Wang (Health Body World Supply, Inc. v.)

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

HEALTH BODY WORLD SUPPLY, INC.,

ET AL. v. REED WANG

(SC 21051)

McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiffs, H Co. and its insurer, brought an action for contribution

against the defendant physician, W, pursuant to the comparative responsibility provisions (§ 52-572o) of the Connecticut Product Liability Act (§

52-572m et seq.). The plaintiffs filed their contribution action in May,

2022, after they paid in full damages awarded pursuant to a judgment

rendered in the underlying action brought by K, who had been injured

when a heat lamp manufactured by H Co. made contact with her foot during

an acupunc-ture session performed by W. In the underlying action, K

originally sought to recover damages from W for his alleged medical

malpractice. Thereafter, W filed a third-party complaint against H Co.

sounding in product liability, and K then filed a complaint directly against H

Co., also sounding in product liability. In response to W’s and K’s

complaints, H Co. raised several special defenses, including that K and W

each bore comparative responsibility for K’s injuries and that, if H Co.

were to be found liable for K’s damages, it was entitled to contribution

from W pursuant to § 52-572o. Before the case was submitted to the jury,

W withdrew his third-party complaint against H Co. The jury subsequently

returned a verdict for K, finding that H Co. was 80 percent responsible

and W was 20 percent responsible for K’s damages. In accordance with

the verdict, judgment was rendered in the underlying action in January,

2019. Thereafter, the Appellate Court reversed that judg-ment in part,

concluding that the medical malpractice claim against W should have been

dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, but affirmed the portion of

the judgment relating to K’s product liability claim. This court

subsequently denied H Co.’s petition for certification to appeal in November,

2021. In their contribution action, the plaintiffs sought to recover 20 percent

of the amount paid to K in satisfaction of the underlying judgment. The trial

court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and rendered

judgment in their favor, and W appealed. W claimed that the plaintiffs were

barred from bringing a contribution action against him because he was not

a ‘‘party’’ to the underlying action for purposes of § 52-572o and that the

plaintiffs’ contribution action was untimely because it was brought more

than one year after the judgment in the underlying action became final. Held:

There was no merit to W’s claim that the plaintiffs were barred from bringing

a contribution action against him because he was not a party to the underlying action who was subject to the comparative responsibility provisions of

§ 52-572o.

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Contrary to W’s argument that the references in § 52-572o (b) through (d),

providing for the apportionment of damages between each ‘‘party’’ according

to each party’s respective degree of responsibility, include only those named

as defendants in connection with a product liability claim, the only reasonable construction of the statutory language was that the term ‘‘party’’

includes all defendants in an action involving a product liability claim,

regardless of whether those persons or entities are product sellers named

as defendants to the product liability claim.

Accordingly, in a hybrid action involving both claims arising out of the

Connecticut Product Liability Act and other claims not sounding in product

liability, in which the harm is indivisible, an adjudication of comparative

responsibility is proper with respect to every party to the action, and the

assessment of comparative responsibility in the underlying action in the

present case was proper because K asserted a product liability claim against

H Co. and a medical malpractice claim against W for the same indivisible

harm.

Contrary to W’s claim, the fact that the Appellate Court reversed the judgment in the underlying action with respect to K’s medical malpractice claim

against W did not mean that W was not a party subject to the comparative

responsibility provisions of § 52-572o.

Although the Appellate Court reversed the portion of the underlying judgment determining W’s liability with respect to the medical malpractice claim,

it affirmed the judgment in all other respects, including with respect to the

jury’s determination that W was 20 percent responsible for K’s total damages,

made in connection with the comparative responsibility claim that H Co.

raised in its special defense to K’s product liability claim.

Accordingly, the court in the underlying action had jurisdiction over W to

determine his comparative responsibility when judgment was rendered, both

W and H Co. were subject to the adjudication of comparative responsibility,

and they both were bound by that portion of the judgment that was not

reversed on appeal.

The plaintiffs’ contribution action was timely, as it was filed action within

one year of all appellate proceedings in the underlying action becoming final.

Pursuant to § 52-572o (e), ‘‘[i]f a judgment has been rendered’’ in an underlying action, any independent action for contribution ‘‘must be brought within

one year after the judgment becomes final,’’ and the only plausible construction of that language was that a ‘‘judgment becomes final’’ for purposes of

triggering the statute of limitations upon the termination of all appellate

proceedings, such that the liability of the parties is absolutely certain.

The judgment in the underlying action became final in November, 2021, ten

days after this court denied H Co.’s petition for certification to appeal, and, Page 2 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

because the plaintiffs filed their contribution action against W in May, 2022,

that action was timely.

Argued January 31—officially released September 9, 2025

Procedural History

Action for contribution, and for other relief, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of StamfordNorwalk, where the court, Menon, J., denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which defendant appealed to the

Appellate Court; thereafter, the court, Menon, J., entered

an order approving the parties’ stipulated supplemental

judgment, and the defendant amended its appeal; subsequently, the appeal was transferred to this court.

Affirmed.

Wesley W. Horton, with whom were Karen L. Dowd

and Mary Alice Moore Leonhardt, and, on the brief,

Kenneth J. Bartschi and Michael A. Lanza, for the

appellant (defendant).

Thomas A. Plotkin, with whom, on the brief, was

Paul D. Meade, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Opinion

ECKER, J. This appeal requires us to resolve two

previously unexamined issues regarding the proper construction and operation of General Statutes § 52-572o,

which is the statute governing comparative responsibility and actions for contribution under the Connecticut

Product Liability Act (CPLA), General Statutes § 52-572m et seq. The plaintiffs, Health Body World Supply,

Inc. (HBWS) and its insurance carrier, Landmark American Insurance Company (Landmark),1 brought this

action for contribution against the defendant, Reed

Wang, pursuant to § 52-572o (e) after paying $1.2 million

1

We refer to HBWS and Landmark collectively as the plaintiffs and individually by name when appropriate.

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

to Judith Kissel in full satisfaction of the judgment in

the underlying matter of Kissel v. Center for Women’s

Health, P.C., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FST-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (January 3, 2019) (Kissel action), rev’d in part, 205 Conn.

App. 394, 258 A.3d 677, cert. granted, 339 Conn. 916,

262 A.3d 139 (2021), and cert. granted, 339 Conn. 917,

262 A.3d 138 (2021) (appeals withdrawn January 11,

2022). The jury in the Kissel action assigned 80 percent

of the responsibility for Kissel’s damages to HBWS and

20 percent of the responsibility to Wang. In the present

action, HBWS seeks to recover from Wang his 20 percent share of the amount paid, including applicable

interest and costs. The trial court rendered judgment

in favor of HBWS.

On appeal, Wang renews his arguments, unsuccessful

in the trial court, that the plaintiffs’ contribution action

is foreclosed because Wang was not a party to the

underlying product liability action and, therefore, does

not fall within the scope of the comparative responsibility or contribution provisions of § 52-572o. In the alternative, Wang argues that the contribution action is

untimely because it was brought more than one year

after the judgment in the Kissel action became final.

See General Statutes § 52-572o (e). We reject both arguments and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

The underlying facts are not in dispute. In April, 2012,

Kissel brought a medical malpractice action against

Wang and his employer, the Center for Women’s Health,

P.C.,2 for injuries she sustained when a heat lamp made

2

For purposes of this opinion, we discuss only Kissel, Wang, and HBWS,

because the procedural history regarding the Center for Women’s Health,

P.C., is not relevant to the present case. For additional facts and procedural

background of the Kissel action, see Kissel v. Center for Women’s Health,

P.C., supra, 205 Conn. App. 398–410, 437–42.

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

contact with her foot during an acupuncture session

performed by Wang. Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-102a, Wang filed a third-party complaint against HBWS,

the manufacturer of the heat lamp, alleging that, in the

event that Kissel prevailed against Wang, HBWS would

be to liable to Wang for all or part of the judgment due

to the defective condition of the product.3 Wang’s initial

third-party complaint contained numerous counts alleging a variety of different causes of action against HBWS,

but it ultimately was amended to allege a single count

under the CPLA. See General Statutes § 52-572n (a)

(‘‘[a] product liability claim . . . may be asserted and

shall be in lieu of all other claims against product sellers,

including actions of negligence, strict liability and warranty, for harm caused by a product’’). In its answer to

Wang’s third-party complaint, HBWS raised a special

defense that Wang was responsible for Kissel’s injuries

due to his negligence in handling the heat lamp.

In March, 2013, Kissel filed a complaint in the Kissel

action directly against HBWS. This complaint, like

Wang’s third-party complaint, was eventually amended

to contain a single count alleging that HBWS was

responsible under the CPLA for Kissel’s injuries caused

by the defective heat lamp. In its answer to Kissel’s

complaint, HBWS raised two special defenses relevant

to this appeal. Its first special defense alleged that any

injury, loss or damage sustained by Kissel was caused,

in whole or in part, by the actions or inactions of Kissel

herself, and asserted that, ‘‘accordingly, [Kissel] bears

comparative responsibility for any such claimed damages or losses in accordance with the provisions of

. . . § 52-572o.’’ Its third special defense alleged that

the damages claimed in Kissel’s complaint were the

result of Wang’s negligent use of the heat lamp, thereby

3

The parties and the trial court often refer to HBWS as ‘‘The WABBO

Company’’ or ‘‘WABBO.’’ For clarity and consistency, we use the name

HBWS in this opinion.

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

entitling HBWS to a determination of the percentage

of responsibility of each party responsible for the harm

and, if HBWS were found to be liable, ‘‘a reduction

of its liability and/or contribution for the comparative

responsibility of . . . Wang.’’4

The Kissel action was tried to a jury in November

and December of 2017. Early in the trial, Wang withdrew

his third-party complaint against HBWS. At that point

in the case, the operative claims remaining to be tried

were Kissel’s medical malpractice claim against Wang

and Kissel’s product liability claim against HBWS, as

well as all of the associated special defenses. The jury

returned a verdict for Kissel against HWBS and Wang

and awarded her $1 million in total damages.

In connection with its deliberations, a series of fifteen

interrogatories was submitted to the jury requiring its

findings as to liability, causation, damages, and comparative responsibility under § 52-572o. To summarize, the

jury found that Wang had breached the applicable stan4

Due to its importance to this appeal, we quote HBWS’s third special

defense to Kissel’s complaint in its entirety: ‘‘The damages alleged in the

complaint are the result of the negligent acts or omissions of codefendant

. . . Wang, in that he: [a] used the subject heat lamp in a manner inconsistent

with the normal use and application of the product as reasonably anticipated

by the manufacturer or seller; [b] failed to follow and undertake the precautions a reasonably careful user of the lamp would ordinarily take under the

circumstances then and there existing, including, but not limited to, not

placing the head of the heat lamp in extremely close proximity to [Kissel’s]

foot; [c] failed to monitor or attend to [Kissel] during the course of the

acupuncture procedure and failed to promptly respond to the situation;

[and] [d] failed to follow the ordinary and customary standards of the

acupuncture profession with regard to the use of the subject heat lamp. In

accordance with the provisions of . . . § 52-572o and [General Statutes §]

52-577a, [HBWS] is entitled to a determination of the percentage of responsibility of each responsible party causing or contributing to cause in any way

the harm for which recovery of damages is sought, whether by negligent

act or omission or other form of legal responsibility and, if [HBWS] is found

liable, which liability it continues to deny, then [HBWS] is entitled to a

reduction of its liability and/or contribution for the comparative responsibility of . . . Wang.’’

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

dard of care and thereby caused Kissel’s injuries, that

Wang had not proven his special defense that Kissel’s

own negligence was also a proximate cause of her injuries, that HBWS was liable to Kissel because her injuries

were caused by its defective heat lamp, and that Kissel

had sustained damages totaling $1 million. In response

to the interrogatories regarding comparative responsibility under § 52-572o, the jury found HBWS 80 percent

responsible and Wang 20 percent responsible for Kissel’s damages.5

HWBS and Wang each filed a motion to set aside the

verdict on numerous grounds. These motions, as well

as Wang’s motion for remittitur, were denied by the

trial court in a lengthy memorandum of decision. The

court thereafter rendered judgment in accordance with

the jury’s verdict. The judgment contained a verbatim

replication of the interrogatories and the jury’s answers,

including the jury’s determination of the percentage of

responsibility allocated to each party. Additional details

regarding the relevant jury instructions, jury interrogaAs relevant to the issue of comparative responsibility, the interrogatories

5

and the jury’s answers thereto were as follows:

‘‘11. Did [HBWS] prove, with respect to [Kissel’s] product liability claim,

that the negligent or other improper conduct of [Kissel] and/or . . . Wang,

as alleged by [HBWS] in its special defense, was also a proximate cause of

[Kissel’s] injuries?

‘‘[Answer] YES . . . .

‘‘[If the answer is ‘YES,’ go to interrogatory #12; if the answer is ‘NO,’ go

to interrogatory #13.]

‘‘12. For purposes of the product liability claim, the parties proved that

the respective comparative responsibility of the parties with respect to the

events of April 22, 2010, is as follows (must add up to 100 [percent]):

‘‘Responsibility of [HBWS] [Answer] 80 [percent]

‘‘Responsibility of . . . Wang [Answer] 20 [percent]

‘‘Responsibility of [Kissel] [Answer] 0 [percent]

‘‘13. [Kissel] proved that she sustained the following damages (pain, loss

of function, loss of enjoyment of life’s activities):

‘‘To date of trial [Answer] $750,000

‘‘Future [Answer] $250,000

‘‘Total damages [Answer] $1,000,000.’’

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

tories, and postverdict proceedings in the underlying

matter will be set forth as necessary.

Wang appealed from the judgment in the Kissel

action, claiming, among other things, that the trial court

had improperly denied his motion to dismiss Kissel’s

medical malpractice claim for failure to comply with

General Statutes § 52-190a.6 See Kissel v. Center for

Women’s Health, P.C., supra, 205 Conn. App. 397, 399–

400. HBWS filed a separate appeal from the judgment,

claiming, among other things, that the trial court had

improperly denied its motions for a directed verdict

and to set aside the verdict because Kissel had failed

to present sufficient evidence of causation as to the

product liability claim. See id., 397, 436. The appeals

were consolidated. In June, 2021, the Appellate Court

issued its decision, holding that the medical malpractice

claim against Wang must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction due to Kissel’s failure to comply with

§ 52-190a within the limitation period; see id., 436; but

affirming the judgment of the trial court ‘‘with respect

to the product liability claim . . . .’’ Id., 447. HBWS

then filed a petition for certification to appeal, which

this court denied on November 9, 2021. See Kissel v.

Center for Women’s Health, P.C., 339 Conn. 917, 262

A.3d 137 (2021). Kissel similarly filed petitions for certification to appeal from the Appellate Court’s judgment

6

General Statutes § 52-190a (a) requires, among other things, that the

plaintiff in a medical malpractice action ‘‘obtain a written and signed opinion

of a similar health care provider . . . that there appears to be evidence of

medical negligence and includes a detailed basis for the formation of such

opinion’’ and ‘‘attach a copy of such written opinion’’ to the complaint. In

the trial court, Wang had challenged Kissel’s compliance with § 52-190a

because the complaint, as originally served and filed, contained a certification by Kissel’s counsel indicating that he had made a reasonable inquiry

that led to a good faith belief that grounds existed for this medical malpractice action against Wang, but failed to attach an actual copy of the opinion

letter itself. The opinion letter was subsequently filed with the court as an

exhibit to an amended complaint, accompanied by an affidavit averring that

the letter was in counsel’s possession at the time the action was commenced. Page 8 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

in favor of Wang, which we granted on November 9,

2021.7 Kissel later withdrew her appeals on January 11,

2022, after HBWS (through its insurance carrier Landmark) paid Kissel $1.2 million in satisfaction of the

judgment, including costs and interest.

After satisfying the judgment in the Kissel action,

the plaintiffs sent a written demand to Wang seeking

contribution in the amount of 20 percent of $1.2 million,

reflecting the percentage of responsibility allocated to

Wang in the Kissel action judgment. Wang refused the

demand. On May 10, 2022, the plaintiffs filed this action

against Wang seeking contribution pursuant to § 52-572o for 20 percent of the amount paid by HBWS in

satisfaction of the Kissel action judgment, including

applicable interest and costs from the date of payment.

The complaint alleged, in relevant part, that Wang was

liable for contribution under § 52-572o (e) because the

trial court in the Kissel action had rendered judgment

on the jury’s verdict finding Wang 20 percent responsible for Kissel’s damages.

Wang answered the complaint and filed special defenses.

His first special defense claimed that the plaintiffs’ contribution action was untimely under the one year limitation period set forth in § 52-572o (e) because it was not

brought by January 3, 2020, which was one year after

the trial court’s denial of Wang’s postverdict motions

in the Kissel action. His second special defense alleged

that the trial court in the Kissel action lacked jurisdiction to render judgment against him with respect to

the allocation of comparative responsibility under § 52-572o because he ‘‘was not a party to the product liability

action when the jury [returned] its verdict.’’ He alleged

that he lacked party status in the underlying Kissel

action for two reasons: (1) the underlying judgment

7

See Kissel v. Center for Women’s Health, P.C., supra, 339 Conn. 917;

Kissel v. Center for Women’s Health, P.C., supra, 339 Conn. 916.

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

against Wang became ‘‘void ab initio’’ when the Appellate Court issued its decision holding that the trial court

should have dismissed Kissel’s medical malpractice

claim for lack of personal jurisdiction, and (2) Wang

was not a party to any pleadings pertaining to ‘‘apportionment’’8 in that action because HBWS had never filed

a cross complaint or a third-party complaint against

him. For all of these reasons, Wang claimed that the

judgment assigning him 20 percent responsibility was

not binding on him.

In January, 2024, the trial court found that there was

no genuine issue of material fact in this case, granted the

plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and rendered

judgment in their favor in the amount of $240,000. In

its memorandum of decision, the trial court reasoned

that the jury’s comparative responsibility determination

in the Kissel action was binding on Wang because, ‘‘even

after he sought and received permission to withdraw

his affirmative product liability claim, [Wang] took no

action to remove himself from the product liability portion of the original Kissel action and thus remained

named as a responsible party in the [third special]

defense asserted by [HBWS] to Kissel’s product liability

claim.’’ The trial court also concluded that the plaintiffs’

contribution action was timely because the one year

period for the commencement of a contribution action

‘‘did not begin to run until the plaintiffs had exhausted

all their appellate remedies,’’ which was when this court

denied HWBS’s petition for certification to appeal in

8

The term ‘‘apportionment,’’ although used by the parties at various points

in this case, is a term of art in Connecticut regarding the distribution of

liability among negligent tortfeasors pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572h

(o). The CPLA, by contrast. does not use the term ‘‘apportionment’’ but,

rather, refers to the ‘‘allocat[ion]’’ of comparative responsibility. General

Statutes § 52-572o (b). Because the two statutory schemes operate differently, we will avoid using the term apportionment to describe the allocation

of comparative responsibility under § 52-572o.

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

November, 2021. See Kissel v. Center for Women’s

Health, P.C., supra, 339 Conn. 917.

Wang timely appealed to the Appellate Court, and,

pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1, the appeal was transferred to this court. He raises two claims of error. First,

he argues that the plaintiffs cannot bring a contribution

action against him because he was not a ‘‘party’’ to the

underlying action at the time the verdict was returned.

In support of this claim, he argues that the plain meaning

of § 52-572o requires that a contribution defendant

‘‘must have been a party to the underlying action’’ and,

specifically, must have been a party to what he calls

the underlying ‘‘product liability action.’’ Wang asserts

that he was not a party to the product liability action

because ‘‘HBWS never impleaded [him] or served him

with process to obtain jurisdiction over him.’’ Additionally, relying on Crotta v. Home Depot, Inc., 249 Conn.

634, 639–41, 732 A.2d 767 (1999), Wang argues that a

defendant is not legally obligated for contribution

unless that defendant is ‘‘originally liable’’ to the plaintiff in the underlying product liability action. He contends that he was not originally liable to Kissel because

she never brought a product liability claim against him,

and the trial court’s judgment incorporating a finding

of his liability for medical malpractice was rendered

void ab initio on appeal. See Kissel v. Center for Women’s Health, P.C., supra, 205 Conn. App. 411, 436. In

the alternative, Wang contends that the plaintiffs’ contribution action is untimely because, pursuant to § 52-572o (e), such an action must commence ‘‘within one

year after the judgment becomes final,’’ which he interprets to mean as within one year from when judgment

is rendered in the trial court.

The plaintiffs maintain that Wang was a party to the

underlying action and is therefore bound by its judgment of comparative responsibility. They emphasize

that both the medical malpractice and product liability

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

claims ‘‘were brought . . . and tried in the same judicial proceeding, within the context of a single action,

bearing a single docket number, with the verdict [being

returned] by a single jury,’’ and point out that the judgment of comparative responsibility in the Kissel action

was not disturbed on appeal. They also argue that their

contribution action is timely because, under ‘‘[t]he plain

language of § 52-572o and the common-law principles

it embodies, the related precedent, and commonsense

public policy,’’ a contribution action must be brought

within one year of the judgment in the underlying action

becoming final through the termination of appellate proceedings.

II

Wang argues that the allocation of comparative

responsibility under § 52-572o can be made only among

parties to a ‘‘product liability action.’’ He contends that

he was not such a party once he withdrew his putative

product liability claim against third-party defendant

HBWS early in the trial of the Kissel action. We reject

this argument because it proceeds from a faulty premise. The phrase ‘‘product liability action’’ never appears

in § 52-572o, and the statute contains no requirement

that the allocation of comparative responsibility is limited to defendants whose liability is based on a product

liability claim. To the contrary, we construe § 52-572o

to provide that, in an action involving both product

liability claims and nonproduct liability claims in which

the harm is indivisible, an adjudication of comparative

responsibility is proper with respect to every party to

the action. The statutory assessment of comparative

responsibility in the Kissel action was proper because

Kissel asserted a product liability claim against HBWS

and a medical malpractice claim against Wang for the

same indivisible harm.9

9

We address in part II B of this opinion the effect of the appellate reversal

of the medical malpractice portion of the judgment against Wang in the

Kissel action. The present discussion relates solely to Wang’s claim that he Page 12 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

A

Before embarking on our statutory analysis, it is necessary to describe in greater detail the position that

Wang took in the Kissel action with respect to the very

issue now under consideration, i.e., the applicability to

him of the comparative responsibility provisions contained in § 52-572o. We do so because Wang’s position

during the Kissel trial was diametrically opposed to

his current position in this action for contribution and

consequently forecloses his ability to now argue that

the allocation of comparative responsibility assessed

in the Kissel action is not binding on him.

As noted in part I of this opinion, the jury was asked

to answer a series of interrogatories before reaching a

verdict. With appropriate directions at each step of the

inquiry, the first five interrogatories related to Kissel’s

medical malpractice claim against Wang. The next five

interrogatories related to Kissel’s product liability claim

against HBWS. The final five interrogatories are most

directly relevant to this appeal because they guided the

jury’s decisionmaking regarding comparative responsibility pursuant to § 52-572o (e). Interrogatory eleven

asked whether HBWS had ‘‘prove[n], with respect to

[Kissel’s] product liability claim, that the negligent or

other improper conduct of [Kissel] and/or . . . Wang,

as alleged by [HBWS] in its special defense[s], was also

a proximate cause of [Kissel’s] injuries . . . .’’ Interrogatory twelve required the jury to allocate the percentage

of comparative responsibility attributable to each party,

specifically HBWS, Wang, and Kissel. Interrogatories

thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen required the jury to determine past and future damages, total damages, damages

attributable to the medical malpractice claim, and damshould not have been included in the assessment of comparative responsibility at trial because he was not a party to a product liability action once he

withdrew his third-party complaint against HBWS asserting a claim for

product liability.

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ages attributable to the product liability claim. See footnote 5 of this opinion.

The important point for immediate purposes is not

the jury’s answers to these interrogatories10 but the fact

that Wang himself was substantially responsible for

formulating the interrogatories, including the interrogatories asking the jury to allocate comparative responsibility pursuant to § 52-572o. The record indicates that

it was Wang who first submitted proposed jury interrogatories to the trial court, and his proposed interrogatories specifically asked the jury to determine whether

HBWS had proven its special defenses alleging that

Kissel and Wang should be found responsible for any

damages sustained by Kissel in connection with the

product liability claim against HBWS. In subheadings

typed in bold font, Wang’s proposed interrogatories

explicitly stated that they were related to HBWS’s special defense of comparative responsibility against Kissel

and its special defense of contribution against Wang. In

particular, Wang’s proposed interrogatory eight, labeled

‘‘ALLOCATION OF FAULT UNDER THE PRODUCT

LIABILITY ACT,’’ asked: ‘‘What specific percentage

of fault do you attribute to each party to describe or

measure the degree to which that party’s wrongful con10

With regard to the medical malpractice claim, the jury found that Wang

had breached the applicable standard of care, that his negligence had caused

Kissel’s injuries, that Kissel’s resulting damages were valued at $1 million,

and that Kissel herself had not been negligent. As to the product liability

claim, the jury found that HBWS was liable to Kissel for its sale of a defective

and unreasonably dangerous heat lamp and valued her damages in connection with that claim at $1 million, as well. To avoid duplicative damages,

the verdict form made clear that the aggregate damages award against both

defendants totaled $1 million and that Kissel would not be entitled to recover

more than her total damages under any circumstances. As for the allocation

of comparative responsibility in connection with the product liability claim,

the jury found that Wang’s negligence in operating the lamp, as alleged in

HBWS’s special defense, was also a proximate cause of Kissel’s injuries,

attributing 80 percent responsibility to HBWS and 20 percent to Wang. The

jury determined that Kissel was not responsible for her injuries.

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duct contributed to any injury or loss to [Kissel]?’’

(Emphasis in original.) The interrogatory lists the parties to be assigned a percentage of responsibility as

‘‘Plaintiff [Kissel],’’ ‘‘Defendant [HWBS],’’ and ‘‘Defendant [Wang].’’11

This submission, filed by Wang one month after he

withdrew his product liability claim against HBWS,

definitively demonstrates that Wang’s argument in this

appeal directly contradicts the position that he asserted

at trial in the Kissel action with respect to the applicability of the comparative responsibility provisions of § 52-572o to him. During the Kissel trial, Wang affirmatively

and without reservation acknowledged that he was an

appropriate party to be included in the allocation of

responsibility pursuant to § 52-572o, and he did so with

full knowledge of the fact that he was not himself a

party to what he now calls a ‘‘product liability action.’’

Wang specifically adopted the view that the allegations

in HBWS’s special defenses to Kissel’s product liability

claim provided a sufficient basis to submit to the jury

the issue of comparative responsibility, including his

own comparative responsibility.12

Had Wang objected to being included as a ‘‘party’’

for purposes of comparative responsibility on the ground

that he was not properly subject to the allocation pro11

The interrogatories submitted to the jury regarding comparative responsibility departed in certain respects from those proposed by Wang, but the

differences are not material to the claims raised by Wang in this appeal.

We see nothing in the record to suggest that Wang raised any objection or

took any exception to the interrogatories as submitted to the jury.

12

It is also noteworthy that Wang submitted proposed jury instructions

reflecting the same legal position contained in his proposed jury interrogatories. Wang thus requested that the jury determine whether he ‘‘violated the

professional standard of care’’ and whether ‘‘such violation was a legal cause

of [Kissel’s] injuries,’’ and, if so, assign him a percentage of responsibility

pursuant to the rules of comparative responsibility. Again, although the

charge as given by the trial court did not precisely track Wang’s requested

instruction, it was consistent with Wang’s position regarding the applicability

of § 52-572o.

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cess after he withdrew his third-party complaint, HBWS

would have had the opportunity to file a cross claim

against Wang, which he now argues was required to

invoke the comparative responsibility provisions of

§ 52-572o. See Practice Book § 10-10 (‘‘In any action for

legal or equitable relief, any defendant may file . . .

cross claims against any codefendant provided that

each such . . . cross claim arises out of the transaction

or one of the transactions which is the subject of the

plaintiff’s complaint . . . . A defendant may also file

a . . . cross claim under this section against any other

party to the action for the purpose of establishing that

party’s liability to the defendant for all or part of the

plaintiff’s claim against that defendant.’’). Rather than

objecting, however, Wang instead filed jury interrogatories and jury instructions recognizing and adopting his

status as a party subject to allocation of comparative

responsibility on the basis of the special defense asserted

by HBWS in its response to Kissel’s third-party complaint.

Ordinarily, the foregoing circumstances would lead

us to conclude that Wang is barred in this appeal from

raising any claims challenging the binding effect of a

procedure that was adopted or encouraged by Wang’s

own conduct in the underlying action. Just as a party

‘‘cannot pursue one course of action at trial and later,

on appeal, argue that a path he rejected should now be

open to him’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State

v. Wade, 351 Conn. 745, 758, 333 A.3d 90 (2025); so,

too, a party cannot use the very path he proposed for

the allocation of comparative responsibility in a prior

action to prevent its enforcement in a subsequent action

for contribution. Cf. Chapin v. Popilowski, 139 Conn.

84, 88, 90 A.2d 167 (1952) (‘‘[a]ction induced by [an]

appellant cannot be made a ground of error’’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)). ‘‘[W]hether we call it induced

error, encouraged error, waiver, or abandonment, the

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result—that the . . . claim is unreviewable—is the

same.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Independent Party of CT—State Central v. Merrill, 330 Conn.

681, 724, 200 A.3d 1118 (2019); see Dougan v. Dougan,

301 Conn. 361, 372, 21 A.3d 791 (2011) (‘‘[J]udicial estoppel prevents a party in a legal proceeding from taking

a position contrary to a position the party has taken in

an earlier proceeding. . . . The courts invoke judicial

estoppel as a means to preserve the sanctity of the oath

or to protect judicial integrity by avoiding the risk of

inconsistent results in two proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also BPP Illinois, LLC v.

Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, 859 F.3d 188,

192–94 (2d Cir. 2017) (plaintiffs were judicially estopped

from asserting claims in action for fraud after asserting

that they had no such claims in prior, separate bankruptcy proceeding).

Despite our misgivings, however, we have decided

to reach the merits of Wang’s claims to the extent that

they do not involve matters of form that could have

been cured by HBWS had the claimed pleading deficiency been challenged (rather than induced) by Wang

in the Kissel action. Specifically, we will address the

merits of Wang’s claims that (1) the procedures governing comparative responsibility and contribution under

§ 52-572o apply only to defendants who are parties to

a ‘‘product liability action,’’ and (2) the appellate reversal of the medical malpractice portion of the judgment

in the Kissel action rendered null and void the portion of

the judgment in that action assessing Wang 20 percent

comparative responsibility. We do so primarily because

HBWS has not raised in this appeal a claim of induced

error, waiver or judicial estoppel on the basis of Wang’s

proposed jury interrogatories and jury charge in the

Kissel action.

B

Whether Wang was a ‘‘party’’ subject to the comparative responsibility provisions in § 52-572o presents a

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matter of statutory construction over which our review

is plenary. See, e.g., Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 338

Conn. 687, 696, 258 A.3d 1268 (2021). In matters of

statutory interpretation, we are guided by General Statutes § 1-2z, which directs us first to consider ‘‘the text

of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.

If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,

extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall

not be considered.’’ A statute is ambiguous if it ‘‘is

susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation.’’

State v. Orr, 291 Conn. 642, 654, 969 A.2d 750 (2009).

We thus begin our analysis with the language of § 52-572o and the relevant statutory scheme, remaining

mindful that ‘‘we do not write on a clean slate, but are

bound by our previous judicial interpretations of this

language and the purpose of [those] statute[s].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Public

Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 312

Conn. 513, 527, 93 A.3d 1142 (2014).

Because Wang argues that he was not a ‘‘party’’ subject to the statute’s comparative responsibility regime

within the meaning of § 52-572o, we will focus initially

on the provisions of the statute that describe the scope

of its application to any particular defendant,13 specifically subsections (b) through (d), which provide:

‘‘(b) In any claim involving comparative responsibility, the court may instruct the jury to give answers to

special interrogatories, or if there is no jury, the court

may make its own findings, indicating (1) the amount

13

We need not be detained by any question regarding the statute’s application to a plaintiff asserting a product liability claim because the procedure

for allocation of responsibility plainly applies to such plaintiffs, referred to

as ‘‘claimants’’ under the CPLA. See General Statutes § 52-572o (a) (comparative responsibility applies to ‘‘claimant[s]’’); General Statutes § 52-572o (b)

(same); see also General Statutes § 52-572m (c) (defining ‘‘claimant’’). Page 18 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

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of damages each claimant would receive if comparative

responsibility were disregarded, and (2) the percentage

of responsibility allocated to each party, including the

claimant, as compared with the combined responsibility

of all parties to the action. For this purpose, the court

may decide that it is appropriate to treat two or more

persons as a single party.

‘‘(c) In determining the percentage of responsibility,

the trier of fact shall consider, on a comparative basis,

both the nature and quality of the conduct of the party.

‘‘(d) The court shall determine the award for each

claimant according to these findings and shall enter

judgment against parties liable on the basis of the common law joint and several liability of joint tortfeasors.

The judgment shall also specify the proportionate amount

of damages allocated against each party liable, according

to the percentage of responsibility established for such

party.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-572o

(b) through (d).

The statute’s repeated use of the term ‘‘party’’ demonstrates that the legislature intended for parties, and only

parties, to be subject to the jury’s determination of comparative responsibility under § 52-572o. Neither Wang

nor HBWS disputes this point. But ‘‘parties’’ to what?

Wang argues that the term ‘‘party,’’ with reference to

defendants, means only a defendant to a product liability claim,14 whereas HBWS argues that the term ‘‘party’’

14

Wang asserts that the term ‘‘party’’ refers specifically to a party to a

‘‘product liability action.’’ (Emphasis added.) Throughout his briefing, his

argument relies on distinguishing between Kissel’s ‘‘product liability action’’

against HBWS and her ‘‘medical malpractice action’’ against Wang. But the

statute uses the term ‘‘product liability claim,’’ which it defines broadly to

include ‘‘all claims or actions’’ in which a claimant seeks damages against

a product seller for personal injury, death or property damage caused by a

product. (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-572m (b). In the underlying case, Kissel’s product liability claim and her medical malpractice claim

were pleaded and tried in one action, arising from a single transaction or

occurrence. See Veits v. Hartford, 134 Conn. 428, 434, 58 A.2d 389 (1948)

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

encompasses all defendants to an action ‘‘involving’’ a

product liability claim, regardless of whether the particular defendant is prosecuting or defending a product

liability claim. These differing understandings of the

term ‘‘party’’ have significant implications in an action,

such as this one, in which a plaintiff seeking damages

for a single, indivisible harm brings an ordinary negligence claim against one defendant and a product liability claim under the CPLA against another defendant.15

Under Wang’s construction of § 52-572o, the jury may

make a comparative responsibility determination only

as between the plaintiff and the defendant sued under

the CPLA. Under HBWS’s construction, so long as both

defendants are parties to the action, the jury may make

a comparative responsibility determination as to the

plaintiff and both defendants.

Upon examination, we believe that the statutory language leads to only one reasonable construction regarding the parties subject to the comparative responsibility

constitute a single transaction or occurrence, he may sue in one action two

or more defendants against whom he claims relief, and it does not matter

that they may be liable concurrently, successively or in the alternative, or

that the relief against each has a different legal basis’’). For these reasons,

Wang’s use of the terms ‘‘product liability action’’ and ‘‘medical malpractice

action’’ is incorrect, and we will construe Wang’s position to be that the

term ‘‘party,’’ for purposes of § 52-572o, refers specifically to parties to a

product liability claim, meaning that only parties to such a claim within a

hybrid action (i.e. actions containing both CPLA and non-CPLA claims) may

be allocated a percentage of responsibility under § 52-572o.

15

In the Kissel action, Kissel’s negligence claim against Wang was not a

‘‘product liability claim’’ because, among other reasons, Wang was not a

‘‘product seller’’ within the purview of the CPLA. The CPLA defines a ‘‘product seller’’ to mean ‘‘any person or entity, including a manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor or retailer who is engaged in the business of selling such

products whether the sale is for resale or for use or consumption. The term

‘product seller’ also includes lessors or bailors of products who are engaged

in the business of leasing or bailment of products.’’ (Emphasis added.)

General Statutes § 52-572m (a); see, e.g., Normandy v. American Medical

Systems, Inc., 340 Conn. 93, 101–102, 262 A.3d 698 (2021) (product liability

claim can be brought only against ‘‘product seller’’).

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procedure. Section 52-572o (b) instructs that the allocation procedure is applicable ‘‘[i]n any claim involving

comparative responsibility . . . .’’ This phrase itself

arguably is ambiguous because the phrase ‘‘claim involving comparative responsibility’’ has no precise, everyday, or technical meaning.16 The remainder of the sentence, however, provides the interpretive guidance we

need by specifying that the trial court may instruct the

jury to make comparative responsibility findings as to

(1) the total damages owed to each claimant without

regard to any consideration of the comparative responsibility of any party, and (2) ‘‘the percentage of responsibility allocated to each party, including the claimant,

as compared with the combined responsibility of all

parties to the action.’’17 (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 52-572o (b). Read as a whole, the first sentence in

§ 52-572o (b) unambiguously means that the legislature

has created a statutory procedure—what may usefully

be called a comparative responsibility claim—available

in any action that includes a product liability claim for

indivisible damages. A properly pleaded comparative

responsibility claim calls for the trier of fact to allocate

comparative responsibility among the plaintiff and all

of the defendants that caused those damages, in whole

or in part.

16

The word ‘‘involving’’ is broad and nonspecific. See, e.g., KalshiEX, LLC

v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Docket No. 23-3257 (JMC),

2024 WL 4164694, *10 (D.D.C. September 12, 2024) (observing that term

‘‘involve’’ is ‘‘broadly defined’’), appeal dismissed, Docket No. 24-5205, 2025

WL 1349979 (D.C. Cir. May 7, 2025). It appears likely that it is used in § 52-572o (b) to refer to the claim of comparative responsibility that is created

by the statute.

17

‘‘There cannot be any broader classification than the word all. . . . In its

ordinary and natural meaning, the word all leaves no room for exceptions.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Redding v. Georgetown Land Development Co., LLC, 337 Conn. 75, 91, 251 A.3d 980 (2020); see also Canton v.

Cadle Properties of Connecticut, Inc., 316 Conn. 851, 858, 114 A.3d 1191

(2015) (legislature’s use of ‘‘[t]he [word] ‘all’ . . . support[ed] the broadest

possible reading’’ of statute).

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We have concluded that the text of § 52-572o (b) does

not state or imply that the class of parties subject to a

comparative responsibility claim is limited to plaintiffs

and those named as a defendant to a product liability

claim, as Wang proposes. Our conclusion is bolstered

by the fact that, if the legislature had so intended, it

would have expressed such a limitation in subsection

(b) or the other provisions of the statute by using readymade, statutorily defined terms to refer specifically to

the ‘‘parties to the product liability claim’’ or, alternatively, ‘‘claimants and product sellers.’’18 Although there

are often different ways to say the same thing, and the

legislature’s choice of one textual formulation does not

necessarily demonstrate an intention to eschew every

possible alternative formulation, normally, ‘‘we assume

that the legislature has a different intent when it uses

different terms in the same statutory scheme.’’ Southern

New England Telephone Co. v. Cashman, 283 Conn.

644, 662, 931 A.2d 142 (2007) (Katz, J., concurring);

see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 95 (2d

Cir. 2011) (‘‘when Congress did intend its reform measures to stretch beyond the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 983

(i), it used language manifesting that intent, carefully

avoiding the ‘civil forfeiture statute’ phrase that it had

specifically defined as a term of art with a meaning

narrower than its more natural purport’’). In the present

context, the statutory definitions of ‘‘product liability

18

A plaintiff asserting a product liability claim is defined in § 52-572m (c)

as a ‘‘claimant,’’ a term that is used repeatedly in § 52-572o to indicate that

such a plaintiff is a party subject to the comparative responsibility procedure.

Although the term ‘‘product seller’’ likewise is defined in the CPLA to identify

those persons or entities within the limited class of defendants subject to

suit in connection with a product liability claim; see General Statutes § 52-572m (a); the term ‘‘product seller,’’ unlike its statutory counterpart ‘‘claimant,’’ appears nowhere in § 52-572o to limit the class of defendants subject

to a comparative responsibility claim. Had the legislature intended to limit

the allocation of comparative responsibility only to defendants named in

the products liability claim, as Wang asserts, the term ‘‘defendant product

seller’’ would have been the obvious language to indicate that intention. Page 22 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

claim’’ and ‘‘product seller’’ in the CPLA provided two

obvious options that naturally could have been used to

express the meaning advocated by Wang, had it been

intended. The legislature instead chose to use the broad

terms ‘‘each party’’ and ‘‘all parties to the action,’’ and

we will take the legislature at its word. General Statutes

§ 52-572o (b).

Subsections (c) and (d) of § 52-572o provide additional procedures for allocating comparative responsibility, and they also do so in terms too broadly worded

to suggest the restrictive meaning advanced by Wang.

Section 52-572o (c) provides guidance to the trier of

fact in determining the percentage of responsibility by

requiring the trier to ‘‘consider, on a comparative basis,

both the nature and quality of the conduct of the party,’’

again without suggesting any limitation regarding the

parties within its scope. Section 52-572o (d) likewise

speaks in the broadest terms possible when it requires

the court to ‘‘determine the award for each claimant

according to these findings [of comparative responsibility],’’ and to ‘‘enter judgment against parties liable on

the basis of the common law joint and several liability

of joint tortfeasors.’’ (Emphasis added.) The provision

further instructs that the ‘‘judgment shall also specify

the proportionate amount of damages allocated against

each party liable, according to the percentage of responsibility established for such party.’’ (Emphasis added.)

General Statutes § 52-572o (d). These terms all point

toward an intention to include all defendants found

responsible for the claimant’s damages, not merely

those responsible on the basis of a product liability claim.19

19

Wang argues that the statutory text supports his construction because

subsection (d) of § 52-572o twice refers to the judgment allocating damages

against ‘‘liable’’ defendants, and claims that he was absolved of liability

when the medical malpractice portion of the judgment against him was

reversed on appeal. The point we make here is that the statute authorizes

allocation of responsibility among all defendants found to have caused a

claimant’s damages and is not limited in scope to product sellers named as

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The judgment in the action will, of necessity, include

the disposition of both CPLA and non-CPLA claims and,

therefore, necessarily will include the judgment as to

non-CPLA defendants; it would be incongruous if the

statute prescribed the required elements of the judgment only with respect to the former class of defendants. We presume that ‘‘the legislature knows how

. . . to use broader or limiting terms when it chooses

to do so.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Costanzo

v. Plainfield, 344 Conn. 86, 108, 277 A.3d 772 (2022).

This conclusion is further strengthened by our precedent establishing that all defendants, including product

sellers and nonproduct sellers, may be allocated a percentage of comparative responsibility under § 52-572o.

In Malerba v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 210 Conn. 189, 554

A.2d 287 (1989), the plaintiff sustained injuries in an

airplane accident and brought a product liability action

against the airplane’s manufacturer. See id., 190. The

airplane’s manufacturer impleaded the airplane’s owner

and its mechanic, neither of whom was classified as a

product seller for purposes of the CPLA, and sought

recovery on the basis of common-law contribution and

indemnification. See id., 191. The trial court ordered the

contribution claim stricken on the ground that, unless

judgment has been rendered in the underlying action,

a contribution claim cannot be commenced unless the

party seeking contribution alleges either of the two

statutory ‘‘precondition[s]’’ set forth in § 52-572o (e),

i.e., that the person seeking contribution has either paid

or agreed to pay the common liability for which contribution is sought.20 Id., 193. We held that the third-party

Wang’s argument that he was absolved of all liability in his appeal in the

Kissel action.

20

General Statutes § 52-572o (e) provides: ‘‘If a judgment has been rendered, any action for contribution must be brought within one year after

the judgment becomes final. If no judgment has been rendered, the person

bringing the action for contribution either must have (1) discharged by

payment the common liability within the period of the statute of limitations

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complaint for contribution under § 52-572o (e) was proper

because these preconditions ‘‘apply only to those circumstances [in which] a party elects to pursue an independent cause of action for a contribution rather than

impleading the prospectively liable third party as

authorized by [General Statutes] §§ 52-102a and 52-577a

(b).’’ Id., 195. In so holding, we explained that such a

construction ‘‘furthers the salutary purpose of encouraging parties to consolidate the litigation following from

a given factual circumstance into a single judicial proceeding thereby avoiding multiplicity of actions.’’ Id.

Our holding in Malerba strongly implies that a nonproduct seller may be made a party to a product liability

action for purposes of contribution under § 52-572o (e);

otherwise, the contribution action brought by the airplane’s manufacturer against the airplane’s owner and

its mechanic was legally impermissible as a threshold

matter, regardless of the preconditions contained in

§ 52-572o (e). Similarly, it is implicit in our holding in

Malerba that the percentage of responsibility allocated

to a nonproduct seller defendant under § 52-572o (b)

through (d) will determine the amount owed by that

defendant in a subsequent contribution action brought

under § 52-572o (e). To the extent that these holdings

were implicit in Malerba, we now make them explicit.21

the action for contribution within one year after payment, or (2) agreed

while action was pending to discharge the common liability and, within one

year after the agreement, have paid the liability and brought an action

for contribution.’’

21

In line with Malerba, Connecticut courts have repeatedly permitted the

allocation of comparative responsibility among product and nonproduct

sellers under § 52-572o. See Foular v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., Superior

Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. X04-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S

(November 30, 2017) (44 Conn. L. Rptr. 608, 609) (‘‘[this] [c]ourt held [in

Malerba] . . . that it was permissible for a defendant in a product liability

action to bring a third-party action for contribution against a party other

than a product seller’’); Nolen-Hoeksema v. Maquet Cardiopulmonary AG,

Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXXS (June 6, 2016) (62 Conn. L. Rptr. 460, 461–62) (in product liability action,

third-party complaint seeking contribution from nonproduct seller was permitted); Ambro v. Inland Paperboard & Packaging, Docket No. CV-04-0, 0 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL Page 25

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Our construction of § 52-572o based on its text also

accommodates the fact that the statute, as construed,

provides a solution to the vexing situation that would

otherwise arise if contribution from non-CPLA defendants were unavailable under the CPLA. It is not uncommon that both product and nonproduct sellers may

be implicated in causing the same indivisible harm to

persons or property. Yet, were we to construe § 52-572o

as proposed by Wang, three distinct doctrinal obstacles

would combine to frustrate apportionment or allocation

under these circumstances.22 First, it is axiomatic that

only product sellers may be named as defendants in a

product liability claim. See, e.g., Normandy v. American Medical Systems, Inc., 340 Conn. 93, 101, 262 A.3d

698 (2021). Second, it is likewise well established that

the CPLA is the exclusive remedy for a claim falling

within its scope. See, e.g., Winslow v. Lewis-Shepard,

Inc., 212 Conn. 462, 463, 471, 562 A.2d 517 (1989). Third,

it is clear that apportionment of comparative negligence

under General Statutes § 52-572h is available only as

between negligent parties.23 Thus, if § 52-572o does not

0287592-S, 2004 WL 3130537, *2 (December 20, 2004) (‘‘the product liability

defendant may seek allocation of responsibility with and contribution from

joint tortfeasors, whether negligent or otherwise liable’’); Gazza v. Bandit

Industries, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No.

X03-CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (January 22, 2001) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 269, 270–71)

(noting that any verdict in product liability action will include a determination of percentage of responsibility under § 52-572o (b) through (d) as to

all defendants, including nonproduct sellers).

22

Yet another doctrine, the common-law prohibition against contribution,

would preclude one responsible party from obtaining contribution from

another responsible party under these circumstances. See Kyrtatas v. Stop &

Shop, Inc., 205 Conn. 694, 700, 535 A.2d 357 (1988) (‘‘the legislature in

subsection (e) of § 52-572o has abolished the [common-law] prohibition

against contribution in the context of these suits’’).

23

See General Statutes § 52-572h (o) (‘‘there shall be no apportionment

of liability or damages between parties liable for negligence and parties

liable on any basis other than negligence including, but not limited to,

intentional, wanton or reckless misconduct, strict liability or liability pursuant to any cause of action created by statute, except that liability may be

apportioned among parties liable for negligence in any cause of action

created by statute based on negligence including, but not limited to, an Page 26 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL 0, 0

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permit the trier of fact to allocate percentages of responsibility to both CPLA and non-CPLA defendants, then,

despite the manifest legislative preference for apportionment among negligent parties reflected in § 52-572h

and the same policy preference for product liability

claims under § 52-572o, we would need to assume that

the legislature intended to exclude from any apportionment of fault or allocation of responsibility all hybrid

cases involving both CPLA and non-CPLA claims.

Although we will not ‘‘engraft language . . . to enhance

or supplement a statute containing clearly expressed

language’’; (internal quotation marks omitted) State v.

Obas, 320 Conn. 426, 436, 130 A.3d 252 (2016); we are

required to construe statutes with the understanding

that ‘‘[t]he legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . .’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 678, 911 A.2d

300 (2006).

To the extent that there is any ambiguity as to the

scope of the term ‘‘party’’ under § 52-572o—and we do

not believe there is—a review of the available extratextual evidence strengthens our plain meaning construction leading to the conclusion that the comparative

responsibility framework includes responsibility allocated to non-CPLA defendants. The legislature enacted

No. 79-483 of the 1979 Public Acts, ‘‘An Act Concerning

Product Liability Actions,’’ after a series of lengthy hearings on the matter. The CPLA was based on the Draft

action for wrongful death pursuant to section 52-555 or an action for injuries

caused by a motor vehicle owned by the state pursuant to section 52-556’’).

We need not address in this opinion whether a negligence claim brought

pursuant to the CPLA is subject to apportionment under § 52-572h (o). See

General Statutes § 52-572m (b) (defining ‘‘product liability claim’’ to include,

among other things, ‘‘all actions based on . . . negligence . . . breach of

or failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent or

innocent . . . [or] misrepresentation or nondisclosure, whether negligent

or innocent’’).

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Uniform Product Liability Law of 1979 (draft act). See

22 H.R. Proc., Pt. 20, 1979 Sess., p. 7021, remarks of

Representative John A. Berman; see also U.S. Department of Commerce, Draft Uniform Product Liability

Law, 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (January 12, 1979) (Draft Uniform Product Liability Law). Although the floor debate

did not address the precise scope intended by the use

of the term ‘‘party’’ in the provision that became § 52-572o,24 the legislative record demonstrates unequivocally that a principal purpose of the CPLA was to combat ‘‘the increased cost of product liability insurance’’

and its associated ‘‘impact on the prices of both consumer and industrial goods . . . .’’ Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 2, 1979 Sess., p.

568, remarks of John Anderson, assistant counsel for

the Connecticut Business and Industry Association; see

also Senate Bill No. 443, 1979 Sess. (‘‘STATEMENT OF

PURPOSE: To restore balance in the law of product

liability and relieve a serious economic problem.’’). This

purpose also was articulated in the draft act, which

sought to address the ‘‘[s]harply rising product liability

insurance premiums [that] have created serious problems in interstate commerce . . . .’’ Draft Uniform

Product Liability Law § 101 (a), supra, 44 Fed. Reg.

2997. The draft act identified ‘‘[u]ncertainty in product

liability law’’ as one cause of these problems; id., § 101

(e); and attempted to ‘‘balance the interests of products

users and sellers and to provide uniformity in the major

areas of tort law that may affect product liability insurance ratemaking.’’ Draft Uniform Product Liability Law,

supra, 44 Fed. Reg. 2996 (Background of the Draft Law).

The criteria used by the Department of Commerce to

develop the draft act included ‘‘expedit[ing] the reparations process from the time of injury to the time the

24

See 22 H.R. Proc., Pt. 21, 1979 Sess., pp. 7288, 7294, remarks of Representative John A. Berman; Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary,

Pt. 2, 1979 Sess., p. 569, remarks of John Anderson, assistant counsel for

the Connecticut Business and Industry Association.

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claim [was] paid’’ and ‘‘minimiz[ing] the sum of accident

costs, prevention costs, and transaction costs.’’ (Emphasis

omitted.) Id. (Criteria for the Law).25

This stated purpose helps explain not only why the

legislature included a provision in the CPLA abrogating

the common-law prohibition against contribution among

responsible parties, but also intended to spread the cost

of liability among all parties to an action involving a

product liability claim. To begin with, the procedures

established in § 52-572o allow litigants to improve the

efficiency of the litigation process by consolidating the

adjudication of the plaintiff’s claims with a determination, by the same trier of fact, of each party’s respective

share of responsibility. A narrower construction of the

term ‘‘party,’’ limiting the procedure to include only

parties to a product liability claim, would not achieve

that purpose. Perhaps even more important, construing

the term ‘‘party’’ to include non-CPLA defendants furthers the legislature’s express goal of reducing the economic burden imposed by product liability claims and,

in particular, the adverse impact on product sellers’

insurance premiums as well as consumer prices for

affected products. See Conn. Joint Standing Committee

Hearings, supra, p. 568, remarks of Attorney Anderson.

Allocating a percentage of responsibility to nonproduct

sellers responsible for some portion of the harm caused

by a product allows for a broader distribution of costs

among all responsible parties, which correspondingly

decreases the costs that are incurred (and must be

passed along) by the product seller.

25

This purpose animating the provision of the CPLA for allocation of

responsibility is consistent with the goals articulated in the Restatement

(Third) of Torts. See Restatement (Third) Torts, Apportionment of Liability

§ 10, reporters’ note to comment (f), p. 107 (2000) (‘‘[a]llocating responsibility once for an indivisible injury suffered by the plaintiff, in a single proceeding involving all responsible parties, has the advantage of efficiency and

avoiding administrative difficulties involved in multiple assessments of

responsibility for the same injury’’).

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To conclude, the plain language of the statute demonstrates to our satisfaction that the only reasonable construction of the term ‘‘party’’ as applied to defendants

includes all defendants in an action involving a claim

for comparative responsibility under § 52-572o, regardless of whether those persons or entities are product

sellers named as defendants to the product liability

claim. This construction finds support in extratextual

evidence of the legislature’s intentions animating the

CPLA.

C

Wang makes two additional arguments in support of

his claim that he is not subject to contribution under

§ 52-572o (e). First, as part of his contention that he

was not a party to the underlying product liability claim,

he argues that, once he withdrew his third-party product

liability complaint against HBWS, he was not a party

to a CPLA claim, whether as a defendant in Kissel’s

product liability claim or in a third-party complaint filed

by HBWS seeking comparative responsibility (which

HBWS never filed). He reasons that he cannot be subject

to contribution on the basis of the allocation of comparative responsibility in the Kissel action because he was

not made a party to a comparative responsibility claim

in any such pleading. Our holding in part II A of this

opinion disposes of this argument because we conclude

that Wang is barred from arguing that he cannot be

liable for comparative responsibility on the basis of

the form of the pleading that he used to invoke the

provisions of § 52-572o in the Kissel action.26

26

Although we have determined that Wang was a party to the underlying

action, we briefly note that, contrary to his repeated assertions, HBWS could

have brought an independent action for contribution against him, even if

he had never been made a party to the underlying product liability action.

This is the central premise of Malerba v. Cessna Aircraft Co., supra, 210

Conn. 189. However, in such a scenario, Wang would not be bound by the

allocation of comparative responsibility as determined in the underlying

action.

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Although Wang’s litigation choices in the Kissel

action preclude him now from claiming that, due to

HBWS’s failure to file a complaint against Wang in that

action, he was not a party subject to an adjudication

of comparative responsibility, we pause to observe that,

ordinarily, a special defense alleging a claim of comparative responsibility is only appropriate to invoke the

provisions of § 52-572o as to the party against whom

the special defense is directed. Therefore, a party seeking an allocation of comparative responsibility would

be well-advised to file a pleading to that effect directed

to the defendant against whom allocation is sought,

whether third-party defendant or not. It is well established that pleadings ‘‘must provide adequate notice of

the facts claimed and the issues to be tried.’’ Tedesco

v. Stamford, 215 Conn. 450, 459, 576 A.2d 1273 (1990).

‘‘Whether a complaint gives sufficient notice is determined in each case with reference to the character of

the wrong complained of and the underlying purpose of

the rule [that] is to prevent surprise [to] the defendant.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. In the Kissel

action, after Wang had withdrawn his third-party complaint, HBWS should have filed a third-party complaint

seeking allocation of comparative responsibility directly

against Wang instead of relying on the third special

defense contained in its pleading directed against Kissel. The pleading error is immaterial in this matter, as

we have explained, because Wang manifestly understood that allocation of comparative responsibility was

being sought as to him and conducted himself accordingly.

Wang’s other argument relies on the fact that the

medical malpractice portion of the judgment in the Kissel action was reversed on appeal.27 He contends that

27

The medical malpractice portion of the judgment in the Kissel action

was reversed on the ground that Kissel’s original pleading failed to comply

with the provisions of § 52-190a, which, at the time the appeal was decided,

were construed to require a plaintiff to include ‘‘an opinion letter from

a similar health care provider with the complaint to establish personal

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the appellate disposition made the judgment against

him ‘‘void ab initio’’ because Kissel’s noncompliance

with § 52-190a was, at the time, considered akin to

defective service of process and thus deprived the trial

court of personal jurisdiction over Wang. He concludes

that he consequently was never properly a ‘‘party’’ subject to the terms of § 52-572o. We find no merit in

this argument.

This contention misapprehends the operation and

effect of the comparative responsibility provisions in

§ 52-572o. The fact that the medical malpractice portion

of the judgment against Wang was reversed does not

alter the fact that Wang was a party to the Kissel action

for purposes of § 52-572o. The comparative responsibility claim contained in HBWS’s third special defense to

the Kissel complaint identified Wang as a responsible

party, alleged that his negligence in his handling of the

heat lamp caused Kissel’s injuries, was presented to

the jury, with his inducement and consent, as a basis

for finding him liable, and was one of two distinct and

independent grounds for the jury verdict against him.

Accordingly, the judgment against Wang in the Kissel

action contained two separate and distinct components.

The first component determined his liability to Kissel

for medical malpractice, noted the absence of any contributory negligence on Kissel’s part in connection with

that claim, and set forth the damages awarded for the

sufficient opinion letter will result in a dismissal [of the medical malpractice

claim].’’ Kissel v. Center for Women’s Health, P.C., supra, 205 Conn. App.

416. This holding was abrogated by Carpenter v. Daar, 346 Conn. 80, 287

A.3d 1027 (2023). See id., 123–24 (‘‘The Appellate Court’s recent decision

in Kissel . . . reveals the danger of [the] conclusion [in Morgan v. Hartford

Hospital, 301 Conn. 388, 21 A.3d 451 (2011)] that the opinion letter implicates

personal jurisdiction. By elevating the opinion letter to a jurisdictional prerequisite of any kind, it allows a potential prelitigation defect to defeat a

medical malpractice action that a jury has deemed meritorious after several

years of litigation.’’). Although it does not bear on the outcome of the

present appeal, we note that the judgment against Wang would not have

been reversed under the paradigm later adopted in Carpenter.

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harm caused by Wang’s medical malpractice. The second component, mandated by § 52-572o (d), reflected

the jury’s determination that he was 20 percent responsible for Kissel’s total damages in connection with the

product liability claim. See footnotes 4 and 5 of this

opinion and accompanying text.28

The Appellate Court reversed the medical malpractice portion of the judgment against Wang, but the judgment was affirmed in all other respects. See Kissel v.

Center for Women’s Health, P.C., supra, 205 Conn. App.

436, 447. Wang never challenged the portion of the

judgment against him involving the allocation of comparative responsibility. His failure to raise that issue on

appeal in the Kissel action is particularly noteworthy

because the trial court’s memorandum of decision concerning the denial of Wang’s motion to set aside the

verdict stated that ‘‘[t]here is no claim that [Wang’s]

conduct . . . was not a proper subject of the process

of determining the respective responsibility of the parties in the context of the product liability claim.’’ The

trial court in the Kissel action had jurisdiction over

Wang to determine his comparative responsibility at

the time that judgment was rendered, and the portion

of the judgment allocating comparative responsibility

was not reversed on appeal.

Wang relies on Crotta v. Home Depot, Inc., supra,

249 Conn. 639–41, for the proposition that he cannot

be ‘‘obligated’’ in an action for contribution because he

was not ‘‘originally liable’’ to Kissel in the underlying

28

The jury interrogatories in the Kissel action directed the jury to answer

interrogatories eleven through thirteen, relating to comparative responsibility, even if the jury determined that Wang was not liable for medical malpractice. In other words, the trial court, the parties, and the jury in the Kissel

action all understood that the question of Wang’s liability for medical malpractice based on the allegations in Kissel’s complaint was separate and

distinct from the question of his liability for comparative responsibility under

§ 52-572o based on HBWS’s third special defense.

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action. Crotta has no application to the present case

because it involved a claim for common-law contribution, not comparative responsibility and contribution

under the CPLA. See id., 639. Section 52-572o establishes a statutory regime to govern contribution for

parties within its scope. The statute substantially changed

the common law by (1) establishing a system for the

allocation of comparative responsibility among parties

whose conduct causes indivisible harm to a plaintiff, (2)

permitting contribution according to the proportionate

responsibility of the parties, and (3) providing defendants with the option to pursue contribution claims

either within the context of the original action involving

a product liability claim or in a subsequent, independent

contribution action. See Malerba v. Cessna Aircraft

Co., supra, 210 Conn. 195–96.29 Wang is subject to a

claim under the statutory scheme provided in § 52-572o,

not a claim for common-law contribution. Under this

statutory scheme, to the extent that the ‘‘rights and

liabilities [of the defendants] were expressly put in issue

in the first action, by cross complaint or other adversary

pleadings, and determined by the judgment in the first

action,’’ they are res judicata in a subsequent action

between them. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.,

197–98. Wang is therefore liable for contribution according

to the percentage of comparative responsibility duly

allocated to him in the underlying action. See, e.g., Kyrtatas v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 205 Conn. 694, 702 n.2, 535

A.2d 357 (1988) (when all defendants are parties to

original action, ‘‘a jury’s findings concerning the relative

responsibility of the parties are conclusive, and are

entitled to res judicata status’’).

29

Our holding in Malerba cannot be harmonized with Wang’s view that

a claim for contribution is barred unless the parties to the contribution

action already share a joint obligation arising from their liability to the

plaintiff on the basis of a judgment in the underlying action. To the contrary,

Malerba allows a party to pursue an independent contribution action, even

as to a ‘‘prospectively liable third party’’ who was never impleaded in the

original action. Malerba v. Cessna Aircraft Co., supra, 210 Conn. 195.

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For purposes of the present contribution action, both

Wang and HBWS were subject to the adjudication of

comparative responsibility in the underlying action, and

they are both bound by that adjudication.

III

Wang next contends that the plaintiffs’ contribution

action is barred by the statute of limitations set forth

in § 52-572o (e), which provides in relevant part that,

‘‘[i]f a judgment has been rendered, any action for contribution must be brought within one year after the

judgment becomes final. . . .’’ Wang argues that a judgment becomes final for purposes of § 52-572o (e) when

it is rendered by the trial court; HBWS argues that

the judgment becomes final under the statute when all

appellate remedies have been exhausted. The trial court

agreed with HBWS, as do we.

The relevant dates are not in dispute. The trial court

in the Kissel action rendered judgment on January 3,

2019. As previously detailed in this opinion, Wang and

HBWS each filed timely appeals. Following proceedings

in the Appellate Court; see generally Kissel v. Center

for Women’s Health, P.C., supra, 205 Conn. App. 394;

we denied HBWS’s petition for certification to appeal

on November 9, 2021. See Kissel v. Center for Women’s

Health, P.C., supra, 339 Conn. 917. On that same date,

we granted Kissel’s petitions for certification to appeal.

See Kissel v. Center for Women’s Health, P.C., supra,

339 Conn. 917; Kissel v. Center for Women’s Health,

P.C., supra, 339 Conn. 916. Kissel filed her certified

appeals but withdrew them on January 11, 2022, after

receiving payment from HBWS in full satisfaction of

the judgment. HBWS commenced the present action

for contribution on May 10, 2022, well within the one

year limitation period as construed by HBWS, but more

than one year after the limitation period as construed

by Wang.

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Our review once again is plenary. Beginning with the

plain language of the statute, it is of primary significance

that the first sentence of subsection (e) uses the word

‘‘judgment’’ twice, first to refer to the precondition for

application of the relevant one year limitation period

(‘‘[i]f a judgment has been rendered’’), and a second

time to identify the specific event triggering the accrual

of the one year period (‘‘one year after the judgment

becomes final’’). General Statutes § 52-572o (e). We

must presume under these circumstances that the legislature intended that there would be a difference between

when ‘‘a judgment has been rendered’’ and when that

‘‘judgment becomes final.’’ The distinction is plainly

temporal and sequential. The statutory language, as the

plaintiffs put it, indicates that ‘‘a judgment first comes

into existence and later becomes final.’’ Compare

Schieffelin & Co. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 194 Conn.

165, 175, 479 A.2d 1191 (1984) (‘‘[t]he use of the present

perfect tense of a verb indicates an action or condition

that was begun in the past and is still going on or

was just completed in the present’’), with Travelers

Indemnity Co. v. Malec, 215 Conn. 399, 404, 576 A.2d

485 (1990) (‘‘The verb [used in the statute] speaks in

the present tense. . . . We are entitled to presume that

if the legislature intended that past acts could constitute

compliance . . . language to that effect would appear

in the statute.’’). It is well established that ‘‘[t]he [legislature’s] use of a verb tense is significant in construing

statutes.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gelinas

v. West Hartford, 65 Conn. App. 265, 281, 782 A.2d 679,

cert. denied, 258 Conn. 926, 783 A.2d 1028 (2001). This

point alone strongly indicates to us that an action for

contribution accrues for purposes of § 52-572o (e) when

all appellate proceedings are terminated, that is, when

either the deadline to seek review has passed, or when

all appellate proceedings have terminated.

We recognize that the term ‘‘final judgment’’ (phrased

as ‘‘the judgment becomes final’’ in § 52-572o (e)) is a

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widely used legal term of art that can mean different

things in different contexts. See General Statutes § 1-1

(a) (‘‘technical words and phrases, and such as have

acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law,

shall be construed and understood accordingly’’). We

therefore consider our cases construing the term ‘‘final

judgment’’ before arriving at a definitive conclusion as

to its proper meaning for purposes of § 52-572o (e).

Wang points to Preisner v. Aetna Casualty & Surety

Co., 203 Conn. 407, 414, 525 A.2d 83 (1987), for the

proposition that, under Connecticut law, ‘‘a judgment

is generally final until it is reversed on appeal.’’ This

isolated quotation overlooks the central principle articulated in Preisner, which is that finality is heavily

dependent on context. As we said in that case: ‘‘[T]he

effect of a pending appeal [on] an otherwise final judgment has aptly been characterized as [o]ne of the most

troublesome problems in applying the rule of finality

[of judgments], because this is an area in which [t]here

are no technically precise and universally recognized

rules . . . . In the absence of universally applicable

rules, we have recognized that the relationship between

a pending appeal and a judgment depends [on] the

nature of the issue that is to be addressed.’’ (Citations

omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 413–14. Indeed, in the particular circumstances at issue in Preisner, we concluded that the

underlying trial court judgment, which involved liability

on a promissory note, was not final during the pendency of the appellate process because the trial court

judgment did not entitle the note holder ‘‘to levy execution to seize and sell assets belonging to [the note

maker]. . . . [E]xecution was precluded by the outstanding stay.’’ Id., 415. Preisner thus stands for the

more nuanced proposition that the finality of judgment

depends on the nature of the judgment at issue and

the purpose for which the issue of finality is being

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determined, e.g., for purposes of appeal, execution, res

judicata, or something else.30 See also In re Application

of Title & Guaranty Co., 109 Conn. 45, 50, 145 A. 151

(1929) (‘‘judgment becomes final only when [rendered

by] a court from which execution can issue’’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

Consistent with Preisner, ‘‘we have taken a functional

approach in our construction of the term [final judgment], eschewing the application of inflexible rules in

favor of a contextual analysis.’’ Stevens v. Aetna Life &

Casualty Co., 233 Conn. 460, 467–68, 659 A.2d 707 (1995).

Given the context-specific nature of the analysis, the

30

An aspect of Preisner seemingly more helpful to Wang is its passing

observation that ‘‘a trial court judgment has been held to be final, despite

a pending appeal, insofar as the issue was the triggering of the statute of

limitations; [see] Varley v. Varley, 181 Conn. 58, 60–61, 434 A.2d 312 (1980)

. . . .’’ (Citations omitted.) Preisner v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra,

203 Conn. 414. Upon examination, however, the Varley case relied on in

Preisner actually reinforces our conclusion that the statute of limitations

in the present case does not accrue at the time that judgment is rendered

in the trial court. The statute of limitations at issue in Varley was General

Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 52-582, which governs petitions for a new trial.

See Varley v. Varley, supra, 59. That statute provides that the limitations

period for filing a petition for a new trial accrues upon ‘‘the rendition of

the judgment or decree complained of.’’ General Statutes (Rev. to 1977)

§ 52-582; see also Varley v. Varley, supra, 59 and n.1. The rendition of

judgment is generally an act performed by the trial court. See, e.g., Bogaert

v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 162 Conn. 532, 535, 294 A.2d 573 (1972) (‘‘[a]

judgment is in fact rendered in a cause tried to the court when the trial

judge officially announces his decision orally in open court, or, out of court,

signifies orally or in a writing filed with the clerk in his official capacity

the decision pronounced by him’’). By contrast, as discussed in this opinion,

the language of the statute of limitations in § 52-572o (e) distinguishes

between the time that ‘‘a judgment has been rendered’’ and when that

‘‘judgment becomes final.’’ Moreover, beyond the textual distinctions

between General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 52-582 and § 52-572o (e), the

discussion of finality in Varley implicated entirely different practical considerations. Varley involved the issue of when a new trial could be ordered to

relitigate the same dispute; see Varley v. Varley, supra, 59; whereas the

present case concerns when a separate action for contribution can be initiated based on a judgment in an underlying proceeding. Although both cases

involve an assessment of finality for purposes of triggering a statute of

limitations, the contexts are altogether different.

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meaning of finality for purposes of triggering the accrual

of a contribution action under the CPLA is the meaning

that best aligns with the language of the statute and

best serves the purpose of § 52-572o (e), which is ‘‘to

provide that if any liable defendant pays more than

its proportional share of that net award, it may seek

appropriate contributions from the other liable defendants.’’ Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc., 280 Conn.

1, 14, 905 A.2d 55 (2006).

Applying this approach, the only plausible construction of the statute is that a judgment ‘‘becomes final’’

for purposes of § 52-572o (e) upon the termination of

all appellate proceedings. Prior to the termination of

appellate proceedings in the underlying action, the parties to an independent action for contribution have no

certainty as to either the ultimate total award or the

percentage of responsibility allocated to them. Requiring the initiation of a contribution claim within one

year of judgment in the trial court would frustrate the

statutory purpose of ensuring that a defendant does not

ultimately ‘‘[pay] more than its proportional share’’ and

would leave the parties and the court without guidance

as to the amount of ‘‘appropriate contributions’’ to seek

from the others. Barry v. Quality Steel Products, Inc.,

supra, 280 Conn. 14. Moreover, there can be no execution on the underlying judgment until the appeal period

expires. See Practice Book § 61-11 (a) (‘‘[e]xcept where

otherwise provided by statute or other law, proceedings

to enforce or carry out the judgment or order shall be

automatically stayed until the time to file an appeal has

expired’’). It follows that a contribution action accrues

after the appeal period expires.

Our construction is consistent with the analysis of

the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Texas interpreting Texas product liability law. In

Evanston Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of

Pittsburgh, PA, Docket No. 1:09-CV-909, 2012 WL

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12977322 (E.D. Tex. March 19, 2012), the court concluded that a contribution claim in a product liability

action accrues when the parties to the underlying action

have exhausted all levels of appellate review, such that

the liability of the party seeking contribution is ‘‘absolutely certain.’’ Id., *8. The court reasoned that, under

Texas product liability law, ‘‘the doctrine of contribution is based on principles of equity and natural justice

so that one shall not bear more than his just share of

a common burden to the advantage of his co-obligors

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The purpose of contribution under Connecticut law is similar

and weighs in favor of arriving at the same result.

We are unpersuaded by Wang’s observation that the

legislature has used different language in other statutes

to define finality in terms of the termination of all appellate proceedings. He lists several examples of such statutes, including General Statutes §§ 52-572h (g) (1)31 and

52-470 (d),32 to demonstrate that the legislature’s failure

to include this explicit language in § 52-572o (e) indicates a different intention. In his view, the phrase ‘‘judgment becomes final’’ appears after the phrase ‘‘judgment

has been rendered’’ out of a mere recognition ‘‘that

some trial court judgments are interlocutory,’’ such as

a judgment in a bifurcated trial that determines liability

but leaves open the question of damages, or a court’s

acceptance of a jury’s verdict on comparative responsibility prior to its adjudication of postverdict motions.

31

General Statutes § 52-572h (g) (1) provides in relevant part:, ‘‘Upon

motion by the claimant to open the judgment filed [in a negligence action],

after good faith efforts by the claimant to collect from a liable defendant,

not later than one year after judgment becomes final through lapse of time

or through exhaustion of appeal, whichever occurs later . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

32

General Statutes § 52-470 (d) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘[T]he prior

[habeas] petition is deemed to be a final judgment due to the conclusion

of appellate review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

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The short answer to this argument is that the legislature is not required to express the same idea using the

same language in every statute. No doubt, as a general

proposition, we will adhere to the principle that, ‘‘[w]hen

a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given

provision, the omission of such provision from a similar

statute concerning a related subject . . . is significant

to show that a different intention existed . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Elianah T.-T., 326

Conn. 614, 624, 165 A.3d 1236 (2017). However, § 52-572o (e) does not so much omit altogether a commonly

used statutory formulation as it does alter that formulation in a manner that is sui generis in Connecticut.

Particularly in the context of final judgment jurisprudence, where irregularities and anomalies are not

uncommon, it should not be surprising that the legislature has employed different language to mean the same

thing. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.

v. Manning, 578 U.S. 374, 384–85, 136 S. Ct. 1562, 194

L. Ed. 2d 671 (2016) (finding ‘‘nothing remarkable’’ in

rule construing ‘‘completely different language . . . to

mean exactly the same thing’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)). The anomaly disappears completely when

we recognize that the source of the statutory language

in this case was the draft act, which was promulgated

by the United States Department of Commerce for use

by the states. See Draft Uniform Product Liability Law,

supra, 44 Fed. Reg. 2996. The relevant language of § 52-572o (e) was taken verbatim from § 112 of the draft

act; see id., § 112 (e), 44 Fed. Reg. 3001; see also 22

H.R. Proc., Pt. 20, 1979 Sess., p. 7021, remarks of Representative Berman; which, in turn, was adopted directly

from § 5 of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act of 1977

(UCFA). See Draft Uniform Product Liability Law,

supra, 44 Fed. Reg. 3012 (‘‘[§] 112 is based on [§§] 4

and 5 of the UCFA’’).33 The origin of the statutory text

33

We observe that only two of our sister states, Iowa and Washington,

have adopted the UCFA; see Iowa Code Ann. § 668.1 et seq. (West 2016);

and Wn. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.22.005 et seq. (West Cum. Supp. 2025); and

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

explains why its language is not identical to that

appearing in other provisions of the General Statutes.

We conclude that a ‘‘judgment becomes final’’ for

purposes of triggering the statute of limitations in an

independent contribution action pursuant to § 52-572o

(e) upon the termination of appellate proceedings in

the underlying action, including the expiration of all

applicable stays of execution. In the present case, the

judgment in the Kissel action became final on November

19, 2021, which is ten days after certification to appeal

was denied by this court on November 9, 2021.34 See

Kissel v. Center for Women’s Health, P.C., supra, 339

Conn. 917. The plaintiffs timely initiated the present

contribution action in May, 2022, well within the one

year statute of limitations. We therefore hold that the

contribution action is timely.

IV

To summarize, we hold that the term ‘‘party’’ for

purposes of an adjudication of comparative responsibility under § 52-572o applies to all defendants in an action

involving a product liability claim. Wang was a party

to the Kissel action, his comparative responsibility for

the damages awarded in connection with the product

liability claim was assessed by the trier of fact to be

20 percent, and that aspect of the judgment was not

reversed on appeal. Accordingly, he is bound in the

reference to their jurisprudence in this area is of limited use as neither of

their state courts of last resort have squarely addressed the issue of when

a judgment becomes final for purposes of triggering the statute of limitations

in an action for contribution.

34

Pursuant to Practice Book § 71-6 (a), ‘‘[u]nless the chief justice or chief

judge shall otherwise direct, any stay of proceedings which was in effect

during the pendency of the appeal shall continue until the time for filing a

motion for reconsideration has expired, and, if a motion is filed, until its

disposition, and, if it is granted, until the appeal is finally determined.’’ A

motion for reconsideration of a decision of the Supreme Court must be filed

‘‘within ten days from the date when the decision or . . . order being challenged is officially released.’’ Practice Book § 71-5.

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Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang

present action for contribution by the underlying judgment assigning him 20 percent comparative responsibility. We further hold that the phrase ‘‘after the judgment

becomes final’’ for purposes of triggering the statute of

limitations in an independent contribution action under

§ 52-572o (e) refers to the judgment upon termination

of appellate proceedings and that the plaintiffs’ present

contribution action was timely.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.