RENDERED: JUNE 25, 2026
TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2023-SC-0513-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE JEAN CHENAULT LOGUE, RET. CIRCUIT JUDGE
NO. 85-CR-00334
VICTOR D. TAYLOR APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE KELLER
AFFIRMING
The Commonwealth of Kentucky seeks a determination of whether the
Fayette Circuit Court inappropriately granted a motion by Victor D. Taylor
(“Taylor”) to present his intellectual disability claim through a CR 1 60.02
motion. Specifically, it asks if a special exception exists to the “reasonable
time” restriction for motions under CR 60.02(d)-(f) for death-row inmates who
raise intellectual disability claims. For the reasons stated below, we hold that
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Commonwealth’s
motion to dismiss and permitting Taylor to litigate his intellectual disability
claim under CR 60.02.
1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Taylor’s placement on death row at the Kentucky State Penitentiary was
a consequence of his conviction in the 1986 capital murder trial on the
kidnapping, sodomy, and execution-style killing of two Trinity High School boys
who had been heading to a football game. He was convicted of first-degree
murder, two counts of first-degree kidnapping, two counts of first-degree
sodomy, and one count of first-degree robbery. 2 Taylor’s death sentences on
the kidnapping charges were vacated, and he filed a motion under RCr 3 11.42
to set aside the remaining judgments against him alleging violation of double
jeopardy protections. The RCr 11.42 motion was denied, and this Court
affirmed the denial. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 151 (Ky. 2001).
Later, Taylor filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to CR 60.02 alleging the
recantation of witness testimony, an issue with a juror, and a challenge to a
statute. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 175 S.W.3d 68 (Ky. 2005). This, too, was
denied.
Most recently, Taylor asserted his KRS 4 422.285 proceeding was
inappropriately dismissed without submitting DNA testing or holding an
evidentiary hearing to explain why the Commonwealth did not make the swab
at issue available for testing. As the slides were the items at issue and not the
original swabs (which had been consumed in testing), the parties indicated an
2 Taylor v. Commonwealth, 821 S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1990), cert. denied 502 U.S.
1100, and cert. denied 502 U.S. 1121 (1992).
3 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
4 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
understanding there were only two slides remaining, and the test results were
not favorable to the petitioner, the trial court correctly dismissed this petition.
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 692 (Ky. 2009) (affirming the dismissal of
the petition).
Before us now is a portion of Taylor’s October 17, 2022, omnibus motion.
Specifically, his CR 60.02 motion to vacate his death sentence asserts that, as
an intellectually disabled person, KRS 532.130-.140 and the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit the enforcement of his
two death sentences. The court directed the Commonwealth to file a response
regarding the procedural viability of this claim. That response asserted the
motion was untimely because Taylor’s level of intellectual functioning had been
known to his counsel since before his trial in 1986 and, therefore, should have
been presented through the prior post-conviction proceedings. A hearing on
the motion was held on July 18, 2023.
On October 3, 2023, the trial court denied the Commonwealth’s motion
to dismiss Taylor’s Motion to Vacate, determining Taylor “shall be permitted to
present his intellectual disability argument” pursuant to his CR 60.02 motion.
The Commonwealth raised this appeal, asserting that the trial court incorrectly
interpreted relevant legal precedent. The circuit court did not grant CR 60.02
relief. It denied the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss and allowed the claim
to proceed.
The issue is not whether Taylor has proven or can prove intellectual
disability, but whether the circuit court abused its discretion by permitting
3
Taylor to litigate that claim under a CR 60.02 within the context of his death
penalty conviction.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a defendant is entitled to the extraordinary relief provided by CR
60.02 is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court. Woodall v.
Commonwealth, 709 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Ky. 2024). We review that finding for an
abuse of discretion. Brown v. Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Ky.
1996). This Court has held that actions under CR 60.02 and “the exercise of
that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except for abuse.” Richardson v.
Brunner, 327 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Ky. 1959). The test for abuse of discretion is
whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d
941, 945 (Ky. 1999). Accordingly, we will affirm the lower court's decision
unless there is a showing of some “flagrant miscarriage of justice.” Gross v.
Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Ky. 1983).
CR 60.02(f) permits a claim for relief for “any other reason of an
extraordinary nature justifying relief.” The burden of proof in a
CR 60.02 proceeding falls squarely on the movant to “affirmatively allege facts
which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further allege special
circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.” McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948
S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997) (citing Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856).
4
III. ANALYSIS
Before addressing the merits, we first consider Taylor’s argument that
the Commonwealth improperly appealed from a nonfinal order. Taylor moved
to dismiss the appeal below, asserting the Fayette Circuit Court’s order merely
denied the Commonwealth’s procedural challenge and did not constitute an
appealable ruling. The Commonwealth responded and asserted jurisdiction
pursuant to KRS 22A.020(4), which permits the Commonwealth to take an
interlocutory appeal from an adverse ruling in a criminal case.
KRS 22A.020(4) authorizes the Commonwealth to appeal “an adverse
decision or ruling of the Circuit Court” when review is important to the correct
and uniform administration of the law. Kentucky courts have repeatedly
recognized the statute grants the Commonwealth a limited right to
interlocutory review unavailable to criminal defendants. See Commonwealth v.
Farmer, 423 S.W.3d 690, 692 (Ky. 2014); Commonwealth v. Nichols, 280
S.W.3d 39, 42 (Ky. 2009). The Commonwealth relies upon that authority here
because the circuit court rejected its claim that Taylor’s motion was
procedurally barred as untimely and successive.
We agree this appeal is properly before the Court. Had the circuit court
accepted the Commonwealth’s procedural arguments, Taylor’s intellectualdisability claim would have been dismissed in its entirety. Thus, the order
constituted an adverse ruling within the meaning of KRS 22A.020(4). See
Commonwealth v. Burkhead, 680 S.W.3d 877, 881–83 (Ky. 2023) (construing
“adverse ruling” broadly in the context of Commonwealth appeals). The issue
5
presented—whether CR 60.02 permits litigation of an intellectual-disability
claim under these circumstances—is a recurring question of substantial
importance to the administration of capital post-conviction proceedings in
Kentucky.
At the same time, the interlocutory posture of this case necessarily limits
the scope of our review. The circuit court did not adjudicate whether Taylor is
intellectually disabled, nor did it vacate his sentence or grant relief under CR
60.02. The court merely denied the Commonwealth’s motion to dismiss and
permitted Taylor to present evidence in support of his claim. It follows that the
only question presently before us is whether the circuit court abused its
discretion by allowing the litigation to proceed. We express no opinion
regarding the ultimate merits of Taylor’s intellectual-disability claim.
Taylor additionally argues portions of the Commonwealth’s reliance on
501 KAR 5 16:310 are unpreserved because the Commonwealth’s position
before the circuit court differed from the argument advanced on appeal. Taylor
notes the Commonwealth previously represented that the proposed
administrative regulations had “very little, if any, impact” on the procedural
arguments, while now asserting the regulations provide an adequate
mechanism for review of intellectual disability claims outside judicial
proceedings. To the extent the Commonwealth now characterizes the
regulations as effectively eliminating the need for present adjudication of
5 Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
6
Taylor’s CR 60.02 motion, that argument was not squarely presented below.
Nevertheless, because the Commonwealth consistently argued the claim was
procedurally barred as untimely and successive, and because the regulations
were discussed before the circuit court as part of the broader procedural
framework governing execution-related intellectual disability claims, we
address the issue insofar as it bears upon the Commonwealth’s preserved
timeliness and ripeness arguments.
The legal landscape concerning intellectual disability has vastly shifted
since Taylor’s trial ended in April of 1986. In 1990, Kentucky passed an
exemption statute that prohibits executing individuals with a serious
intellectual disability under KRS 532.140(1). This disability is defined as
“significant subaverage intellectual functioning,” further defined as “an
intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below,” “existing concurrently with
substantial deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the
developmental period.” KRS 532.130(2). Also significant, despite being a split
decision, was the United States Supreme Court holding in Ford v. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986).
Recently, relying on established United States Supreme Court
precedents, we emphasized procedural due process rights in Woodall, stating:
The only thing all three of these opinions have in common
regarding the required procedure, and thus the only process
that is necessarily due to a prisoner challenging his death
sentence due to insanity, is the opportunity to be heard. See
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 51
L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (“When a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be
7
viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds[.]’ ”
(quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15, 96 S.Ct.
2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). If there was any question
about this, in 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court reinforced that
“Ford requires, at a minimum, that a court allow a prisoner's
counsel the opportunity to make an adequate response to
evidence solicited by the state court.” Panetti v. Quarterman,
551 U.S. 930, 952, 127 S.Ct. 2842, 168 L.Ed.2d 662 (2007).
In Panetti, the Court declined to “address whether other
procedures, such as the opportunity for discovery or for the
cross-examination of witnesses, would in some cases be
required under the Due Process Clause.” Id.
Woodall v. Commonwealth, 709 S.W.3d 71, 79–80 (Ky. 2024), reh'g denied,
(Mar. 20, 2025), cert. denied, sub nom. Woodall v. Kentucky, 223 L. Ed. 2d 560
(Jan. 20, 2026).
Against that constitutional and procedural backdrop, we consider
whether the circuit court abused its discretion by permitting Taylor to proceed
under CR 60.02. Specifically, we address the Commonwealth’s arguments that
Taylor’s motion is impermissibly successive, untimely under the reasonabletime requirement of CR 60.02(f), and unnecessary in light of the Department of
Corrections’ amended administrative regulations governing pre-execution
medical review. Moreover, although the Commonwealth relies upon recent outof-state authority suggesting a categorical prohibition on the use of civil rule
relief in post-conviction proceedings, we decline to depart from Kentucky’s
longstanding jurisprudence recognizing the applicability of CR 60.02 in
criminal cases, as discussed more fully below.
8
SUCCESSIVE 60.02 MOTIONS
Relevant here, CR 60.02(f) provides relief from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for “any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief” . .
. “made within a reasonable time.” Rule 60.02(f) “may be invoked only under
the most unusual circumstances....” Howard v. Commonwealth, 364 S.W.2d
809, 810 (Ky. 1963); see also Cawood v. Cawood, 329 S.W.2d 569 (Ky. 1959).
This invoked relief should not be granted, pursuant to Rule 60.02(f), unless the
new evidence, if presented originally, would have, with reasonable certainty,
changed the result. See Wallace v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.2d 17 (Ky. 1959).
We acknowledge the finding of intellectual disability would, in fact, change the
result in accordance with KRS 532.140.
This Court has repeatedly made clear, CR 60.02 does not permit
successive post judgment motions, and the rule may be utilized only in
extraordinary situations when relief is not available on direct appeal or under
RCr 11.42. McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997). That
is, CR 60.02 is not intended merely as an additional opportunity to relitigate
the same issues which could reasonably have been presented by direct appeal
or an RCr 11.42 proceeding. Id.; Foley v, Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 884-85 (Ky. 2014). Unlike Foley, this case concerns a claim that, if proven, would
categorically prohibit execution under both the Eighth Amendment and KRS
532.140, rendering execution a “flagrant miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 886
(citing Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 858).
9
In Bowling, despite Atkins 6 having been decided six months before oral
argument was held on his habeas appeal to the Sixth Circuit, and not having
raised the issue during normal collateral review, this Court acknowledged one
reason for giving retroactive effect to Atkins is because it created a new
constitutional right. That would not be true if the conviction had been
obtained while Kentucky “had in effect at the time of the condemned person's
trial a statute affording the same right subsequently created by Atkins.”
Bowling v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. 2005) abrogated on other
grounds by Woodall v. Commonwealth, 563 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2018). While Bowling
recognized that constitutional rights may be waived by failure to timely assert
them, Bowling preceded the substantial evolution of intellectual disability
jurisprudence.
In Woodall v. Commonwealth, “[a]fter extensive collateral attack litigation
ensued in both state and federal court[,]” the trial court denied Woodall’s CR
60.02 motion without holding a hearing. 709 S.W.3d 71, 74 (Ky. 2024). On
appeal “[w]e held that a trial court’s determination of whether a criminal
defendant is intellectually disabled is ‘akin to a totality of the circumstances
test.’” 709 S.W.3d at 75 (citing Woodall, 563 S.W.3d at 6). We then reversed
the trial court’s order and remanded to the trial court to conduct a hearing on
Woodall’s potential intellectual disability pursuant to the guidelines we had laid
6 In Atkins v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits the execution of a person who has an intellectual disability. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
10
out. Woodall, 709 S.W.3d at 75. The constitutional right extends to the
application of Kentucky’s legal test for intellectual disability. Id.
Federal AEDPA 7 cases addressing successive habeas petitions are not
controlling in the interpretation of Kentucky’s independent post-conviction
framework under CR 60.02. 8
In our own case, Taylor’s 2005 motion asserted Taylor was entitled to a
new trial for two reasons and sought a declaratory judgment regarding a
statute. The first claim involved exculpation of guilt based on the recanted
testimony of his co-conspirator. The second claim involved a juror’s response
to questions during voir dire. Finally, he asserted an infringement on Supreme
Court rule-making prerogatives, negating the constitutionality of KRS 422.285.
In a split decision, the then Chief Justice Lambert affirmed the trial court’s
denial of Taylor’s CR 60.02 motion on all points and held the encroachment of
the statute was unconstitutional, but granted comity. At no point in Taylor’s
2005 CR 60.02 Motion was intellectual disability raised, despite Atkins having
been decided three years prior. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Because Taylor’s prior CR 60.02 motion did not litigate intellectual disability, it
was not inappropriate to raise it. While the claim is a successive CR 60.02
motion, it raises an issue that remains previously un-litigated, and which
7 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
8 The out-of-state authorities cited by the Commonwealth arise under materially
different statutory and procedural frameworks, including AEDPA successive-habeas standards not applicable to Kentucky CR 60.02 proceedings.
11
importantly implicates constitutional rights fundamental to procedural due
process and the Eighth Amendment.
TIMELINESS OF 60.02 MOTIONS IN DEATH PENALTY CASES
The Commonwealth’s timeliness argument fails because it treats Taylor’s
intellectual disability claim as an ordinary collateral attack. It is not. An
intellectual disability claim in a capital case does not merely challenge the
reliability of the conviction or the fairness of the original trial, but it challenges
the Commonwealth’s present constitutional authority to carry out a death
sentence. That distinction controls the timing analysis.
CR 60.02 motions ordinarily must be brought within a reasonable time,
and successive motions are disfavored, but this Court has treated intellectual
disability claims in capital cases differently, beginning with Atkins’ creation of a
categorical constitutional limitation on the State’s power to execute. Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Notably, Taylor was tried and sentenced before
Kentucky statutorily prohibited the execution of intellectually disabled
offenders and before Atkins made that prohibition a matter of federal
constitutional law. In that circumstance, the claim did not have the same legal
significance at trial that it has now. Additionally, there have been a series of
recognizable alterations to this prohibition through Kentucky case law
providing further direction. The most recent and comprehensive explanation
on the allowance of a hearing is a discussion of the Supreme Court case
Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305 (2015), found in our Court’s Woodall v.
Commonwealth, 709 S.W.3d 71, 82–83 (Ky. 2024), reh'g denied, (Mar. 20,
12
2025), cert. denied sub nom. Woodall v. Kentucky, 223 L. Ed. 2d 560 (Jan. 20,
2026). Like Victor Taylor,
Brumfield had been sentenced to death . . . at a time when
U.S. Supreme Court precedent permitted the imposition of
the death penalty on a person with an intellectual
disability. Id. at 308, 135 S.Ct. 2269. After the Supreme
Court rendered Atkins, Brumfield raised a post-conviction
Atkins claim, seeking to invalidate his death sentence due to
his intellectual disability. Id. at 309, 135 S.Ct. 2269. He
sought an evidentiary hearing and pointed to mitigation
evidence that was offered at his trial to support his request.
Id. Brumfield further sought funds to obtain experts to
provide evidence supporting his claim. Id. at 310, 135 S.Ct.
2269. The Louisiana trial court dismissed his petition
without holding a hearing or granting funds for Brumfield to
conduct additional investigation. Id. The trial court relied in
large part on the testimony presented at Brumfield's original
trial in making its determination. Id.
Brumfield filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court.
Id. at 311, 135 S.Ct. 2269. On review of that petition, the U.S.
Supreme Court noted that “in seeking an evidentiary hearing,
Brumfield was not obligated to show that he was
intellectually disabled, or even that he would likely be able to
prove as much. Rather, Brumfield needed only raise a
‘reasonable doubt’ as to his intellectual disability to be
entitled to an evidentiary hearing.” Id. at 320, 135 S.Ct. 2269.
The Court explained that “Brumfield had not yet had the
opportunity to develop the record for the purpose of proving
an intellectual disability claim. At his pre-Atkins trial,
Brumfield had little reason to investigate or present evidence
relating to intellectual disability.” Id. at 321, 135 S.Ct. 2269.
It even explained that at a trial “conducted prior to Atkins,
the defense's trial strategy may have been to shift the focus
away from any diagnosis of mental retardation.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court
held that “the state trial court should have taken into account
that the evidence before it was sought and introduced at a
time when Brumfield's intellectual disability was not at issue.
The court's failure to do so resulted in an unreasonable
determination of the facts.” Id. at 322, 135 S.Ct. 2269. After
a thorough review, we cannot conclude that Brumfield stands
for the proposition that any reliance on evidence introduced
13
at a pre-Atkins trial is reversible error in a hearing held
pursuant to Atkins. Instead, Brumfield merely held that the
evidence elicited at Brumfield's pre-Atkins trial was sufficient
to raise a reasonable doubt as to his asserted intellectual
disability and, as such, Brumfield was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on the matter. Id. at 321, 135 S.Ct. 2269.
Woodall, 709 S.W.3d at 82–83.
The Commonwealth argues Taylor waited too long because his
intellectual-functioning evidence was known decades ago. That argument has
merit in ordinary CR 60.02 litigation, but it is not dispositive here. The
question is not simply whether some evidence of low intellectual functioning
existed earlier; the question is whether the circuit court abused its discretion
by allowing Taylor to litigate a claim that, if proven, would establish that the
Commonwealth lacks authority to execute him. We hold the trial court’s
affording a defendant their Eighth Amendment rights in this manner is not an
abuse of discretion. We do not hold that intellectual-disability claims are
categorically exempt from CR 60.02’s reasonable-time requirement. Rather, we
hold only that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding this
particular claim warranted further adjudication.
The Commonwealth also asserts the lack of a signed death warrant
renders the motion premature. A death warrant may create urgency, but it
does not create the constitutional right, the circuit court’s authority, or the
need for adjudication. Requiring Taylor to wait until a warrant is issued would
undermine finality rather than promote it, because it would defer a potentially
14
dispositive constitutional issue until the eve of execution. Nothing in CR 60.02
Atkins, Woodall, or any Kentucky legal precedent requires such a delay.
Nor does Wilson v. Commonwealth compel reversal. 403 S.W.2d 710 (Ky.
1966). While Wilson involved a defendant under an active death warrant, no
part of Wilson held that an intellectual disability claim becomes cognizable only
after a warrant is signed. Rather, Wilson recognized that certain intellectual
disability claims may become viable only after conviction due to evolving
constitutional standards governing execution eligibility. The existence of a
death warrant in Wilson informed the procedural posture of that case, but it
did not create a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review.
The contention that Taylor’s claim is untimely because he did not raise it
earlier, while also contending that it is unripe because no execution date has
been set cannot simultaneously exist. A claim cannot sensibly be both too late
and too early where the asserted defect is the Commonwealth’s lack of
authority to execute. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting
that contradiction and allowing the claim to proceed.
Finally, we decline the Commonwealth’s invitation to characterize
Taylor’s “untimeliness” as mere gamesmanship or strategic delay. The circuit
court did not excuse dilatory conduct categorically, nor did it create a blanket
exemption from CR 60.02’s reasonable-time requirement for intellectual
disability claims. Instead, the court considered the unique constitutional
nature of the claim, the substantial evolution of governing law, and the
absence of any present execution warrant before concluding Taylor should be
15
permitted to proceed. Under these circumstances, permitting litigation of a
potentially dispositive constitutional bar to execution was not an abuse of
discretion.
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS RE: PRE-EXECUTION MEDICAL EXAMS
The Commonwealth further argues that the amended administrative
regulations governing pre-execution medical procedures adequately protect
Taylor’s constitutional rights and render present judicial review unnecessary.
Specifically, the Commonwealth relies upon 501 KAR 16:310, which provides a
mechanism for review of Department of Corrections medical records prior to
execution and permits suspension of an execution if indicators of intellectual
disability are identified. We disagree that these regulations replace or supplant
the judiciary’s constitutional obligation to adjudicate a properly presented
intellectual disability claim under CR 60.02.
The regulations provide for a review of “the department medical records”
in search of “[a] diagnosis of an intellectual disability” under certain provisions
including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), as defined by the
American Association on Intellectual disabilities, “other similar prevailing
medical standards and clinical guidelines,” or an “IQ test score of seventy-five
(75) or lower after adjustment for the applicable standard error of
measurement.” If “Serious Intellectual Disability” is found, the regulations
proceed under Section 4 of the statute requiring notification of certain persons
and suspension of execution “to allow procedures consistent with KRS
532.135.” That statute essentially requires submission of intellectual disability
16
evidence to be submitted prior to trial, allows the Commonwealth to rebut such
evidence, and leads us to KRS 532.140, which prevents execution of
defendants with serious intellectual disabilities or mental illness and
designates authorized sentences.
Relying upon these regulations as a safety valve in this instance is error.
These regulations are found under the Justice and Public Safety Cabinet –
Department of Corrections “Pre-execution medical actions” administrative
regulations. While the ultimate prevention of execution of a person with a
serious intellectual disability seems likely, the Eighth Amendment is not
protected by our judicial system if we abdicate our role to uphold that
protection within our court system.
Here, the Commonwealth would like us to delegate this determination to
the Department of Corrections, whose procedures do not have the clarity of due
process and protections of legal jurisprudence. In fact, they are only required
to review medical records. This concern is especially significant in light of our
recent decision in Woodall v. Commonwealth, which held there is
no reason why this same analysis (the procedural due process requirements of
a post-conviction attack on a death sentence due to insanity) does not apply to
a post-conviction attack on a death sentence due to intellectual disability. 709
S.W.3d 71, 80 (Ky. 2024). We recognized that the procedural due-process
protections applicable to competency-for-execution proceedings likewise apply
to post-conviction intellectual disability claims because “[t]he same interests
are at stake, and the determinations made by the trial court are sufficiently
17
similar.” Id. at 80. We concluded in Woodall that due process requires a
meaningful opportunity to be heard before the Commonwealth may carry out a
death sentence where intellectual disability is credibly alleged. The trial court
was required to provide Woodall with an opportunity to be heard in order for
his due process rights to be vindicated with regard to that claim. 9 The
Department of Corrections’ administrative review process cannot substitute for
that judicial determination.
The legal landscape continued to develop after Atkins when in Hall v.
Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a rigid and bright-line IQ test score
cut-off for determining intellectual disability as inconsistent with prevailing
clinical standards. 572 U.S. 701, 723 (2014). Finally, in Moore v. Texas, the
U.S. Supreme Court further emphasized that courts must be guided by current
medical and clinical standards when evaluating intellectual disability in capital
cases. 581 U.S. 1, 15 (2017). These decisions collectively demonstrate that
intellectual disability determinations require nuanced, individualized judicial
consideration—not merely administrative screening.
To emphasize, while 501 KAR 16:310 may provide an additional
procedural safeguard against unconstitutional execution, it is not a substitute
for judicial adjudication of a properly presented CR 60.02 intellectual disability
claim. The circuit court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by permitting
9 In Woodall’s case, he was given the opportunity and the trial court found he
did not prove that he was intellectually disabled by a preponderance of the evidence to be supported by substantial evidence. Woodall, 709 S.W.3d at 86.
18
Taylor to proceed with litigation of that claim notwithstanding the existence of
the amended regulations.
We recognize the Commonwealth’s substantial interest in finality,
particularly in capital litigation. But the prohibition against executing
intellectually disabled individuals concerns the state’s authority to impose the
punishment itself, not the State’s authority to sentence. Where a litigant
presents a colorable claim that execution is constitutionally barred, heightened
reliability necessarily tempers ordinary finality concerns.
KENTUCKY’S RECOGNITION OF CR 60.02 IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
The Commonwealth’s supplemental reliance upon State v. Hill is
unpersuasive because Ohio’s post-conviction framework differs materially from
Kentucky’s longstanding jurisprudence regarding the application of civil rules
in criminal proceedings. __ N.E.3d __, 2026 WL 1102912 (Ohio, Apr. 23, 2026).
In Hill, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that Ohio’s post-conviction statute
provided the “exclusive remedy” for collateral attacks and rendered Ohio Civil
Rule 60(B) “manifestly inapplicable” to post-conviction proceedings. Kentucky,
however, has long taken the opposite approach. Our RCr 13.04 expressly
provides that “[t]he Rules of Civil Procedure shall be applicable in criminal
proceedings to the extent not superseded by or inconsistent with these Rules of
Criminal Procedure.” (emphasis added).
Consistent with that directive, Kentucky courts have repeatedly
recognized the applicability of CR 60.02 in criminal and post-conviction
proceedings. See Gross, 648 S.W.2d at 856 (recognizing CR 60.02 as part of
19
Kentucky’s organized structure for post-conviction review); McQueen, 948
S.W.2d at 416 (acknowledging CR 60.02 relief remains available for
extraordinary claims not otherwise subject to review); Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 884
(court did not abuse its discretion denying a motion for failure to bring within a
“reasonable time” when twenty years had passed); and Woodall, 709 S.W.3d at
76 (acknowledging the court’s lack of discretion regarding subjecting an
intellectually disabled person to the death penalty). Unlike Ohio’s statutory
scheme, Kentucky’s criminal rules expressly contemplate limited application of
the civil rules, and Kentucky precedent has long recognized CR 60.02 as an
extraordinary procedural mechanism within capital post-conviction litigation.
Hence, Hill neither controls nor alters our analysis.
This case presents the type of extraordinary circumstance contemplated
by CR 60.02(f). Taylor does not merely challenge the fairness of his trial or
seek relitigation of previously adjudicated issues; rather, he asserts that the
Commonwealth is constitutionally prohibited from executing him at all. Since
Taylor’s conviction became final, both Kentucky law and federal constitutional
jurisprudence have substantially evolved regarding intellectual disability and
capital punishment, including Atkins, Hall, Moore, and this Court’s decision in
Woodall. A claim that the State lacks lawful authority to impose the death
penalty implicates the heightened reliability demanded in capital proceedings
20
and falls within the narrow category of claims warranting extraordinary postconviction review. 10
IV. CONCLUSION
We do not decide today whether Taylor is intellectually disabled. We
decide only that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by allowing him
to present that claim. Because Taylor’s motion alleges a constitutional bar to
execution, and because Kentucky precedent recognizes CR 60.02 as an
appropriate vehicle for such a claim, the circuit court’s ruling was not
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. The
order of the Fayette Circuit Court is affirmed.
All sitting. Lambert, C.J.; Bisig, Goodwine, and Nickell, JJ., concur.
Conley, and Thompson, JJ., concur in result only.
10 In reference to the timeliness of Mr. Taylor’s 60.02 petitions, this holding is
limited to those death row inmates who were sentenced pre-Atkins and who have not otherwise received an intellectual disability hearing.
21
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Russell M. Coleman
Kentucky Attorney General
Matthew R. Krygiel
John H. Heyburn
Assistant Attorneys General
Thomas Allen Van DeRostyne
Jefferson County Attorney
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
David M. Barron
Assistant Public Advocate
22