Supreme Court of Florida
No. SC2022-1176
WILLIAM F. ROBERTS,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
June 25, 2026
PER CURIAM.
William Roberts appeals his conviction of first-degree murder
and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1),
Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
I
In the late evening of December 18, 2017, Roberts sent a text
message to a friend, Glen Reynolds, indicating he had an argument
with his then-girlfriend, Elizabeth Hellstrom. Roberts suggested
she had become unresponsive, but he was able to “bring her back.”
Reynolds noticed the text messages at 3:00 a.m. but could not get
in contact with Roberts. They connected later that day and Reynolds learned that Roberts had found thirty Klonopin pills
missing. When they spoke again later that afternoon, Roberts
revealed that Elizabeth was dead and had been placed in the trunk
of her car. Roberts also indicated he had a propane tank in the car,
which he planned to use to commit suicide. Reynolds reported the
matter to the Lake County Sheriff’s Office, which issued a be on the
lookout for Roberts, Elizabeth, and Elizabeth’s Toyota Camry.
Eventually, the Lake County Sheriff’s Office located the
camper shared by Roberts and Elizabeth, and later, Elizabeth’s
vehicle. During the well-check conducted in the camper, officers
noticed signs of blood in the sleeping area and that bedding had
been stripped. 1 After locating Elizabeth’s vehicle, deputies found
her naked body in the trunk wrapped in a white mattress pad and
covered by a blue tarp. In addition, crime scene investigators found
1. When Lake County deputies executed the search warrant for the camper, they found Elizabeth’s purse with identification information and two cylindrical type objects near the door. Other items found in the search included a box of butterfly bandages, an empty wrapper originally containing a butterfly bandage, and a security camera. Blood was located on three walls of the sleeping area of the camper. The two cylindrical objects found at the entrance to the camper were tested. Roberts’ DNA was found on one end of one of the objects and Elizabeth’s DNA was located on both ends of the same object.
-2-items including a shovel, a pickaxe, a propane tank, a yellow hose,
and a regulator valve to a propane tank. A butterfly bandage was
located on Elizabeth’s nose.
On February 5, 2018, Roberts was indicted for first-degree
murder. Three days later, the State filed a Notice of Intent to Seek
Death Penalty listing two statutory aggravators under section
921.141(6), Florida Statutes (2018): (1) that Roberts was previously
convicted of another capital felony, or of a felony involving the use
or threat of violence to the person, and (2) that the capital felony at
issue in the current case was especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel.
The trial court appointed Candace Hawthorne to represent
Roberts. Roberts initially waived his right to appear at jury
selection but appeared in the courtroom after a break. He
complained that he was unhappy with Hawthorne as his counsel.
He also expressed his desire to have a bench trial to speed up the
trial process. He presented the court with a signed waiver of his
right to a jury trial and a signed waiver of his presence. The trial
court conducted a lengthy colloquy with Roberts and determined
that both of his waivers were knowing and voluntary.
-3-The case proceeded as a bench trial, and the trial court
returned its verdict of guilty of first-degree premeditated murder.
At the outset of the penalty phase, Roberts instructed his counsel
not to present any mitigating evidence. The trial court conducted a
hearing and determined that Roberts had knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waived his right to present evidence of mitigation in
his defense, as well as his right to an advisory jury
recommendation. The penalty phase then proceeded as a bench
trial.
During the penalty phase proceedings, the State offered
evidence of statutory aggravating factors. The defense did not offer
evidence of mitigating circumstances, but the trial court ordered a
Pre-Sentence Investigation (PSI) to be prepared by the Florida
Department of Corrections. After receiving the PSI, the trial court
conducted a Spencer 2 hearing and received sentencing memoranda.
On July 28, 2022, the trial court pronounced its sentence of death.
In its sentencing order, the trial court gave great weight to two
statutory aggravators: (1) that Roberts was previously convicted of
2. Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
-4-another capital felony, or of a felony involving the use or threat of
violence to the person, and (2) that the capital felony at issue in the
current case was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
While Roberts had insisted that he did not want to present
mitigating evidence, the court still found some mitigation. For
statutory mitigators, the court gave some weight to Roberts’ age but
specifically found insufficient evidence to prove that Roberts was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at
the time of the murder, or that his capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law was substantially impaired. As to nonstatutory
mitigators, the trial court gave slight weight to Roberts’ emotional
disconnection from his father beginning in early childhood and little
weight to his drug and alcohol usage throughout his life. The trial
court gave some weight to his physical health and to his various
mental health conditions including antisocial personality disorder.
But the trial court found his educational background and
intelligence to be not mitigating and his allegations of a brain injury
as not established.
Roberts appealed his judgment and sentence of death, and we
-5-received briefing and held oral argument. Roberts v. State, No.
SC2022-1176, 2023 WL 8187322, at *1 (Fla. Nov. 27, 2023). In his
initial brief, Roberts asserted that the “trial court violated his due
process rights when it failed to conduct a competency hearing.” Id.
Upon consideration, we remanded for the trial court to determine,
nunc pro tunc, Roberts’ competency at the time of the trial. Id. We
further instructed that “should the trial court determine that an
evaluation of Roberts’ competency at the time of the trial cannot be
conducted in a manner that ensures Roberts’ due process rights,
then the trial court should proceed to adjudicate Roberts’ current
competency and, if he is competent, conduct a new trial.” Id.
The circuit court conducted a competency hearing on
September 6, 2024. Roberts was informed of the hearing and its
purpose to which he responded unfavorably and refused to attend
in person or virtually. The court determined that Roberts’ refusal to
attend the hearing was a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver
of his appearance, and the hearing proceeded.
Four witnesses3 testified that Roberts was competent at the
3. Dr. Prichard testified and is a forensic psychologist who participated in an earlier Spencer hearing to this case. Dr. Werner
-6-time of trial. The witnesses based their testimony on Roberts’
behavior in court, the sophistication of the documents he prepared
for the proceedings, psychological tests, and prior medical reports.
The witnesses also noted that Roberts had, by the time of trial,
successfully completed educational programs while in custody. The
circuit court, after considering the witness testimony, concluded
that Roberts was competent at the time of trial. Thereafter, we
received supplemental briefing regarding the sufficiency of the
hearing.
II
On appeal, Roberts presents several claims of trial court error
spanning his guilt and penalty phases and during the nunc pro
tunc competency determination. We address each in turn.
A
Roberts first argues that the trial court erred during the guilt
is a forensic psychiatrist and testified with the same conclusions as Dr. Prichard. Dr. O’Neal testified as an expert and came to the same conclusion as the other doctors after reading the transcripts and records. The Honorable G. Richard Singeltary testified as the final witness at the nunc pro tunc hearing after presiding over the pretrial motions, bench trial, Spencer hearing, and sentencing in this case.
-7-phase by admitting certain collateral crime, or Williams rule,4
evidence of text messages and verbal threats. As codified in section
90.404(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2018), the general rule for the
admission of collateral crime evidence is that “[s]imilar fact evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible when relevant to
prove a material fact in issue, including, but not limited to, proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident.” By contrast, collateral crime
evidence is “inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to
prove bad character or propensity” to commit the crime. Kopsho v.
State, 84 So. 3d 204, 212 (Fla. 2012) (quoting § 90.404(2)(a), Fla
Stat.). Even when admissible though, the State cannot make
collateral crime evidence a feature of trial, which occurs “when
inquiry into the collateral crimes ‘transcends the bounds of
relevancy to the charge being tried’ and the prosecution ‘devolves
from development of facts pertinent to the main issue of guilt or
innocence into an assault on the character of the defendant.’ ”
Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 945 (Fla. 2003) (quoting Williams v.
4. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959).
-8-State, 117 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1960)).
Here, as Roberts recognizes in his initial brief, trial counsel
conceded that the evidence at issue was admissible collateral crime
evidence but argued the evidence was so voluminous that it would
become a feature of the trial. For this reason, to the extent Roberts
argues the evidence did not qualify as collateral crime evidence, we
reject his argument as unpreserved and inconsistent with trial
counsel’s concession. See Scott v. State, 331 So. 3d 297, 299 (Fla.
2d DCA 2021) (“[A] party may not ordinarily take one position in
proceedings at the trial level and then take an inconsistent position
on appeal.” (alteration in original) (quoting Harper ex rel. Daley v.
Toler, 884 So. 2d 1124, 1135 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004))), disapproved on
other grounds by Saffold v. State, 429 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 2026); see
also Emmitt v. First Transit, Inc., 300 So. 3d 225, 229 (Fla. 4th DCA
2020) (holding that the defendant could not contend on appeal that
a certain inconsistent statement should have been admissible as
substantive evidence when he stipulated to the contrary below).
To the extent Roberts argues the collateral crime evidence
became a feature of trial, we likewise reject his argument. The trial
court correctly concluded that the evidence was introduced to
-9-complete the story of the case, rather than to prejudice the trial
court against Roberts. Evidence of his prior threats and acts of
violence against Elizabeth was relevant to completing the narrative
of their relationship. The admission of this evidence shed light on
the controlling, aggressive, and violent nature of their relationship,
as well as Roberts’ state of mind at the time of her murder.
Likewise, a review of the record establishes that the presentation of
evidence did not devolve from a development of facts into an assault
on Roberts’ character. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence.
B
In his next argument on appeal, Roberts argues that the trial
court erred when it rejected the statutory mitigator of Roberts’
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. We
review the trial court’s determination for abuse of discretion. Ault v.
State, 53 So. 3d 175, 186-87 (Fla. 2010).
Section 921.141(7), Florida Statutes, sets forth mitigating
circumstances for the death penalty. At issue here is subsection (f):
“[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his
or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements
- 10 -of law was substantially impaired.” We have explained that this
provision protects “that person who, while legally answerable for his
actions, may be deserving of some mitigation of sentence because of
his mental state.” See Perri v. State, 441 So. 2d 606, 608 (Fla.
1983) (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973)).
In determining whether this factor or any mitigating factor is
present, “[this Court’s] sole concern on evidentiary matters is to
determine whether there was sufficient competent evidence in the
record from which the judge and jury could properly find the
presence of appropriate aggravating or mitigating circumstances.”
Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327, 1331 (Fla. 1981). And this
specific factor has been explained as
[m]ental disturbance which interferes with but does not
obviate the defendant’s knowledge of right and
wrong . . . . Like subsection (b), this circumstance is
provided to protect that person who, while legally
answerable for his actions, may be deserving of some
mitigation of sentence because of his mental state.
Perri, 441 So. 2d at 608 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Dixon,
283 So. 2d at 10).
Roberts’ argument on this point rests primarily on his
characterization of Dr. Prichard’s “uncontested” testimony as
- 11 -establishing Roberts’ impairment in conforming his conduct to the
requirements of the law. But, in our view, Roberts overstates both
the nature and import of Dr. Prichard’s testimony. Although Dr.
Prichard acknowledged that no one except for Roberts was present
when the alleged murder took place, and Roberts may have lost his
temper, Dr. Prichard also testified that the inability to conform to
the requirements of the law would indicate some mental illness,
from which Roberts did not suffer. Dr. Prichard testified that “Mr.
Roberts had no mental health symptoms.”
Equivocating as he did, Dr. Prichard’s testimony did not
conclusively establish the statutory mitigator by the greater weight
of the evidence. And after listening to testimony from both doctors,
as well as observing evidence as to Roberts’ actions after the
murder, the trial court ascertained that any mental disturbance
was not significant enough to fulfill the requirements of this
statutory mitigator. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
doing so. See Ault, 53 So. 3d at 188 (holding that, based on a
review of the trial court’s sentencing order, the trial court appeared
to have considered all the evidence relating to two statutory
mitigators and properly exercised its discretion in rejecting both
- 12 -mitigators).
C
Roberts next argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in overruling defense objections to the presentencing report and Dr.
Prichard’s testimony because both relied on “non-statutory
aggravators.”
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.710(b) provides that if a
defendant in a capital case waives his right to present mitigation,
the trial court must order a comprehensive PSI to determine the
existence of mitigating circumstances. See Amends. to Fla. Rules of
Crim. Proc., 886 So. 2d 197, 199 (Fla. 2004). To be admissible
during the penalty phase, the State’s direct evidence needs to be
related to a statutory aggravating factor. Perry v. State, 801 So. 2d
78, 90 (Fla. 2001). The State cannot present evidence of
nonstatutory aggravating factors under pretense. Id. at 91. This is
true for bench trials as well as jury trials; “[j]ust as a jury should
not be exposed to evidence of impermissible aggravating factors, a
judge should not be permitted to consider them as part of the
evaluation process.” Oyola v. State, 158 So. 3d 504, 510 (Fla.
2015). Even so, the State “shall be provided a full opportunity to
- 13 -rebut the existence of mitigating factors urged by [the defendant]
and to introduce evidence tending to diminish their weight if they
cannot be rebutted.” Kormondy v. State, 845 So. 2d 41, 51-52 (Fla.
2003) (quoting Ellis v. State, 622 So. 2d 991, 1001 (Fla. 1993)).
Here, the trial court’s sentencing order demonstrates it
properly considered both the PSI and Dr. Prichard’s testimony.
First, the trial court properly considered the arrests and nonviolent
convictions listed in the PSI to rebut section 921.141(7)(a), Florida
Statutes. Second, Dr. Prichard’s testimony was specifically
introduced and considered in order “to rebut some of the mitigation
evidence presented in the PSI” and not to establish or to
demonstrate nonstatutory aggravation by pretense. Indeed, the
sentencing order references Dr. Prichard’s findings and gives the
testimony some weight only in the “mitigating circumstances”
section. The trial court did not mention Dr. Prichard’s findings as
nonstatutory aggravation in the “aggravating circumstances”
portion of its sentencing order, giving great weight only to the
statutory aggravating factors. Accordingly, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in overruling defense objections to the PSI
report and Dr. Prichard’s testimony.
- 14 -D
Roberts next challenges the constitutionality of the death
penalty.5 Roberts argues that the death penalty violates the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
because: (1) it violates evolving standards of decency, (2) lethal
injection categorically involves an unnecessary risk of pain as
similarly foreclosed by precedent, and (3) it results in unreliable,
arbitrary, and delayed penalties. We reject Roberts’ constitutional
attack as it is foreclosed by United States Supreme Court
precedent. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 869 (2015)
(“[B]ecause it is settled that capital punishment is constitutional,
‘[i]t necessarily follows that there must be a [constitutional] means
of carrying it out.’ ” (second and third alterations in original)
(quoting Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
463-64 (1947))); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008) (plurality
opinion) (“We begin with the principle, settled by Gregg [v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976)], that capital punishment is constitutional
5. Robert’s argument on this point appears to attack capital punishment generally as unconstitutional under the United States Constitution, rather than Florida’s death penalty scheme specifically.
- 15 -[and] [i]t necessarily follows that there must be a means of carrying
it out.” (citation omitted)).
E
Roberts also challenges the constitutionality of Florida’s
capital sentencing scheme. Roberts argues that because Florida
has eliminated comparative proportionality review and a heightened
standard of review for cases involving wholly circumstantial
evidence, the scheme fails to narrow the class of first-degree
murderers who are eligible for death. But “[w]e have repeatedly
rejected the argument that the death-penalty statute violates the
Eighth Amendment because it fails to sufficiently narrow the class
of murderers eligible for the death penalty.” Wells v. State, 364 So.
3d 1005, 1015 (Fla. 2023). We likewise reject Roberts’ argument on
this point.
F
Finally, through supplemental briefing received after the trial
court’s nunc pro tunc competency determination, Roberts argues
the trial court erred in finding him competent to stand trial. He
requests a new trial, claiming that the trial court could not conduct
a sufficient nunc pro tunc evaluation. In support of his argument,
- 16 -Roberts contends that the trial court considered medical records
and trial transcripts from a trial over two years before, thus relying
on “stale” medical records and a cold record, which requires
reversal.
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the
inherent difficulty in determining competency to stand trial
retrospectively, even under the most favorable circumstances. See
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 183 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383
U.S. 375, 387 (1966). As a result, the Supreme Court has reversed
convictions where it determined that a trial court could not make a
retrospective competency determination that would adequately
protect due process rights. See, e.g., Drope, 420 U.S. at 183 (where
six years elapsed from the trial date to the release of the Supreme
Court’s decision); see Pate, 383 U.S. at 387 (where elapse of six
years from time of trial was a significant factor in like
determination). We have likewise acknowledged the difficulties
retrospective competency determinations present. See Mason v.
State, 489 So. 2d 734, 737 (Fla. 1986). Even so, we have been clear
that there is no per se rule forbidding a nunc pro tunc competency
evaluation. Id. Instead, such proceedings are appropriate if the
- 17 -defendant can be assured due process of law. Id.
While we have been clear that nunc pro tunc competency
evaluations are permitted, our precedent is less clear as to when
such proceedings satisfy due process requirements. That said, in
Mason, we cited Martin v. Estelle, 583 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1978),
and United States v. Makris, 398 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. Tex. 1975), as
emblematic of satisfactory nunc pro tunc competency evaluations.
Those cases both characterize a retrospective competency
evaluation that comports with due process as a “meaningful” one—
one where the “quantity and quality of available evidence is
adequate to arrive at an assessment that could be labelled as more
than mere speculation.” Martin, 583 F.2d at 1374 (quoting Bruce v.
Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir. 1976)).
The factors that make a retrospective competency evaluation
meaningful vary from case to case. But we have suggested the test
may be satisfied when “there are a sufficient number of expert and
lay witnesses who have examined or observed the defendant
contemporaneous with trial available to offer pertinent evidence at a
retrospective hearing.” Mason, 489 So. 2d at 737 (quoting Martin,
583 F.2d at 1375); see also Mason v. State, 597 So. 2d 776, 778
- 18 -(Fla. 1992). “Likewise, the recollections of non-experts (including
the observations of the trial judge) who had the opportunity to
interact with defendant during the relevant period may in some
instances provide a sufficient base upon which a factfinder may rest
his decision that even a belated determination will be accurate.”
United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 905 (5th Cir. 1976). These
are just examples though. Just as we have rejected per se rules
forbidding nunc pro tunc competency determinations, we clarify
that these examples should not be read as establishing bright line
rules for the types of evidence that must be presented at
competency hearings. Instead, the meaningfulness test demands a
case-by-case analysis.
With that framework in mind, we evaluate Roberts’ argument
that his hearing was inadequate because “stale” records cannot
support a competency determination. In support he relies primarily
on Losada v. State, 260 So. 3d 1156 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018), and Elder
v. State, 268 So. 3d 995 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). In Losada, after
determining the trial court failed to make the requisite independent
finding of competency, the court likewise determined that the facts
of that case did not support a retroactive determination of the
- 19 -defendant’s competency to proceed. 260 So. 3d at 1163. In
explanation, the Third District Court of Appeal noted that the trial
court made its competency determination in December 2013, but
the defendant did not go to trial until April 2016. The court also
explained that none of the available experts examined or observed
the defendant “contemporaneous with the trial” and therefore any
competency hearing would not satisfy the “Florida Supreme Court’s
requirement.” Id. Distinguishing the case from those where courts
remanded for nunc pro tunc determinations, the Third District
further observed that the trial court never received any explanation
of the expert reports beyond defense counsel stating that they found
the defendant competent and the defendant was not present at the
competency hearing. Id. at 1164.
Elder turned primarily on the issue of the trial court exceeding
the scope of the appellate court’s mandate. 268 So. 3d at 999-1000. But the court later noted that even if its prior opinion had
permitted a new hearing, the evidence was insufficient to support a
finding of competency. Id. at 1000. Agreeing with the defendant,
the Second District Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge
determining retrospective competency had no personal experience
- 20 -with the defendant at the time of the plea as he was not the
presiding judge at that time. Id. at 1001. Thus, the trial judge’s
determination of retrospective competency was based entirely on his
current perception of the defendant and on counsel’s testimony. Id.
The court characterized those facts as “exactly the situation that
Dougherty [v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 676 (Fla. 2014)] warned
against: due process concerns resulting from the examination of a
cold record and speculation.” Id.
Neither Losada, Elder, nor the additional district court cases 6
cited by Roberts persuade us that the nunc pro tunc evaluation
here was insufficient. In contrast to these cases, retired Judge
George Singeltary testified that he presided over Roberts’ trial,
engaged in several colloquies with Roberts throughout the trial, and
if asked to decide at that time, would have found him competent.
6. In Auerbach v. State, 273 So. 3d 134, 139 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), “the only evidence available to the trial court in making a nunc pro tunc competency determination would be the doctors’ reports issued three years before trial.” In Aquino v. State, 290 So. 3d 525, 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), the court merely remanded for the trial court to decide whether a nunc pro tunc proceeding satisfied due process. These cases present no conflict here because of the quantity and quality of contemporaneous evidence that provides for meaningful review.
- 21 -In addition to Judge Singeltary’s testimony, Dr. Prichard, the
same expert who testified at Roberts’ Spencer hearing, opined that
there were sufficient data points with which to render an expert
opinion on Roberts’ competency at the time of trial. He recognized
that Roberts had refused to see any mental health practitioner for a
competency evaluation or any other reason. Even so, he reviewed
documents created during the four years leading up to trial as well
as hearing and trial transcripts and pro se pleadings. Dr. Prichard
observed that Roberts obtained his GED while in custody, never
took psychotropic mediations, and was assessed by mental health
staff with a “normal mental health status” sixteen times between
2020 and 2022.
Dr. Prichard likewise highlighted Roberts’ linear, logical, and
rational pro se arguments and “very competent” pretrial pro se
motions. He also noted the trial court’s extensive colloquy with
Roberts when Roberts waived mitigation during his penalty phase.
As to Roberts’ outbursts in court, Dr. Prichard characterized the
behavior as a personality characteristic rather than indicative of
incompetence. In the end, Dr. Prichard concluded that Roberts
“clearly appreciated the charges and the penalties” as well as the
- 22 -adversarial nature of the proceedings. This conclusion led to Dr.
Prichard’s ultimate opinion that Roberts was competent to proceed
at the time of trial.
Two other experts, Dr. Tonia Werner and Dr. Steven O’Neal,
were retained and testified. Both attempted a face-to-face
evaluation, but Roberts refused. Even so, each expert was provided
documents including the trial transcripts, pleadings, and
psychiatric documents. Upon review, Dr. Werner found that
Roberts did not exhibit any psychotic symptoms, disorganized
thought process, or illogical thinking that was indicative that there
was anything going on psychiatrically that would impair his ability
to make decisions. Dr. Werner opined that Roberts’ decision to
waive mitigation was rational based on his stated reason of not
wanting to put his family through the mitigation process. Dr.
Werner ultimately opined that at the time of trial Roberts was
competent to proceed.
Dr. O’Neal testified that there was nothing in the trial
transcripts to suggest any significant mental illness or cognitive or
perceptual problems. Dr. O’Neal opined that Roberts’ lack of
cooperation with counsel and the trial court was not an indication
- 23 -of incompetence. He received questions as to each prong of the
competency test and concluded Roberts was competent at the time
of his trial.
Taking this all into account, we are convinced that the
quantum and quantity of the evidence presented at the hearing was
such that the circuit court’s determination was not unduly
speculative. The circuit court had the benefit of a lay witness who
provided first-hand observations from the relevant period. In
addition, three expert witnesses, one of whom was retained around
the time of trial, provided their informed analyses of Roberts’
competency at the time of trial. Competent, substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s determination. Roberts was therefore
afforded due process. We affirm the trial court’s nunc pro tunc
competency determination.
III
We affirm Roberts’ conviction and sentence of death.
It is so ordered.
MUÑIZ, C.J., and LABARGA, COURIEL, GROSSHANS, FRANCIS, and SASSO, JJ., concur.
TANENBAUM, J., did not participate.
- 24 -NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Lake County,
G. Richard Singletary, Judge
Case No. 352017CF003368AXXXXX
Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, and George D.E. Burden, Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellant
James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Naomi Nichols, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee
- 25 -