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State v. William A.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. WILLIAM A.*
(AC 47138)
Alvord, Clark and Seeley, Js.
Syllabus
Convicted, following a jury trial, of the crimes of sexual assault in the fourth
degree and risk of injury to a child, the defendant appealed. He claimed,
inter alia, that the state deprived him of his fifth amendment right to remain
silent when the prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited
testimony about the defendant’s silence occurring after he had been
informed of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436), in violation
of Doyle v. Ohio (426 U.S. 610), during the state’s case-in-chief and commented about the defendant’s post-Miranda silence during closing argument. Held:
This court reviewed the merits of the defendant’s unpreserved claim of a
Doyle violation pursuant to State v. Golding (213 Conn. 233), as it was of
constitutional magnitude and the record was adequate to review the alleged
claim of error.
This court, having concluded that the defendant had established the existence of a constitutional violation that violated his due process right to a
fair trial for purposes of the third prong of Golding, further concluded that
the state failed to meet its burden of proof that the Doyle violation was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the state’s case against the defendant
was not particularly strong and the prosecutor made multiple remarks concerning the defendant’s post-Miranda silence, which struck at the jugular
of the defendant’s theory of defense or suggested a connection between
the defendant’s silence and his guilt; accordingly, this court reversed the
judgment of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial.
Argued March 11—officially released September 2, 2025
* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the
victims of sexual assault and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline
to use the defendant’s full name or to identify the complainant or others
through whom the complainant’s identity may be ascertained. See General
Statutes § 54-86e.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained
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State v. William A.
Procedural History
Substitute information charging the defendant with
the crimes of sexual assault in the fourth degree and
risk of injury to a child, brought to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of New London, geographical
area number twenty-one, and tried to the jury before
Papastavros, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty; thereafter, the court, Droney, J., denied the defendant’s
motion for a new trial, and the defendant appealed to
this court. Reversed; new trial.
Conrad O. Seifert, assigned counsel, for the appellant
(defendant).
Olivia M. Hally, deputy assistant state’s attorney,
with whom, on the brief, were Paul Narducci, state’s
attorney, and Adam B. Scott, supervisory assistant
state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion
SEELEY, J. The defendant, William A., appeals from
the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial,
of sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of
General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) and risk of injury
to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a)
(2). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) pursuant
to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 91 (1976),1 the state violated his fifth amendment
right to remain silent when the prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited testimony during the
state’s case-in-chief and commented during closing
argument about the defendant’s post-Miranda2 silence,
1
‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. [619], the United States Supreme Court
held that the impeachment of a defendant through evidence of his silence
following his arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due process.’’
State v. Washington, 345 Conn. 258, 267, 284 A.3d 280 (2022).
2
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed.
2d 694 (1966) (person who has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom in any significant way ‘‘must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
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State v. William A.
(2) the prosecutor’s improper question about the defendant’s post-Miranda silence implicated the defendant’s
constitutional right to have the state prove his guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt and thereby implied that
the defendant had to prove his innocence, in violation
of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25
L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970),3 (3) the prosecutor engaged in
improprieties during the trial and closing argument that
deprived the defendant of his due process right to a
fair trial, and (4) the trial court committed plain error
by instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt when
there was no evidence to support such an instruction
and the instruction did not comply with the model Connecticut Criminal Jury Instructions. We agree that the
prosecutor impermissibly asked a question and elicited
testimony about the defendant’s post-Miranda silence
in violation of Doyle and conclude that the state has
failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that the
constitutional violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of
conviction and remand the case for a new trial.4
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. On October 29, 2020, the complainant, K, who
was sixteen years old at the time, told her mother that
she did not want to take the bus home from school.
Although her mother told her that she had to, K did
not take the bus home, and she subsequently lied to
her mother about having done so. When K’s mother
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
for him prior to any questioning if he so desires’’).
3
In In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. 364, the United States Supreme Court
held ‘‘that the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’’
4
Because we agree with the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor violated
Doyle by impermissibly asking a question and eliciting testimony about the
defendant’s post-Miranda silence and remand the case for a new trial, we
do not reach the merits of his other claims on appeal.
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State v. William A.
confronted K, K acknowledged that she did not take
the bus. K’s mother punished K by taking her cell phone
away from her for one month. That same day, K told
her mother information about her sexual orientation.
K’s mother was supportive but thought that K might
have made that statement in an effort to get her cell
phone back. The next day, K revealed to her mother
that the defendant, her stepfather, had touched her
inappropriately when she was younger. K’s mother also
thought that, in making these allegations, ‘‘[K] could be
attempting to have her phone returned to her.’’ K testified at trial that she came forward out of concern for
her sister, who is autistic, in case the defendant had
done the same thing to her.
In her trial testimony, K described an incident that
occurred in April, 2013, when she was eight years old
and had stayed home from school due to a lung infection. According to K, she used to get sick a lot because
she has asthma, and, on that particular day when she
stayed home, she and the defendant were the only two
people in the house. K was lying underneath a blanket
in a chair in the living room watching television while
the defendant, who had worked the night shift, was
sleeping. When the defendant woke up, he came into
the living room and sat down on a couch that was across
from K. After a few minutes passed, the defendant got
up, lay down next to K, and then slid his hands underneath the waistband of K’s leggings and underwear. The
defendant left his hand there for a time and then began
to ‘‘try and feel’’ K’s vagina, but her legs were closed,
and, when she noticed what he was trying to do, she
sat up and took a drink of water to try and indicate
to the defendant that she was uncomfortable with his
conduct. K then moved to the couch on the opposite
side of the room, and the defendant followed her, lay
on top of her, stuck his hands down her leggings and
underwear again, and started touching her vagina. K
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State v. William A.
responded by getting up and sitting on the other couch,
but the defendant followed her again, repeated the same
behavior, and began moving his hand back and forth
while touching her vagina. Thereafter, K got up and
went to the bathroom to ‘‘be safe . . . .’’ In the bathroom, K decided to take a shower. While in the shower,
she realized that she did not have a washcloth and
asked the defendant to bring her one. When the defendant entered the bathroom to give K a washcloth, K
covered her body with the shower curtain and extended
her arm over the curtain to take the washcloth from
the defendant. After having done so, however, K noticed
that the defendant had not left the bathroom and was
still standing there, which prompted her to say something to the effect of: ‘‘[A]re you just going to stand
there?’’ Thereafter, the defendant left the bathroom. K
testified that, after this incident, she did not want to
have contact with the defendant but acknowledged that
she would ask to go along with him when he would
pick up his daughter in Maryland. During those long
road trips, she would be alone with the defendant in
the car, but nothing happened between her and the
defendant on those trips.
K also described an incident in which the defendant
allegedly touched her on her leg. When K was between
thirteen and fourteen years old, she was sleeping in her
mother’s bed with her mother while the defendant was
at work because she was afraid of the dark. When the
defendant arrived home from work, he got into the bed
and lay in between K and her mother, with the front
of his body positioned against the back of K’s body. K,
who was awake, felt the defendant start to slide his
hand down her leg, but she got out of the bed and went
to her bedroom before he could touch her further. K’s
mother recalled a time when K was a teenager and the
defendant lay in bed with the both of them. K’s mother
testified that, the next morning, she told the defendant
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State v. William A.
that she felt it was inappropriate for him to be in bed
with K because she was a teenager, and he agreed. K
testified that, apart from these two instances, there
were no other times when the defendant touched her
inappropriately.
After K’s disclosure, K’s mother informed the defendant of K’s allegations, and he denied them. The next
day, K’s mother made a report to the Department of
Children and Families, which informed the Norwich
Police Department. On November 6, 2020, K’s mother
was interviewed by John Tangney, a patrol officer with
the Norwich Police Department, and she conveyed to
him K’s account of what had occurred. See footnote 7
of this opinion. A forensic interview of K subsequently
was conducted.
On February 10, 2021, the defendant voluntarily went
to the Norwich Police Department for the purpose of
being interviewed about K’s allegations. The interview
was conducted by Peter Karasik, the detective assigned
to the case, and another detective. At the outset of the
interview, Karasik informed the defendant that he was
not under arrest, that he was free to go at any time,
and that the door to the interview room had been closed
for privacy purposes. During the interview, which lasted
approximately one hour and fifteen minutes, the defendant was asked repeatedly about the allegations, and
each time he responded by denying that anything inappropriate had happened. At least twenty-six times during the course of the interview the defendant denied
K’s allegations.5 The defendant also was asked multiple
times why K would make up the allegations or lie. He
consistently responded that he did not know why and
5
Specifically, the defendant stated that nothing happened, K’s allegations
were not true, there was nothing that could be construed as inappropriate,
he never put his hand on K’s thigh, never got into bed with K, never saw
K come out of the shower or hand her a washcloth while she was in the
shower, and the couch and bathroom incidents did not happen.
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State v. William A.
mentioned how K often asked to join him on long road
trips when he would drive out of state to pick up his
daughter, and it would be just the two of them in the
car, and that such road trips occurred after the alleged
sexual abuse took place. At several points in the interview, the defendant also speculated that maybe K did
not like that he was her stepfather, especially when she
did not get her way; was covering for someone else,
including a boyfriend; was trying to make her allegations appear credible; was trying to get the defendant
‘‘away from her mother . . . to get her parents back
together’’; was describing a bad dream; or was looking
for attention. Nevertheless, one of the detectives stated
that they needed to be able to give their boss a ‘‘reasonable explanation’’ as to why they should believe the
defendant over K, and that, if they could not explain
why K was making up the allegations, they could ‘‘only
assume [the allegations were] accurate.’’
Twice during the interview, the defendant stated that
he was willing to take a lie detector test, but no such
test ever was conducted. Toward the end of the interview, after telling the defendant that he felt that there
was something that the defendant wanted to get off of
his chest, Karasik stated that the defendant could call
Karasik at any time and leave a message if he recalled
anything. Thereafter, the other detective stated that K
had given them ‘‘a completely credible account of what
occurred,’’ and that ‘‘[t]he next time we’ll be in touch
. . . will be to arrest you. Is that what you want? Be
honest with us now. Cause you got two choices.’’ The
defendant responded: ‘‘Good luck . . . you guys are
beyond [the] statute of limitations.’’ The detectives then
informed the defendant that the applicable statute of
limitations was thirty years. The defendant thereafter
ended the interview.
The defendant was arrested on March 26, 2023, at
which time he was advised of his Miranda rights, and
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State v. William A.
subsequently he was charged in an amended substitute
long form information with sexual assault in the fourth
degree in violation of § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A) and risk of
injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (2). Both
charges stemmed from the April, 2013 incident. A two
day jury trial followed,6 at which the state presented
testimony from K, Karasik, and K’s mother, and submitted three exhibits into evidence: the videotape of the
defendant’s police interview, a photograph of how K
looked when she was eight years old, and a physician’s
note showing that K had asthma.
K and her mother provided their accounts of the
events, and Karasik testified about the defendant’s videotaped interview, which was played in its entirety for
the jury. Immediately thereafter, the prosecutor asked
Karasik: ‘‘[D]id the defendant ever give you a reason
why he thought the victim gave—or the complainant
. . . strike that. Your Honor, I apologize—[the] complainant gave you any other reason why this could have
happened, why she made these allegations?’’ Defense
counsel objected to this question on the ground that
the question called for speculation. The prosecutor
offered to clarify the question, and the court responded
by telling the prosecutor to ask the question again.
The prosecutor subsequently asked Karasik: ‘‘[D]id the
defendant ever offer up a reason why the complainant
made these allegations?’’ (Emphasis added.) Defense
counsel objected again, this time on the grounds that
the question was ‘‘[a]sked and answered of the complainant,’’ and that it was being asked ‘‘to augment [K’s]
testimony.’’ The court overruled defense counsel’s
objection, and Karasik answered: ‘‘No.’’ The state then
concluded its direct examination of Karasik.
6
The evidence portion of the trial commenced and ended on June 13,
2023, and, on June 15, 2023, counsel made their closing arguments and the
court instructed the jury, which returned its verdict that day.
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State v. William A.
The defendant did not present any testimony and
submitted one exhibit into evidence, which consisted
of a police report concerning K’s allegations.7 At the
conclusion of trial, the jury found the defendant guilty
of both charges. On August 25, 2023, the court, Papastavros, J., sentenced the defendant to a total effective
term of ten years of incarceration, execution suspended
after three years, followed by ten years of probation.
It also ordered the defendant to register as a sexual
offender for life. Four days prior to sentencing, on
August 21, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for a new
trial. In that motion, he asserted that a new trial was
warranted for a number of reasons, including because
the ‘‘state presented inadmissible evidence about [his]
. . . post-Miranda silence.’’ The court denied the
motion, and this appeal followed. Additional facts and
procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
On appeal, the defendant claims, inter alia, that the
state violated the proscriptions set forth in Doyle when
the prosecutor asked Karasik whether the defendant
‘‘ever’’ had given a reason as to why K made the allegations of sexual assault. Although defense counsel
objected to the prosecutor’s question, he did so on
evidentiary grounds and did not assert a Doyle violation
before the trial court. The defendant, therefore, seeks
review of his unpreserved Doyle claim pursuant to State
v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989),
7
In the report, Officer Tangney recounts the details of his interview with
K’s mother, who told him about her conversation with K and K’s allegations
of inappropriate touching by the defendant. After setting forth the details
of the incidents of alleged abuse described to him, Tangney noted the
incident that occurred on October 29, 2020, when K lied to her mother about
taking the bus home from school and her mother punished her by taking
K’s cell phone away from her. The report references K’s statement to her
mother about her sexual orientation, and that K’s mother ‘‘was very accepting
but felt her daughter may be telling her this just to get her phone back.
Upon hearing the [allegations of inappropriate touching by the defendant]
from her daughter, [K’s mother] also thought [K] could be attempting to
have her phone returned to her.’’
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State v. William A.
as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781,
120 A.3d 1188 (2015). ‘‘Under Golding, a defendant can
prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved
at trial only if all of the following conditions are met:
(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim
of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude
alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the
alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . .
deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject
to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Washington,
345 Conn. 258, 267, 284 A.3d 280 (2022). We conclude
that the defendant’s Doyle claim is of constitutional
magnitude; see State v. Smith, 180 Conn. App. 181,
195, 182 A.3d 1194 (2018) (claim that state violated
defendant’s right to remain silent is of constitutional
magnitude); and that the record is adequate to review
the alleged claim of error, as the record demonstrates
that the defendant received a Miranda warning at the
time of his arrest, and the Doyle claim relates, at least
in part, to the defendant’s silence during a time period
after the Miranda warning was given. See State v. Griffin, 232 Conn. App. 866, 882, 337 A.3d 1211 (2025) (‘‘[a]s
a factual predicate to an alleged Doyle violation, the
record must demonstrate that the defendant received
a Miranda warning prior to the period of silence that
was disclosed to the jury’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)), petition for cert. filed (Conn. June 20, 2025)
(No. 240408); see also State v. Patrick M., 344 Conn.
565, 583 n.6, 280 A.3d 461 (2022) (because ‘‘it [was]
undisputed that the defendant received Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest . . . any reference to the
defendant’s postarrest silence also was a reference to
his post-Miranda silence’’). We therefore will review
the merits of the defendant’s claim.
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State v. William A.
Next, we must ascertain whether a constitutional violation exists that deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
To answer that question, we must determine whether
the prosecutor’s question constituted an impermissible
reference to the defendant’s post-Miranda silence. The
following legal principles guide our analysis.
‘‘In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. 610, the United
States Supreme Court held that the impeachment of a
defendant through evidence of his silence following his
arrest and receipt of Miranda warnings violates due
process. See id., 611, 619. In reaching its conclusion,
the court in Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 617–19, reasoned,
first, that silence in the wake of Miranda warnings is
insolubly ambiguous and consequently of little probative value, and, [s]econd . . . [although] it is true that
the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance
that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is
implicit to any person who receives the warnings. . . .
State v. Bell, 283 Conn. 748, 765, 931 A.2d 198 (2007);
accord State v. Patrick M., [supra, 344 Conn. 582]. In
a subsequent case, the United States Supreme Court
went on to explain that [t]he point of the Doyle holding
is that it is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested
person that his silence will not be used against him and
thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence
to impeach his trial testimony. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292, 106 S. Ct. 634, 88 L. Ed. 2d
623 (1986).
‘‘Although Doyle explicitly prohibits impeachment of
a defendant with evidence of his post-Miranda silence,
[our Supreme] [C]ourt has extended the Doyle rationale
to conclude that due process is also violated when
the state uses evidence of a defendant’s post-Miranda
silence as affirmative proof at trial . . . . State v.
Plourde, 208 Conn. 455, 468, 545 A.2d 1071 (1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1034, 109 S. Ct. 847, 102 L. Ed. 2d 979
(1989); accord State v. Montgomery, 254 Conn. 694, 714,
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State v. William A.
759 A.2d 995 (2000).’’ (Emphasis in original; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Washington, supra,
345 Conn. 267–68. ‘‘Use of a defendant’s pre-Miranda
silence, by contrast, does not raise the same constitutional concerns: evidence of prearrest, and specifically
pre-Miranda, silence is admissible to impeach the testimony of a defendant who testifies at trial, since the
rule of Doyle . . . is predicated on the defendant’s reliance on the implicit promise of Miranda warnings.
State v. Angel T., 292 Conn. 262, 286 n.19, 973 A.2d 1207
(2009); see Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240, 100
S. Ct. 2124, 65 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1980) (if [t]he failure to
speak occurred before the [defendant] was taken into
custody and given Miranda warnings . . . [then] the
fundamental unfairness present in Doyle is not [implicated], and impeachment by use of prearrest silence
does not violate the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment).’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 583. ‘‘The defendant
bears the burden of proving that a Doyle violation
occurred. . . . If the defendant fulfills his burden, then
the state assumes the burden of demonstrating that the
constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 588.
In support of his claim that the prosecutor improperly
asked a question and elicited testimony about his postMiranda silence, in violation of Doyle, the defendant
contends that, although he was interviewed by the
police months prior to his arrest, ‘‘[the] improper question was not limited to [the] one hour and [fifteen]
minute interview. The reason is because the prosecutor
used the word ‘ever.’ . . . ‘The jury would have naturally and necessarily interpreted the answer to include
the entire period after the defendant became aware
of the allegations, including the twenty-seven months
between the defendant’s arrest and trial. Certainly, the
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State v. William A.
jury would have inferred that the use of the word ‘‘ever’’
included more than just the video recorded interview.
The jury had already seen the interview—it did not need
to be informed that the defendant did not provide an
explanation for the allegations during the interview.
The natural interpretation of the prosecution’s question
is that it went beyond what the jury had seen and was
asking whether the defendant ‘‘ever’’ provided such an
explanation.’ ’’ (Emphasis altered.) The state, citing
State v. Jeffrey, 220 Conn. 698, 721, 601 A.2d 993 (1991),
cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1224, 112 S. Ct. 3041, 120 L. Ed.
2d 909 (1992),8 counters these assertions by arguing
that, ‘‘[i]n determining whether a prosecutor’s ambiguous remarks refer to pre-Miranda silence or postMiranda silence, this court draws the ‘more probable’
interpretation, given the context of the remarks.’’
According to the state, the prosecutor’s question ‘‘pertained to the defendant’s silence during his police interview, at which he was not in custody and, therefore,
had not received Miranda warnings,’’ and that ‘‘it was
more probable, given the context in which the prosecutor asked the question, that it would have been understood to refer to the defendant’s prearrest silence, specifically, his silence in the police interview.’’ (Emphasis
in original.)
8
In Jeffrey, our Supreme Court, in concluding that the defendant in that
case had failed to establish a Doyle violation, stated: ‘‘On appeal, the defendant maintains that [a] . . . question [posed to him on cross-examination]
should . . . have been excluded as an impermissible use of [his] postarrest
silence. Although he acknowledges that it is not clear from the question
whether the [prosecutor] was referring to the defendant’s silence before or
after he was arrested, he contends that the question reasonably could have
been understood by the jury to encompass the defendant’s postarrest silence.
We agree that the question was ambiguous but believe that, given the context
in which it was asked, it is more probable that it would have been understood
to refer to the defendant’s pre-arrest silence. The state’s line of inquiry
leading up to this question concerned the defendant’s conduct when the
police arrived at his home before they placed him under arrest.’’ (Emphasis
omitted.) State v. Jeffrey, supra, 220 Conn. 721.
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State v. William A.
These differing positions of the parties demonstrate
the ambiguity9 in the prosecutor’s use of the word
‘‘ever.’’ In State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 584, our
Supreme Court recently addressed how to construe
ambiguous remarks that reasonably can be interpreted
to refer either to a defendant’s pre-Miranda or postMiranda silence. In Patrick M., our Supreme Court
concluded that the prosecutor’s references to the defendant’s silence in that case ‘‘were ambiguous because
they were not confined to a defined point in time within
the pre-Miranda period but, instead, referred generally
to the defendant’s delay in disclosing his version of
events without limitation. That delay, when referenced
by the prosecutor in an unspecified and, therefore,
unrestricted manner, could reasonably have been understood to include both the four days of pre-Miranda
silence and the much lengthier period between the
defendant’s arrest and his trial.’’ Id. In light of those
circumstances, the court adopted a ‘‘contextualized
approach’’ for addressing such situations. Id., 586. ‘‘Under
this approach, [b]oth the intent of the prosecutor and
the character of the remarks are determined by
reviewing the context in which they occur, and the
burden of proving such intent is on the defendant. . . .
The standard is strict; virtually any description of a
defendant’s silence following arrest and a Miranda
warning will constitute a Doyle violation.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The
court further concluded: ‘‘[T]o determine whether a
Doyle violation occurred . . . we must analyze
whether the language used [by the prosecutor was]
manifestly intended to be, or was . . . of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take
it to be a comment on the [defendant’s post-Miranda
9
See State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 584 (citing State v. Courtney
G., 339 Conn. 328, 345–46, 260 A.3d 1152 (2021), for proposition that ‘‘prosecutorial statements are ambiguous if their meaning is unclear and susceptible
to more than one reasonable interpretation’’).
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State v. William A.
silence]. . . . [I]n applying this test, we must look to
the context in which the statement was made in order
to determine the manifest intention [that] prompted it
and its natural and necessary impact [on] the jury.’’
(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 588.
Similarly, in the present case, the prosecutor failed
to use language restricting the time period covered by
his question to the police interview only and, thus, did
not confine his question to a defined point in time within
the pre-Miranda period. Because the word ‘‘ever’’ used
in the question posed could be construed as referring
to a time period that included both pre-Miranda and
post-Miranda silence; see State v. Patrick M., supra,
344 Conn. 584; we apply the contextualized approach
set forth in Patrick M. in our determination of whether
a Doyle violation occurred. We conclude that the question, when viewed in the context in which it was made,
was of such a character that the jury naturally and
necessarily10 would have understood it to be a comment
on the defendant’s post-Miranda silence.11
Our determination is guided, in part, by our Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Silano, 204 Conn. 769, 529
A.2d 1283 (1987). In Silano, the defendant argued on
10
We note that the defendant utilizes the ‘‘naturally and necessarily’’ language from State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 588, in his appellate briefs.
The state, on the other hand, does not refer to or rely on the language set
forth in Patrick M. but, rather, refers in its appellate brief to the ‘‘more
probable than not’’ language employed in State v. Jeffrey, supra, 220 Conn.
721, even though it does cite to Patrick M. generally regarding Doyle violations. The state has not raised any argument as to why Patrick M. should
not apply to the present case. Even though we apply the test set forth in
Patrick M., we note that, under either test, our conclusion would be the
same, as they both focus primarily on the context in which the challenged
statement was made.
11
In light of this conclusion, we need not determine whether the prosecutor’s question was ‘‘manifestly intended to refer to the defendant’s postMiranda silence . . . .’’ State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 588.
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appeal to our Supreme Court that the trial court improperly ‘‘allow[ed] the state to ask a question on crossexamination concerning [the defendant’s] postarrest
silence after Miranda warnings had been given . . . .’’
Id., 770–71. Specifically, the defendant claimed that he
was denied due process ‘‘because the court allowed the
state to cross-examine him about his failure to contact
the police after the interrogation had ceased in order
to correct [a] statement he had given to them. [Also]
. . . the prosecutor commented about that failure during the state’s final argument. The defendant characterize[d] th[e] issue as one involving postarrest silence,
and the state characterize[d] it as one involving the
permissible use of prior inconsistent statements to
impeach credibility during cross-examination.’’ Id., 778–
79. Our Supreme Court concluded that ‘‘one of the prosecutor’s questions on cross-examination was constitutionally improper . . . .’’ Id., 779. In particular, the state
asked the defendant if he ‘‘ever again’’ contacted ‘‘the
police to correct allegedly false statements he had made
during the interrogation.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id.
On appeal, our Supreme Court concluded: ‘‘The state
may impeach a defendant by cross-examination concerning a prior inconsistent statement made after arrest
and the giving of Miranda warnings, even though such
impeachment may call into question a defendant’s
silence about the truth when he made that prior inconsistent statement. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404,
100 S. Ct. 2180, 65 L. Ed. 2d 222, reh. denied, 448 U.S.
912, 101 S. Ct. 27, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1173 (1980). Such an
examination is allowed because it is impossible to
‘bifurcate’ a prosecutor’s questions concerning inconsistency into those relating to facts contained in a prior
statement and those concerning facts omitted therefrom. Id., 408–409. A prosecutor may not, however,
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State v. William A.
question a defendant about his silence after the interrogation has ceased, since a ‘defendant may reassert his
right to remain silent at any time, and if he ceases to
answer questions, or to come forward with additional
or correcting information after questions are no longer
being asked of him, there is a reasonable possibility
that he is relying upon that right.’ . . . We conclude,
therefore, that the question concerning the defendant’s
failure ‘ever again’ to contact the police, after he had
been arrested and given a Miranda warning, was
improper under the strictures of Doyle.’’ (Citation omitted.) State v. Silano, supra, 204 Conn. 780–81.
Likewise, in the present case, the prosecutor asked
Karasik whether the defendant ‘‘ever’’ provided an
explanation for why K made the allegations of sexual
assault. The adverb ‘‘ever,’’ used in this context, means
‘‘at any time . . . .’’ Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th Ed. 2003) p. 433. The question asked by
the prosecutor contained no language limiting it to ‘‘any
time’’ during the defendant’s police interview.12 Also,
12
The present case is distinguishable from State v. Devito, 159 Conn. App.
560, 124 A.3d 14, cert. denied, 319 Conn. 947, 125 A.3d 1012 (2015), on which
the state relies in support of its argument that the defendant cannot establish
a Doyle violation resulting from the prosecutor’s use of the word ‘‘ever’’ in
his question to Karasik. In Devito, the defendant claimed ‘‘that his due
process right to a fair trial was violated when the court improperly admitted
testimony regarding his post-Miranda silence at the police station’’ following
his arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. Id., 567. The prosecutor in Devito questioned state police
troopers on the witness stand by asking if the defendant ‘‘ever denied driving
[his] vehicle during the course of the evening’’ when he was arrested.
(Emphasis added.) Id., 570. The defendant argued that the question could
have been understood by the jury as implicating his post-Miranda silence.
This court disagreed, concluding, inter alia, that, given the context in which
the question was asked, ‘‘it [was] more probable that it would have been
understood to refer to the defendant’s prearrest silence,’’ as the trooper’s
‘‘testimony was primarily focused on the defendant’s conduct during the
traffic stop,’’ and ‘‘the state’s line of inquiry leading up to the question related
only to the defendant’s conduct at the scene rather than at the [police]
barracks.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) Id., 572. With respect to testimony from two
other troopers, this court concluded that their testimony did not implicate
the defendant’s post-Miranda silence, as one trooper testified ‘‘only as
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State v. William A.
the question was asked after the jury had just finished
viewing the videotape of the interview, during which
the defendant, numerous times, emphatically denied
the allegations of sexual assault and, aside from speculating—at the detectives’ invitation—about a few reasons why K may have done so, stated repeatedly that
he did not know why K made the allegations. Because
the jury had just viewed the videotape of the interview,
it was aware of the position taken by the defendant
during his pre-Miranda interview. Moreover, the fact
that the defendant did offer some explanations during
the interview as to why K may have made the allegations
further supports a determination that the question
posed by the prosecutor necessarily would have covered a time period after the interview, which included
the defendant’s post-Miranda silence. Significantly,
toward the end of the interview, after Karasik told the
defendant that he felt that there was something that
the defendant wanted to get off of his chest, Karasik
stated that the defendant could call Karasik at any time
and leave a message if he recalled anything. With that
in mind, the jury naturally and necessarily would have
viewed the question posed by the prosecutor, immediately following its viewing of the interview, as referring
to a time period following the interview and up to trial,
which, at least in part, pertained to the defendant’s
post-Miranda silence.
As our Supreme Court has made clear, ‘‘[t]he standard
is strict; virtually any description of a defendant’s
silence following arrest and a Miranda warning will
constitute a Doyle violation.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 586.
to events that transpired during the traffic stop,’’ and the other trooper’s
testimony was limited to the defendant’s silence during the traffic stop, as
the prosecutor had used the phrase ‘‘during that time’’ in reference to when
the trooper had approached the defendant’s vehicle. (Emphasis omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 571. These circumstances differ from
those of the present case, as we explain in this opinion.
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Consequently, we conclude that the prosecutor’s question to Karasik of whether the defendant ‘‘ever’’ offered
an explanation for K’s allegations, when viewed in the
context in which it was made, violated the proscriptions
of Doyle in that, by posing that question and eliciting
the response, the prosecutor improperly used the defendant’s post-Miranda silence against him. See State v.
Patrick M., supra, 591; see also Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609, 615, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965)
(fifth amendment to federal constitution ‘‘forbids . . .
comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence’’);
State v. A. M., 324 Conn. 190, 200, 152 A.3d 49 (2016)
(‘‘[t]he fifth amendment prohibits the state from forcing
the defendant to be a witness against himself, and the
United States Supreme Court has concluded that this
protection also prohibits prosecutors from commenting
at trial on the defendant’s decision not to testify’’); State
v. Carlson, 226 Conn. App. 514, 537, 318 A.3d 283 (‘‘fifth
amendment to the United States constitution protects
a defendant’s right not to testify and prohibits comments on a defendant’s silence’’), cert. denied, 350
Conn. 911, 324 A.3d 143 (2024). When a prosecutor’s
remarks violate Doyle, they are regarded as ‘‘fundamentally unfair, in violation of [a] defendant’s fourteenth
amendment right to due process.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Patrick M., supra, 592. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant has established
the existence of a constitutional violation that violated
his due process right to a fair trial for purposes of the
third prong of Golding.
This conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry.
Next, we must address the fourth prong of Golding
concerning the harmfulness of the Doyle violation. See
id. (‘‘Doyle violations are subject to harmless error analysis’’). Under the fourth prong of Golding and when,
as here, the error involves a constitutional violation,
‘‘[t]he state bears the burden of demonstrating that the
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State v. William A.
constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . . That determination must be made in light
of the entire record [including the strength of the state’s
case without the Doyle violation].’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. ‘‘Whether an error is harmful, as
always, depends on its impact on the trier of fact and
the result of the case.’’ Id.; see also State v. A. M., supra,
324 Conn. 204 (‘‘[t]he focus of our harmless error inquiry
is on whether the state has demonstrated that the [error]
did not influence the outcome of the trial’’).
‘‘A Doyle violation may, in a particular case, be so
insignificant that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict without the impermissible question or comment [on] a
defendant’s silence following a Miranda warning.
Under such circumstances, the state’s use of a defendant’s [post-Miranda] silence does not constitute
reversible error. . . . The [error] has similarly been
[found to be harmless when] a prosecutor does not
focus [on] or highlight the defendant’s silence in his
cross-examination and closing remarks and [when] the
prosecutor’s comments do not strike at the jugular of
the defendant’s story. . . . The cases [in which] the
error has been found to be prejudicial disclose repetitive references to the defendant’s silence, reemphasis
of the fact [during] closing argument, and extensive,
[strongly worded] argument suggesting a connection
between the defendant’s silence and his guilt.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Patrick M., supra,
344 Conn. 592.
In State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 592, our
Supreme Court, after finding a Doyle violation, engaged
in a harmless error analysis and concluded: ‘‘The state’s
harmless error argument erroneously focuses exclusively on the rebuttal argument and fails to consider
the impact of the similar remarks the prosecutor made
during his initial argument. It argues that the ‘single
Doyle violation during rebuttal argument was harmless’
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State v. William A.
but does not explain how the prosecutor’s repeated
emphasis on the defendant’s post-Miranda silence during initial closing argument, which struck at the jugular
of the defendant’s exculpatory story that [his wife] was
killed during the course of a robbery, was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore conclude that
the state has failed to fulfill its burden of demonstrating
harmlessness.’’ Id., 592–93. After viewing the entire
record in the present case, we reach a similar conclusion.
Here, the state contends that, ‘‘even if this court were
to determine that the state had violated Doyle, any such
violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ In
support of this contention, the state argues that the
prosecutor’s question was ‘‘infrequent,’’ and that ‘‘the
state never returned to the subject of the defendant’s
post-Miranda silence during closing or rebuttal argument. . . . At no point during closing or rebuttal argument did the prosecutor reference or comment on the
defendant’s decision not to testify during the trial.’’ The
state also asserts that the prosecutor’s question ‘‘did
not affect the defendant’s defense that K fabricated the
allegations . . . [or] that K had motivation to lie about
the sexual assault because she had her phone taken
away by her mother that same month.’’ Finally, the state
argues that the prosecutor’s ‘‘singular question . . .
did not ‘strike at [the] jugular’ of the defendant’s silence
after his arrest’’ and that the state presented strong
evidence of the defendant’s guilt. (Emphasis omitted.)
We do not agree with the state’s contentions that it
‘‘never returned to the subject of the defendant’s postMiranda silence during closing or rebuttal argument,’’
that the Doyle violation did not relate to or have an
impact on the defendant’s theory of defense, and that
the state presented a strong case against the defendant.
Accordingly, we conclude that the state has not met its
burden of demonstrating that the Doyle violation was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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First, following our review of the entire record, which
necessarily includes comments made by the prosecutor
during closing and rebuttal arguments;13 see State v.
Hamilton, 352 Conn. 317, 337–38, 336 A.3d 1188 (2025);
13
Although we do not review the merits of the defendant’s second Doyle
violation claim concerning a comment made by the prosecutor during closing
argument, we take that comment into consideration in our analysis of harm.
Specifically, during closing argument the prosecutor discussed K’s testimony
about the alleged sexual assault and stated in part: ‘‘You may look at the
fact that . . . K was isolated and alone in the home, and . . . point that
toward intent. You may use the fact that the defendant pursued . . . K from
one couch to another couch as an intentional act, and you may definitely
use the fact that he manipulated his fingers to determine sexual gratification
and intent. For a man to place his hands down an eight year old child’s
pants, inside her underwear, who isn’t a doctor, who doesn’t verbalize what
his meaning in doing it is, you may find that that was an intentional act for
sexual gratification. That testimony is unrefuted.’’ (Emphasis added.) The
defendant argues that the italicized comment ‘‘planted in the jury’s mind
that the defendant’s decision to not testify at his trial meant that he was guilty
or [that he] should have taken the witness stand to prove his innocence.’’
Our Supreme Court addressed a similar type of comment in State v. Ruffin,
316 Conn. 20, 26, 110 A.3d 1225 (2015). In Ruffin, the defendant claimed
that ‘‘the prosecutor’s no conflicting witness argument constituted an impermissible comment on the defendant’s silence because the defendant alone
[had] information to contradict [the victim] as to [her allegations of] sexual
abuse.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Although our Supreme Court
ultimately disagreed with that claim, in part because ‘‘there were witnesses
other than the defendant who could have, and did, contradict other aspects
of the victim’s allegations’’; (emphasis omitted) id., 33; it ‘‘note[d] that,
although the prosecutor did not comment on the defendant’s failure to
testify, ‘[a] prosecutor does take a risk whenever the ‘‘not contradicted’’
argument is made’ . . . and that prosecutors generally should avoid taking
this unnecessary risk . . . and avoid language that could be misinterpreted
as a veiled comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 33–34. In the present case, the prosecutor made the comment after
discussing K’s testimony about the defendant’s alleged sexual assault and
arguing that, from the defendant’s alleged conduct, as described by K, the jury
could infer intent; thus, the comment that ‘‘[t]hat testimony was unrefuted’’
necessarily was a reference to K’s testimony, in particular, her testimony
that the defendant put his hand down her pants, inside her underwear.
When we view the comment in the context in which it was made and with
consideration of the fact that, in this case, the defendant was the only person
who could contradict K’s testimony about the alleged sexual assault that
formed the basis for the two charges; see State v. Walker, 206 Conn. 300,
307–308, 537 A.2d 1021 (1988); we cannot ignore the possibility that the jury
could have interpreted the remark as a ‘‘veiled comment on the defendant’s
failure to testify,’’ which is the precise harm our Supreme Court cautioned
can occur when prosecutors make such comments. State v. Ruffin, supra, 34. Page 22 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
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State v. William A.
we conclude that, in addition to the Doyle violation that
we have found, the prosecutor further highlighted the
defendant’s silence in his closing remarks to the jury.14
For example, during rebuttal argument, the prosecutor
stated in relevant part: ‘‘The defense wants you to
believe that . . . K concocted this detailed story about
the defendant sexually assaulting her over the mom’s
punishment over her phone. She didn’t say mom did it.
It’s over a phone that mom took away. It wasn’t a phone
that the defendant took away. . . . So, let’s talk about
the interview. You have no evidence there was anything
wrong with that interview. . . . [L]et’s look at what
the defendant told you. . . . He told you that . . . K
was right, that they did live in three different homes,
that he was her stepdad. . . . [O]ne thing I can say
about that interview is that . . . Karasik was right all
along; the defendant had something he wanted to say,
but he didn’t want to say it. All he said, first thing he
wanted to say is, nope, it didn’t happen. Nope it didn’t
happen. And he said that a number of times, and I agree
he said that a lot. Again . . . Karasik was like, you’re
trying to tell me something; you want to tell me something. . . .
‘‘Did [the defendant] want to save his marriage? He
didn’t tell you that. Did he want to save his family? He
didn’t want to . . . tell you that. Did he want to save
his freedom? He didn’t want to tell you that. He didn’t
make up a story. He didn’t tell you about the phone
incident, all right, a perfect example of something that
14
We note that, although the defendant refers to these remarks in his
appellate briefs, he has not claimed that they are separate Doyle violations;
thus, we do not determine whether they constitute Doyle violations. Nevertheless, ‘‘the various instances in which the prosecutor mentions [postarrest]
silence informs this [c]ourt’s analysis as to the prejudicial effect on the jury.
See Brecht [v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 641, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed.
2d 353 (1993)] (adopting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 762, 66
S. Ct. 1239, 90 L. Ed. 1557 (1946)) (finding that a [c]ourt on harmless error
review should consider ‘the proceedings in their entirety.’).’’ Jaradat v.
Williams, 591 F.3d 863, 868 n.3 (6th Cir. 2010).
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State v. William A.
might be an issue. All right. It’s here today as something
that you should disbelieve . . . K about. All right. He
didn’t tell you that.’’ (Emphasis added.)
In making these statements during his closing remarks
to the jury and repeatedly using the word ‘‘you,’’ the
prosecutor was speaking, and referring, to the jury; he
was not suggesting that the defendant did not tell Karasik these things during the pre-Miranda interview, as
the state contends. During the course of this argument,
the prosecutor stated five times that the defendant did
not tell the jury those various reasons for K’s allegations. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that these
five statements repeatedly highlighted the defendant’s
failure to testify and undeniably implicated the defendant’s post-Miranda silence.15 Moreover, by commenting on the defendant’s failure at trial to explain why K
should be disbelieved, the prosecutor was effectively
continuing to call attention to the defendant’s failure
to ‘‘ever’’ proffer an alternative explanation as to why
K would have made her allegations.
This conclusion is further reinforced when the prosecutor’s reference to the ‘‘phone incident’’ is considered
in connection with the defendant’s theory of defense
at trial, made through cross-examination of witnesses,
that K made up the allegations in an effort to gain access
to her cell phone that had been taken away from her
for one month as a punishment. When viewed in that
light, the prosecutor’s references to the defendant’s theory of defense concerning the ‘‘phone incident,’’ followed by statements that the defendant ‘‘didn’t tell
you’’—i.e., the jury—about the phone incident and a
suggestion that the jury should disbelieve it, ‘‘strike at
15
Although the defendant, in his principal appellate brief, does not label
these remarks as constituting a separate Doyle violation, he does claim that
the remarks amounted to prosecutorial improprieties that infringed on,
inter alia, his right to remain silent and improperly referred to facts not
in evidence.
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State v. William A.
the jugular’’ of the defendant’s theory of defense that
K made up the allegations in an effort to get her cell
phone back. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 592. As the defendant
aptly points out in his principal appellate brief: ‘‘There
[was] no trial evidence that, during the [police interview], the defendant knew about the cell phone being
seized by [K’s] mother for a month as [a] punishment.
There [was] no trial evidence [that] the defendant knew
about [K’s mother’s] concerns that her daughter was
lying when he voluntarily went to the police [interview].
The defendant may have learned about . . . K’s mother’s information about her daughter lying at some point
after his public defender showed him the disclosed
police report, which mentions it. . . . When the prosecutor argues that the defendant ‘didn’t tell’ [the jury]
about the phone incident, it naturally and necessarily
caused the jury to believe he should have testified in
order to tell [the jurors] he learned about the cell phone
incident after he was [interviewed]. This constitutes
indirect commentary on the defendant’s decision not
to testify and his right to remain silent.’’ (Emphasis
omitted.) We agree with the defendant.
As our Supreme Court has explained: ‘‘When the
defendant chooses not to testify, he takes the risk that
the jury will view his silence with skepticism—a prosecutor’s explicit reminders to the jury of the defendant’s
decision serves only to heighten this risk, burdening
the defendant’s constitutional right to remain silent.’’
State v. A. M., supra, 324 Conn. 203. ‘‘[P]rosecutors
should not be allowed to sidestep the Doyle protections
by skirting the edge of the law with vague and imprecise
references to a defendant’s silence.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn.
584–85.
Given that a determination of the harmfulness of the
Doyle violation ‘‘must be made in light of the entire
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State v. William A.
record [including the strength of the state’s case without
the Doyle violation]’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 592; we next
examine the strength of the state’s case. Our Supreme
Court has ‘‘described a child sexual abuse case lacking
conclusive physical evidence, when the prosecution’s
case rests on the credibility of the victim [as] not particularly strong, even when otherwise sufficient to support
a conviction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Angel T., supra, 292 Conn. 293.16
In State v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 593 n.8, our
Supreme Court, in addressing the harmfulness of a
Doyle violation, stated: ‘‘Although the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction . . . we
disagree with the state that it was overwhelming. As
we previously noted, there was no direct, physical, or
forensic evidence implicating the defendant in [the]
murder; instead, the state’s case against the defendant
was largely circumstantial, resting on the defendant’s
motive, means, and opportunity to commit the crime
and his flight from the scene. At trial, the defendant
testified that his flight was motivated by fear, rather
than guilt, because someone else killed [the victim]
during the course of a robbery in which a large quantity
of money and illicit drugs was stolen. As to the identity
of the perpetrator, the defendant raised a third-party
16
We also note that, in the context of a prosecutorial impropriety claim,
this court has stated: ‘‘[W]e must be mindful that [t]he sexual abuse of
children is a crime [that], by its very nature, occurs under a cloak of secrecy
and darkness. It is not surprising, therefore, for there to be a lack of corroborating physical evidence . . . . Given the rarity of physical evidence in
[sexual assault cases involving children], a case is not automatically weak
just because a child’s will was overborne and he or she submitted to the
abuse . . . . [Our Supreme Court has] never stated that the state’s evidence
must have been overwhelming in order to support a conclusion that prosecutorial [impropriety] did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. . . . State
v. Courtney G., [339 Conn. 328, 365–66, 260 A.3d 1152 (2021)].’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Henry B-A., 234 Conn. App. 197, 226,
A.3d (2025).
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State v. William A.
culpability defense [that was] . . . a plausible, alternative theory of culpability. On the present evidentiary
record, we cannot conclude that the evidence of the
defendant’s guilt was overwhelming or that the defendant’s exculpatory story was transparently frivolous.
See State v. Brunetti, [279 Conn. 39, 82–86, 901 A.2d 1
(2006)] (Doyle violation was harmless beyond reasonable doubt because defendant confessed to crime,
police found clothing soaked in victim’s blood in defendant’s home, and defendant’s exculpatory story that he
removed his clothing and that someone else dipped it
in victim’s blood was transparently frivolous); State v.
Montgomery, supra, 254 Conn. 718–20 (Doyle violation
was harmless beyond reasonable doubt, in part because
of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, which
consisted of eyewitness testimony identifying him as
perpetrator with 100 percent certainty, his purchase of
murder weapon, his confession to his cellmate, and
discovery of other incriminating evidence in [his] car,
including a knife, a can of Mace, latex gloves, duct tape,
and an ice pick).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Patrick M., supra, 593 n.8
With these considerations in mind, we conclude that
the state’s case against the defendant in the present
case was not particularly strong. See, e.g., State v. Angel
T., supra, 292 Conn. 292–95. In addition to the fact that
there was no physical or medical evidence of the alleged
incident of sexual abuse, no expert testimony was
offered;17 there was no evidence presented of behavioral
changes by K following the incident in April, 2013; and
17
We note that, although expert testimony is not required in a child sexual
assault case, the state often presents such testimony. See State v. Taylor
G., 315 Conn. 734, 761, 110 A.3d 338 (2015) (‘‘in cases that involve allegations
of sexual abuse of children, we have held that expert testimony of reactions
and behaviors common to victims of sexual abuse is admissible [because]
. . . [s]uch evidence assists a jury in its determination of the victim’s credibility by explaining the typical consequences of the trauma of sexual abuse
on a child’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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K testified that, at times following that incident, she
asked to go on long road trips with the defendant in
which the two of them were alone in his car. See State
v. Patrick M., supra, 344 Conn. 593 n.8 (state’s case
against defendant was not overwhelming when there
was no direct, physical, or forensic evidence implicating
defendant in murder). The evidence submitted by the
state consisted of K’s testimony setting forth her
account of what had occurred in April, 2013; the testimony of K’s mother, which corroborated K’s testimony
in part that, at some point in time when K was a teenager, the defendant had climbed into and slept in a bed
with K and K’s mother, although that incident was not
the basis for the charges against the defendant, and
which also included her acknowledgement that she initially thought that K was just trying to get her cell phone
back; the testimony of Karasik regarding his interview
of the defendant, which the jury viewed in its entirety;
a photograph of K when she was eight years old; and
a doctor’s note indicating that K suffers from asthma.
The defendant submitted the police report into evidence, which referenced K’s statement to her mother,
made after her mother had taken her cell phone away
from her for one month, about her sexual orientation,
the fact that K’s mother thought that K might be telling
her about her sexual orientation ‘‘just to get her phone
back,’’ and that, upon hearing the allegations of inappropriate touching by the defendant from K, K’s mother
also thought that K ‘‘could be attempting to have her
phone returned to her.’’
In State v. Angel T., supra, 292 Conn. 263–64, our
Supreme court addressed a claim of prosecutorial
impropriety stemming from the conduct of the prosecutor in ‘‘eliciting evidence of, and commenting during
summations about, the fact that the defendant . . . had
obtained representation by an attorney during the
police investigation of the crimes at issue.’’ In doing
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State v. William A.
so, it conducted an analysis under the factors set forth
in State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 540, 529 A.2d 653
(1987), concerning whether the prosecutorial impropriety deprived the defendant of his due process right to
a fair trial; State v. Angel T., supra, 292 Conn. 287–95;
which we find instructive, especially with respect to its
statements regarding the impact of the prosecutorial
impropriety when the state’s case involving a child sexual assault is not particularly strong. For example, the
court concluded that the state’s case, which consisted
of the victim’s testimony and testimony from the victim’s mother and cousin, ‘‘was not sufficiently strong
so as to not be overshadowed by the impropriety.’’ Id.,
293. As the court explained: ‘‘[A]lthough there exists
evidence in the present case supporting the defendant’s
conviction despite the lack of direct physical evidence
linking the defendant to the sexual assault of the victim—namely, the victim’s testimony and the testimony
of her mother and cousin—without independent physical evidence to prove that the defendant had sexually
assaulted [the victim], or even that [the victim] had
been sexually assaulted at all, the significance of the
[prosecutor’s] improper conduct increases considerably.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Our application of that reasoning to the present case, in which
we similarly have determined that the state’s case was
not particularly strong and which also involves a credibility contest between the defendant and his accuser,
leads us to an analogous conclusion regarding the
impact of the Doyle violation.
The lack of physical evidence in the present case
rendered the trial a credibility contest between K and
the defendant. The harm resulting from the state’s Doyle
violation is compounded when considered in conjunction with other comments of the prosecutor during closing and rebuttal argument. See State v. Hamilton, supra,
352 Conn. 337–38 (trial court’s improper admission into
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State v. William A.
evidence of witness’ two interviews with police, in
which witness identified defendant as person in surveillance footage, was harmful, and that conclusion was
‘‘buttressed by the way [the witness’] two interviews
were used by the prosecutor during closing arguments’’); State v. Calderon-Perez, 234 Conn. App. 228,
264, A.3d (2025) (harm resulting from court’s
exclusion of evidence in violation of defendant’s constitutional right to present defense ‘‘could only have been
compounded by’’ prosecutor’s improper remarks in
closing argument about excluded evidence); see also
State v. A. M., supra, 324 Conn. 203 (when prosecutor’s
comment ‘‘calls the jury’s attention to the defendant’s
silence . . . such comment heighten[s] the jury’s
awareness of the defendant’s silence, namely, his failure
to answer to the state’s charges’’ (internal quotation
marks omitted)). That is, the Doyle violation, together
with the prosecutor’s other comments during closing
and rebuttal arguments, conveyed and reinforced the
idea that the defendant should not be believed because
he never spoke up, either during the interview or at
any time afterward, to provide a reasonable explanation
for why K made her accusations against him.18 As such,
18
Compare State v. Hughes, 45 Conn. App. 289, 296, 696 A.2d 347 (1997)
(‘‘trial court’s improper admission of the evidence of the defendant’s postMiranda silence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’’ when ‘‘evidence of the defendant’s post-Miranda silence was brought up repeatedly
during the examination of [a police detective] and was then referred to during
closing argument,’’ and ‘‘defendant’s post-Miranda silence was consistently
equated with his guilt,’’ and because ‘‘defendant did not testify at trial, there
was a ‘reasonable possibility’ that the repeated use of evidence of [his] postMiranda silence as affirmative proof of his guilt and consciousness of guilt
contributed to his conviction’’) and State v. Crosby, 34 Conn. App. 261, 270,
641 A.2d 406 (‘‘In this case, the state questioned the defendant about his
postarrest silence and then argued three times during its closing remarks
that, since the defendant had remained silent prior to trial, he had had time
to fabricate an exculpatory story. Thus, the state repeatedly highlighted the
defendant’s postarrest silence and linked this silence to the defendant’s
explanation at trial. As a result, a reasonable possibility exists that the
impermissible questions and comments contributed to the defendant’s conviction, and the Doyle violation was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.’’), cert. denied, 230 Conn. 903, 644 A.2d 916 (1994), with State v.
Montgomery, supra, 254 Conn. 718–19 (concluding that Doyle violation was
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State v. William A.
the harm went to the core of the defendant’s theory
of defense, which was not ‘‘transparently frivolous.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Patrick M.,
supra, 344 Conn. 593 n.8. Under such circumstances
and in light of the entire record before us, which demonstrates that the state’s case against the defendant was
not strong, that the prosecutor, in addition to committing the Doyle violation, highlighted the defendant’s
post-Miranda silence multiple times during closing and
rebuttal arguments, and that some of those references
struck at the jugular of the defendant’s theory of defense
or suggested a connection between the defendant’s
silence and his guilt, we cannot conclude that the state’s
improper question and the detective’s answer did not
influence the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, the state
has failed to meet its burden of proof that the Doyle
violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See
id., 592, 593 n.8; State v. Hughes, 45 Conn. App. 289,
296, 696 A.2d 347 (1997); State v. Crosby, 34 Conn. App.
261, 270, 641 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 230 Conn. 903, 644
A.2d 916 (1994).
harmless beyond reasonable doubt because ‘‘prosecutor did not attempt
repeatedly to introduce evidence of the defendant’s silence . . . [or] mention that evidence during his closing argument,’’ ‘‘prosecutor focused on
the state’s strong case against the defendant, including the incriminating
responses that the defendant gave to the police before terminating the
[police] interview,’’ and ‘‘other evidence introduced by the state overwhelmingly demonstrated the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt’’), State
v. Alexis, 194 Conn. App. 162, 173–77, 220 A.3d 38 (any Doyle violation was
harmless because ‘‘the evidence introduced by the state unrelated to the
defendant’s post-Miranda silence established the defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt’’), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 904, 219 A.3d 800 (2019); State
v. Bereis, 117 Conn. App. 360, 379, 978 A.2d 1122 (2009) (Doyle violation
was harmless beyond reasonable doubt in view of ‘‘substantial evidence of
the defendant’s guilt’’ and fact that reference to defendant’s silence ‘‘did
not strike at the jugular of the defendant’s version of events and was not
equated with the defendant’s guilt’’), and State v. Pepper, 79 Conn. App. 1,
16–17, 828 A.2d 1268 (2003) (any alleged Doyle violation was harmless
beyond reasonable doubt because there was substantial evidence supporting
defendant’s guilt, including physical evidence tying defendant to victim,
alleged Doyle violation was isolated, and there were no repeated references
to defendant’s silence), aff’d, 272 Conn. 10, 860 A.2d 1221 (2004).
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The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for a new trial.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.