NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: February 18, 2025
S25A0408. GUYTON v. THE STATE.
MCMILLIAN, Justice.
Appellant V’Daul Devontae Makik Guyton was convicted of
malice murder and other charges in connection with the shooting
death of Taurus Thurmond. 1 On appeal, Guyton argues that the
evidence was insufficient to support his malice murder conviction
1 Thurmond died on May 11, 2021. On May 27, 2021, a Douglas County
grand jury indicted Guyton for malice murder (Count 1), three counts of felony
murder (Counts 2-4), armed robbery (Count 5), aggravated assault (Count 6),
aggravated battery (Count 7), hijacking a motor vehicle (Count 8), theft by
taking (Count 9), tampering with the operation of an electronic monitoring
device (Count 10), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony (Count 11). At a trial from February 27 through March 2, 2023, the jury
found Guyton guilty of all counts. On March 7, 2023, the trial court sentenced
Guyton to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice
murder, plus various consecutive sentences for Counts 5 and 8-11; the other
counts were vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing purposes.
Guyton filed a timely motion for new trial on March 9, 2023, which was
amended by new counsel on June 5, 2024. Following a hearing on August 15,
2024, the trial court denied Guyton’s motion for new trial, as amended, on
September 3, 2024. Guyton filed a timely notice of appeal on September 23,
2024, and the case was docketed to the term of this Court beginning in
December 2024 and thereafter submitted for a decision on the briefs.
and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective
assistance by failing to object to: (a) the State repeatedly showing
crime-scene photographs of Thurmond’s body without warning and
(b) certain testimony regarding Guyton’s criminal past. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
The evidence presented at trial showed the following.
Thurmond had a reputation for helping previously incarcerated
people. According to his roommate, who had been previously
incarcerated and helped by Thurmond, “[Thurmond] acquired a lot
of friends in custody. Cause he – he been incarcerated himself and
he done met a lot of people in and out of jail,” and “he help[ed] a lot
of people that’s incarcerated.” In late April 2021, Thurmond bailed
Guyton out of jail, the two began a romantic relationship, and
Thurmond allowed Guyton to live with him and share his room.
During their short relationship, the two took a trip together to
Florida to visit family and friends of Thurmond, and during that
trip, a family friend who was conversing with Guyton heard him
mutter that “he was going to kill [Thurmond].” About a week later,
2
on the evening of May 10, 2021, Thurmond told his sister over
Facetime that he “felt used,” was “tired of . . . being taken advantage
of,” and “was going to end the relationship with [Guyton].”
Thurmond’s sister testified that she could see Guyton within earshot
of Thurmond during their call.
The next morning, Thurmond’s roommate left the home
because the roommate learned that he had to go re-register as a sex
offender at the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office.2 When the
roommate returned home, he noticed that Thurmond’s vehicle was
gone, found Thurmond’s body in bed with blood on the sheets, and
called 911. No one else was at home. Law enforcement responded
and discovered that Thurmond was dead with three gunshot wounds
to his head; bullets were recovered from Thurmond’s pillow and his
body.
Officers discovered that Guyton was supposed to be wearing an
2 In the course of this testimony, the roommate also testified that he had
first spoken to Guyton about two weeks before when Guyton had telephoned
from jail and that he first met Guyton soon after when Guyton, having been
bailed out by Thurmond, moved in.
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ankle monitor and that his monitor had been cut off at 10:43 a.m. on
the day that Thurmond was killed. Based on GPS data retrieved
from Guyton’s ankle monitor, it was at the home he shared with
Thurmond the morning of May 11, but left the home shortly after
10:00 a.m., transmitting again from a nearby Walmart at 10:36 a.m.
Officers obtained surveillance footage from the Walmart, which
showed Guyton there buying scissors. Thurmond’s vehicle was
equipped with a tracking system, and law enforcement found it in
Mississippi in Guyton’s possession later that day. Guyton was also
found in possession of scissors and the Walmart receipt for them;
Thurmond’s bank and credit cards; over $5,000 in cash, along with
ATM receipts from that day; and Thurmond’s gun, a Taurus 9mm.
A firearms examiner testified at trial that Thurmond’s firearm,
which was found in Guyton’s possession, fired the bullets recovered
from the crime scene. The DNA of Thurmond, Guyton, and an
unknown third person was also discovered on the firearm.
1. Guyton contends that the evidence presented at trial was
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insufficient to support that he shot Thurmond with malice.3
Specifically, he argues that evidence that Thurmond shared his
room with Guyton, introduced Guyton to friends and family
members, and invited Guyton on an out-of-town trip showed that
Guyton and Thurmond had a close, loving, and devoted relationship,
not that Guyton had any malice toward Thurmond. We disagree.
When this Court evaluates the constitutional sufficiency of the
evidence, “we review whether the evidence presented at trial, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, enabled the
jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the
crimes of which [he] was convicted.” Fitts v. State, 312 Ga. 134, 141
(3) (859 SE2d 79) (2021) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)). “This limited
review leaves to the jury the resolution of conflicts in the evidence,
the weight of the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and
3 Because Guyton only argues on appeal that the evidence was
insufficient to support his malice murder conviction, we do not address the
sufficiency of the evidence of his other convictions. See Davenport v. State, 309
Ga. 385, 399 (4) (b) (846 SE2d 385) (2020) (ending practice of sua sponte
considering sufficiency of the evidence in non-death penalty cases).
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reasonable inferences to be made from basic facts to ultimate facts.”
Muse v. State, 316 Ga. 639, 647 (2) (889 SE2d 885) (2023) (citation
and punctuation omitted).
OCGA § 16-5-1 provides in relevant part:
(a) A person commits the offense of murder when he
unlawfully and with malice aforethought, either
express or implied, causes the death of another
human being.
(b) Express malice is that deliberate intention
unlawfully to take the life of another human being
which is manifested by external circumstances
capable of proof. Malice shall be implied where no
considerable provocation appears and where all the
circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart.
“In other words, malice may be inferred from evidence of
conduct that demonstrates such a reckless disregard for human life
as to show an abandoned and malignant heart.” Allaben v. State,
315 Ga. 789, 792-93 (1) (885 SE2d 1) (2023) (citation and
punctuation omitted). “The malice necessary to establish malice
murder may be formed in an instant, as long as it is present at the
time of the killing,” Benton v. State, 305 Ga. 242, 244 (1) (a) (824
6
SE2d 322) (2019), and “[t]he issue of whether a killing is intentional
and malicious is for the jury to determine from all the facts and
circumstances.” Allaben, 315 Ga. at 793 (1) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
Guyton’s argument that the evidence showed only a loving
relationship and therefore failed to prove malice ignores that:
Guyton threatened to kill Thurmond; Guyton was able to hear
Thurmond telling his sister the night before his murder that he
planned to end his relationship with Guyton; Thurmond was shot
multiple times in the head while sleeping in his bed; Guyton cut off
his ankle monitor after Thurmond’s murder and was later found in
Mississippi; and Guyton was found in possession of Thurmond’s
vehicle, his firearm (which fired the fatal shots), and his debit and
credit cards and thousands in cash along with ATM receipts. This
evidence of Guyton’s conduct, motives, premeditation, and flight
after the murder was more than sufficient to authorize a rational
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt not only that Guyton
intended to cause Thurmond’s death, but also that he did so with an
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abandoned and malignant heart, thus satisfying the element of
malice. See, e.g., White v. State, 303 Ga. 533, 535 (1) (813 SE2d 592)
(2018) (where evidence showed that husband threatened to kill his
wife if she left him, struck her multiple times in the head with a
hammer, and tried to cover up her death, it was sufficient to prove
malice and supported husband’s conviction for malice murder);
Walden v. State, 289 Ga. 845, 846 (1) (717 SE2d 159) (2011)
(evidence sufficient to support malice murder conviction where it
showed “not only the nature of the gunshot wound, but also [the
wife’s] motive to harm [her husband], and her prolonged coverup”).
2. Guyton also asserts that his trial counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to: (a) the
prosecutor repeatedly showing gruesome photos of Thurmond’s body
without warning, and (b) certain testimony about Guyton’s criminal
past. For the reasons discussed below, these claims also fail.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
Guyton must show both that his counsel’s performance was deficient
and that such deficiency prejudiced his defense. See Strickland v.
8
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (III) (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674)
(1984). To establish prejudice, Guyton “must prove that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s deficiency, the
result of the trial would have been different.” Bates v. State, 313 Ga.
57, 62 (2) (867 SE2d 140) (2022). And if Guyton fails to make a
sufficient showing on either the deficiency or the prejudice prong,
we need not address the other prong. See Washington v. State, 313
Ga. 771, 773 (3) (873 SE2d 132) (2022).
(a) Photos of Thurmond. During Guyton’s trial, the court
asked counsel to approach the bench, where the court said the
following:
On multiple occasions the State’s Counsel has
thrown pictures of the deceased on the screen without
warning people in the audience that they are about to do
so. These folks are gasping at the pictures, they’re
jumping up, they’re leaving the room.
They are conducting themselves appropriately, they
are not yelling, screaming, or hollering. But they’re
reacting to this. And I am going to instruct the State that
the State will warn the members of the audience before it
does that again. I am concerned for the emotional wellbeing of these family members. And I am also concerned
about the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
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Maybe the members of the victim’s family could
control their reactions if they had a warning. And it’s
happened numerous times. So I am ordering the State
not to do that again.
Guyton argues that the State’s “continuous showing of
gruesome photos of the decedent without warning, causing members
of the audience to emotionally react,” was unfairly prejudicial under
OCGA § 24-4-403, 4 and violated Guyton’s right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury under the United States Constitution. Guyton
contends therefore, that by failing to object (presumably before the
trial court sua sponte instructed the State to provide warnings), trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
Pretermitting whether trial counsel performed deficiently in
this respect and that, upon objection, the trial court would have
4 OCGA § 24-4-403 provides: “Relevant evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” See
also State v. Burns, 306 Ga. 117, 126 (3) (829 SE2d 367) (2019) (“The major
function of Rule 403 is to exclude matter of scant or cumulative probative force,
dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.”) (citation and
punctuation omitted).
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instructed the State sooner to provide warnings before showing the
otherwise admissible photographs, we conclude that Guyton has not
carried his burden of establishing a reasonable probability that had
trial counsel objected, the result of Guyton’s trial would have been
different. The evidence against Guyton—already discussed above—
was strong. Guyton had recently been bailed out of jail by
Thurmond, with whom he had a romantic relationship, and Guyton
depended on Thurmond for a place to live and other assistance;
Guyton had threatened to kill Thurmond shortly before his murder;
Thurmond confided to his sister the night before his murder that he
was planning on ending his relationship with Guyton—a
conversation that took place while Guyton was within earshot; and
Guyton cut off his ankle monitor almost immediately after
Thurmond’s murder and fled to Mississippi, where he was found
with Thurmond’s bank cards and cash, vehicle, and, most notably,
the murder weapon.
Given this strong evidence of Guyton’s guilt and the relatively
low level of prejudice that may stem from the State showing
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concededly admissible crime scene photos to the jury repeatedly
without warning—a practice that the trial judge addressed sua
sponte—Guyton has not established a reasonable probability that
but for his counsel’s failure to object, the result of his trial would
have been different. 5 See Stuckey v. State, 301 Ga. 767, 772 (2) (b),
773 (2) (d) (804 SE2d 76) (2017) (“Pretermitting whether some or all
of these photos [of the victim in life] would have been excluded upon
objection . . . we conclude that Appellant cannot demonstrate
prejudice in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.”);
Sullivan v. State, 301 Ga. 37, 41 (2) (b) (799 SE2d 163) (2017)
(holding, where appellant argued counsel was ineffective for failing
to object to inflammatory photos of appellant holding a gun, that
“[appellant] cannot show that, had counsel objected, the
photographs would have been excluded, or that, but for counsel’s
5 Guyton also states in his appellate brief that trial counsel did not move
for a mistrial or request a curative instruction, but he does not argue those
points beyond that single mention of them. We conclude that any ineffective
assistance of counsel claims based on those grounds, aside from lacking merit,
have been abandoned. See Supreme Court Rule 22 (1) (“Any enumerated error
or subpart of an enumerated error not supported by argument, citations to
authority, and citations to the record shall be deemed abandoned.”).
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alleged error, the outcome of his trial would have been different, as
the evidence against [appellant] was overwhelming”). Because
Guyton has not carried his burden of showing prejudice under
Strickland, this claim fails.
(b) Guyton’s Criminal Past. During the State’s direct
examination of the roommate at trial, the following exchange
occurred:
Q. . . . When did you first meet the defendant?
A. Uh – let me see, bout two weeks before the murder.
Q. Okay. And did you know of him before he came to live
there?
A. Not personally. I just conversed with him over the
phone.
Q. Okay. And where was he when you were talking to
him on the phone?
A. In the county jail, in I think Dublin.
Later during the State’s direct examination of one of the
investigators, in explaining how police first identified Guyton as a
suspect, the investigator testified that Thurmond “had recently
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bonded [Guyton] out of jail down in Houston County.”
Guyton argues that these mentions of his prior incarcerations
were impermissible negative character evidence that biased the jury
against him. See OCGA § 24-4-404 (a) (“Evidence of a person’s
character or a trait of character shall not be admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion” except for circumstances not applicable here). Guyton
contends therefore, that by failing to object, trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance.
Again, pretermitting whether trial counsel performed
deficiently, Guyton has not carried his burden of establishing a
reasonable probability that had his trial counsel objected, the result
of Guyton’s trial would have been different. The jury was already
aware that Guyton had been previously arrested and required to
wear an ankle monitor due to Count 10, and evidence of his cutting
off the monitor almost immediately after the murder to flee was
intrinsic to the murder and properly admitted. See Jenkins v. State,
313 Ga. 81, 88 (3) (868 SE2d 205) (2022) (evidence that appellant
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evaded a police roadblock after crimes was “properly admitted as
flight evidence, which is generally intrinsic”).
Moreover, other witnesses testified without objection and
without argument on appeal that Guyton had been to jail.
Thurmond’s friend testified that Thurmond told her that he “got
[Guyton] out of the jail.” And Thurmond’s cousin testified that
Guyton had mentioned to her that he’d been experiencing
“temptation after temptation” since getting “out of jail.” Later in his
testimony, the roommate also mentioned that Thurmond had
recently bailed out Guyton. Because the testimony mentioning
Guyton’s previous incarcerations on which he bases his
ineffectiveness claim was largely cumulative of other uncontested
evidence about him being previously incarcerated, Guyton has not
established a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s failure to
object to the roommate’s testimony about Guyton talking to him on
the phone from jail in Dublin or the investigator’s testimony about
Guyton bonding out of the Houston County jail, the result of his trial
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would have been different.6 See Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322, 330 (3)
(b) (877 SE2d 202) (2022) (“[B]ecause the [complained of] testimony
was cumulative of other evidence presented at trial and the
admission of which [appellant] does not contest, . . . its admission
did not prejudice [appellant].”); Koonce v. State, 305 Ga. 671, 675 (2)
(c) (827 SE2d 633) (2019) (no prejudice from failure to object or move
for a mistrial based on certain testimony that was “largely
cumulative of other, unobjected-to evidence of the same facts”).
Accordingly, Guyton has not carried his burden of showing prejudice
under Strickland, and this ineffectiveness claim fails as well. 7
6 Guyton also again notes, without argument, that his trial counsel never
moved for a mistrial or asked for a curative instruction. And he mentions in
his appellate brief with no argument that trial counsel gave no strategic reason
for not moving to sever Count 10 (tampering with his ankle monitor) from the
rest of the counts. We conclude that any ineffective assistance of counsel
claims based on those grounds, aside from lacking merit, have been abandoned.
See Supreme Court Rule 22 (1).
7 Guyton does not argue that the deficiencies we have assumed for
purposes of analysis and determined to individually lack prejudice
cumulatively resulted in prejudice mandating a new trial, and in light of the
other evidence in the case, and from our review of the record, we discern no
cumulative prejudice warranting reversal. See Reed v. State, 314 Ga. 534, 554
(8) n.18 (878 SE2d 217) (2022); see also State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 18 (1) (838
SE2d 808) (2020) (“[A] defendant who wishes to take advantage of the
[cumulative error rule] should explain to the reviewing court just how he was
prejudiced by the cumulative effect of multiple errors.”).
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Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
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