NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: March 4, 2025
S25Y0220. IN THE MATTER OF CHRISTOPHER RYAN
BREAULT.
PER CURIAM.
This is the second appearance before the Court of this
disciplinary matter, arising from the conduct of Christopher Ryan
Breault (State Bar No. 207142), a member of the State Bar of
Georgia since 2013. The conduct underlying this matter occurred
while Breault was litigating a personal injury case in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, resulting
in Breault being charged with violating Rules 1.1, 1.6 (a), 1.16 (a) (3)
and 3.5 (d) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”)
found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).1 Following the State Disciplinary
1 The maximum penalty for a single violation of Rules 1.1 and 1.6 (a) is
disbarment, while the maximum penalty for a single violation of Rules 1.16 (a)
(3) and 3.5 (d) is a public reprimand.
Board’s filing of a formal complaint against Breault, a Special
Master was appointed to oversee the matter. The Special Master
held an evidentiary hearing, and in October 2022, the Special
Master entered his report and recommendation, finding that
Breault had violated the provisions of the GRPC with which he was
charged and recommending that he be suspended for a period of one
month. The State Disciplinary Review Board (“Review Board”) then
recommended that this Court adopt the Special Master’s
recommendation.
However, after reviewing the record, this Court concluded that
the Special Master failed to adequately analyze Breault’s conduct
under the framework found in the American Bar Association
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1992) (“ABA
Standards”), rejected the sanction recommendation, and remanded
the case to the Review Board with direction to remand the case to a
Special Master to conduct a full analysis of Breault’s conduct under
the ABA Standards and to issue a new recommendation. See In the
Matter of Breault, 318 Ga. 127, 141 (897 SE2d 385) (2024) (“Breault
2
I”). Specifically, we instructed that this Special Master should (1)
conduct a full analysis of the ABA standards, including the duties
violated, Breault’s mental state, the potential or actual injury
caused by Breault’s misconduct, and any aggravating or mitigating
factors that might justify an upward or downward departure from
the appropriate sanction; and (2) provide a new recommendation as
to the appropriate discipline to be imposed. See id. Additionally, we
instructed that the Special Master should assess whether any
exceptions to Rule 1.6 (a) were applicable. See id. at 138.
Upon remand, Thomas Cauthorn, III, was appointed as the
new Special Master, and held a hearing to receive arguments related
to the ABA standards and appropriate discipline. On April 16, 2024,
the Special Master issued his final report and recommendation, in
which he concluded that Breault violated the provisions of the GRPC
with which he was charged and recommended that Breault receive
a one-year suspension from the practice of law. Subsequently, the
Review Board filed its report and recommendation, in which it
recommended that this Court adopt the findings and
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recommendation of the Special Master. On November 12, 2024,
Breault filed exceptions to the Review Board’s report, and on
December 12, 2024, the State Bar filed a response, agreeing with the
Special Master’s findings and recommended discipline.
Upon careful consideration of the record, the new report and
recommendation of the Special Master, and analogous cases, we
conclude that a six-month suspension is the appropriate sanction.
Further, we conclude that Breault’s exceptions to the Special
Master’s report and recommendation are without merit.
1. The Special Master’s Report and Recommendation
(a) The Facts
The Special Master recounted that on October 14, 2015, a man
from South Carolina suffered two breaks in his back and a skull
fracture after a tractor trailer struck his truck, which caused the
truck to go over the side of a bridge and into the Savannah River.
The man and his wife (collectively referred to as “Clients,”
individually referred to as “Husband” and “Wife”) hired a Georgia
attorney, C.M., to represent them. C.M. associated lawyers from a
4
personal injury firm, which filed a lawsuit on behalf of the Clients
in the District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. However,
C.M. then fired the firm and, with the clients’ approval, C.M.
associated Breault to act as lead counsel in the case. On June 5,
2017, Breault was admitted pro hac vice to the District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia, and the case was set for a trial on June
27, 2017.
In preparing for the trial, Breault came to believe that the
Clients needed to pursue a claim based on a traumatic brain injury
and learned that the Husband had been treated by a neurologist.
Breault contacted the treating physician’s office manager to
schedule a meeting and deposition with the physician. The office
manager informed Breault that the physician would be available for
a meeting on June 7, 2017, and available for a deposition on June
15, 2017. On June 7, Breault and C.M. met with the physician and,
unbeknownst at the time to Breault or the physician, C.M. made an
audio recording of this meeting. During this meeting, the physician
described the Husband’s purported brain injury as “all kind of
5
speculative” and made remarks casting doubt on the possible brain
injury claim. Following this meeting, on June 14, 2017, Breault
contacted the office manager and canceled the deposition. On June
20, 2017, Breault had another telephone conversation with the office
manager regarding whether the physician would be available to
testify at trial. The office manager informed Breault that the
physician would not be able to testify because of his workload, and
Breault responded in a threatening manner by stating that the
physician would have to do a deposition or Breault would subpoena
him for trial. The following day, the defendants in the suit filed a
motion to revoke Breault’s pro hac vice admission because his
actions violated the court’s guidelines for courtroom conduct and
included with the motion an affidavit by the office manager detailing
the conversation. Without discussing it with the Clients, Breault
filed a response to the defendants’ motion to revoke and attached a
transcript of the audio recording of the June 7 meeting. Breault also
obtained the actual audio recording of the meeting from C.M. and
emailed it to all counsel in the case and to the court. In his response
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to the defendant’s motion to revoke, Breault admitted that the
recording was “attorney work product and includes many insights
into how the Plaintiff[s] view every part of this case,” and that his
actions “tipp[ed] the ‘playing field’ in favor of the Defendants by
disclosing this work product,” but that he “fe[lt] the esteem and
confidence of this Honorable Court are more important.” Later at a
disciplinary hearing held by the first Special Master, Breault
admitted to making the disclosures public to make the defense
counsel look like “a disingenuous a**hole.” Although the district
court denied the defendants’ motion to revoke, it specifically found
that the disclosure of the conversation was unnecessary and
damaging to the Clients’ case.
Subsequently, on June 27, 2017, the date on which the trial
was originally scheduled, the district court allowed Breault to add a
neuropsychologist to the Clients’ witness list and ordered that the
neuropsychologist be deposed by the middle of August 2017. The
addition of the neuropsychologist resulted in the district court
continuing the trial from June 27 to October 30, 2017. On July 6,
7
2017, defense counsel asked Breault to provide suggested dates for
the neuropsychologist’s deposition. After receiving no response from
Breault, defense counsel asked Breault again to provide suggested
dates and then volunteered to contact the neuropsychologist’s office
regarding dates for the deposition. On July 20, 2017, Breault
responded to defense counsel, stating that August 14, 2017, would
work for the deposition. When defense counsel replied to ask about
the time, Breault told him 10:00 a.m. However, Breault had not
confirmed this date and time with the neuropsychologist. And, upon
later learning that Breault had told defense counsel that the
deposition had been scheduled for this date, the neuropsychologist
informed the parties that he would not be available that day. In
response, Breault told defense counsel that he would ask the court
for more time to schedule the deposition, but he never filed the
request.
On August 16, 2017, the Clients discharged Breault by a handdelivered letter, instructing him to cease communication with them
and refer all communications to C.M, and to file the appropriate
8
documents to withdraw from the case. On the following day, Breault
went to the Clients’ home in South Carolina unannounced. During
this visit, Breault called into question the competency of the Clients’
remaining counsel and told them that they would lose out on funding
for medical treatment should he be removed from the case. After
Breault left the Clients’ home, the Wife sent him a text message
informing him that she did not want him to represent them. Breault
acknowledged receipt of this message, and told the Wife that he
would file withdrawal paperwork on the following day. However,
Breault failed to file his paperwork and, instead, advised the
Husband to seek legal advice from a litigation funding company and
reached out to the Wife to request her to attend a focus group
regarding the case.
The Clients then filed a motion to revoke Breault’s pro hac vice
admission, in which they alleged that Breault had lied about
scheduling the neuropsychologist’s deposition, made an
unannounced visit to the Clients’ home after he had been terminated
as their attorney, and had invited the Clients to attend a focus group
9
after receiving the termination letter. Fifty-four days after he had
been discharged as counsel, Breault filed a response to the Clients’
motion to revoke, again disclosing confidential information that he
gained in the course of his representation of the Clients. Specifically,
Breault disclosed that he had a disagreement with C.M. regarding a
potential $90,000 loan to pay for evaluation and treatment of the
Husband, that he advised the Husband to contact a litigation
funding company, and that the Husband had followed his advice and
obtained an opinion from the company.
On October 11, 2017, the district court determined that the
parties could not proceed to trial as scheduled because of the serious
allegations raised in the Clients’ motion to revoke. Instead, the
district court scheduled a disciplinary hearing regarding Breault’s
conduct for October 30, 2017, which was the date the trial was
supposed to commence. Following the October 30 disciplinary
hearing, Breault finally filed his withdrawal paperwork, and the
district court entered a Disciplinary Order, in which it found that
Breault had violated several provisions of the GRPC and that his
10
disclosures of the Clients’ protected information had been damaging
to the Clients, and revoked Breault’s pro hac vice admission.
(b) Rules Violated
Based on these facts, the Special Master concluded that
Breault violated Rule 1.12 by his deliberate disclosure of confidential
information, his handling of the physician’s deposition, and his posttermination advice to the Husband; Rule 1.6 (a)3 by disclosing
protected information gained in his professional relationship with
his clients in two public court filings; Rule 1.16 (a) (3)4 by his failure
to withdraw from the representation upon termination; and Rule 3.5
(d)5 by engaging in conduct intended to disrupt the tribunal,
including disclosing the Clients’ confidential information, failing to
2 Rule 1.1 imposes the duty of competence on a lawyer representing a
client.
3 Rule 1.6 (a) states in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall maintain in
confidence all information gained in the professional relationship with a
client.”
4 Rule 1.16 (a) (3) states in pertinent part that a lawyer “shall withdraw
from the representation of a client if . . . the lawyer is discharged.”
5Rule 3.5 (d) provides in pertinent part that “[a] lawyer shall not,
without regard to whether the lawyer represents a client in the matter . . .
engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.”
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schedule the deposition, making misleading statements regarding
the deposition, and refusing to withdraw from the case.
Additionally, as for Rule 1.6 (a), the Special Master concluded
that the two exceptions that Breault asserted—the implied
authority exception in Rule 1.6 (a)6 and the lawyer’s right to respond
to allegations exception in Rule 1.6 (b) (1) (iii)7—were not applicable
for either disclosure. As for the implied authority exception, the
Special Master relied on State v. Ledbetter, 318 Ga. 457 (899 SE2d
222) (2024) (rejecting the State’s argument that the defendant had
implicitly waived attorney-client privilege and authorized the
disclosures because his lawyer intended the disclosures to benefit
the defendant), and, in doing so, the Special Master rejected
Breault’s argument that his disclosure of the audio recording of the
6 The implied authority exception allows “disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation.” See Rule 1.6 (a).
7 The exception in Rule 1.6 (b) (1) (iii) provides that a lawyer may reveal
confidential information which the lawyer reasonably believes necessary “to
establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil
claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved,
or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s
representation of the client.”
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meeting with the physician was not a violation of Rule 1.6 (a)
because it was “helpful” to the Clients. Further, the Special Master
found that the implied authority exception was not applicable to the
disclosures in Breault’s response to the Client’s motion to revoke
because Breault had been terminated prior to filing this response
and lacked any type of authority to make disclosures of protected
information. As for the exception in Rule 1.6 (b) (1) (iii), the Special
Master found that the disclosure of the Clients’ protected
information in Breault’s response to the defendants’ motion to
revoke was not reasonably necessary to respond to the allegations
that he had been abusive and threatening in his telephonic
interactions. The Special Master also found that Breault’s disclosure
of the Clients’ protected information in response to the Clients’
motion to revoke was not reasonably necessary, as he had already
been discharged by the Clients and there was no need for him to file
a public response brief.
(c) ABA Standards
13
After finding that Breault violated the provisions of the GRPC
with which he was charged, the Special Master applied the
framework set out in the ABA Standards, which provide that, when
imposing a sanction, “a court should consider the following factors:
(a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer’s mental state; (c) the potential
or actual injury caused by the lawyer’s misconduct; and (d) the
existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.” ABA Standard 3.0.
The Special Master concluded that by violating Rule 1.1, Breault
violated the duty that lawyers owe to their clients to provide
competent representation; by violating Rule 1.6 (a), Breault violated
the duty that lawyers owe to their clients to keep client information
confidential; by violating Rule 1.16 (a) (3), Breault violated the duty
that lawyers owe as professionals to timely withdraw from
representation when terminated; and by violating Rule 3.5 (d),
Breault violated the duty that lawyers owe to the legal system. In
assessing Breault’s mental state, the Special Master found that
Breault acted both knowingly and intentionally with respect to his
violations of the Rules by knowingly and intentionally disclosing the
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Clients’ protected information, knowingly and intentionally
misleading opposing counsel regarding the deposition, and
knowingly and intentionally failing to withdraw his representation
after his termination. In assessing the injury caused, the Special
Master found that the Clients suffered actual and potential injury
by Breault’s incompetent representation—which led to their
protected information being unnecessarily disclosed and delays in
their case—and by continuing to act as their attorney after he had
been discharged, as he continued to improperly disclose the Clients’
protected information at this time.
As for aggravating circumstances, the Special Master found
that seven out of the 11 aggravating factors set forth in ABA
Standard 9.22 applied: dishonest or selfish motive; a pattern of
misconduct; multiple offenses; bad faith obstruction of the
disciplinary proceedings; refusal to acknowledge the wrongful
nature of conduct; vulnerability of the victim; and substantial
experience in the practice of law. See ABA Standard 9.22 (b), (c), (d),
(e), (g), (h), and (i). Regarding the bad faith obstruction of the
15
disciplinary proceedings factor, the Special Master specifically noted
that Breault was initially “non-responsive, repetitive, and sarcastic”
during the disciplinary hearings, made baseless accusations against
the State Bar for not being “forthright” with certain evidence, and
failed to timely respond to the State Bar’s interrogatories and
requests for documents. Additionally, the Special Master concluded
that out of the 13 mitigating factors set forth in ABA Standard 9.32,
only two applied, as Breault did not have a prior disciplinary record
and had been sanctioned by the district court for the same conduct.
See ABA Standard 9.32 (a) & (k).
(d) Recommended Discipline
Although the Special Master noted that “[t]he application of
the ABA Standards show that [Breault] is subject to disbarment for
the violations of Rule 1.6,” the Special Master ultimately
recommended that Breault receive a one-year suspension from the
practice of law. In doing so, the Special Master relied on In the
Matter of Skinner, 295 Ga. 217 (758 SE2d 788) (2014), in which the
attorney posted confidential client information on the internet and
16
the Court imposed a public reprimand. The Special Master
distinguished Breault’s case, noting that, in Skinner, there was only
one applicable aggravating factor and five factors in mitigation, see
295 Ga. at 218-219, whereas here, Breault was found to have
intentionally violated several additional rules. Thus, the Special
Master concluded that “[g]iven the difference in the balance of the
aggravating and mitigating factors in Skinner and the balance in
this case, Skinner leads . . . to the conclusion that a sanction more
serious than a public reprimand is appropriate in this case.”
2. The Review Board’s Report and Recommendation
Breault filed exceptions to the Special Master’s report and
recommendation for the Review Board’s consideration, requesting
that the entire case against him be dismissed. However, the Review
Board adopted the findings of the Special Master, determined that
the Special Master’s conclusions of law were correct, and agreed
with the Special Master’s recommendation that Breault receive a
one-year suspension for his violations of the GRPC provisions.
3. Breault’s Exceptions
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On November 12, 2024, Breault filed exceptions to the Review
Board’s report, arguing that the Special Master erred by refusing to
conduct a de novo evidentiary hearing to establish a new record; by
finding that the exceptions to Rule 1.6 (a) were inapplicable; by
finding that Breault violated Rule 1.16 (a) (3) because he should
have been charged with Rule 1.16 (c) (providing that “[w]hen a
lawyer withdraws it shall be done in compliance with applicable
laws and rules”); and by making an erroneous factual finding
concerning one of Breault’s improper disclosures of personal client
information. Breault also asserts that he is being punished for
exercising his rights and that the claims against him are spurious.8
As explained in our analysis section below, we reject Breault’s
arguments.
4. Analysis
8 Specifically, Breault, who is representing himself in this disciplinary
matter, argues: “I (genuinely) apologize if I offend your sensibilities with some
of my word choices. It’s English, and I have a Right to Free Speech. And if the
glove fits, and it’s a bulls**t case, then I’m going to speak the truth.” «Breault Exceptions pg. 4»
18
After consideration of the record in this matter, we agree with
the Special Master’s determination that Breault’s conduct violated
Rules 1.1, 1.6 (a), 1.16 (a) (3) and 3.5 (d), and that neither the implied
authority exception nor the lawyer’s right to respond to allegations
exception is applicable regarding Breault’s violation of Rule 1.6 (a).
And in agreeing with the Special Master’s determination that
Breault violated the GRPC provisions with which he was charged,
we reject the arguments that Breault presents in his brief. As for
Breault’s argument regarding establishing a new record, we did not
impose such a requirement in Breault I, but rather directed the
Special Master to apply the ABA standards based on “the record as
a whole” and emphasized certain evidence in the existing record that
the Special Master should consider in applying the ABA Standards.
Breault I, 318 Ga. at 139-141. As for Breault’s argument that the
Special Master erred in finding the exceptions to Rule 1.6 (a)
inapplicable, we conclude that the Special Master specifically
addressed the implicitly authorized exception and the lawyer’s right
to respond to allegations exception regarding both disclosures—i.e.,
19
Breault’s response to the defendants’ motion to revoke and Breault’s
response to the Clients’ motion to revoke—and properly found
neither exception was applicable because the Clients did not
implicitly authorize the disclosures and the disclosures were not
reasonably necessary to defend against any of the allegations
against him. As for Breault’s argument that the State Bar was
required to charge him with violating Rule 1.16 (c) rather than Rule
1.16 (a) (3), we note that the State Bar alleged that he failed to
effectuate his withdrawal rather than that he improperly withdrew
and, therefore, charged Breault with the proper GRPC violation.
Lastly, with regard to Breault’s argument that the Special Master
erroneously found that the treating physician stated that the
Husband’s brain injury was speculative, as an initial matter, we
note that this finding does not affect the conclusion that Breault
improperly disclosed personal client information by sharing the
transcript and audio recording of the June 7 meeting in violation of
Rule 1.6 (a), nor does it have any effect on the conclusions that the
exceptions in Rule 1.6 (a) and Rule 1.6 (b) (1) (iii) are not applicable.
20
Further, based on the record,9 we cannot say that the Special
Master’s factual finding is erroneous.
Further, we agree with the Special Master’s application of the
ABA Standards and findings that Breault’s conduct violated the
duty that lawyers owe to their clients to provide competent
representation, to keep client information confidential, and to timely
withdraw from representation when terminated, and, by causing
delays in the trial and making misrepresentations to opposing
counsel, Breault’s conduct also violated the duty that lawyers owe to
the legal system; that Breault acted knowingly and intentionally;
that Breault’s conduct—including his disclosures of personal client
information, failure to schedule the deposition, and failure to
withdraw from the case—caused injury to his clients; and that seven
out of the 11 aggravating factors are present, whereas only two
factors in mitigation are applicable. Thus, given these findings
9 Breault claims that a review of the transcript and audio of the June 7
meeting would show that this factual finding was erroneous, but Breault failed
to tender the transcript or audio into evidence at the hearing. For the same
reasons, we reject Breault’s argument that the Special Master erred by failing
to review the transcript or audio of the June 7 meeting.
21
which are supported by the record, we reject Breault’s contention
that he is being punished for asserting his rights.
In assessing the Special Master’s recommendation of a oneyear suspension, we note that this Court has not decided many
disciplinary matters concerning the improper and intentional
disclosure of personal client information in violation of Rule 1.6 (a).
However, as detailed by the Special Master, this violation was
present in Skinner, where this Court accepted the attorney’s
voluntary petition for a public reprimand. But, while recognizing the
need to impose consistent sanctions for similar disciplinary matters,
we agree with the Special Master that a more severe punishment is
warranted in Breault’s case because of the additional aggravating
circumstances and his additional violations of the GRPC. The
sanction here should be “sufficient to penalize the offender for his
wrongdoing, deter other attorneys from engaging in similar
behavior, and inform the general public that the courts will
maintain the ethics of the profession.” Breault I, 318 Ga. at 136.
That said, this case does not seem as severe as In the Matter of
22
Farmer, 307 Ga. 307 (835 SE2d 629) (2019), where the attorney
violated Rule 1.6 (a) and this Court imposed disbarment, as the
attorney in that case was found to have violated nine additional
GRPC provisions and was found liable in a civil Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations action, see id. at 309-310,
whereas Breault was found to have violated only four additional
rules. Given this range, Breault’s conduct appears to be more like
that seen in Skinner than in Farmer. Therefore, in distinguishing
Breault’s case from our recent cases concerning 1.6 (a) violations,
considering the Special Master’s application of the ABA Standards,
and reiterating that the maximum penalty for two of the Rules
GRPC that Breault violated—Rules 1.1 and 1.6 (a)—is disbarment,
we conclude that a six-month suspension is appropriate in this
case.10
10 Some members of this Court believe that a one-year suspension would
be supported by the record here where Breault has engaged in a series of
escalating misconduct when challenged—first, by defense counsel and later by
his own clients and co-counsel—and seven of the 11 aggravating factors are
present. Moreover, Supreme Court Rule 7 provides that: [p]ersonal remarks
which are discourteous or disparaging to opposing counsel or to any judge are
23
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered Chrisopher Ryan Breault be
suspended from the practice of law for six months. The suspension
based on this opinion will take effect as of the date this opinion is
issued and will expire by its own terms six months later. Because
there are no conditions on Breault’s reinstatement other than the
passage of time, there is no need for Breault to take any action either
through the State Bar or through this Court to effectuate his return
to the practice of law. Breault is reminded of his duties pursuant to
Bar Rule 4-219 (b).
Six-month suspension. All the Justices concur.
strictly forbidden, whether oral or written, and may be cause for sanctions.
Nothing in this rule affects the Court’s inherent authority to sanction attorneys
or parties before this Court.” At least some of us believe that the way Breault
has conducted himself in this Court would further support a longer suspension.
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