UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MICHAEL STOVALL,
Plaintiff,
No. 24-cv-3066 (EGS)
v.
BROOK ROLLINS,
Secretary of Agriculture et
al., 1
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Michael Stovall (“Mr. Stovall”), brings this
action against Brook Rollins in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of
Agriculture (collectively the “Department”) alleging claims for:
(1) Count I: Breach of Contract; (2) Count II: Violation of the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 et
seq.; (3) Count III: Violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”) 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; (4) Count IV: Due Process
Under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; (5) Count V:
Negligence; and (6) Count VI: Intentional Infliction of
1
Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the current Secretary of Agriculture is substituted for the prior Secretary of Agriculture. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Emotional Distress. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 16-22. 2 Mr. Stovall
seeks the following relief:
(a) finding and declaring that the
[Department] has unlawfully discriminated
against Mr. Stovall in connection with the
[Department]’s loan program in violation of
ECOA, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) and the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 551;
(b) finding and declaring that the
[Department]’s treatment of Mr. Stovall in
connection with the [Department]’s loan
program and Settlement Agreement violated Mr.
Stovall’s constitutional right to equal
protection and due process;
(c) finding and declaring that Defendants
breached and continue to breach the 1998
Settlement Agreement it had with Mr. Stovall;
(d) finding and declaring that Defendants are
liable to Mr. Stovall in negligence for
breaching its duty owed in performing agreed
upon tasks outlined in the 1997 Settlement
Agreement; and
(e) finding and declaring that Defendants are
liable to Mr. Stovall in [intentional
infliction of emotional distress] for its
outrageous conduct towards Mr. Stovall over
the past two decades;
(f) awarding monetary relief pursuant to 15
U.S.C. §§ 1691e(a) and (c);
(g) awarding attorney’s fees . . . and
(h) [i]ncluding such other and further
declaratory and monetary relief.”
2
When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page number of the filed document.
2
Id. at “Prayer for Relief.”
The Department moves to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See Mot., ECF No. 9. 3 Upon careful consideration of
the motion, the response, the reply thereto, and the applicable
law, the Court GRANTS the Department’s Motion to Dismiss.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts—drawn from the Complaint—are assumed to
be true. See Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119,
1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Mr. Stovall is an African-American,
fourth generation farmer who began farming in the 1960s. Compl.,
ECF No. 1 ¶ 34. In 2019, the Department attempted to foreclose
on his property because it accused him of being delinquent in
repaying a 1998 loan. Id. ¶ 52. The foreclosure was vacated when
it was discovered that this was a mistake. Id. ¶ 53. In 2021,
the USDA agreed in writing to deposit $173,000 (apparently in
Mr. Stovall’s account) but failed to fulfill the promise, id. ¶
3 Mr. Stovall brings this action against Brook Rollins, Secretary of Agriculture in her official capacity, and the United States Department of Agriculture. See generally docket for Case # 24-cv-3066. The Court construes the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, as brought by all Defendants even though the case caption on the Motion to Dismiss does not include “et al.” and Defendants are referred to in the singular in the motion. The docket clearly indicates government counsel’s intent to represent both named defendants. See e.g., Notice of Appearance, ECF No. 7; Defendants’ Consent Motion for Enlargement of Time, ECF No. 8.
3
54; and it promised to write off $876,00 but failed to fulfill
this promise also, id. ¶ 55.
B. Procedural History
Mr. Stovall filed this lawsuit on October 30, 2024. See
Compl., ECF No. 1. The Department filed its Motion to Dismiss on
February 18, 2025. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9. Mr.
Stovall filed his five and a half-page opposition brief on March
2, 2025, see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 10; and the Department filed
the reply brief on March 10, 2025, see Reply, ECF No. 11. The
briefing is now complete, and the motion is ripe and ready for
the Court’s adjudication.
II. Legal Standards
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
On a motion to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing that the court has subjectmatter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 561 (1992). “The court must address the issue of
jurisdiction as a threshold matter, because absent jurisdiction
the court lacks the authority to decide the case on any other
grounds.” Am. Farm Bureau v. EPA, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 91 (D.D.C.
2000). Moreover, because subject-matter jurisdiction relates to
the Court's power to hear the claim, the Court must give the
plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a
4
Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. Uberoi v. EEOC, 180 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D.D.C. 2001). In
resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, the Court “may consider the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's
resolution of disputed facts.” Coal. for Underground Expansion
v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning
v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). To survive a
12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal (“Iqbal”), 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly (“Twombly”),
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw [a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. The standard does not amount to a
“probability requirement,” but it does require more than a
“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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When evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, the court “may consider
only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either
attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of
which [courts] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis
Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Furthermore, the court “must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint.” Atherton v. D.C. Off.
of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal
quotations omitted). The court must also give the plaintiff the
“benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged.” Id. at 677 (internal quotations omitted). However, the
court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986). And “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are not
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.
III. Analysis
A. Jurisdictional Arguments
1. Mr. Stovall Does Not Allege a Declaratory
Judgment Cause of Action
Mr. Stovall asserts in the “Subject Matter Jurisdiction”
section of his Complaint that the Court has jurisdiction over
his Declaratory Judgment Act (“DCA”) “claim” under 28 U.S.C. §§
6
2201, 2202. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 7. The Department argues that
the Court lacks jurisdiction over Mr. Stovall’s DCA “claims”
since the DCA “is not an independent source of federal
jurisdiction.” Mot., ECF No. 9 at 12 (citing Lovitky v. Trump,
918 F.3d 160, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Under the DCA, a court may “declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The DCA is not, however, “an
independent source of federal jurisdiction.” Metz v. BAE Sys.,
Tech. Solutions & Servs. Inc., 774 F.3d 18, 25 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (citation omitted). Despite Mr. Stovall’s assertion in the
Subject Matter Jurisdiction portion of his Complaint, however,
his Complaint does not contain a cause of action under the DCA.
See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 16-22 (listing the six Counts in the
Complaint). Nor could it since the DCA does not “provide a cause
of action.” Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Rather, as listed above, the relief Mr. Stovall seeks includes
that the Court make various declarations, which it could be
empowered to do under the DCA. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (explaining that the DCA
“enlarged the range of remedies available in the federal courts
but did not extend their jurisdiction”). Accordingly, there is
no DCA cause of action to dismiss.
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2. The United States Has Not Waived Its
Sovereign Immunity with Respect to the
Constitutional Claim for Money Damages
Mr. Stovall alleges a Due Process claim under the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution based on racial
discrimination he allegedly suffered as a result of the
Department’s actions over the years. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶
78-82. The Department moves to dismiss this claim on the ground
that the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for
constitutional claims for money damages. Mot., ECF No. 9 at 12-13. Mr. Stovall fails to respond substantively to the
Department’s arguments. See generally Opp’n, ECF No. 10. His
only response is that the Department’s “assertions and argument
for dismissing this claim is displaced and therefore hold no
merit.” Opp’n, ECF No. 10 at 4. Mr. Stovall cites no points or
authorities in support of his claim that the Department’s
argument has no merit. See id.
Constitutional claims for money damages
against federal agencies are claims against
the United States. Clark v. Library of Cong.,
750 F.2d 89, 103–104 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Kline
v. Republic of El Salvador, 603 F. Supp. 1313,
1316 (D.D.C.1985). And, the United States can
be sued only to the extent that it consents to
suit. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S.
535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607
(1980) (“It is elementary that the United
States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save
as it consents to be sued ... and the terms of
its consent to be sued in any court define
that court's jurisdiction to entertain the
8
suit.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
The D.C. Circuit has “recognized the wellestablished rule that sovereign immunity bars
suits for money damages against officials in
their official capacity, absent a specific
waiver by the government.” Ward v. Kennard,
133 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing
Clark, 750 F.2d at 103). The United States has
not waived its sovereign immunity for
constitutional torts. See Kline, 603 F.Supp.
at 1317 (“the Federal Tort Claims Act does not
waive sovereign immunity with respect to
constitutional torts”); Birnbaum v. United
States, 588 F.2d 319, 327–28 (2d Cir. 1978)
(same).
Stovall v. Veneman, 394 F. Supp. 2d 21, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2005).
Since Mr. Stovall seeks monetary relief, see Compl., ECF No. 1
at 23; and since the government has not waived sovereign
immunity for constitutional torts, Mr. Stovall’s constitutional
claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
3. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Mr.
Stovall’s Breach of Contract Claim
Mr. Stovall seeks “actual and consequential” damages in the
amount of 25 million dollars based on the alleged breach of the
settlement agreement between the Department and him in which he
alleges that the Department agreed to deposit $173,000 in his
account and write off $876,000. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶
60-62. The Department argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction
over this claim pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1346(a)(2), because since the claim exceeds $10,000, it is
9
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Court of
Claims. Mot., ECF No. 9 at 13.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
(“D.C. Circuit”) interprets the Tucker Act
to confer exclusive jurisdiction over breach
of contract claims against the United States
seeking more than $10,000 in damages on the
Court of Federal Claims,” Hammer v. United
States, 989 F.3d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (citing
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491(a); Greenhill v.
Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 573 (D.C. Cir.
2007)), and thus “to ‘impliedly forbid[ ]’
contract claims against the Government from
being brought in district court under the
waiver in the APA,” 5 Perry Cap., 864 F.3d at
618–19 (quoting Albrecht v. Comm. on Emp.
Benefits of Fed. Rsrv. Emp. Benefits Sys., 357
F.3d 62, 67–68 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (alteration in
original)).
Crowley Government Services, Inc. v. General Services
Administration, 38 F.4th 1099, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 2022). Whether a
claim against the United States is “‘at its essence’ contractual
for the Tucker Act ‘depends both on the source of the rights
upon which the plaintiff bases its claims, and upon the type of
relief sought (or appropriate).’” Id. (quoting Megapulse, Inc.
v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Citing Crowley
Government Services, Mr. Stovall asserts that the Court has
jurisdiction over his contract claim because it is brought under
the APA. Opp’n, ECF No. 10 at 4-5. For the reasons explained
below, Mr. Stovall’s reliance on Crowley Government Services is
misplaced.
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The “source of the rights upon which [Mr. Stovall] bases
[his] claim[]” are clearly contractual. First, he alleges that
the Department breached a settlement agreement with him. Id. ¶¶
60-61. Second, the relief he seeks are “actual and consequential
damages” resulting from the alleged breach. Id. ¶ 62. D.C.
Circuit precedent identifies “money damages as . . . [the]
type[] of relief that are specific to actions that sound in
contract.” Crowley Government Services, Inc. 38 F.4th at 1107.
Since Mr. Stovall seeks money damages in excess of $10,000 for
the alleged breach of the settlement agreement, the Court of
Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over the claim.
It is Mr. Stovall’s initial burden to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over his claim. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 527 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (D.D.C. 2007). Since he has not
met this burden, the Court will dismiss his breach of contract
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
See Brown v. Mattis, No. 16-cv-1025, 2018 WL 6433754, at *5
(D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2018).
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4. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction Over Mr.
Stovall’s Tort Claims
Mr. Stovall alleges that the Department was negligent when
it breached the agreement to deposit $173,000 in Mr. Stovall’s
account and write off $876,000. Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 85. He
further alleges that the Department is liable to him for
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress because its
discrimination against him in the loan process was reckless and
severe. Id. ¶ 90.
The Department argues that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Mr. Stovall’s claims for negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress because he does not
allege that he exhausted his administrative remedies. Mr.
Stovall fails to respond substantively to these arguments. See
generally Opp’n, ECF No. 10. His only response is that he will
have the opportunity to prove that he exhausted his
administrative remedies during discovery. See id. at 5. He cites
no points or authorities in response to the Department’s
arguments.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) waives sovereign
immunity in limited circumstances, permitting a plaintiff to sue
the United States for torts in situations in which “the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
12
occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); Sloan v. Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 236 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The FTCA gives
federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims
against the United States for “injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act
or omission” of a federal employee “acting within the scope of
his office or employment.” Millbrook v. U.S.,133 S. Ct. 1441,
1443, (2013); 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)(1).
Before filing suit under the FTCA, a plaintiff must first
present his alleged claims “to the appropriate Federal
agency.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a mandatory, jurisdictional prerequisite to filing
such a lawsuit in federal court. See Jones v. United States, 296
Fed. Appx. 82, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Simpkins v. D.C. Gov't, 108
F.3d 366, 370–71 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
To exhaust administrative remedies under the FTCA, a
plaintiff must have presented the agency with “(1) a written
statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable the
agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a sum-certain
damages claim.” GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 905
(D.C. Cir. 1987). Further, the agency must have either denied
the claim in writing or failed to provide a final disposition
within six months of the filing of the claim. Id. Importantly,
an individual submitting an administrative claim to an agency
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must do so within two years of discovery of “both his injury and
its cause.” Sexton v. United States, 832 F.2d 629, 633 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 119
(1979)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
In his Complaint, Mr. Stovall fails to allege that he
exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claims
for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
He further fails to respond substantively to the Department’s
argument, asserting that he will prove that he exhausted his
administrative remedies during discovery. Opp’n, ECF No. 10 at
5.
It is Mr. Stovall’s initial burden to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over his claim. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); Citizens for
Responsibility and Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec., 527 F. Supp. 2d 101, 104 (D.D.C. 2007). Since he has not
met this burden, the Court will dismiss his tort claims for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. See Brown v. Mattis, No. 16-cv1025, 2018 WL 6433754, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2018).
B. Mr. Stovall’s APA and Equal Credit Opportunity Claims
Must Be Dismissed
Mr. Stovall alleges that the Department violated the APA
when it discriminated against him by: (1) “failing to timely
14
process his loan application”; (2) “failing to conduct due
diligence to confirm his current debt”; (3) “subjecting his loan
to adverse terms and burdensome supervision”; (4) “failing to
properly service his loan”; (5) “failing to investigate his
civil rights complaint”; and (6) “failing to enforce its
conflict-of-interest regulations.” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 76. The
Department argues that Mr. Stovall’s APA claims lack merit
because he has failed to cite any statute or regulation that
requires the Department to take the actions he alleges they
failed to take. Mot., ECF No. 9 at 16-17.
Mr. Stovall alleges that the Department violated the ECOA
by discriminating against him on the basis of his race by: (1)
“failing to timely process loan applications”; (2) “denying loan
applications or causing them to be withdrawn”; (3) “failing to
conduct due diligence to confirm Mr. Stovall’s current debt”;
(4) “subjecting loans to adverse terms and burdensome
supervision”; and (5) “failing to property service loans.”
Comp., ECF No. 1 ¶ 70. The Department argues that Mr. Stovall
has not plausibly alleged an Equal Credit Opportunity (“ECO”)
Claim and that any such claim is time-barred. Id. at 17-19.
In response to both of the Department’s arguments, Mr.
Stovall states that the Department’s assertions “are just not
true and fail [sic] the plausibility test set forth in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.” Opp’n, ECF No.10
15
at 5. Mr. Stovall has failed to respond substantively to the
Department’s arguments regarding his APA and ECOA claims. See
generally Opp’n, ECF No. 10. He has not pointed to any statute
or regulation that requires the Department to take the actions
that he alleges it failed to do in violation of the APA. Nor has
he responded substantively to the Department’s arguments
regarding the plausibility of his ECOA claim nor that the claim
is time-barred. Because Mr. Stovall has failed to respond
substantively with points and authorities to the Department’s
arguments, he has failed to address the arguments and so has
conceded them. Cf. Hopkins v. Women's Div., Gen. Bd. of Glob.
Ministries, 238 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2002) (“It is well
understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an
opposition to a motion . . . addressing only certain arguments
raised by the defendant, a court may treat those arguments that
the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”). Therefore, the
Court will dismiss Mr. Stovall’s APA and ECOA claims.
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9; and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE
this action.
A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
September 10, 2025
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