NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: December 20, 2024
S24A1327. PARKER v. THE STATE.
PETERSON, Presiding Justice.
Stefan Parker appeals his convictions related to the shooting
death of Shelbra Lee Stallings. 1 On appeal, Parker argues that the
evidence was insufficient to disprove his claim of self-defense, the
trial court erred in denying his trial counsel’s motion to withdraw as
counsel, the court erred by admitting a book entitled “The 48 Laws
of Power,” and he received ineffective assistance of counsel for
1The crimes occurred on February 28, 2021. In November 2021, a
Rockdale County grand jury indicted Parker for malice murder, felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a crime. A jury found Parker guilty on all
counts at a March 2023 trial, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison
for malice murder and a consecutive five-year term for the firearms offense.
The remaining counts were merged or vacated by operation of law. Parker filed
a motion for new trial in June 2023, which he later amended. The trial court
denied the motion in April 2024 following a hearing. Parker timely filed a
notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to this Court’s August 2024 term
and submitted for a decision on the briefs.
stipulating to the authenticity of evidence that showed his presence
at the crime scene. We conclude that the evidence authorized the
jury to reject Parker’s self-defense claim, the trial court did not
commit reversible error in denying counsel’s motion to withdraw or
admitting the book into evidence, and Parker has not shown that
counsel was ineffective for stipulating to the authenticity of evidence
that was consistent with Parker’s self-defense claim. We therefore
affirm.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the trial
evidence showed the following. On the morning of February 28,
2021, Parker and his cousin, Michael Walker, made a trip from
Walker’s workplace to Stallings’s residence in Rockdale County and
then back to Walker’s workplace. They travelled in Walker’s gray
2013 Acura RDX, leaving at 8:23 a.m. and returning at 8:45 a.m.
Upon returning to Walker’s workplace, Walker went inside to begin
his shift, letting Parker use his vehicle.
Parker admitted at trial that he returned to Stallings’s
residence alone. Surveillance cameras from a house across the street
2
recorded the following. A dark-colored SUV drove down the road,
and then a male in a gray hooded sweatshirt, dark pants, and white
shoes walked across Stallings’s front yard from the direction where
the SUV had driven. Shortly thereafter, there was a sound of
approximately eleven gunshots, and the same male ran across the
front yard of the residence toward the SUV. At least two neighbors
heard the gunshots. One neighbor saw a male in a gray hooded
sweatshirt walking quickly towards a gray Acura SUV and saw the
vehicle leave. Another neighbor saw a man in a gray hooded
sweatshirt running across Stallings’s yard and carrying a gun that
had the handle wrapped in a plastic bag.
Police arrived shortly after and found Stallings lying on her
back in her carport and blood pooling around her. Stallings died from
four gunshot wounds. Police searched Stallings’s residence,
recovering nine 9mm casings in the carport and front yard. Police
did not locate any firearms or ammunition inside. Police located a
bullet and a bullet fragment at the scene, and a medical examiner
found two bullets inside Stallings’s body during the autopsy.
3
Police interviewed Donald Harris, Stallings’s boyfriend, later
that day, and Harris was “crying” and “very emotional” about the
shooting. Harris testified at trial that he was sleeping at Stallings’s
residence at the time of the shooting, was awakened by the
gunshots, but went back to sleep because people had hunted
previously in the area behind Stallings’s house.
Police also talked to Stallings’s son. After being told about the
Acura, Stallings’s son identified Walker as a suspect, as Walker had
previously sold marijuana to Stallings and him. Police investigated
but learned that Walker had an alibi, as surveillance footage showed
him at work at the time of the shooting.
Police discovered that a GPS tracker had been installed on
Walker’s vehicle and, accessing that system, located the vehicle at
an apartment complex in Decatur. Police eventually found Parker in
an apartment, detained him, and obtained consent to search the
apartment. During the search, police found a backpack in a hall
closet; the backpack contained a Taurus 9mm handgun with an
empty extended magazine and a book entitled “The 48 Laws of
4
Power.” A GBI firearms examiner determined that the recovered
handgun fired all nine casings found at the crime scene and one of
the bullets found in Stallings’s body. 2
During a custodial interview that was recorded and played for
the jury, Parker denied any involvement in the shooting and claimed
that Walker was the shooter and was wearing Parker’s clothing at
the time. But at trial, he admitted that he had lied to police about
his involvement, admitted that he shot Stallings, and claimed that
he did so in self-defense. Parker stated that during the initial trip to
Stallings’s residence, Walker got out of the vehicle and talked to
someone at the door. Parker said that he went back to the residence
to get money that Walker forgot. Parker also testified that he was
wearing the clothing shown in the surveillance videos and was
carrying the murder weapon.
According to Parker, when he got to Stallings’s residence the
second time, he knocked on the front door and went to the side door
2 The other bullet found in Stallings’s body was “very damaged,” so the
firearms examiner was unable to determine whether it was also shot by the
Taurus.
5
when he heard it open. Parker saw a male, whom he identified as
Harris, stick his head out and say something angrily. Parker said
that Harris then exited the residence with a firearm, followed by
Stallings. When Harris began to raise his firearm, Parker began
firing his gun and continued to fire as he ran back to the Acura.
Parker said that Harris definitely fired a shot. Parker also stated,
however, that because “it happened so quick,” he did not really know
if Harris raised a firearm. Parker said that he did not report the
shooting and had lied to police during his interview because he was
scared. Although Parker maintained that he remained scared at the
time of the police interview, he testified that he did not hide the
murder weapon because he did nothing wrong.
In rebuttal testimony, Harris denied ever seeing Parker prior
to trial, pointing a firearm at Parker, or seeing the shooting.
1. Parker argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict
him because the State failed to disprove his self-defense claim
beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.
When we consider whether the trial evidence was sufficient as
6
a matter of federal due process, “we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and evaluate whether a rational trier
of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.” Davenport v. State,
309 Ga. 385, 388 (1) (846 SE2d 83) (2020) (citing Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). In conducting that
review, “[w]e put aside any questions about conflicting evidence, the
credibility of witnesses, or the weight of the evidence, leaving the
resolution of such things to the discretion of the trier of fact.”
Goodman v. State, 313 Ga. 762, 766-767 (2) (a) (873 SE2d 150) (2022)
(citation and punctuation omitted).
“When a defendant presents evidence that he was justified in
using deadly force, the State bears the burden of disproving the
defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 147,
150 (1) (886 SE2d 818) (2023) (citation omitted). But “[i]t is the role
of the jury to evaluate the evidence and, when doing so, the jury is
free to reject any evidence in support of a justification defense and
to accept the evidence that the [act] was not done in self-defense.”
7
Id. (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Gibbs v. State, 309
Ga. 562, 565 (847 SE2d 156) (2020) (“[T]he question of justification
. . . is for the jury to decide.”).
We conclude that the trial evidence was sufficient to sustain
the verdicts. Parker admitted that he shot Stallings, but claimed
that he did so only in response to a purported threat from Harris.
His claim was based solely on his testimony, which the jury was
authorized to reject. Parker’s testimony was self-contradictory,
claiming at one point that Harris definitely fired a shot and at
another saying that he was not even sure if Harris raised a gun.
Parker’s testimony also conflicted with Harris’s testimony that he
did not point a gun at Parker and had not even seen Parker prior to
trial. And despite Parker’s claim that Harris fired a shot, the only
shell casings recovered from the crime scene were linked to Parker’s
gun. Under these circumstances, the jury was authorized to find
Parker not credible, resolve conflicts in the evidence against him,
and find him guilty of the crimes of which he was convicted. See
Taylor v. State, 303 Ga. 624, 626 (1) (814 SE2d 353) (2018) (“It is the
8
role of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine
the credibility of witnesses, and the resolution of such conflicts
adversely to the defendant does not render the evidence
insufficient.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
2. Parker argues that the trial court erred in denying trial
counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney of record. We disagree.
Trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on
February 28, 2022. At a hearing on March 1, 2022, the prosecutor
represented that the case had been continued from the court’s
January and February motions calendars, first for the State to
finalize the discovery it had sent to counsel, and then to allow
counsel adequate time to review the “voluminous discovery.” Trial
counsel confirmed that it was “a lot of data” in discovery, but said
Parker consented to his withdrawal, and said he believed Parker
qualified for indigent defense. Trial counsel argued that new counsel
would have plenty of time to prepare for trial. The prosecutor noted
in response that the case was set for a May trial, so new counsel
would have a “voluminous amount of work” to do to “catch up,” and
9
that even trial counsel conceded that there was a “considerable
amount” of discovery.
When asked why Parker was interested in appointed counsel
when he had hired counsel, trial counsel said that, although Parker
had originally been appointed counsel, Parker’s mother paid to
retain trial counsel, that Parker had no assets or income of his own,
and the family was unable to keep “their end of [the] fee
arrangement,” which was why he was seeking a withdrawal. Parker
told the court that he “ran out of money” since he had been
incarcerated for about a year and his mother could not afford to
continue paying the fees. Trial counsel said he was “[a]bsolutely”
more than willing to share the discovery with new counsel. The
court took the matter under advisement, and later denied the motion
without explanation. In reconsidering this issue as a part of Parker’s
motion for new trial, the court concluded that it did not err in
denying the motion to withdraw because granting it would have
unnecessarily delayed the trial.
Parker argues that the trial court made no findings in initially
10
denying counsel’s motion to withdraw representation and that there
was no basis for the court’s retroactive finding that procuring new
counsel would unnecessarily delay the trial. Neither of these
arguments prevail.
The decision whether to grant a motion to withdraw
representation falls within the sound discretion of the trial court.
See, e.g., Rouse v. State, 275 Ga. 605, 608-609 (9) (571 SE2d 353)
(2002); White v. State, 365 Ga. App. 101, 104-105 (877 SE2d 649)
(2022).
Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the trial court is
afforded substantial deference that allows for a range of
permissible outcomes, as long as that discretionary
decision is based on a correct understanding of the law
and facts. Accordingly, those findings will generally not
be disturbed as long as they are within the bounds of the
law, based on correct, relevant facts, and within the range
in which reasonable jurists could disagree.
Burns v. State, ___ Ga. ___, ___ (2) (907 SE2d 581) (2024) (citation
and punctuation omitted). An attorney’s request to withdraw will be
granted unless the judge determines that doing so “would delay the
trial or otherwise interrupt the orderly operation of the court[.]”
11
Uniform Superior Court Rule 4.3 (1).
To the extent Parker argues that the trial court’s initial
determination was erroneous because it did not include express
findings of fact or conclusions of law, this argument fails because
Parker points to no authority mandating a detailed order in this
context. Parker’s main argument is that the trial court’s later
finding is not supported by the record, but that too fails. Trial
counsel did not challenge the prosecutor’s representations at the
hearing that the discovery in this case was voluminous; indeed, trial
counsel stated that there was a “considerable amount” of it. Given
that trial counsel’s request to withdraw came two months before the
trial was scheduled to start, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that granting the request would delay the
trial. See Rouse, 275 Ga. at 608-609 (9) (upholding the trial court’s
decision to deny a motion to withdraw, in part, because it “was filed
within two months of the scheduled trial date”).
3. Parker argues that the trial court erred in admitting into
evidence the book entitled “The 48 Laws of Power.” Parker argues
12
that the evidence was not relevant to the issue of whether Parker
murdered Stallings, and even if relevant, its low probative value was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We
conclude that even if the court abused its discretion in admitting the
book into evidence, any such error was harmless.
A trial court’s non-constitutional evidentiary error requires
reversal of a defendant’s conviction “unless it can be deemed
harmless, meaning that it is highly probable that the error did not
contribute to the verdict.” Heard v. State, 309 Ga. 76, 90 (3) (g) (844
SE2d 791) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In
determining whether the error was harmless, we review the record
de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect reasonable
jurors to have done[.]” Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 80 (2) (c) (829
SE2d 142) (2019) (citation omitted).
Here, the admission of the book likely made very little
difference in the jury’s assessment of the evidence. As recounted
above, the evidence of guilt was strong, if not overwhelming. Parker
admitted to shooting Stallings, and his claim of self-defense was
13
very weak. Parker points to no portion of the book that was
particularly prejudicial. Although the State argued to the court that
the book was basically an instruction manual on how to deceive and
manipulate people, and that Parker’s actions reflected an intent to
deceive the police and the jury, there is nothing in the record
indicating that the State made this argument to the jury or
otherwise focused on the contents of the book at trial. The only
mention of the book before the jury was the prosecutor identifying it
as having been found in the backpack that also contained the
murder weapon.3 Even if the book was relevant to Parker’s
credibility, the book likely had very little impact compared to
Parker’s inconsistent statements and contradictory testimony. The
jury could assess Parker’s credibility and reject his self-defense
claim independent of Parker’s possession of the book. Because the
evidence of guilt was strong and the book had very little prejudicial
force, any error in admitting the book is not a basis for reversal. See
3 Although the book did go out with the jury during its deliberations, the
State did not mention the book during its closing argument.
14
Jivens v. State, 317 Ga. 859, 863-865 (2) (896 SE2d 516) (2023) (any
error in admission of demonstrative photographs of model firearms
was harmless given the compelling evidence of guilt and the limited
prejudicial effect from the photographs); Puckett v. State, 303 Ga.
719, 720-721 (2) (814 SE2d 726) (2018) (any error in admitting a
photograph showing several crime books on the defendant’s
bookshelf was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt);
Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 147, 155 (4) (805 SE2d 873) (2017) (any
error in allowing the State to engage in a demonstration regarding
the crime was harmless, as any effect that the demonstration may
have had on the jury “would have been minimal compared to the
effect of the properly-admitted evidence before it”).
4. Parker argues that trial counsel was ineffective for entering
into several stipulations regarding the authenticity of evidence that
showed Parker’s movements on the day of the crime and placed him
in the Acura. Parker argues that counsel’s lack of investigation and
his entering into stipulations resulted in the admission of
overwhelming evidence of Parker’s travels to and from and presence
15
at the crime scene. Parker argues that the jury would have been
more likely to acquit Parker without these stipulations. This claim
has no merit.
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must prove both that his counsel’s performance was
deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d
674) (1984). Deficient performance means that “no reasonable
lawyer would have done” what trial counsel did, while prejudice
means there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial
would have been different but for the deficient performance. Wells
v. State, 295 Ga. 161, 164 (2) (a) (758 SE2d 598) (2014). A defendant
claiming that his counsel was underprepared must show that more
preparation “might have produced [something] that would have
made a difference in the outcome of his trial.” Roberts v. State, 305
Ga. 257, 266 (5) (c) (824 SE2d 326) (2019) (citation omitted).
Parker makes no showing that any of the evidence in question
— surveillance recordings, a GBI fingerprint report, and GPS data
16
from the Acura — was inadmissible. Trial counsel explained at the
motion for new trial hearing that he had no reason to question the
authenticity of the evidence, the stipulations were “partly a
housekeeping matter,” and he had no reason to believe the relevant
witnesses would fail to show up at trial to authenticate the evidence
in question. Trial counsel stated that Parker understood the
stipulations and consented to them. Trial counsel also explained
that the stipulated evidence was consistent with Parker’s version of
events and self-defense claim. By challenging these stipulations,
Parker seems to suggest that counsel should have presented an
alternative defense that he was not present for the shooting. But
such a defense would not have been supported by the evidence and
was contrary to his self-defense claim, a defense that Parker had
discussed with counsel prior to trial as part of a review of his
potential trial testimony. See Gaston v. State, 307 Ga. 634, 637 (2)
(a) (837 SE2d 808) (2020) (“[I]t is rarely an unreasonable strategy to
not pursue defenses that logically conflict.”). Because Parker has not
shown that any of the evidence would have been inadmissible had
17
counsel not stipulated to its authenticity, and the evidence in
question was consistent with his self-defense claim, Parker cannot
establish that no reasonable attorney would have stipulated to the
evidence’s authenticity. Accordingly, his ineffective assistance claim
fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
18