis in original, citations omitted.)
“A trial court’s decision whether to admit or exclude evidence
is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.” Martinez-Arias v.
State, 313 Ga. 276, 285 (3) (869 SE2d 501) (2022). A trial court
abuses that discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard. See
State v. Harris, __ Ga. __, __, 2023 Ga. LEXIS 103, at *11 (3), 2023
WL 3468109, at *4-5 (3) (May 16, 2023).
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Rule 403 provides that “[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by” several dangers,
including “unfair prejudice” and “confusion of the issues[.]” OCGA §
24-4-403. As illustrated above, the court’s order did not measure
admissibility by that standard — it said only that the “prejudicial
effect” of the evidence and the risk of confusing the issues
“outweighed” the probative value of the evidence. It did not
determine that the probative value was “substantially” outweighed
by those dangers, or limit its focus on prejudice to only the “unfair”
prejudice, as the Rule requires. Harris, 2023 WL 3468109, at *5 (3)
(“the proper standard requires the trial court to determine whether
the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice”) (cleaned up). The trial court thus
misapplied the Rule 403 standard and therefore abused its
discretion. See id. (vacating and remanding a trial court order
excluding evidence under the same circumstances). Accordingly, we
remand for the trial court to apply the correct standard in the first
instance.
Given that disposition, we also point out one additional error
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to ensure that it does not affect the trial court’s determination on
remand. The trial court’s order asserted that the State had not
shown a “causal connection between this alleged statement and the
present allegations,” and found it significant that “[Brinkley] is not
charged with Fleeing or Attempting to Elude.” It is not clear whether
the trial court believed all this minimized the statement’s probative
value or increased its prejudicial effect. In any case, we have said
that evidence of flight is generally relevant and supports an
inference of consciousness of guilt of the underlying crime regardless
of whether any flight-related crime is also charged. See Harris v.
State, 313 Ga. 225, 231 (3) (869 SE2d 461) (2022); Rowland v. State,
306 Ga. 59, 65 (3) n.4 (829 SE2d 81) (2019) (“Evidence showing that
a defendant attempted to evade arrest . . . may be admissible as
evidence of flight[,] and statements about flight are generally
admissible as circumstantial evidence of guilt.” (emphasis added)).
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the
Justices concur.
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