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In re Ariella M.
IN RE ARIELLA M. ET AL.*
(AC 48293)
Seeley, Wilson and Lavine, Js.
Syllabus
The respondent father appealed from the trial court’s judgment terminating
his parental rights with respect to his minor children. He claimed, inter alia,
that the court improperly determined that he had failed to achieve the
requisite degree of personal rehabilitation required by statute (§ 17a-112 (j)
(3) (B) (i)). Held:
This court determined that there was no practical relief it could afford the
respondent father with respect to his claim that the trial court improperly
found that he was unable or unwilling to benefit from efforts by the Department of Children and Families to reunify him with his children, as the
father’s claim was rendered moot because he challenged only one of the two
independent bases in § 17a-112 (j) (1) for upholding the court’s determination
that the department had made reasonable reunification efforts without challenging the court’s finding that those efforts themselves were reasonable.
The trial court’s unchallenged factual findings, including findings regarding
the respondent father’s parenting ability, his failure to address the children’s
sexualized behavior and his volatile relationship with their mother, supported the court’s determination, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
father had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation pursuant
to § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) as would encourage the belief that, within a
reasonable time, considering the children’s ages and needs, he could assume
a responsible caretaking and parentlng position in their lives.
The trial court properly determined, on the basis of abundant evidence in
the record, that termination of the respondent father’s parental rights was
in the children’s best interests, as the father did not challenge any of the
court’s findings in support of its best interest determination, including its
* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142
(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this
appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open
for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon
order of the court.
Moreover, in accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3)
(2018), as amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization
Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to
identify any person protected or sought to be protected under a protection
order, protective order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied
for, or others through whom that person’s identity may be ascertained. 0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 1
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In re Ariella M.
findings that the father had ignored the children’s specific needs and disregarded the importance of stability and permanency in their lives.
Argued June 5—officially released August 18, 2025 **
Procedural History
Petitions by the Commissioner of Children and Families to terminate the respondents’ parental rights with
respect to their minor children, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Litchfield, Juvenile Matters at Torrington, and transferred to the Superior Court
in the judicial district of Middlesex, Child Protection
Session at Middletown, where the cases were tried to
the court, Hon. Barbara M. Quinn, judge trial referee;
judgments terminating the respondents’ parental rights,
from which the respondent father appealed to this
court. Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed.
David B. Rozwaski, assigned counsel, for the appellant (respondent father).
Daniel M. Salton, assistant attorney general, with
whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
James P. Sexton, assigned counsel, for the minor
children.
Opinion
WILSON, J. The respondent father appeals from the
judgments of the trial court rendered in favor of the
petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families,
terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor
** August 18, 2025, the date that this decision was released as a slip
opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes. Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0
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In re Ariella M.
children, Ariella M. and Emilia M.2 On appeal, the
1
respondent claims that the court improperly determined
that (1) he was unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification efforts, (2) he failed to rehabilitate sufficiently, and (3) termination of his parental rights was
in the children’s best interests. We conclude that the
appeal is moot as to the first claim and dismiss that
portion of the appeal. We otherwise affirm the judgments of the trial court.
The following relevant facts and procedural history,
taken from this court’s decision in a related appeal by
the children’s mother, Cydney; see In re Emilia M., 233
Conn. App. 565, A.3d (2025), petition for cert.
filed (Conn. July 21, 2025) (No. 250121); were found by
the trial court, or are otherwise undisputed in the
record. ‘‘[The respondent] is . . . forty-eight years old.
. . . Of significance is his long substance abuse history
during which time he was heavily addicted to heroin.
During those years, more than ten years ago, he was
arrested and convicted of illegal sexual contact with a
minor and remains under probation, [in] the [Department of Children and Families’ (department)] [c]entral
[r]egistry for investigation of sexual abuse of a minor
and is also on the Connecticut sex offender registry.
At present and for some time, he receives Suboxone
for his addiction and has tested negative for any illicit
substances in his urine screens since 2017, indicating
no opiate or cocaine use, his probation officer testified
at trial. [The respondent] was recently diagnosed with
We note that the attorney for the minor children filed a statement with
1
this court adopting the petitioner’s brief.
2
The trial court also rendered judgments terminating the parental rights
of the minor children’s mother, Cydney M., who filed a separate appeal, not
challenging the termination of her parental rights but, rather, concerning
the minor children’s right to conflict free counsel. See In re Emilia M., 233
Conn. App. 565, A.3d (2025), petition for cert. filed (Conn. July 21,
2025) (No. 250121). We hereinafter refer to the respondent father as the
respondent and to Cydney M. by her first name.
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In re Ariella M.
post-traumatic stress disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and generalized anxiety disorder.’’
‘‘[Cydney], who has been diagnosed with major
depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, as well as opioid use in standing remission and borderline personality
disorder . . . is now thirty-one years old, and her first
child was born when she turned twenty-five. She met
[the respondent], the father of her two children, approximately ten years ago, and they were married in 2015.
. . . [The respondent] is some seventeen years older
than [Cydney], and he has two adult children from earlier relationships. . . . [Cydney] and [the respondent]
have had a volatile relationship marked with intimate
partner violence and ongoing difficulties related to significant mental health issues and ongoing drug use by
both. All who have counseled or interviewed the parents
have spoken of a toxic relationship that is harmful to
both of them but which they had not been able to set
aside during the course of these proceedings. In the
past, each has represented to [the department] and their
therapeutic counselors that they were not in a relationship when, secretly, they remained involved with each
other until very recently. . . . Ending their relationship
was a necessary predicate to each of the parents’ rehabilitation efforts, as their intimate partner violence and
escalating arguments and fights negatively impacted
their two daughters and were a continuing source of
trauma for the children.
‘‘During the time between the birth of Ariella, the
oldest child, in 2018, and September 12, 2022, when
. . . orders of temporary custody with neglect petitions
were filed [by the petitioner], there were a total of nine
referrals to [the department] due to the ever escalating,
more serious intimate partner violence and neglectful
care of the two children, Emilia having been born in
September, 2020. The difficulties and arguments that
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In re Ariella M.
arose between the parents were exacerbated by [Cydney’s] mental health difficulties [and] her out-of-control
behaviors and reflected the ever growing toxic relationship between [Cydney] and [the respondent].
‘‘In August, 2022, the department received a referral
from the children’s maternal grandmother alleging that
[the respondent] was touching the children inappropriately while the children were naked. [Cydney] apparently had videotaped the children in the nude demonstrating the alleged acts of sexual abuse by [the
respondent] and accusing their father of touching them
inappropriately.3 [Cydney] subsequently admitted that
she had coached the children. Following these events,
the petitioner sought and received orders of temporary
custody for the children, who were placed in the foster
home of their aunt. . . . While in the home of their
aunt, the children engaged in sexualized behaviors that
became too difficult for their aunt to handle, which
resulted in the children being separated, with Ariella
being placed in the care of her maternal grandmother4
3
‘‘The trial court specifically found that the ‘the police [had] reported to
[the department] that [Cydney] had sexually exploited her children by taking
videos of them on her cell phone in the nude. . . . [Cydney] also had sent
similar videos to a friend, who also reported her to the police for ‘kiddy
porn.’ It appeared that [Cydney] was regularly coaching the children to
accuse [the respondent] of sexual abuse, as he was on probation and was
a registered sex offender. She has several times admitted that she did coach
them because of her concerns. She was arrested on December 1, 2022, [on]
charges of possession of child pornography and promoting minor[s] [in
an] obscene performance, as well as risk of injury to children. She was
incarcerated at York Correctional Institution and subsequently released on
bond. There is a full no contact protective order in place protecting the
children from [Cydney], who, with the exception of one supervised visit
during a psychological evaluation, has had no contact with her children
since November, 2022, when a motion to suspend visitation was granted by
the court. [Cydney] was ultimately convicted of these charges and sentenced
to a period of incarceration from January, 2024, to June, 2024.’ ’’ In re Emilia
M., supra, 233 Conn. App. 569 n.5.
4
‘‘In March, 2024, the maternal grandmother could no longer take care
of Ariella, who, ultimately, was placed in the same foster home as Emilia.’’
In re Emilia M., supra, 233 Conn. App. 570 n.6.
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In re Ariella M.
and Emilia ultimately being placed with a foster family.’’
(Footnotes in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Emilia M., supra, 233 Conn. App. 568–70.
On March 6, 2023, the trial court, Aaron, J., adjudicated the children neglected, committed them to the
care and custody of the petitioner, and ordered specific
steps for the respondent to take to facilitate the return
of the children to him. The steps required, inter alia,
that the respondent take part in counseling and make
progress toward individual treatment goals; address
intimate partner violence and domestic violence with
a therapist; and cooperate with the service providers
recommended for counseling, in-home support services, substance abuse assessment or treatment, and
intimate partner violence services.5 The specific steps
further provided that the identified treatment goal for
the respondent was to ‘‘[d]evelop insight into maintaining a household void of substance use, intimate
5
The specific steps in their entirety required that the respondent keep all
appointments set by or with the department; cooperate with the department’s
home visits; let the department know where he resides; immediately let the
department know about any changes in the makeup of the household; take
part in counseling and make progress toward identified treatment goals;
accept in-home support services referred by the department and cooperate
with them; submit to a substance abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations about treatment; submit to random drug testing; not use illegal drugs
or abuse alcohol or medicine; cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or
testing; get and maintain adequate housing and a legal income; comply
with any restraining or protective orders or other appropriate safety plan
approved by the department; address intimate partner violence and domestic
violence with a therapist; not break the law; cooperate with the children’s
therapy; visit the children as often as permitted; inform the department of
any person he would like the department to consider as a placement resource
for the children; tell the department the names and addresses of the children’s grandparents; sign releases allowing the department to communicate
with service providers to check on his attendance, cooperation, and progress
toward identified goals; sign releases allowing the children’s attorney and
guardian ad litem to review the children’s medical, psychological, psychiatric, and/or educational records; and cooperate with the service providers
recommended for counseling, in-home support services, substance abuse
assessment or treatment, and intimate partner violence services.
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In re Ariella M.
partner violence, [and] abuse.’’ On December 8, 2023,
the petitioner filed petitions for the termination of the
parental rights of both the respondent and Cydney with
respect to the children, alleging that the parents had
failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, given the
age and needs of the children, they could assume a
responsible position in their lives within a reasonable
time. The trial on the termination of parental rights
petitions was held over five nonconsecutive days in
July and August, 2024.6 The respondent and Cydney
appeared, and each were represented by counsel. During the trial, the petitioner presented testimony from
multiple witnesses, including Koren Kermashek, a clinician who provided treatment to the respondent; Kerin
Foley, a licensed therapist and clinical social worker
who provided couples counseling to the respondent and
Cydney; Jessica Biren Caverly, a licensed psychologist
who performed a psychological and parenting evaluation of the respondent and Cydney, which was admitted
into evidence as exhibit H, as well as a neuropsychological evaluation of the respondent, admitted into evidence
as exhibit I; Morgan McGinnis, a department social
worker assigned to the case; and Eric Smith, a department social work supervisor involved in the case. The
respondent presented testimony from Erin O’Brien, his
probation officer, and also testified himself.7
6
While the petitions were pending, Cydney filed a motion seeking a permanent transfer of guardianship of the children to their maternal grandmother.
The trial on the termination petitions was consolidated with the hearing
on the motion to transfer guardianship. In its memorandum of decision
terminating both parents’ parental rights, the trial court also denied Cydney’s
motion to transfer guardianship, concluding, inter alia, that ‘‘[t]he proposed
placement would not foster the sustained growth, development and wellbeing of [the] two young girls, nor the continuity and stability of their
environment.’’
7
During the proceedings, counsel for Cydney also presented testimony
from witnesses.
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In re Ariella M.
On October 7, 2024, the court, Hon. Barbara M.
Quinn, judge trial referee, issued a memorandum of
decision, in which the court found that the department
had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent
with the children and that the respondent was unable
to benefit from reunification efforts. The court further
found that the respondent had failed to achieve an
appropriate degree of personal rehabilitation as would
encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, he
could assume a responsible position in the children’s
lives and determined that termination of the respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the
children. Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-112 (j) (3)
(B) (i), the court granted the petitions for the termination of the respondent’s parental rights.8 This appeal
followed. Additional facts and procedural history will
be set forth as necessary.
Before addressing the respondent’s claims, we set
forth the following relevant legal principles. ‘‘Proceedings to terminate parental rights are governed by § 17a112. . . . Under [that provision], a hearing on a petition
to terminate parental rights consists of two phases: the
adjudicatory phase and the dispositional phase. During
the adjudicatory phase, the trial court must determine
whether one or more of the . . . grounds for termination of parental rights set forth in § 17a-112 [(j) (3)]
exists by clear and convincing evidence. The [petitioner] . . . in petitioning to terminate those rights,
must allege and prove one or more of the statutory
grounds. . . . Subdivision (3) of § 17a-112 (j) carefully
sets out . . . [the] situations that, in the judgment of
the legislature, constitute countervailing interests sufficiently powerful to justify the termination of parental
rights in the absence of consent. . . . Because a
respondent’s fundamental right to parent his or her
8
The trial court also granted the petitions for the termination of Cydney’s
parental rights. See footnote 2 of this opinion.
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In re Ariella M.
child is at stake, [t]he statutory criteria must be strictly
complied with before termination can be accomplished
and adoption proceedings begun. . . .
‘‘Section 17a-112 (j) provides in relevant part: The
Superior Court, upon notice and hearing . . . may
grant a petition . . . if it finds by clear and convincing
evidence that (1) the [department] has made reasonable
efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with
the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section
17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that
the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, except that such finding is not required
if the court has determined at a hearing pursuant to
section 17a-111b, or determines at trial on the petition,
that such efforts are not required, (2) termination is in
the best interest of the child, and (3) . . . (B) the child
(i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate
Court to have been neglected, abused or uncared for
in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected,
abused or uncared for and has been in the custody of
the [petitioner] for at least fifteen months and the parent
of such child has been provided specific steps to take
to facilitate the return of the child to the parent . . .
and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a
reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the
child, such parent could assume a responsible position
in the life of the child . . . .
‘‘If the trial court determines that a statutory ground
for termination exists, then it proceeds to the dispositional phase. During the dispositional phase, the trial
court must determine whether termination is in the best
interests of the child. . . . The best interest determination also must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Autumn O., 218 Conn. App. 424, 430–31,
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In re Ariella M.
292 A.3d 66, cert. denied, 346 Conn. 1025, 294 A.3d
1026 (2023).
I
The respondent first claims that the trial court erred
in its findings that he was unable or unwilling to benefit
from reunification efforts. Specifically, the respondent
claims that this finding is ‘‘clearly erroneous because
there is no evidence contrary to the evidence of consistent employment, medication management, and compliance with probation.’’ Moreover, he argues that the
court focused on the ‘‘ ‘toxic relationship’ ’’ between
the respondent and Cydney, which, ‘‘by itself, should
not be the basis for a finding that the [respondent]
is unable or unwilling to benefit from services.’’ The
respondent does not, however, challenge the court’s
determination that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify him with the children. Because
the respondent challenges only one of the two bases
for the court’s determination that § 17a-112 (j) (1) had
been satisfied, we conclude that this portion of the
respondent’s appeal is moot.
‘‘Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be
determined as a threshold matter because it implicates
[this] court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . . .
Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a
resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. . . . A
case is considered moot if [the] court cannot grant the
appellant any practical relief through its disposition of
the merits . . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way. . . .
‘‘Section 17a-112 (j) (1) provides in relevant part that
the Superior Court may grant a petition [for termination
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In re Ariella M.
of parental rights] . . . if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the [department] has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the
child with the parent . . . unless the court finds . . .
that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from
reunification efforts . . . . In construing that statutory
language, our Supreme Court has explained that,
[b]ecause the two clauses are separated by the word
unless, this statute plainly is written in the conjunctive.
Accordingly, the department must prove either that it
has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively,
that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from
reunification efforts. . . . [E]ither showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element. . . .
‘‘Because either finding, standing alone, provides an
independent basis for satisfying § 17a-112 (j) (1) . . .
in cases in which the trial court concludes that both
findings have been proven, a respondent on appeal must
demonstrate that both determinations are improper. If
the respondent fails to challenge either one of those
independent alternative bases . . . the trial court’s
ultimate determination that the requirements of § 17a112 (j) (1) were satisfied remains unchallenged and
intact. . . . In such instances, the appeal is moot, as
resolution of a respondent’s claim of error in her favor
could not [afford] her any practical relief.’’ (Citation
omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Kharm A., 218 Conn. App. 750, 757–59,
292 A.3d 1286 (2023).
In the present case, the trial court found that the
department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the
respondent with the children and that he was unable
or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. In his
principal appellate brief, the respondent recognizes that
the court determined that both findings had been
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In re Ariella M.
proven, yet he failed to demonstrate that both determi9
nations were improper. On appeal, the respondent challenges only the court’s finding that he was unable or
unwilling to benefit from the department’s reunification
efforts. Although the statement of issues in and introduction to his appellate brief reference the issue of
whether reasonable efforts toward reunification were
made, the respondent’s brief is devoid of any legal analysis on this point. See, e.g., Stubbs v. ICare Management,
LLC, 198 Conn. App. 511, 529–30, 233 A.3d 1170 (2020)
(declining to review claim as inadequately briefed
because it was referenced in plaintiff’s brief only in
statement of issues, introduction, and heading of argument section). In the context of his argument that the
court erred in finding that he had failed to achieve a
sufficient degree of rehabilitation, the respondent
makes several references to the efforts the department
made at reunification. These references, however, do
not constitute an adequately briefed claim that the
department’s efforts were inadequate. See In re S. G.,
229 Conn. App. 834, 843–44 n.9, 328 A.3d 737 (2024)
(‘‘To the extent that those references . . . can be construed as a challenge to the court’s finding that the
department made reasonable efforts to reunify the
respondent with the children, we conclude that such a
claim is inadequately briefed and, therefore, decline to
review it. See State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 724, 138
A.3d 868 (2016) (‘Analysis, rather than mere abstract
assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an
issue by failure to brief the issue properly. . . . [F]or
this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims
of error raised on appeal . . . the parties must clearly
and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs.’ ’’)).
9
In his principal appellate brief, the respondent argued: ‘‘The trial court,
in making its decision, found that the [department] had made reasonable
efforts to reunify the [respondent], but due to continued mental health issues
and the ‘toxic relationship’ with [Cydney] . . . the [respondent] was unable
or unwilling to benefit in his reunification services . . . .’’
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In re Ariella M.
Because the respondent failed to properly challenge
the trial court’s findings with respect to the two separate
and independent bases set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (1), this
court is unable to grant him any practical relief with
respect to this claim. See In re Kharm A., supra, 218
Conn. App. 759 (‘‘[b]ecause the respondent challenges
only one of the two separate and independent bases
set forth in § 17a-112 (j) (1), there is no practical relief
that this court can afford her with respect to her claim’’).
His claim, therefore, is moot. Accordingly, this portion
of the appeal is dismissed.
II
The respondent next claims that the trial court’s
determination that he had failed to rehabilitate sufficiently was unsupported by the evidence. We are not
persuaded.
‘‘Failure of a parent to achieve sufficient personal
rehabilitation is one of [the] statutory grounds on which
a court may terminate parental rights pursuant to § 17a112. . . . Concerning the failure to achieve personal
rehabilitation, § 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i) provides for the
termination of parental rights when the minor child has
been found to have been neglected, abused or uncared
for in a prior proceeding and the parent of such child
has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child,
such parent could assume a responsible position in the
life of the child.
‘‘Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a-112 (j) (3)
(B) (i)] refers to the restoration of a parent to [his]
former constructive and useful role as a parent. . . .
[I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not
whether the parent has improved [his] ability to manage
[his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the
ability to care for the particular needs of the child at
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In re Ariella M.
issue. . . . An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation
requires us to obtain a historical perspective of the
respondent’s child-caring and parenting abilities. . . .
Although the standard is not full rehabilitation, the parent must show more than any rehabilitation. . . . Successful completion of the petitioner’s expressly articulated expectations is not sufficient to defeat the
petitioner’s claim that the parent has not achieved sufficient rehabilitation. . . . [E]ven if a parent has made
successful strides in [his] ability to manage [his] life
and may have achieved a level of stability within [his]
limitations, such improvements, although commendable, are not dispositive on the issue of whether, within
a reasonable period of time, [he] could assume a responsible position in the life of [his child]. . . .
‘‘[T]he appropriate standard of review is one of evidentiary sufficiency, that is, whether the trial court
could have reasonably concluded, upon the facts established and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
that the cumulative effect of the evidence was sufficient
to justify its [ultimate conclusion]. . . . When applying
this standard, we construe the evidence in a manner
most favorable to sustaining the judgment of the trial
court.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) In re Mikhail M., 230 Conn. App. 86, 88–89,
328 A.3d 758, cert. denied, 351 Conn. 907, 330 A.3d
132 (2025).
In determining that the respondent had failed to rehabilitate sufficiently, the trial court found that, ‘‘although
[the respondent] has engaged in therapy for many years,
attended many of the services that were offered to him,
his limitations are such that he has not benefited from
those services nor learned to change his behavior in
any meaningful way. His failure to separate from Cydney, even while she was incarcerated, lying to his therapist of many years about this central failure, indicates
a man who goes through the motions of complying with
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In re Ariella M.
what is required of him while resisting and undermining
any benefit from the services provided to him. Even if
he were able to have his children in his care, the court
concludes from the clear and convincing evidence that
he has shown no signs of rehabilitation so that he could
be expected to responsibly care for them and their
needs in the reasonably foreseeable future.’’ With
respect to both parents, the court similarly found that
‘‘[n]either parent was ever able to comply with the steps
ordered for them. The clear and convincing evidence
demonstrates that neither has made sufficient progress
for a long enough period of time to assume either one
is stable, has adequately treated his or her mental health
difficulties, including through medication. The intimate
partner violence between them was evident until very
recently, and whether they have finally ended their toxic
relationship is still in doubt. The evidence demonstrates
that this was so both on the adjudicatory date in December, 2023, and in the time that has elapsed since then.
Whatever changes each may have achieved, it was
unfortunately too little and too late for them to assume
their children’s care in the reasonably foreseeable
future. Both children require stability and permanency.
The court finds from the clear and convincing evidence
that the grounds for termination of Cydney’s and [the
respondent’s] parental rights have been proven by [the
petitioner].’’
In support of its conclusion, the trial court also
focused on the intimate partner violence between the
respondent and Cydney as well as the respondent’s
parenting ability. Specifically, the court found that, in
the fall of 2022, the respondent and Cydney began
attending couples counseling to preserve their marriage, during which ‘‘[t]he couples counselor tried to
help Cydney and [the respondent] with their communications. She attempted to teach them to listen openly to
each other, establish with people outside their marriage,
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and deal with other marital issues. . . . Nonetheless,
their relationship continued with toxic impact on each
of their lives, to which their counselors testified at trial.’’
Further, ‘‘[a]ll who have counseled or interviewed the
parents have spoken of a ‘toxic relationship’ that is
harmful to both of them but which they had not been
able to set aside during the course of these proceedings.
In the past, each has represented to [the department]
and their therapeutic counselors that they were not in
a relationship when, secretly, they remained involved
with each other until very recently. Their representations were accepted by their counselors and featured
significantly in the counselors’ assessment of the parents’ progress and their recommendations.’’ (Footnote
omitted.) As a result of the respondent’s and Cydney’s
‘‘ongoing and active concealment’’ of their relationship,
the court found that assessments of the parents’ progress ‘‘cannot now carry much weight, as the progress
each counselor lauded had not in fact taken place,’’ and
‘‘whether they have finally ended their toxic relationship is still in doubt.’’
With respect to the parenting ability of the respondent, the court relied on the opinion of Caverly, who
testified and performed evaluations of the parents that
were admitted into evidence. Specifically, the court
stated: ‘‘In her opinion, both parents required further
parenting education, and each of them needed to learn
about implementing a wide range of discipline strategies for their daughters. Each needed to learn how to
approach discipline now and when their children are
older. In particular, it was imperative for them to learn
how to address the unsafe behaviors she noted that
each of them permitted during the parent-child portion
of the evaluation. At that time, in January, 2023, [Caverly] continued to recommend that both children
remain in foster care, as each parent had significant
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mental health needs that were not being appropriately
addressed. . . .
‘‘[Caverly] performed a psychological parenting and
interaction assessment with [the respondent] and the
children. She noted that, while Ariella remembered him,
Emilia seemed to have not much of a recollection of
him in her life. [Caverly] recommended that he engage
in parenting education and that [he] not only complete
that education, but also be able to demonstrate his
ability to better supervise his children. She was concerned about his cognitive functioning due to his longterm drug use and discrepancies in his test scores. She
believed his limitations would make it more difficult
for him to learn the material he needed to master and
recall in order to parent successfully. She also found it
of concern that Ariella’s sexualized behaviors increased
significantly after seeing [the respondent] in the evaluation, but those apparently abated after a time. [Caverly’s] recommendations for [the respondent] also included
his continued engagement in individual therapy and
psychiatric medication management. Subsequent to the
evaluation, he was referred to CT Kids Matter for parenting and offender counseling with his probation officer. At trial, he testified as to his present situation and
his inability to assume primary care of his children.’’
(Footnotes omitted.)
Moreover, specific to the children’s sexualized behavior, the trial court found that ‘‘[b]oth Cydney and [the
respondent] thought their daughters’ behavior was normal and did nothing to intervene and redirect their
children when they were engaging in such sexualized
conduct.’’
Notwithstanding these factual findings, the respondent maintains that ‘‘there was more than sufficient
evidence to make a determination that [the respondent],
with continuing services, could, within a reasonable
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period of time, make sufficient progress to reunify with
his children.’’ In support of this argument, he relies on
evidence in the record reflecting that (1) despite the
absence of visitation, Ariella was excited to see him,
(2) Caverly recommended that the respondent see a
neurologist to determine if there are any issues
impacting his cognitive functioning that could lead to
further recommendations to assist him, (3) he was compliant with various programs through probation, and
(4) he was compliant with his medication regimen. In
sum, the respondent argues that the evidence ‘‘clearly
demonstrate[s] that the respondent . . . has been
engaged in services, is making progress, and is committed to remaining engaged in services.’’
The trial court’s decision makes clear that the court
recognized that the respondent had engaged in therapy
and many of the services offered to him; however, the
court deemed the respondent’s efforts to be ‘‘too little
and too late for [him] to assume [his] children’s care
in the reasonably foreseeable future.’’ As the court
found, the respondent had failed to address the intimate
partner violence between himself and Cydney, given
their inability to separate and the subsequent concealment of their relationship. As a result of the respondent’s and Cydney’s ‘‘ongoing and active concealment’’
of their relationship, the court found that assessments
of the parents’ progress ‘‘cannot now carry much
weight, as the progress each counselor lauded had not
in fact taken place.’’ The court also made findings as
to the respondent’s parenting ability and his failure
to understand and address the children’s sexualized
behavior. The respondent does not challenge any of the
court’s subordinate findings.
Although there was evidence of progress on the part
of the respondent, this does not undermine the trial
court’s reliance on its subordinate findings that demonstrate that he had failed to rehabilitate sufficiently. See
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In re Sheila J., 62 Conn. App. 470, 481–82, 771 A.2d 244
(2001) (court’s determination that respondent failed to
rehabilitate sufficiently was proper notwithstanding
respondent’s having demonstrated efforts and taken
steps toward rehabilitation, which were ‘‘too little and
too late’’). We conclude that there is sufficient evidence
in the record to support the court’s determination that
the petitioner had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent failed to achieve the degree
of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the
belief that, within a reasonable time, considering the
ages and needs of the children, he could assume a
responsible position in their lives.
III
The respondent’s final claim is that the trial court
improperly determined that terminating his parental
rights was in the children’s best interests. We disagree.
We begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant
legal principles and standard of review. ‘‘In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing,
the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of
the parent to the best interest of the child. . . . It is
well settled that we will overturn the trial court’s decision that the termination of parental rights is in the
best interest of the [child] only if the court’s findings
are clearly erroneous. . . . The best interests of the
child include the child’s interests in sustained growth,
development, well-being, and continuity and stability
of [his or her] environment. . . . In the dispositional
phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the
trial court must determine whether it is established by
clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of
the respondent’s parental rights is not in the best interest of the child. In arriving at this decision, the court
is mandated to consider and make written findings
regarding seven factors delineated in [§ 17a-112 (k)].
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. . . The seven factors serve simply as guidelines for
the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need
to be proven before termination can be ordered. . . .
There is no requirement that each factor be proven
by clear and convincing evidence.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) In re Bianca K., 188 Conn. App. 259,
273, 203 A.3d 1280 (2019); see also In re S. G., supra,
229 Conn. App. 861–62 (‘‘[a]n appellate tribunal will
not disturb a trial court’s finding that termination of
parental rights is in a child’s best interest unless that
finding is clearly erroneous’’ (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
In the present case, the trial court addressed each of
the factors set forth in § 17a-112 (k)10 in the dispositional
10
General Statutes § 17a-112 (k) provides: ‘‘Except in the case where
termination of parental rights is based on consent, in determining whether
to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and
shall make written findings regarding: (1) The timeliness, nature and extent
of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child
by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent; (2)
whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable
efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, as amended from time to time; (3) the terms of any
applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or
agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled
their obligations under such order; (4) the feelings and emotional ties of
the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s
person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control
of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed
significant emotional ties; (5) the age of the child; (6) the efforts the parent
has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to
make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the
foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which
the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to
reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to
incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other
custodian of the child; and (7) the extent to which a parent has been
prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by
the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the
unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of
the parent.’’
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portion of its decision. The court made the following
relevant findings. First, the department made reasonable efforts to provide timely services to both the
respondent and Cydney, tailored to their needs. Specifically, the department required mental health services,
substance abuse services, intimate partner violence services, and parenting services that ‘‘were offered to both
[parents], and neither had benefited from them.’’ Second, the department made reasonable efforts to reunite
the respondent and the children in light of the services
made available to the respondent, who ‘‘had more than
adequate time and many services to assist [him] in [his]
hoped for rehabilitation, but [he] was [not] able to
achieve any substantial progress toward that goal.’’
Third, the respondent failed to complete most of the
specific steps ordered by the court and is ‘‘not in a
position to safely care for [his] daughters within a reasonable period of time, as [he] [cannot] yet conduct
[himself] in the manner required to parent these girls
safely and provide for their emotional welfare.’’ Fourth,
‘‘Emilia has developed significant emotional ties to her
foster family, with whom she has lived for more than
a year. . . . Ariella has not been with her new foster
family for the same length of time as her sister. She is
attached to her mother and to her [maternal] grandmother . . . to whose care she wishes to return.’’ Fifth,
Ariella was six years old, and Emilia was four years
old at the time of trial. Sixth, the respondent was ‘‘prohibited from visiting with [his] children by court order
and, except for contact during the evaluation, [had] not
seen them since late 2022.’’
After discussing the factors set forth in § 17a-112 (k),
the trial court found that ‘‘Cydney and [the respondent]
are not able to have the children in their care, as Cydney
admits she cannot care for them, and [the respondent]
is in the same position. There is no question that these
children, at six and four years of age, require permanent
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and competent caretakers who can consistently and
reliably deal with their special needs, their emotional
requirements and provide daily loving care for both of
them. . . . After considering Ariella’s and Emilia’s ages
and the totality of circumstances, including the strength
of Ariella’s bond to her grandmother and the other
familial connections, the court concludes, from the
clear and convincing evidence, that, even despite Ariella’s bond to her grandmother and also to her mother,
termination of their parents’ rights [with respect] to
them is [in] these young girls’ best interests.’’ (Citation
omitted.)
There is abundant evidence in the record to support
the trial court’s conclusion that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. Moreover, the respondent does not challenge
any particular finding made by the court in support of
its best interest determination. Rather, the respondent
makes only two brief arguments in support of his claim
that the court improperly determined that termination
of his parental rights was in the best interests of the
children, neither of which we find persuasive.11
First, the respondent argues that, by not allowing
him to have continuing contact with his children, the
11
The respondent raises an additional argument that warrants little discussion. He argues that ‘‘[m]ultiple placements of a child in nonrelative foster
homes can have a destabilizing effect on the emotional welfare of a minor
child. . . . [T]he two children reside in separate nonrelative foster homes,
but . . . the maternal grandmother and maternal aunt are allowed to have
contact through the foster parent. In light of the continuing contact with
family members, there is no reason why a plan cannot be put [into] place
to reestablish the relationship between the [respondent] and his children.’’
(Citations omitted.)
This argument has no merit. We first observe that the respondent’s assertion is inconsistent with the trial court’s finding that the children have
resided in the same fictive kin foster home since June, 2024, which counsel
for the respondent conceded at oral argument. Moreover, the respondent
fails to demonstrate how the continuing contact between the children and
other family members is relevant to the question before us as to whether
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termination of his parental rights will have a negative
effect on the children and therefore is not in their best
interests. Specifically, the respondent contends that he
‘‘loves his children and his oldest daughter, at least, has
a positive recollection [of] her father, and, in light of
[his] continuing efforts and work on his issues, it would
be in the best interests of the minor children not to
terminate parental rights but, rather, to remand the
case to work on the [respondent’s] relationship with
his children so that the children will have a father who
can be a part of their lives in some form.’’ This argument
‘‘is inconsistent with our Supreme Court’s repeated recognition of ‘the importance of permanency in children’s
lives.’ In re Davonta V., [285 Conn. 483, 494, 940 A.2d
733 (2008); see id.] (‘Virtually all experts, from many
different professional disciplines, agree that children
need and benefit from continuous stable home environments. . . . [S]table and continuous care givers are
important to normal child development. Children need
secure and uninterrupted emotional relationships with
the adults who are responsible for their care.’).’’ In re
Ja’La L., 201 Conn. App. 586, 596, 243 A.3d 358 (2020),
cert. denied, 336 Conn. 909, 244 A.3d 148 (2021).
Second, the respondent argues that the trial court
improperly based its best interest determination on its
underlying finding that the children required ‘‘daily loving care’’ because ‘‘[t]he respondent . . . loves his children and wants to be able to have a loving relationship
with his children, even if he cannot provide for the dayto-day care of his children. A requirement of providing
day-to-day care is not a requirement of being a parent.
. . . Even though the [respondent] will have to work
at reestablishing his relationship with his children, it is
in the children’s best interests to allow the [respondent]
to do so because they deserve the right to have a relationship with their father.’’ (Citation omitted.) First,
we disagree with the respondent’s assertion that his
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inability to provide the children with ‘‘daily loving care’’
was the basis for the court’s best interest determination.
A review of the court’s decision makes clear that the
court considered numerous factors in its determination,
unchallenged by the respondent, including those found
by the court pursuant to § 17a-112 (k).
To the extent that the trial court considered the
respondent’s ability to provide ‘‘daily loving care,’’ however, the respondent’s argument similarly disregards
‘‘ ‘the importance of permanency in children’s lives’ ’’;
In re Ja’La L., supra, 201 Conn. App. 596; and, moreover,
ignores the specific needs of the children. The court
made several findings as to the children’s need for stability and permanency in the context of their particular
circumstances. With respect to Ariella, the court found
that ‘‘Ariella is considered a medically complex child
due to her diagnosis of nephrotic syndrome, which is
a kidney disorder. She needs caregivers to monitor her
diet and follow medication administration directions
from her physicians. She requires a parent who can
coordinate and attend multiple appointments in a timely
manner in order to ensure that Ariella’s needs are met.’’
Regarding both children, the court found that the intimate partner violence and escalating arguments
between the respondent and Cydney were a continuing
source of trauma for the children. Further, the court
found that both children had been exposed to sexual
conduct while in the care of their parents and became
hypersexualized. The court found that both children
continue with therapy to overcome the trauma they
experienced in their family of origin. Considering the
needs of the children, the court found that ‘‘these children, at six and four years of age, require permanent
and competent caretakers who can consistently and
reliably deal with their special needs, their emotional
requirements, and provide daily loving care for both of
them.’’ The respondent does not challenge any of these
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underlying findings as to the children’s needs nor does
he challenge the court’s findings as to his inability to
meet those needs.
Our review of the record demonstrates that the trial
court properly considered the specific needs of the
children and the abilities of the respondent in determining whether termination of his parental rights was in
the best interests of the children. See In re Ja’La L.,
supra, 201 Conn. App. 594, 597 (concluding that respondent’s claim that she should have been permitted more
time to rehabilitate before her parental rights were terminated ignored particular needs of children). To the
extent that the respondent invites this court to secondguess the trial court’s assessment that the children’s
need for permanency and stability outweighs the benefits of maintaining a connection between him and the
children, he has not afforded us a basis on which to
do so. See In re Aubrey K., 216 Conn. App. 632, 671, 285
A.3d 1153 (2022) (reviewing court declined to secondguess trial court’s best interest determination in light
of facts that strongly support it), cert. denied, 345 Conn.
972, 286 A.3d 907 (2023). Accordingly, we conclude that
the respondent has failed to demonstrate that the court
erred in its determination that termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
The appeal is dismissed with respect to the respondent’s claim that the trial court erred in finding that he
was unable or unwilling to benefit from the department’s reunification efforts; the judgments are affirmed
in all other respects.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.