STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2025-K-0440
VERSUS *
COURT OF APPEAL
DARRION A. BROWN *
FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
STATE OF LOUISIANA
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APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 561-927, SECTION “J”
Honorable Calvin Johnson, Judge
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Judge Dale N. Atkins
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(Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins, Judge Dale N. Atkins)
Jason R. Williams, District Attorney
Brad Scott, Chief of Appeals
Danny Tran, Assistant District Attorney
Patricia Amos, Assistant District Attorney
PARISH OF ORLEANS
619 S. White Street
New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR RELATOR, the State of Louisiana
Matthew Kellner
ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS
2601 Tulane Avenue, Suite 700
New Orleans, LA 70119
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT, Darrion A. Brown
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED
SEPTEMBER 10, 2025
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DLD
SCJ
This is a criminal case. Relator, the State of Louisiana (“State”), seeks
review of the district court’s May 21, 2025 ruling, which granted the “Motion for
Suppression of Statements” (“Motion to Suppress”) filed by Respondent, Darrion
Brown (“Mr. Brown”). For the following reasons, we grant the State’s writ
application and reverse the district court’s ruling.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 13, 2024, the State charged Mr. Brown via bill of information with
one count of aggravated burglary in violation of La. R.S. 14:60; one count of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1; one
count of domestic abuse battery against Teana Clayton (“Ms. Clayton”) in the
presence of a minor child in violation of La. R.S. 14:35.3(I);1 and one count of
domestic abuse battery against Ms. Clayton in violation of La. R.S. 14:35.3. On
May 29, 2024, Mr. Brown filed his Motion to Suppress2 wherein he sought
“[s]uppression . . . of all involuntary statements obtained in violation of [his] Fifth
1 Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:35.3(I) applies when “a minor child thirteen years of age
or younger was present at the residence or any other scene at the time of the commission of the offense” of domestic abuse battery.
2 Mr. Brown filed his Motion to Suppress as part of an “Omnibus Motion for Discovery;
Motion to Preserve Evidence; Motion for Suppression of Statements, Evidence and Identifications; and Motion for a Preliminary Examination.”
Amendment rights as well as his rights under Article 1, Sections 13 and 16 of the
Louisiana Constitution and La. R.S. 15:451.” In terms of the United States
Constitution, Mr. Brown also requested suppression pursuant to the Due Process
Clause, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the Fourth Amendment, as well
as “all other applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.” Mr. Brown further
requested suppression “pursuant to [Miranda v. Arizona], 384 U.S. 436[, 86 S.Ct.
1602] (1966) and its progeny under both the state and federal constitutions.” When
Mr. Brown subsequently appeared for arraignment on June 18, 2024, he pled not
guilty to the charges. Thereafter, on May 21, 2025, the district court held a hearing
on Mr. Brown’s Motion to Suppress.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
May 21, 2025 Hearing on Motion to Suppress
Officer Ashlyn Falls (“Officer Falls”) testified as the sole witness at the
hearing on Mr. Brown’s Motion to Suppress. Officer Falls testified that on October
27, 2023, she responded to a call concerning Mr. Brown’s alleged unauthorized
entry into the residence of his child’s mother, Ms. Clayton. Officer Falls testified
that she first spoke with Ms. Clayton, who told her that Mr. Brown entered the
residence uninvited, armed with a gun, and demanding to see Ms. Clayton. Officer
Falls stated that, according to Ms. Clayton, Mr. Brown left several voicemail
messages for Ms. Clayton prior to his arrival at the residence, including one
wherein he allegedly stated: “If you play with me one more time I’m gonna beat
the f--- out of you.”
In speaking with Ms. Clayton’s grandmother and aunt, who were present
when she arrived, Officer Falls ascertained that both the grandmother and the aunt
saw Mr. Brown enter the residence armed with a gun and told him to leave because
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there were children present. Officer Falls stated that the witnesses explained to her
that Mr. Brown did not have to force entry because the residence was unlocked at
the time he entered. Officer Falls also testified that Ms. Clayton and Mr. Brown’s
daughter reported that Mr. Brown tried to push her down when he entered, that she
almost fell as a result, and that Mr. Brown was armed with a gun at the time.
Officer Falls then testified that after speaking with Ms. Clayton and family
members at the residence, she obtained Mr. Brown’s cellphone number, intending
to call him to get his side of the story. According to Officer Falls, Mr. Brown
answered her phone call and told her that he went to Ms. Clayton’s residence for
his daughter’s birthday. Officer Falls explained that Mr. Brown was not in custody
at the time of the phone call because they were not communicating in person and
Mr. Brown was free to terminate the call at any time. Additionally, Officer Falls
explained that she did not prepare or obtain an arrest warrant until after speaking to
Mr. Brown over the phone. Finally, Officer Falls testified that, during a
photographic lineup, Ms. Clayton and witnesses identified Mr. Brown as the
individual who entered Ms. Clayton’s residence with a gun.
On cross-examination, Officer Falls clarified that Mr. Brown and Ms.
Clayton shared a daughter, whose birthday was October 27, the date of the
incident. Officer Falls testified that prior to their daughter’s birthday, Mr. Brown
and Ms. Clayton had been coordinating with one another to prepare for their
daughter’s birthday party. Officer Falls stated that Ms. Clayton had asked Mr.
Brown to bring food for the party. According to Officer Falls, she found no
damage or signs of forced entry at the residence because the door to the residence
was unlocked and Mr. Brown was able to simply walk in. Officer Falls also
testified that none of the victims or witnesses reported or appeared to have any
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injuries. To this end, Officer Falls stated that Ms. Clayton did not report having
any physical contact with Mr. Brown during the incident. Officer Falls further
added that Ms. Clayton’s aunt reported that the gun was not in Mr. Brown’s hands,
but rather was in his waistband.
Regarding her phone conversation with Mr. Brown, Officer Falls further
testified on cross-examination that prior to calling Mr. Brown, she discussed
possible charges to file against him with her supervisor, including aggravated
burglary. Officer falls further testified that Mr. Brown was cooperative when they
spoke over the phone. When asked if “[a]t the end of the call, the person on the
other end of the line asked if he had anything to worry about,” Officer Falls stated
that she did not remember. Officer Falls explained that she did not record the
phone call, so the only recording of the phone call that existed was her own bodyworn camera footage recording of her side of the conversation. Officer Falls also
testified that she never located a gun in the course of her investigation.
On redirect-examination, Officer Falls testified that Ms. Clayton’s
grandmother and aunt told Mr. Brown to leave the residence after he entered and
then physically pushed him out the door to make him leave. Officer Falls again
testified that her phone conversation with Mr. Brown occurred prior to preparing or
obtaining the warrant for his arrest. Further, Officer Falls explained that during the
phone call, she identified herself as a police officer and told Mr. Brown that she
was calling him about his involvement in the incident at Ms. Clayton’s house.
Officer Falls also admitted that she did not advise Mr. Brown of his Miranda rights
at any time during the phone conversation.
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Ruling3
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court orally granted Mr.
Brown’s Motion to Suppress, stating:
Calling the defendant on . . . his cell phone giving the defendant
the impression that there is, as I take it he said at the end of the call,
“Am I in any kind of trouble?” Well, he was in trouble at the
beginning of the call. He was obviously in trouble at the beginning of
the call and the officer knew he was in trouble at the beginning of the
call, which is why I asked the question about recording the
conversation. . . . It should have been sufficient to also know that you
needed to inform this person [of his rights], as you would inform this
person when you actually showed up and arrested him.
The State’s timely writ application to this Court followed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
In its writ application to this Court, the State asserts one assignment of error,
contending “[t]he [district] court abused its discretion in granting [Mr. Brown]’s
motion to suppress [his] statement- there is no just reason to suggest Miranda
warnings would ever be required under these circumstances.” Before resolving the
issue raised by the State’s writ application, we begin with the standard of review
applicable to motions to suppress.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As recently explained by this Court, a district court is afforded great
discretion when ruling on a motion to suppress, and an appellate court will not
disturb the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress absent an abuse of that
discretion. State v. Hill, 2025-0316, p. 10 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/19/25), ___ So.3d ___,
___, 2025 WL 2398906, at *4 (citing State v. Debose, 2024-0217, p. 6 (La. App. 4
3 The district court found no probable cause for the domestic battery charges in violation
of La. R.S. 14:35.3 and La. R.S. 14:35.3(I) nor for the felon in possession of a firearm charge in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. The State did not seek review of the district court’s probable cause findings, so those rulings are not before this Court.
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Cir. 6/13/24), 390 So.3d 971, 977). In reviewing a motion to suppress, “[a]n
appellate court affords ‘great weight’ to the district court’s ruling,” recognizing
that the district “court ha[d] the opportunity to observe the witnesses and weigh the
credibility of their testimony.” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Debose,
2024-0217, p. 6, 390 So.3d at 977). As this Court also explained in Hill, “a motion
to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” Id. at pp. 10-11, ___ So.3d
at ___, 2025 WL 2398906, at *4 (quoting Debose, 2024-0217, p. 7, 390 So.3d at
977). Accordingly, “the appellate court reviews the underlying facts for an abuse
of discretion but reviews conclusions to be drawn from those facts de novo.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). If there are no facts in dispute, “the appellate
court need only consider whether the district court came to the proper legal
determination under the undisputed facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the matter sub judice, there are no underlying facts in dispute. Accordingly, we
will conduct a de novo review of the district court’s ruling.
DISCUSSION
The State contends that the district court erred in granting Mr. Brown’s
Motion to Suppress because Mr. Brown was not in the presence of law
enforcement; he was not subject to a custodial interrogation; and he had not been
charged with any crime at the time he spoke with Officer Falls over the phone. In
opposition, Mr. Brown argues that his statements should be suppressed for lack of
a Miranda warning, violation of his due process rights, and violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Our de novo review of the record shows the State’s
arguments have merit.
Pertaining to motions to suppress statements, La. C.Cr.P. art. 703 provides,
in pertinent part:
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B. A defendant may move on any constitutional ground to
suppress a confession or statement of any nature made by the
defendant.
D. On the trial of a motion to suppress filed under the
provisions of this Article, the burden of proof is on the defendant to
prove the ground of his motion, except that the state shall have the
burden of proving the admissibility of a purported confession or
statement by the defendant . . . .
See also Hill, 2025-0316, p. 11, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 2398906, at *5 (citing
State v. Willis, 2022-0452, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/22), 348 So.3d 167, 173).
Additionally, La. R.S. 15:451 states that “[b]efore what purports to be a confession
can be introduced in evidence, it must be affirmatively shown that it was free and
voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces,
threats, inducements or promises.” Thus, at the hearing on Mr. Brown’s Motion to
Suppress, the State bore the burden of proving the admissibility of his statements.
We must therefore determine whether the State satisfied its burden. Thus, we turn
to the laws on custodial interrogations and Miranda warnings.
Regarding “the free and voluntary nature of confessions and statements, both
the Louisiana and United States Constitutions provide ‘procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.’” Hill, 2025-0316, p.
12, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 2398906, at *5 (quoting Willis, 2022-0452, p. 8,
348 So.3d at 173). See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. In
particular, the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no
person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . .
.” The United States Supreme Court held in Miranda “that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect
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persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any
significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.” 384 U.S. at 467,
86 S.Ct. at 1624. The United States Supreme Court further held in Miranda that
“[p]rior to any questioning, [a person who has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way] must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed.” 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.
Similarly, the Louisiana Constitution provides that “[w]hen any person has
been arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or commission of
any offense, he shall be advised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention, his
right to remain silent, his right against self incrimination, his right to the assistance
of counsel and, if indigent, his right to court appointed counsel.” La. Const. art. I, §
13 (1974). These rights are reiterated in La. C.Cr.P. art. 218.1 which states that
“any person [who] has been arrested or detained in connection with the
investigation or commission of any offense . . . shall be advised fully of the reason
for his arrest or detention, his right to remain silent, his right against self
incrimination, his right to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, his right to
court appointed counsel.”
The Louisiana Supreme Court has established three factors which must be
present so as to require the advisement of Miranda rights: “(1) the defendant is in
‘custody’ or significantly deprived of freedom, (2) there is an ‘interrogation,’ and
(3) the interrogation is conducted by a ‘law enforcement officer’ or someone acting
as their agent.” State v. Bernard, 2009-1178, p. 5 (La. 3/16/10), 31 So.3d 1025,
1029. Thus, the first factor establishes that “Miranda warnings are applicable only
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when it is established that the defendant has been subject to a custodial
interrogation.” State v. Lagarde, 2005-268, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/29/05), 917
So.2d 623, 628 (citing State v. Maise, 2000-1158, p. 10 (La. 1/15/02), 805 So.2d
1141, 1148-49). As recently defined by this Court, a “custodial interrogation” is
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.” Hill, 2025-0316, p. 13, ___ So.3d at ___, 2025 WL 2398906, at *6 (quoting
Willis, 2022-0452, 348 So.3d at 173-74). Thus, just “because an investigation
focuses on a suspect” this “does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in a
non-custodial setting.” Lagarde, 2005-268, p. 8, 917 So.2d at 628, 629 (citing
Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1144). For example, in
Maise, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the defendant was not subject to a
custodial interrogation when he made an inculpatory statement to his probation
officer, and thus, was not entitled to Miranda warnings prior to making said
statement, because the defendant was not under arrest, was speaking to the officer
on the telephone, was free to terminate call, and was not given inducement to make
statement. 2000-1158, pp. 9-10, 805 So.2d at 1148-49. We find the matter sub
judice, is analogous to Maise. When Mr. Brown provided his statement to Officer
Falls, he was not entitled to Miranda warnings because he was not under arrest; he
spoke to Officer Falls on the telephone; he was free to terminate the call; and there
is no evidence he was given an inducement to make his statement.
Next, we consider whether Officer Falls’ phone conversation with Mr.
Brown violated his right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic].” As stated
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previously, La. Const. art. I, § 13 also establishes that a “person [who] has been
arrested or detained in connection with the investigation or commission of any
offense,” must “be advised fully of . . . his right to the assistance of counsel and, if
indigent, his right to court appointed counsel.” The Louisiana Supreme Court has
noted that “[t]he right to counsel under Louisiana Constitution Article I, Section 13
and the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment are coextensive in scope,
operation, and application.” State v. Brown, 2018-01999, p. 19 (La. 9/30/21), 330
So.3d 199, 222 (first citing State v. Carter, 1994-2859, p. 20 (La. 11/27/95), 664
So.2d 367, 382; then citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9
L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); and then citing State v. Brooks, 452 So.2d 149, 155 (La.
1984)).
The right to counsel “does not attach until a prosecution is commenced.”
State v. Walker, 51,217, p. (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/17/17), 221 So.3d 951, 965 (first
citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 111 S.Ct. 2204 (1991); and then citing
Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (2001)). Stated differently, the right
to counsel, “attaches only after the commencement of adverse judicial criminal
proceedings.” 1994-2859, p. 5 (La. 11/27/95), 664 So.2d 367, 372. The “initiation
of adversary judicial criminal proceedings” may be “by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” State v. Jefferson,
2018-0083, p. (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/24/18), 261 So.3d 793, 799 (citing Carter, 1994-2859, p. 5, 666 So.2d at 372). In applying the foregoing principles in State v.
Graffia, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal held that even though the
defendant was already under arrest and participated in a lineup, “the adversary
judicial criminal proceedings against the [d]efendant that would have secured his
right to an attorney . . . had not commenced when the lineup was conducted”
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because “no formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, bill of information, or
arraignment had been held, filed, and/or returned.” 2006-756, pp. 9-10 (La. App. 5
Cir. 1/30/07), 951 So.2d 1186, 1191. See also State v. Cheathon, 28,741, p. 6 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 10/30/96), 682 So.2d 823, 827 (holding the defendant’s right to
counsel had not been violated when officers conducted a photo lineup without his
attorney present because the lineup occurred years before the filing of the bill of
information). In Kirby v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court explained the
rationale behind why the right to counsel does not attach until a prosecution has
commenced:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a
mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of
adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has
committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions
of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a
defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and
procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the
commencement of the ‘criminal prosecution’ to which alone the
explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable.
406 U.S. 682, 689-690, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1882 (1972) (first citing Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 66-71, 53 S.Ct. 55, 63 (1932); then citing Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199 (1964); and then citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 324, 79 S.Ct. 1202, 1207 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
Turning to the matter sub judice, the State had not commenced a prosecution
against Mr. Brown at the time of his phone call with Officer Falls because there
had been no formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, bill of information, or
arraignment. The mere fact that Officer Falls and her supervisor discussed the
possible charges that could arise after the investigation of the incident prior to the
phone call did not begin the formal prosecutorial process necessary to elicit Mr.
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Brown’s right to counsel. We note Mr. Brown was not even under arrest when he
made the subject statement to Officer Falls, though Graffia establishes that Mr.
Brown’s right to counsel still would not have attached if that had been the case.
Further, while officers conducted a photographic lineup with Ms. Clayton and
witnesses, this too did not violate Mr. Brown’s constitutional right to counsel in the
absence of the commencement of adverse judicial proceedings. Graffia, 2006-756,
pp. 9-, 951 So.2d at 1191; Cheathon, 28,741, p. 6, 682 So.2d at 827. Therefore, the
trial court erred in suppressing Mr. Brown’s statement.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the State’s writ application and reverse
the district court’s May 21, 2025 ruling, which granted Mr. Brown’s Motion to
Suppress.
WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED
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