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State v. William A.

2025-09-02

Summary

Holding. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial because the prosecution violated the defendant's Doyle rights by eliciting testimony about his post-Miranda silence through an ambiguous question using the word "ever," and the state failed to demonstrate the violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was convicted of sexual assault in the fourth degree and risk of injury to a child following a jury trial. The prosecution violated his constitutional rights by asking a detective at trial whether the defendant had "ever" provided an explanation for the victim's allegations. Because this question used the unrestricted word "ever," the jury could reasonably interpret it as referring to the defendant's silence after receiving Miranda warnings, which violated the Doyle doctrine. Although the defendant did not preserve this claim at trial by raising a specific Doyle objection, the appellate court reviewed it under the Golding standard for unpreserved constitutional claims. The court found that the prosecution's Doyle violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly because the prosecution further emphasized the defendant's silence in closing arguments and rebuttals, and the prosecution's case lacked physical evidence, making credibility central to the trial.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether the prosecutor violated Doyle v. Ohio by asking whether the defendant "ever" provided an explanation for allegations, thereby referencing post-Miranda silence
  • Whether the prosecutor's use of the word "ever" without temporal limitation created an ambiguous question reasonably interpreted to include post-Miranda silence
  • Whether the Doyle violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the prosecution's emphasis on the defendant's silence in closing argument and the absence of physical evidence

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed his conviction from a jury trial in Superior Court, raising an unpreserved claim of a Doyle violation that the appellate court reviewed under the Golding standard.

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

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State v. William A.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIAM A.*

(AC 47138)

Alvord, Clark and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, following a jury trial, of the crimes of sexual assault in the fourth

degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed. He claimed,

inter alia, that the state deprived him of his fifth amendment right to remain

silent when the prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited

testimony about the defendant’s silence occurring after he had been

informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436), in violation

of Doyle v. Ohio (426 U.S. 610), during the state’s case-in-chief and commented about the defendant’s post-Miranda silence during closing argument. Held:

This court reviewed the merits of the defendant’s unpreserved claim of a

Doyle violation pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as it was of

constitutional magnitude and the record was adequate to review the alleged

claim of error.

This court, having concluded that the defendant had established the existence of a constitutional violation that violated his due process right to a

fair trial for purposes of the third prong of Golding, further concluded that

the state failed to meet its burden of proof that the Doyle violation was not

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the state’s case against the defendant

was not particularly strong and the prosecutor made multiple remarks concerning the defendant’s post-Miranda silence, which struck at the jugular

of the defendant’s theory of defense or suggested a connection between

the defendant’s silence and his guilt; accordingly, this court reversed the

judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial.

Argued March 11—officially released September 2, 2025

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of sexual assault and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline

to use the defendant’s full name or to identify the complainant or others

through whom the complainant’s identity may be ascertained. See General

Statutes § 54-86e.

Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)

(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization

Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to

identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection

order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied

for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained

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State v. William A.

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of sexual assault in the fourth degree and

risk of injury to a child, brought to the Superior Court

in the judicial district of New London, geographical

area number twenty-one, and tried to the jury before

Papastavros, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty; thereafter, the court, Droney, J., denied the defendant’s

motion for a new trial, and the defendant appealed to

this court. Reversed; new trial.

Conrad O. Seifert, assigned counsel, for the appellant

(defendant).

Olivia M. Hally, deputy assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Paul Narducci, state’s

attorney, and Adam B. Scott, supervisory assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The defendant, William A., appeals from

the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial,

of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) and risk of injury

to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a)

(2). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) pursuant

to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L.

Ed. 2d 91 (1976),1 the state violated his fifth amendment

right to remain silent when the prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited testimony during the

state’s case-in-chief and commented during closing

argument about the defendant’s post-Miranda2 silence,

1

‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. [619], the United States Supreme Court

held that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence

following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due process.’’

State v. Washington, 345 Conn. 258, 267, 284 A.3d 280 (2022).

2

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.

2d 694 (1966) (person who has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived

of his freedom in any significant way ‘‘must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be

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State v. William A.

(2) the prosecutor’s improper question about the defendant’s post-Miranda silence implicated the defendant’s

constitutional right to have the state prove his guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt and thereby implied that

the defendant had to prove his innocence, in violation

of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25

L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970),3 (3) the prosecutor engaged in

improprieties during the trial and closing argument that

deprived the defendant of his due process right to a

fair trial, and (4) the trial court committed plain error

by instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt when

there was no evidence to support such an instruction

and the instruction did not comply with the model Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions. We agree that the

prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited

testimony about the defendant’s post-Miranda silence

in violation of Doyle and conclude that the state has

failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the

constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of

conviction and remand the case for a new trial.4

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. On October 29, 2020, the complainant, K, who

was sixteen years old at the time, told her mother that

she did not want to take the bus home from school.

Although her mother told her that she had to, K did

not take the bus home, and she subsequently lied to

her mother about having done so. When K’s mother

an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed

for him prior to any questioning if he so desires’’).

3

In In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. 364, the United States Supreme Court

held ‘‘that the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary

to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’’

4

Because we agree with the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor violated

Doyle by impermissibly asking a question and eliciting testimony about the

defendant’s post-Miranda silence and remand the case for a new trial, we

do not reach the merits of his other claims on appeal.

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State v. William A.

confronted K, K acknowledged that she did not take

the bus. K’s mother punished K by taking her cell phone

away from her for one month. That same day, K told

her mother information about her sexual orientation.

K’s mother was supportive but thought that K might

have made that statement in an effort to get her cell

phone back. The next day, K revealed to her mother

that the defendant, her stepfather, had touched her

inappropriately when she was younger. K’s mother also

thought that, in making these allegations, ‘‘[K] could be

attempting to have her phone returned to her.’’ K testified at trial that she came forward out of concern for

her sister, who is autistic, in case the defendant had

done the same thing to her.

In her trial testimony, K described an incident that

occurred in April, 2013, when she was eight years old

and had stayed home from school due to a lung infection. According to K, she used to get sick a lot because

she has asthma, and, on that particular day when she

stayed home, she and the defendant were the only two

people in the house. K was lying underneath a blanket

in a chair in the living room watching television while

the defendant, who had worked the night shift, was

sleeping. When the defendant woke up, he came into

the living room and sat down on a couch that was across

from K. After a few minutes passed, the defendant got

up, lay down next to K, and then slid his hands underneath the waistband of K’s leggings and underwear. The

defendant left his hand there for a time and then began

to ‘‘try and feel’’ K’s vagina, but her legs were closed,

and, when she noticed what he was trying to do, she

sat up and took a drink of water to try and indicate

to the defendant that she was uncomfortable with his

conduct. K then moved to the couch on the opposite

side of the room, and the defendant followed her, lay

on top of her, stuck his hands down her leggings and

underwear again, and started touching her vagina. K

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State v. William A.

responded by getting up and sitting on the other couch,

but the defendant followed her again, repeated the same

behavior, and began moving his hand back and forth

while touching her vagina. Thereafter, K got up and

went to the bathroom to ‘‘be safe . . . .’’ In the bathroom, K decided to take a shower. While in the shower,

she realized that she did not have a washcloth and

asked the defendant to bring her one. When the defendant entered the bathroom to give K a washcloth, K

covered her body with the shower curtain and extended

her arm over the curtain to take the washcloth from

the defendant. After having done so, however, K noticed

that the defendant had not left the bathroom and was

still standing there, which prompted her to say something to the effect of: ‘‘[A]re you just going to stand

there?’’ Thereafter, the defendant left the bathroom. K

testified that, after this incident, she did not want to

have contact with the defendant but acknowledged that

she would ask to go along with him when he would

pick up his daughter in Maryland. During those long

road trips, she would be alone with the defendant in

the car, but nothing happened between her and the

defendant on those trips.

K also described an incident in which the defendant

allegedly touched her on her leg. When K was between

thirteen and fourteen years old, she was sleeping in her

mother’s bed with her mother while the defendant was

at work because she was afraid of the dark. When the

defendant arrived home from work, he got into the bed

and lay in between K and her mother, with the front

of his body positioned against the back of K’s body. K,

who was awake, felt the defendant start to slide his

hand down her leg, but she got out of the bed and went

to her bedroom before he could touch her further. K’s

mother recalled a time when K was a teenager and the

defendant lay in bed with the both of them. K’s mother

testified that, the next morning, she told the defendant

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State v. William A.

that she felt it was inappropriate for him to be in bed

with K because she was a teenager, and he agreed. K

testified that, apart from these two instances, there

were no other times when the defendant touched her

inappropriately.

After K’s disclosure, K’s mother informed the defendant of K’s allegations, and he denied them. The next

day, K’s mother made a report to the Department of

Children and Families, which informed the Norwich

Police Department. On November 6, 2020, K’s mother

was interviewed by John Tangney, a patrol officer with

the Norwich Police Department, and she conveyed to

him K’s account of what had occurred. See footnote 7

of this opinion. A forensic interview of K subsequently

was conducted.

On February 10, 2021, the defendant voluntarily went

to the Norwich Police Department for the purpose of

being interviewed about K’s allegations. The interview

was conducted by Peter Karasik, the detective assigned

to the case, and another detective. At the outset of the

interview, Karasik informed the defendant that he was

not under arrest, that he was free to go at any time,

and that the door to the interview room had been closed

for privacy purposes. During the interview, which lasted

approximately one hour and fifteen minutes, the defendant was asked repeatedly about the allegations, and

each time he responded by denying that anything inappropriate had happened. At least twenty-six times during the course of the interview the defendant denied

K’s allegations.5 The defendant also was asked multiple

times why K would make up the allegations or lie. He

consistently responded that he did not know why and

5

Specifically, the defendant stated that nothing happened, K’s allegations

were not true, there was nothing that could be construed as inappropriate,

he never put his hand on K’s thigh, never got into bed with K, never saw

K come out of the shower or hand her a washcloth while she was in the

shower, and the couch and bathroom incidents did not happen.

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State v. William A.

mentioned how K often asked to join him on long road

trips when he would drive out of state to pick up his

daughter, and it would be just the two of them in the

car, and that such road trips occurred after the alleged

sexual abuse took place. At several points in the interview, the defendant also speculated that maybe K did

not like that he was her stepfather, especially when she

did not get her way; was covering for someone else,

including a boyfriend; was trying to make her allegations appear credible; was trying to get the defendant

‘‘away from her mother . . . to get her parents back

together’’; was describing a bad dream; or was looking

for attention. Nevertheless, one of the detectives stated

that they needed to be able to give their boss a ‘‘reasonable explanation’’ as to why they should believe the

defendant over K, and that, if they could not explain

why K was making up the allegations, they could ‘‘only

assume [the allegations were] accurate.’’

Twice during the interview, the defendant stated that

he was willing to take a lie detector test, but no such

test ever was conducted. Toward the end of the interview, after telling the defendant that he felt that there

was something that the defendant wanted to get off of

his chest, Karasik stated that the defendant could call

Karasik at any time and leave a message if he recalled

anything. Thereafter, the other detective stated that K

had given them ‘‘a completely credible account of what

occurred,’’ and that ‘‘[t]he next time we’ll be in touch

. . . will be to arrest you. Is that what you want? Be

honest with us now. Cause you got two choices.’’ The

defendant responded: ‘‘Good luck . . . you guys are

beyond [the] statute of limitations.’’ The detectives then

informed the defendant that the applicable statute of

limitations was thirty years. The defendant thereafter

ended the interview.

The defendant was arrested on March 26, 2023, at

which time he was advised of his Miranda rights, and

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State v. William A.

subsequently he was charged in an amended substitute

long form information with sexual assault in the fourth

degree in violation of § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) and risk of

injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2). Both

charges stemmed from the April, 2013 incident. A two

day jury trial followed,6 at which the state presented

testimony from K, Karasik, and K’s mother, and submitted three exhibits into evidence: the videotape of the

defendant’s police interview, a photograph of how K

looked when she was eight years old, and a physician’s

note showing that K had asthma.

K and her mother provided their accounts of the

events, and Karasik testified about the defendant’s videotaped interview, which was played in its entirety for

the jury. Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor asked

Karasik: ‘‘[D]id the defendant ever give you a reason

why he thought the victim gave—or the complainant

. . . strike that. Your Honor, I apologize—[the] complainant gave you any other reason why this could have

happened, why she made these allegations?’’ Defense

counsel objected to this question on the ground that

the question called for speculation. The prosecutor

offered to clarify the question, and the court responded

by telling the prosecutor to ask the question again.

The prosecutor subsequently asked Karasik: ‘‘[D]id the

defendant ever offer up a reason why the complainant

made these allegations?’’ (Emphasis added.) Defense

counsel objected again, this time on the grounds that

the question was ‘‘[a]sked and answered of the complainant,’’ and that it was being asked ‘‘to augment [K’s]

testimony.’’ The court overruled defense counsel’s

objection, and Karasik answered: ‘‘No.’’ The state then

concluded its direct examination of Karasik.

6

The evidence portion of the trial commenced and ended on June 13,

2023, and, on June 15, 2023, counsel made their closing arguments and the

court instructed the jury, which returned its verdict that day.

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State v. William A.

The defendant did not present any testimony and

submitted one exhibit into evidence, which consisted

of a police report concerning K’s allegations.7 At the

conclusion of trial, the jury found the defendant guilty

of both charges. On August 25, 2023, the court, Papastavros, J., sentenced the defendant to a total effective

term of ten years of incarceration, execution suspended

after three years, followed by ten years of probation.

It also ordered the defendant to register as a sexual

offender for life. Four days prior to sentencing, on

August 21, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for a new

trial. In that motion, he asserted that a new trial was

warranted for a number of reasons, including because

the ‘‘state presented inadmissible evidence about [his]

. . . post-Miranda silence.’’ The court denied the

motion, and this appeal followed. Additional facts and

procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

On appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the

state violated the proscriptions set forth in Doyle when

the prosecutor asked Karasik whether the defendant

‘‘ever’’ had given a reason as to why K made the allegations of sexual assault. Although defense counsel

objected to the prosecutor’s question, he did so on

evidentiary grounds and did not assert a Doyle violation

before the trial court. The defendant, therefore, seeks

review of his unpreserved Doyle claim pursuant to State

v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989),

7

In the report, Officer Tangney recounts the details of his interview with

K’s mother, who told him about her conversation with K and K’s allegations

of inappropriate touching by the defendant. After setting forth the details

of the incidents of alleged abuse described to him, Tangney noted the

incident that occurred on October 29, 2020, when K lied to her mother about

taking the bus home from school and her mother punished her by taking

K’s cell phone away from her. The report references K’s statement to her

mother about her sexual orientation, and that K’s mother ‘‘was very accepting

but felt her daughter may be telling her this just to get her phone back.

Upon hearing the [allegations of inappropriate touching by the defendant]

from her daughter, [K’s mother] also thought [K] could be attempting to

have her phone returned to her.’’

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State v. William A.

as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781,

120 A.3d 1188 (2015). ‘‘Under Golding, a defendant can

prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved

at trial only if all of the following conditions are met:

(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim

of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude

alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the

alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . .

deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject

to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Washington,

345 Conn. 258, 267, 284 A.3d 280 (2022). We conclude

that the defendant’s Doyle claim is of constitutional

magnitude; see State v. Smith, 180 Conn. App. 181,

195, 182 A.3d 1194 (2018) (claim that state violated

defendant’s right to remain silent is of constitutional

magnitude); and that the record is adequate to review

the alleged claim of error, as the record demonstrates

that the defendant received a Miranda warning at the

time of his arrest, and the Doyle claim relates, at least

in part, to the defendant’s silence during a time period

after the Miranda warning was given. See State v. Griffin, 232 Conn. App. 866, 882, 337 A.3d 1211 (2025) (‘‘[a]s

a factual predicate to an alleged Doyle violation, the

record must demonstrate that the defendant received

a Miranda warning prior to the period of silence that

was disclosed to the jury’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)), petition for cert. filed (Conn. June 20, 2025)

(No. 240408); see also State v. Patrick M., 344 Conn.

565, 583 n.6, 280 A.3d 461 (2022) (because ‘‘it [was]

undisputed that the defendant received Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest . . . any reference to the

defendant’s postarrest silence also was a reference to

his post-Miranda silence’’). We therefore will review

the merits of the defendant’s claim.

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State v. William A.

Next, we must ascertain whether a constitutional violation exists that deprived the defendant of a fair trial.

To answer that question, we must determine whether

the prosecutor’s question constituted an impermissible

reference to the defendant’s post-Miranda silence. The

following legal principles guide our analysis.

‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. 610, the United

States Supreme Court held that the impeachment of a

defendant through evidence of his silence following his

arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due

process. See id., 611, 619. In reaching its conclusion,

the court in Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 617–19, reasoned,

first, that silence in the wake of Miranda warnings is

insolubly ambiguous and consequently of little probative value, and, [s]econd . . . [although] it is true that

the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance

that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is

implicit to any person who receives the warnings. . . .

State v. Bell, 283 Conn. 748, 765, 931 A.2d 198 (2007);

accord State v. Patrick M., [supra, 344 Conn. 582]. In

a subsequent case, the United States Supreme Court

went on to explain that [t]he point of the Doyle holding

is that it is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested

person that his silence will not be used against him and

thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence

to impeach his trial testimony. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292, 106 S. Ct. 634, 88 L. Ed. 2d

623 (1986).

‘‘Although Doyle explicitly prohibits impeachment of

a defendant with evidence of his post-Miranda silence,

[our Supreme] [C]ourt has extended the Doyle rationale

to conclude that due process is also violated when

the state uses evidence of a defendant’s post-Miranda

silence as affirmative proof at trial . . . . State v.

Plourde, 208 Conn. 455, 468, 545 A.2d 1071 (1988), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S. Ct. 847, 102 L. Ed. 2d 979

(1989); accord State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 714,

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State v. William A.

759 A.2d 995 (2000).’’ (Emphasis in original; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Washington, supra,

345 Conn. 267–68. ‘‘Use of a defendant’s pre-Miranda

silence, by contrast, does not raise the same constitutional concerns: evidence of prearrest, and specifically

pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, since the

rule of Doyle . . . is predicated on the defendant’s reliance on the implicit promise of Miranda warnings.

State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262, 286 n.19, 973 A.2d 1207

(2009); see Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240, 100

S. Ct. 2124, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980) (if [t]he failure to

speak occurred before the [defendant] was taken into

custody and given Miranda warnings . . . [then] the

fundamental unfairness present in Doyle is not [implicated], and impeachment by use of prearrest silence

does not violate the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment).’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 583. ‘‘The defendant

bears the burden of proving that a Doyle violation

occurred. . . . If the defendant fulfills his burden, then

the state assumes the burden of demonstrating that the

constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 588.

In support of his claim that the prosecutor improperly

asked a question and elicited testimony about his postMiranda silence, in violation of Doyle, the defendant

contends that, although he was interviewed by the

police months prior to his arrest, ‘‘[the] improper question was not limited to [the] one hour and [fifteen]

minute interview. The reason is because the prosecutor

used the word ‘ever.’ . . . ‘The jury would have naturally and necessarily interpreted the answer to include

the entire period after the defendant became aware

of the allegations, including the twenty-seven months

between the defendant’s arrest and trial. Certainly, the

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State v. William A.

jury would have inferred that the use of the word ‘‘ever’’

included more than just the video recorded interview.

The jury had already seen the interview—it did not need

to be informed that the defendant did not provide an

explanation for the allegations during the interview.

The natural interpretation of the prosecution’s question

is that it went beyond what the jury had seen and was

asking whether the defendant ‘‘ever’’ provided such an

explanation.’ ’’ (Emphasis altered.) The state, citing

State v. Jeffrey, 220 Conn. 698, 721, 601 A.2d 993 (1991),

cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1224, 112 S. Ct. 3041, 120 L. Ed.

2d 909 (1992),8 counters these assertions by arguing

that, ‘‘[i]n determining whether a prosecutor’s ambiguous remarks refer to pre-Miranda silence or postMiranda silence, this court draws the ‘more probable’

interpretation, given the context of the remarks.’’

According to the state, the prosecutor’s question ‘‘pertained to the defendant’s silence during his police interview, at which he was not in custody and, therefore,

had not received Miranda warnings,’’ and that ‘‘it was

more probable, given the context in which the prosecutor asked the question, that it would have been understood to refer to the defendant’s prearrest silence, specifically, his silence in the police interview.’’ (Emphasis

in original.)

8

In Jeffrey, our Supreme Court, in concluding that the defendant in that

case had failed to establish a Doyle violation, stated: ‘‘On appeal, the defendant maintains that [a] . . . question [posed to him on cross-examination]

should . . . have been excluded as an impermissible use of [his] postarrest

silence. Although he acknowledges that it is not clear from the question

whether the [prosecutor] was referring to the defendant’s silence before or

after he was arrested, he contends that the question reasonably could have

been understood by the jury to encompass the defendant’s postarrest silence.

We agree that the question was ambiguous but believe that, given the context

in which it was asked, it is more probable that it would have been understood

to refer to the defendant’s pre-arrest silence. The state’s line of inquiry

leading up to this question concerned the defendant’s conduct when the

police arrived at his home before they placed him under arrest.’’ (Emphasis

omitted.) State v. Jeffrey, supra, 220 Conn. 721.

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These differing positions of the parties demonstrate

the ambiguity9 in the prosecutor’s use of the word

‘‘ever.’’ In State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 584, our

Supreme Court recently addressed how to construe

ambiguous remarks that reasonably can be interpreted

to refer either to a defendant’s pre-Miranda or postMiranda silence. In Patrick M., our Supreme Court

concluded that the prosecutor’s references to the defendant’s silence in that case ‘‘were ambiguous because

they were not confined to a defined point in time within

the pre-Miranda period but, instead, referred generally

to the defendant’s delay in disclosing his version of

events without limitation. That delay, when referenced

by the prosecutor in an unspecified and, therefore,

unrestricted manner, could reasonably have been understood to include both the four days of pre-Miranda

silence and the much lengthier period between the

defendant’s arrest and his trial.’’ Id. In light of those

circumstances, the court adopted a ‘‘contextualized

approach’’ for addressing such situations. Id., 586. ‘‘Under

this approach, [b]oth the intent of the prosecutor and

the character of the remarks are determined by

reviewing the context in which they occur, and the

burden of proving such intent is on the defendant. . . .

The standard is strict; virtually any description of a

defendant’s silence following arrest and a Miranda

warning will constitute a Doyle violation.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The

court further concluded: ‘‘[T]o determine whether a

Doyle violation occurred . . . we must analyze

whether the language used [by the prosecutor was]

manifestly intended to be, or was . . . of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take

it to be a comment on the [defendant’s post-Miranda

9

See State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 584 (citing State v. Courtney

G., 339 Conn. 328, 345–46, 260 A.3d 1152 (2021), for proposition that ‘‘prosecutorial statements are ambiguous if their meaning is unclear and susceptible

to more than one reasonable interpretation’’).

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State v. William A.

silence]. . . . [I]n applying this test, we must look to

the context in which the statement was made in order

to determine the manifest intention [that] prompted it

and its natural and necessary impact [on] the jury.’’

(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 588.

Similarly, in the present case, the prosecutor failed

to use language restricting the time period covered by

his question to the police interview only and, thus, did

not confine his question to a defined point in time within

the pre-Miranda period. Because the word ‘‘ever’’ used

in the question posed could be construed as referring

to a time period that included both pre-Miranda and

post-Miranda silence; see State v. Patrick M., supra,

344 Conn. 584; we apply the contextualized approach

set forth in Patrick M. in our determination of whether

a Doyle violation occurred. We conclude that the question, when viewed in the context in which it was made,

was of such a character that the jury naturally and

necessarily10 would have understood it to be a comment

on the defendant’s post-Miranda silence.11

Our determination is guided, in part, by our Supreme

Court’s decision in State v. Silano, 204 Conn. 769, 529

A.2d 1283 (1987). In Silano, the defendant argued on

10

We note that the defendant utilizes the ‘‘naturally and necessarily’’ language from State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 588, in his appellate briefs.

The state, on the other hand, does not refer to or rely on the language set

forth in Patrick M. but, rather, refers in its appellate brief to the ‘‘more

probable than not’’ language employed in State v. Jeffrey, supra, 220 Conn.

721, even though it does cite to Patrick M. generally regarding Doyle violations. The state has not raised any argument as to why Patrick M. should

not apply to the present case. Even though we apply the test set forth in

Patrick M., we note that, under either test, our conclusion would be the

same, as they both focus primarily on the context in which the challenged

statement was made.

11

In light of this conclusion, we need not determine whether the prosecutor’s question was ‘‘manifestly intended to refer to the defendant’s postMiranda silence . . . .’’ State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 588.

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appeal to our Supreme Court that the trial court improperly ‘‘allow[ed] the state to ask a question on crossexamination concerning [the defendant’s] postarrest

silence after Miranda warnings had been given . . . .’’

Id., 770–71. Specifically, the defendant claimed that he

was denied due process ‘‘because the court allowed the

state to cross-examine him about his failure to contact

the police after the interrogation had ceased in order

to correct [a] statement he had given to them. [Also]

. . . the prosecutor commented about that failure during the state’s final argument. The defendant characterize[d] th[e] issue as one involving postarrest silence,

and the state characterize[d] it as one involving the

permissible use of prior inconsistent statements to

impeach credibility during cross-examination.’’ Id., 778–

79. Our Supreme Court concluded that ‘‘one of the prosecutor’s questions on cross-examination was constitutionally improper . . . .’’ Id., 779. In particular, the state

asked the defendant if he ‘‘ever again’’ contacted ‘‘the

police to correct allegedly false statements he had made

during the interrogation.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.

On appeal, our Supreme Court concluded: ‘‘The state

may impeach a defendant by cross-examination concerning a prior inconsistent statement made after arrest

and the giving of Miranda warnings, even though such

impeachment may call into question a defendant’s

silence about the truth when he made that prior inconsistent statement. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404,

100 S. Ct. 2180, 65 L. Ed. 2d 222, reh. denied, 448 U.S.

912, 101 S. Ct. 27, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1173 (1980). Such an

examination is allowed because it is impossible to

‘bifurcate’ a prosecutor’s questions concerning inconsistency into those relating to facts contained in a prior

statement and those concerning facts omitted therefrom. Id., 408–409. A prosecutor may not, however,

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State v. William A.

question a defendant about his silence after the interrogation has ceased, since a ‘defendant may reassert his

right to remain silent at any time, and if he ceases to

answer questions, or to come forward with additional

or correcting information after questions are no longer

being asked of him, there is a reasonable possibility

that he is relying upon that right.’ . . . We conclude,

therefore, that the question concerning the defendant’s

failure ‘ever again’ to contact the police, after he had

been arrested and given a Miranda warning, was

improper under the strictures of Doyle.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Silano, supra, 204 Conn. 780–81.

Likewise, in the present case, the prosecutor asked

Karasik whether the defendant ‘‘ever’’ provided an

explanation for why K made the allegations of sexual

assault. The adverb ‘‘ever,’’ used in this context, means

‘‘at any time . . . .’’ Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2003) p. 433. The question asked by

the prosecutor contained no language limiting it to ‘‘any

time’’ during the defendant’s police interview.12 Also,

12

The present case is distinguishable from State v. Devito, 159 Conn. App.

560, 124 A.3d 14, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 947, 125 A.3d 1012 (2015), on which

the state relies in support of its argument that the defendant cannot establish

a Doyle violation resulting from the prosecutor’s use of the word ‘‘ever’’ in

his question to Karasik. In Devito, the defendant claimed ‘‘that his due

process right to a fair trial was violated when the court improperly admitted

testimony regarding his post-Miranda silence at the police station’’ following

his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. Id., 567. The prosecutor in Devito questioned state police

troopers on the witness stand by asking if the defendant ‘‘ever denied driving

[his] vehicle during the course of the evening’’ when he was arrested.

(Emphasis added.) Id., 570. The defendant argued that the question could

have been understood by the jury as implicating his post-Miranda silence.

This court disagreed, concluding, inter alia, that, given the context in which

the question was asked, ‘‘it [was] more probable that it would have been

understood to refer to the defendant’s prearrest silence,’’ as the trooper’s

‘‘testimony was primarily focused on the defendant’s conduct during the

traffic stop,’’ and ‘‘the state’s line of inquiry leading up to the question related

only to the defendant’s conduct at the scene rather than at the [police]

barracks.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 572. With respect to testimony from two

other troopers, this court concluded that their testimony did not implicate

the defendant’s post-Miranda silence, as one trooper testified ‘‘only as

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State v. William A.

the question was asked after the jury had just finished

viewing the videotape of the interview, during which

the defendant, numerous times, emphatically denied

the allegations of sexual assault and, aside from speculating—at the detectives’ invitation—about a few reasons why K may have done so, stated repeatedly that

he did not know why K made the allegations. Because

the jury had just viewed the videotape of the interview,

it was aware of the position taken by the defendant

during his pre-Miranda interview. Moreover, the fact

that the defendant did offer some explanations during

the interview as to why K may have made the allegations

further supports a determination that the question

posed by the prosecutor necessarily would have covered a time period after the interview, which included

the defendant’s post-Miranda silence. Significantly,

toward the end of the interview, after Karasik told the

defendant that he felt that there was something that

the defendant wanted to get off of his chest, Karasik

stated that the defendant could call Karasik at any time

and leave a message if he recalled anything. With that

in mind, the jury naturally and necessarily would have

viewed the question posed by the prosecutor, immediately following its viewing of the interview, as referring

to a time period following the interview and up to trial,

which, at least in part, pertained to the defendant’s

post-Miranda silence.

As our Supreme Court has made clear, ‘‘[t]he standard

is strict; virtually any description of a defendant’s

silence following arrest and a Miranda warning will

constitute a Doyle violation.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 586.

to events that transpired during the traffic stop,’’ and the other trooper’s

testimony was limited to the defendant’s silence during the traffic stop, as

the prosecutor had used the phrase ‘‘during that time’’ in reference to when

the trooper had approached the defendant’s vehicle. (Emphasis omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 571. These circumstances differ from

those of the present case, as we explain in this opinion.

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Consequently, we conclude that the prosecutor’s question to Karasik of whether the defendant ‘‘ever’’ offered

an explanation for K’s allegations, when viewed in the

context in which it was made, violated the proscriptions

of Doyle in that, by posing that question and eliciting

the response, the prosecutor improperly used the defendant’s post-Miranda silence against him. See State v.

Patrick M., supra, 591; see also Griffin v. California,

380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965)

(fifth amendment to federal constitution ‘‘forbids . . .

comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence’’);

State v. A. M., 324 Conn. 190, 200, 152 A.3d 49 (2016)

(‘‘[t]he fifth amendment prohibits the state from forcing

the defendant to be a witness against himself, and the

United States Supreme Court has concluded that this

protection also prohibits prosecutors from commenting

at trial on the defendant’s decision not to testify’’); State

v. Carlson, 226 Conn. App. 514, 537, 318 A.3d 283 (‘‘fifth

amendment to the United States constitution protects

a defendant’s right not to testify and prohibits comments on a defendant’s silence’’), cert. denied, 350

Conn. 911, 324 A.3d 143 (2024). When a prosecutor’s

remarks violate Doyle, they are regarded as ‘‘fundamentally unfair, in violation of [a] defendant’s fourteenth

amendment right to due process.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Patrick M., supra, 592. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant has established

the existence of a constitutional violation that violated

his due process right to a fair trial for purposes of the

third prong of Golding.

This conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry.

Next, we must address the fourth prong of Golding

concerning the harmfulness of the Doyle violation. See

id. (‘‘Doyle violations are subject to harmless error analysis’’). Under the fourth prong of Golding and when,

as here, the error involves a constitutional violation,

‘‘[t]he state bears the burden of demonstrating that the

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State v. William A.

constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt. . . . That determination must be made in light

of the entire record [including the strength of the state’s

case without the Doyle violation].’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘Whether an error is harmful, as

always, depends on its impact on the trier of fact and

the result of the case.’’ Id.; see also State v. A. M., supra,

324 Conn. 204 (‘‘[t]he focus of our harmless error inquiry

is on whether the state has demonstrated that the [error]

did not influence the outcome of the trial’’).

‘‘A Doyle violation may, in a particular case, be so

insignificant that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt

that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict without the impermissible question or comment [on] a

defendant’s silence following a Miranda warning.

Under such circumstances, the state’s use of a defendant’s [post-Miranda] silence does not constitute

reversible error. . . . The [error] has similarly been

[found to be harmless when] a prosecutor does not

focus [on] or highlight the defendant’s silence in his

cross-examination and closing remarks and [when] the

prosecutor’s comments do not strike at the jugular of

the defendant’s story. . . . The cases [in which] the

error has been found to be prejudicial disclose repetitive references to the defendant’s silence, reemphasis

of the fact [during] closing argument, and extensive,

[strongly worded] argument suggesting a connection

between the defendant’s silence and his guilt.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Patrick M., supra,

344 Conn. 592.

In State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 592, our

Supreme Court, after finding a Doyle violation, engaged

in a harmless error analysis and concluded: ‘‘The state’s

harmless error argument erroneously focuses exclusively on the rebuttal argument and fails to consider

the impact of the similar remarks the prosecutor made

during his initial argument. It argues that the ‘single

Doyle violation during rebuttal argument was harmless’

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State v. William A.

but does not explain how the prosecutor’s repeated

emphasis on the defendant’s post-Miranda silence during initial closing argument, which struck at the jugular

of the defendant’s exculpatory story that [his wife] was

killed during the course of a robbery, was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore conclude that

the state has failed to fulfill its burden of demonstrating

harmlessness.’’ Id., 592–93. After viewing the entire

record in the present case, we reach a similar conclusion.

Here, the state contends that, ‘‘even if this court were

to determine that the state had violated Doyle, any such

violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ In

support of this contention, the state argues that the

prosecutor’s question was ‘‘infrequent,’’ and that ‘‘the

state never returned to the subject of the defendant’s

post-Miranda silence during closing or rebuttal argument. . . . At no point during closing or rebuttal argument did the prosecutor reference or comment on the

defendant’s decision not to testify during the trial.’’ The

state also asserts that the prosecutor’s question ‘‘did

not affect the defendant’s defense that K fabricated the

allegations . . . [or] that K had motivation to lie about

the sexual assault because she had her phone taken

away by her mother that same month.’’ Finally, the state

argues that the prosecutor’s ‘‘singular question . . .

did not ‘strike at [the] jugular’ of the defendant’s silence

after his arrest’’ and that the state presented strong

evidence of the defendant’s guilt. (Emphasis omitted.)

We do not agree with the state’s contentions that it

‘‘never returned to the subject of the defendant’s postMiranda silence during closing or rebuttal argument,’’

that the Doyle violation did not relate to or have an

impact on the defendant’s theory of defense, and that

the state presented a strong case against the defendant.

Accordingly, we conclude that the state has not met its

burden of demonstrating that the Doyle violation was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

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First, following our review of the entire record, which

necessarily includes comments made by the prosecutor

during closing and rebuttal arguments;13 see State v.

Hamilton, 352 Conn. 317, 337–38, 336 A.3d 1188 (2025);

13

Although we do not review the merits of the defendant’s second Doyle

violation claim concerning a comment made by the prosecutor during closing

argument, we take that comment into consideration in our analysis of harm.

Specifically, during closing argument the prosecutor discussed K’s testimony

about the alleged sexual assault and stated in part: ‘‘You may look at the

fact that . . . K was isolated and alone in the home, and . . . point that

toward intent. You may use the fact that the defendant pursued . . . K from

one couch to another couch as an intentional act, and you may definitely

use the fact that he manipulated his fingers to determine sexual gratification

and intent. For a man to place his hands down an eight year old child’s

pants, inside her underwear, who isn’t a doctor, who doesn’t verbalize what

his meaning in doing it is, you may find that that was an intentional act for

sexual gratification. That testimony is unrefuted.’’ (Emphasis added.) The

defendant argues that the italicized comment ‘‘planted in the jury’s mind

that the defendant’s decision to not testify at his trial meant that he was guilty

or [that he] should have taken the witness stand to prove his innocence.’’

Our Supreme Court addressed a similar type of comment in State v. Ruffin,

316 Conn. 20, 26, 110 A.3d 1225 (2015). In Ruffin, the defendant claimed

that ‘‘the prosecutor’s no conflicting witness argument constituted an impermissible comment on the defendant’s silence because the defendant alone

[had] information to contradict [the victim] as to [her allegations of] sexual

abuse.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Although our Supreme Court

ultimately disagreed with that claim, in part because ‘‘there were witnesses

other than the defendant who could have, and did, contradict other aspects

of the victim’s allegations’’; (emphasis omitted) id., 33; it ‘‘note[d] that,

although the prosecutor did not comment on the defendant’s failure to

testify, ‘[a] prosecutor does take a risk whenever the ‘‘not contradicted’’

argument is made’ . . . and that prosecutors generally should avoid taking

this unnecessary risk . . . and avoid language that could be misinterpreted

as a veiled comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 33–34. In the present case, the prosecutor made the comment after

discussing K’s testimony about the defendant’s alleged sexual assault and

arguing that, from the defendant’s alleged conduct, as described by K, the jury

could infer intent; thus, the comment that ‘‘[t]hat testimony was unrefuted’’

necessarily was a reference to K’s testimony, in particular, her testimony

that the defendant put his hand down her pants, inside her underwear.

When we view the comment in the context in which it was made and with

consideration of the fact that, in this case, the defendant was the only person

who could contradict K’s testimony about the alleged sexual assault that

formed the basis for the two charges; see State v. Walker, 206 Conn. 300,

307–308, 537 A.2d 1021 (1988); we cannot ignore the possibility that the jury

could have interpreted the remark as a ‘‘veiled comment on the defendant’s

failure to testify,’’ which is the precise harm our Supreme Court cautioned

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State v. William A.

we conclude that, in addition to the Doyle violation that

we have found, the prosecutor further highlighted the

defendant’s silence in his closing remarks to the jury.14

For example, during rebuttal argument, the prosecutor

stated in relevant part: ‘‘The defense wants you to

believe that . . . K concocted this detailed story about

the defendant sexually assaulting her over the mom’s

punishment over her phone. She didn’t say mom did it.

It’s over a phone that mom took away. It wasn’t a phone

that the defendant took away. . . . So, let’s talk about

the interview. You have no evidence there was anything

wrong with that interview. . . . [L]et’s look at what

the defendant told you. . . . He told you that . . . K

was right, that they did live in three different homes,

that he was her stepdad. . . . [O]ne thing I can say

about that interview is that . . . Karasik was right all

along; the defendant had something he wanted to say,

but he didn’t want to say it. All he said, first thing he

wanted to say is, nope, it didn’t happen. Nope it didn’t

happen. And he said that a number of times, and I agree

he said that a lot. Again . . . Karasik was like, you’re

trying to tell me something; you want to tell me something. . . .

‘‘Did [the defendant] want to save his marriage? He

didn’t tell you that. Did he want to save his family? He

didn’t want to . . . tell you that. Did he want to save

his freedom? He didn’t want to tell you that. He didn’t

make up a story. He didn’t tell you about the phone

incident, all right, a perfect example of something that

14

We note that, although the defendant refers to these remarks in his

appellate briefs, he has not claimed that they are separate Doyle violations;

thus, we do not determine whether they constitute Doyle violations. Nevertheless, ‘‘the various instances in which the prosecutor mentions [postarrest]

silence informs this [c]ourt’s analysis as to the prejudicial effect on the jury.

See Brecht [v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 641, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed.

2d 353 (1993)] (adopting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762, 66

S. Ct. 1239, 90 L. Ed. 1557 (1946)) (finding that a [c]ourt on harmless error

review should consider ‘the proceedings in their entirety.’).’’ Jaradat v.

Williams, 591 F.3d 863, 868 n.3 (6th Cir. 2010).

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State v. William A.

might be an issue. All right. It’s here today as something

that you should disbelieve . . . K about. All right. He

didn’t tell you that.’’ (Emphasis added.)

In making these statements during his closing remarks

to the jury and repeatedly using the word ‘‘you,’’ the

prosecutor was speaking, and referring, to the jury; he

was not suggesting that the defendant did not tell Karasik these things during the pre-Miranda interview, as

the state contends. During the course of this argument,

the prosecutor stated five times that the defendant did

not tell the jury those various reasons for K’s allegations. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that these

five statements repeatedly highlighted the defendant’s

failure to testify and undeniably implicated the defendant’s post-Miranda silence.15 Moreover, by commenting on the defendant’s failure at trial to explain why K

should be disbelieved, the prosecutor was effectively

continuing to call attention to the defendant’s failure

to ‘‘ever’’ proffer an alternative explanation as to why

K would have made her allegations.

This conclusion is further reinforced when the prosecutor’s reference to the ‘‘phone incident’’ is considered

in connection with the defendant’s theory of defense

at trial, made through cross-examination of witnesses,

that K made up the allegations in an effort to gain access

to her cell phone that had been taken away from her

for one month as a punishment. When viewed in that

light, the prosecutor’s references to the defendant’s theory of defense concerning the ‘‘phone incident,’’ followed by statements that the defendant ‘‘didn’t tell

you’’—i.e., the jury—about the phone incident and a

suggestion that the jury should disbelieve it, ‘‘strike at

15

Although the defendant, in his principal appellate brief, does not label

these remarks as constituting a separate Doyle violation, he does claim that

the remarks amounted to prosecutorial improprieties that infringed on,

inter alia, his right to remain silent and improperly referred to facts not

in evidence.

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State v. William A.

the jugular’’ of the defendant’s theory of defense that

K made up the allegations in an effort to get her cell

phone back. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 592. As the defendant

aptly points out in his principal appellate brief: ‘‘There

[was] no trial evidence that, during the [police interview], the defendant knew about the cell phone being

seized by [K’s] mother for a month as [a] punishment.

There [was] no trial evidence [that] the defendant knew

about [K’s mother’s] concerns that her daughter was

lying when he voluntarily went to the police [interview].

The defendant may have learned about . . . K’s mother’s information about her daughter lying at some point

after his public defender showed him the disclosed

police report, which mentions it. . . . When the prosecutor argues that the defendant ‘didn’t tell’ [the jury]

about the phone incident, it naturally and necessarily

caused the jury to believe he should have testified in

order to tell [the jurors] he learned about the cell phone

incident after he was [interviewed]. This constitutes

indirect commentary on the defendant’s decision not

to testify and his right to remain silent.’’ (Emphasis

omitted.) We agree with the defendant.

As our Supreme Court has explained: ‘‘When the

defendant chooses not to testify, he takes the risk that

the jury will view his silence with skepticism—a prosecutor’s explicit reminders to the jury of the defendant’s

decision serves only to heighten this risk, burdening

the defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent.’’

State v. A. M., supra, 324 Conn. 203. ‘‘[P]rosecutors

should not be allowed to sidestep the Doyle protections

by skirting the edge of the law with vague and imprecise

references to a defendant’s silence.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn.

584–85.

Given that a determination of the harmfulness of the

Doyle violation ‘‘must be made in light of the entire

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State v. William A.

record [including the strength of the state’s case without

the Doyle violation]’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 592; we next

examine the strength of the state’s case. Our Supreme

Court has ‘‘described a child sexual abuse case lacking

conclusive physical evidence, when the prosecution’s

case rests on the credibility of the victim [as] not particularly strong, even when otherwise sufficient to support

a conviction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Angel T., supra, 292 Conn. 293.16

In State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 593 n.8, our

Supreme Court, in addressing the harmfulness of a

Doyle violation, stated: ‘‘Although the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction . . . we

disagree with the state that it was overwhelming. As

we previously noted, there was no direct, physical, or

forensic evidence implicating the defendant in [the]

murder; instead, the state’s case against the defendant

was largely circumstantial, resting on the defendant’s

motive, means, and opportunity to commit the crime

and his flight from the scene. At trial, the defendant

testified that his flight was motivated by fear, rather

than guilt, because someone else killed [the victim]

during the course of a robbery in which a large quantity

of money and illicit drugs was stolen. As to the identity

of the perpetrator, the defendant raised a third-party

16

We also note that, in the context of a prosecutorial impropriety claim,

this court has stated: ‘‘[W]e must be mindful that [t]he sexual abuse of

children is a crime [that], by its very nature, occurs under a cloak of secrecy

and darkness. It is not surprising, therefore, for there to be a lack of corroborating physical evidence . . . . Given the rarity of physical evidence in

[sexual assault cases involving children], a case is not automatically weak

just because a child’s will was overborne and he or she submitted to the

abuse . . . . [Our Supreme Court has] never stated that the state’s evidence

must have been overwhelming in order to support a conclusion that prosecutorial [impropriety] did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. . . . State

v. Courtney G., [339 Conn. 328, 365–66, 260 A.3d 1152 (2021)].’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henry B-A., 234 Conn. App. 197, 226,

A.3d (2025).

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State v. William A.

culpability defense [that was] . . . a plausible, alternative theory of culpability. On the present evidentiary

record, we cannot conclude that the evidence of the

defendant’s guilt was overwhelming or that the defendant’s exculpatory story was transparently frivolous.

See State v. Brunetti, [279 Conn. 39, 82–86, 901 A.2d 1

(2006)] (Doyle violation was harmless beyond reasonable doubt because defendant confessed to crime,

police found clothing soaked in victim’s blood in defendant’s home, and defendant’s exculpatory story that he

removed his clothing and that someone else dipped it

in victim’s blood was transparently frivolous); State v.

Montgomery, supra, 254 Conn. 718–20 (Doyle violation

was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, in part because

of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, which

consisted of eyewitness testimony identifying him as

perpetrator with 100 percent certainty, his purchase of

murder weapon, his confession to his cellmate, and

discovery of other incriminating evidence in [his] car,

including a knife, a can of Mace, latex gloves, duct tape,

and an ice pick).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Patrick M., supra, 593 n.8

With these considerations in mind, we conclude that

the state’s case against the defendant in the present

case was not particularly strong. See, e.g., State v. Angel

T., supra, 292 Conn. 292–95. In addition to the fact that

there was no physical or medical evidence of the alleged

incident of sexual abuse, no expert testimony was

offered;17 there was no evidence presented of behavioral

changes by K following the incident in April, 2013; and

17

We note that, although expert testimony is not required in a child sexual

assault case, the state often presents such testimony. See State v. Taylor

G., 315 Conn. 734, 761, 110 A.3d 338 (2015) (‘‘in cases that involve allegations

of sexual abuse of children, we have held that expert testimony of reactions

and behaviors common to victims of sexual abuse is admissible [because]

. . . [s]uch evidence assists a jury in its determination of the victim’s credibility by explaining the typical consequences of the trauma of sexual abuse

on a child’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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K testified that, at times following that incident, she

asked to go on long road trips with the defendant in

which the two of them were alone in his car. See State

v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 593 n.8 (state’s case

against defendant was not overwhelming when there

was no direct, physical, or forensic evidence implicating

defendant in murder). The evidence submitted by the

state consisted of K’s testimony setting forth her

account of what had occurred in April, 2013; the testimony of K’s mother, which corroborated K’s testimony

in part that, at some point in time when K was a teenager, the defendant had climbed into and slept in a bed

with K and K’s mother, although that incident was not

the basis for the charges against the defendant, and

which also included her acknowledgement that she initially thought that K was just trying to get her cell phone

back; the testimony of Karasik regarding his interview

of the defendant, which the jury viewed in its entirety;

a photograph of K when she was eight years old; and

a doctor’s note indicating that K suffers from asthma.

The defendant submitted the police report into evidence, which referenced K’s statement to her mother,

made after her mother had taken her cell phone away

from her for one month, about her sexual orientation,

the fact that K’s mother thought that K might be telling

her about her sexual orientation ‘‘just to get her phone

back,’’ and that, upon hearing the allegations of inappropriate touching by the defendant from K, K’s mother

also thought that K ‘‘could be attempting to have her

phone returned to her.’’

In State v. Angel T., supra, 292 Conn. 263–64, our

Supreme court addressed a claim of prosecutorial

impropriety stemming from the conduct of the prosecutor in ‘‘eliciting evidence of, and commenting during

summations about, the fact that the defendant . . . had

obtained representation by an attorney during the

police investigation of the crimes at issue.’’ In doing

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State v. William A.

so, it conducted an analysis under the factors set forth

in State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653

(1987), concerning whether the prosecutorial impropriety deprived the defendant of his due process right to

a fair trial; State v. Angel T., supra, 292 Conn. 287–95;

which we find instructive, especially with respect to its

statements regarding the impact of the prosecutorial

impropriety when the state’s case involving a child sexual assault is not particularly strong. For example, the

court concluded that the state’s case, which consisted

of the victim’s testimony and testimony from the victim’s mother and cousin, ‘‘was not sufficiently strong

so as to not be overshadowed by the impropriety.’’ Id.,

293. As the court explained: ‘‘[A]lthough there exists

evidence in the present case supporting the defendant’s

conviction despite the lack of direct physical evidence

linking the defendant to the sexual assault of the victim—namely, the victim’s testimony and the testimony

of her mother and cousin—without independent physical evidence to prove that the defendant had sexually

assaulted [the victim], or even that [the victim] had

been sexually assaulted at all, the significance of the

[prosecutor’s] improper conduct increases considerably.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Our application of that reasoning to the present case, in which

we similarly have determined that the state’s case was

not particularly strong and which also involves a credibility contest between the defendant and his accuser,

leads us to an analogous conclusion regarding the

impact of the Doyle violation.

The lack of physical evidence in the present case

rendered the trial a credibility contest between K and

the defendant. The harm resulting from the state’s Doyle

violation is compounded when considered in conjunction with other comments of the prosecutor during closing and rebuttal argument. See State v. Hamilton, supra,

352 Conn. 337–38 (trial court’s improper admission into

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State v. William A.

evidence of witness’ two interviews with police, in

which witness identified defendant as person in surveillance footage, was harmful, and that conclusion was

‘‘buttressed by the way [the witness’] two interviews

were used by the prosecutor during closing arguments’’); State v. Calderon-Perez, 234 Conn. App. 228,

264, A.3d (2025) (harm resulting from court’s

exclusion of evidence in violation of defendant’s constitutional right to present defense ‘‘could only have been

compounded by’’ prosecutor’s improper remarks in

closing argument about excluded evidence); see also

State v. A. M., supra, 324 Conn. 203 (when prosecutor’s

comment ‘‘calls the jury’s attention to the defendant’s

silence . . . such comment heighten[s] the jury’s

awareness of the defendant’s silence, namely, his failure

to answer to the state’s charges’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)). That is, the Doyle violation, together

with the prosecutor’s other comments during closing

and rebuttal arguments, conveyed and reinforced the

idea that the defendant should not be believed because

he never spoke up, either during the interview or at

any time afterward, to provide a reasonable explanation

for why K made her accusations against him.18 As such,

18

Compare State v. Hughes, 45 Conn. App. 289, 296, 696 A.2d 347 (1997)

(‘‘trial court’s improper admission of the evidence of the defendant’s postMiranda silence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’’ when ‘‘evidence of the defendant’s post-Miranda silence was brought up repeatedly

during the examination of [a police detective] and was then referred to during

closing argument,’’ and ‘‘defendant’s post-Miranda silence was consistently

equated with his guilt,’’ and because ‘‘defendant did not testify at trial, there

was a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the repeated use of evidence of [his] postMiranda silence as affirmative proof of his guilt and consciousness of guilt

contributed to his conviction’’) and State v. Crosby, 34 Conn. App. 261, 270,

641 A.2d 406 (‘‘In this case, the state questioned the defendant about his

postarrest silence and then argued three times during its closing remarks

that, since the defendant had remained silent prior to trial, he had had time

to fabricate an exculpatory story. Thus, the state repeatedly highlighted the

defendant’s postarrest silence and linked this silence to the defendant’s

explanation at trial. As a result, a reasonable possibility exists that the

impermissible questions and comments contributed to the defendant’s conviction, and the Doyle violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.’’), cert. denied, 230 Conn. 903, 644 A.2d 916 (1994), with State v.

Montgomery, supra, 254 Conn. 718–19 (concluding that Doyle violation was

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State v. William A.

the harm went to the core of the defendant’s theory

of defense, which was not ‘‘transparently frivolous.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Patrick M.,

supra, 344 Conn. 593 n.8. Under such circumstances

and in light of the entire record before us, which demonstrates that the state’s case against the defendant was

not strong, that the prosecutor, in addition to committing the Doyle violation, highlighted the defendant’s

post-Miranda silence multiple times during closing and

rebuttal arguments, and that some of those references

struck at the jugular of the defendant’s theory of defense

or suggested a connection between the defendant’s

silence and his guilt, we cannot conclude that the state’s

improper question and the detective’s answer did not

influence the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, the state

has failed to meet its burden of proof that the Doyle

violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See

id., 592, 593 n.8; State v. Hughes, 45 Conn. App. 289,

296, 696 A.2d 347 (1997); State v. Crosby, 34 Conn. App.

261, 270, 641 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 230 Conn. 903, 644

A.2d 916 (1994).

harmless beyond reasonable doubt because ‘‘prosecutor did not attempt

repeatedly to introduce evidence of the defendant’s silence . . . [or] mention that evidence during his closing argument,’’ ‘‘prosecutor focused on

the state’s strong case against the defendant, including the incriminating

responses that the defendant gave to the police before terminating the

[police] interview,’’ and ‘‘other evidence introduced by the state overwhelmingly demonstrated the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt’’), State

v. Alexis, 194 Conn. App. 162, 173–77, 220 A.3d 38 (any Doyle violation was

harmless because ‘‘the evidence introduced by the state unrelated to the

defendant’s post-Miranda silence established the defendant’s guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt’’), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 904, 219 A.3d 800 (2019); State

v. Bereis, 117 Conn. App. 360, 379, 978 A.2d 1122 (2009) (Doyle violation

was harmless beyond reasonable doubt in view of ‘‘substantial evidence of

the defendant’s guilt’’ and fact that reference to defendant’s silence ‘‘did

not strike at the jugular of the defendant’s version of events and was not

equated with the defendant’s guilt’’), and State v. Pepper, 79 Conn. App. 1,

16–17, 828 A.2d 1268 (2003) (any alleged Doyle violation was harmless

beyond reasonable doubt because there was substantial evidence supporting

defendant’s guilt, including physical evidence tying defendant to victim,

alleged Doyle violation was isolated, and there were no repeated references

to defendant’s silence), aff’d, 272 Conn. 10, 860 A.2d 1221 (2004).

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State v. William A.

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded

for a new trial.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.