[Cite as State v. Molina, 2025-Ohio-4758.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 114849
v. :
SABRINA MOLINA, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 16, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-23-685670-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Alyssa Waite, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Edward F. Borkowski, Jr., for appellant.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
Defendant-appellant Sabrina Molina (“Molina”) appeals her
convictions and claims the following errors:
1. The trial court erred by accepting appellant’s guilty plea when it was
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.
2. The trial court erred by failing to conduct a sufficient inquiry into
appellant’s request for new counsel prior to her change of plea.
3. The trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion to withdraw her
guilty plea.
After a careful review of the record, we find that the trial court
completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b), which requires the court to
explain the effect of a guilty or no contest plea. We, therefore, reverse the judgment
of conviction, vacate Molina’s plea and sentence, and remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Molina was charged with one count of aggravated robbery, in violation
of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1); one count of robbery, in violation of R.C. 2911.02(A)(2); one
count of theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1); three counts of assault, in violation
of R.C. 2903.13(A); three counts of obstructing official business, in violation of
R.C. 2921.31(A); and two counts of criminal damaging, in violation of
R.C. 2909.06(A)(1). The aggravated robbery and robbery charges included one- and
three-year firearm specifications.
The court called the case for trial on April 10, 2024. Molina appeared
for trial and expressed dissatisfaction with her assigned counsel. She complained
that her lawyer was not communicating with her and that when she asked about her
case, she was “given the runaround.” (Tr. 5.) Her lawyer acknowledged that he had
been preoccupied with an aggravated-murder trial but indicated that now that the
defendant in the aggravated-murder case had pleaded guilty, he was available to discuss Molina’s case with her. Before doing so, however, the State described the
evidence in its possession that placed Molina at the crime scene and documented
her communications with her codefendant regarding the crimes she was accused of
having committed. The trial court encouraged Molina to meet with counsel to
review the evidence. The court stated:
So, now is the best opportunity for you to have this conversation. If
you’re dissatisfied and I hear a reason to disquali — or to have him
withdraw, then I’ll consider whether you’re indigent — sounds like you
have a job — and I will decide whether another attorney should be
appointed.
(Tr. 16.) Allowing Molina time to discuss her case with counsel, the court continued
the trial to June 24, 2024.
On June 24, 2024, the court again called the case for trial. A few days
before trial, Molina’s attorney had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, stating that
“Defendant Molina has told counsel that she wants new counsel and will not
communicate with counsel.” (Motion to withdraw filed June 20, 2024.) The court
addressed the motion, and Molina indicated that she wanted a new lawyer
appointed to defend her because she did not believe her presently appointed lawyer
was preparing the case for an optimum resolution. (Tr. 23-24.) The court recounted
the fact that there had been several pretrials in the case, that Molina’s lawyer was an
experienced criminal lawyer, and that Molina and her lawyer had several
opportunities to discuss her case. (Tr. 24.) The court also noted that the case had
previously been set for trial and had been continued, that Molina’s case was again set for trial, and that “[t]oday is not the day for you to ask for a new attorney.”
(Tr. 24.)
Following a recess, the State advised the court that the parties had
reached a plea agreement. Molina’s codefendant, Artemous Roulette Sr., had just
pleaded guilty and agreed to testify at Molina’s trial. (Tr. 23, 65, and 69.) The
prosecutor outlined the terms of the plea agreement on the record, and Molina’s
lawyer confirmed that Molina agreed to the delineated terms. Before proceeding
further, the court addressed Molina:
THE COURT: And, Miss Molina, have you understood what the
prosecutor has said, what your attorney has agreed and is that also your
understanding of the plea?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
(Tr. 31.) Thereafter, the court engaged in a Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy wherein the
court advised Molina of the nature of the charges, the maximum penalty involved,
and the constitutional rights she would be waiving by virtue of her guilty pleas.
(Tr. 34-43.) Molina indicated that she understood the court’s advisements.
However, the court did not explain the effect of a guilty plea. Nevertheless, Molina
confirmed there were no threats or promises made to induce her guilty pleas and
that she was not under the influence of any drugs, alcohol, or medication that would
impair her judgment. (Tr. 32.)
Following the plea colloquy, Molina pleaded guilty to one count of
robbery with a one-year firearm specification, one count of aggravated theft, one
count of assault on a peace officer, one count of criminal damaging, and two counts of obstructing official business. The remaining counts and firearm specifications
were nolled.
On June 24, 2024, Molina filed a letter with the court, requesting a
court date to withdraw her guilty pleas. The letter states, in relevant part:
Dear [Judge], I am writing this letter to request a court date to change
my plea back to not guilty. On Monday June 24, 2024, I was forced to
enter a guilty plea without the knowledge of understanding my case and
the consequences of the plea. I was not psychologically competent due
to being off my mental health medication for a couple of months due to
health reasons these couple months. I also told you that my lawyer has
been incompetent and hasn’t been able to investigate my case, provide
me with any information pertaining to my case, he doesn’t answer or
return calls [and] he was and still is not ready to represent my case for
trial. . . . [M]y lawyer . . . had me under the impression if I didn’t accept
the plea, I would not be able to go home and I had to make sure my kids
were going to be okay. I told him several times I wanted to take my case
to trial there in the lobby and he still didn’t honor my wishes[.]
[I]nstead he coerced me into changing my plea to guilty.
On July 11, 2024, Molina failed to appear for a presentenceinvestigation appointment, and the trial court issued a warrant. On July 25, 2024,
Molina appeared in court, and the court appointed new counsel to represent her.
On October 21, 2024, Molina, through new counsel, filed a motion to withdraw her
guilty pleas. In the motion, she reiterated that “she was told a number of times that
if she did not accept the plea agreement she would go to prison for a very long time.”
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
The trial court sentenced Molina to an indefinite sentence of eight to
12 years in prison on the robbery charge, as amended in Count 2, plus one year on
the firearm specification for a term of 9 to 13 years. The court also sentenced Molina to 12-month prison terms on the theft conviction and on each of the two obstructingofficial-business convictions; 18-month prison terms on the two assault convictions;
and 60 days and 90 days on each of the two criminal-damaging convictions. The
court ordered all prison terms to be served concurrently for an aggregate prison
term of 9 to 13 years in prison. This appeal followed.
II. Law and Analysis
In the first assignment of error, Molina argues she did not enter her
guilty pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the trial court
completely failed to explain the effect of a guilty plea.
“The standard for reviewing whether the trial court accepted a plea in
compliance with Crim.R. 11(C) is a de novo standard of review.” State v. Cardwell,
2009-Ohio-6827, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86 (1977).
In a de novo review, we review the merits of the case independently, without any
deference to the trial court. Sosic v. Stephen Hovancsek & Assocs., Inc., 2021-Ohio2592, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).
Crim.R. 11(C) outlines the procedures a trial court must follow when
accepting guilty or no contest pleas. The purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is “‘to convey to
the defendant certain information so that he [or she] can make a voluntary and
intelligent decision whether to plead guilty.’” State v. Woodall, 2016-Ohio-294, ¶ 12
(8th Dist.), quoting State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 479-480 (1981). It also
“‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally
inform the defendant of his [or her] rights and the consequences of his [or her] plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’” State v.
Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168
(1975).
Ordinarily, when a defendant seeks to reverse his conviction on
grounds that his or her plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made,
the defendant must demonstrate (1) an error in the proceedings, and (2) that the
error caused prejudice to the defendant. Dangler at ¶ 13.
There are, however, two exceptions applicable to convictions rendered
following a guilty or no contest plea. The first occurs when “a trial court fails to
explain the constitutional rights that the defendant waives by pleading guilty or no
contest.” Id. at ¶ 14. The second occurs if the trial court completely fails to comply
with Crim.R. 11(C)’s requirement that it explain the nonconstitutional aspects of the
plea proceedings. Id. at ¶ 15. “Aside from these two exceptions, the traditional rule
continues to apply: a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he [or
she] demonstrates he [or she] was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply
with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d
106, 107 (1990). “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise
been made.’” Id. at ¶ 16, citing Nero at 108.
In Dangler, the Ohio Supreme Court sought to simplify our review of
the criminal-plea analysis by dispensing with the different tiers of compliance with
Crim.R. 11(C), i.e., partial, substantial, or strict compliance. Id. at ¶ 17. Instead, the Court identified the following questions to be asked when reviewing a trial court’s
Crim.R. 11(C) colloquy:
(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provision of the rule?
(2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported
failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of
demonstrating prejudice? And
(3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that
burden?
Id. at ¶ 17.
In Dangler, the Ohio Supreme Court did not explicitly define what
constitutes a “complete failure to comply” with Crim.R. 11. Nevertheless, the Court
held that the trial court in that case did not completely fail to comply with its duty to
explain the maximum potential penalties to Dangler even though it did not explain
the in-person-verification requirements, community-notification provisions, and
residency restrictions applicable to his sex-offender classification. Id. at ¶ 22-23.
Although the applicable sex-offender registration was punitive, the Court found that
the trial court did not completely fail to explain the maximum potential penalty
because the trial court generally advised Dangler that he would be subject to
registration requirements. Id. at ¶ 22-23.
Molina contends the trial court completely failed to explain to her the
effect of her guilty pleas. Crim.R. 11(B)(1) provides that the effect of a “plea of guilty
is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt.” Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) provides that
during the plea colloquy, the trial court must inform “the defendant of and determine[e] that the defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment
and sentence.”
Sitting en banc, we recently addressed the question of whether a trial
court’s failure to inform a defendant that a guilty plea is a complete admission of the
defendant’s guilt constitutes a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b)
such that a showing of prejudice is not required to invalidate the plea in State v.
Fontanez, 2024-Ohio-4579 (8th Dist.).
In Fontanez, we held that a trial court does not completely fail to
comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b), even though the court did not explicitly inform the
defendant that his or her guilty plea is complete admission of guilt, if it is obvious
from the context of the plea colloquy that the defendant understood the effect of his
or her “guilty” plea. In Fontanez, the effect of the guilty pleas was unmistakable
because the trial court inquired as to whether the defendant “committed the specific
act charged in each count to which he was pleading guilty.” Id. at ¶ 14. The trial
court read the facts alleged in the indictment, asked Fontanez how he wished to
plead to the specific allegations presented to him, and Fontanez replied “guilty.” Id.
We distinguished Fontanez in two recent cases wherein we held that
where the factual basis for the plea is not placed on the record, the effect of the guilty
plea is not obvious from the context of the plea colloquy and that we, therefore,
cannot presume that the defendant understood that a guilty plea is a complete
admission of guilt. See State v. Cuyler, 2025-Ohio-4461 (8th Dist.); Cleveland v. Greene, 2024-Ohio-4899 (8th Dist.). In Cuyler, we noted that “the trial court not
only failed to read the full amended indictment, but essentially recited only the
statutory names of each count — strangulation, felonious assault, and criminal
damaging or endangering — without describing, in any fashion, the specific acts
charged.” Cuyler at ¶ 24. In Greene, we vacated the defendant’s guilty plea because
“the factual basis for the plea was not placed on the record” and “it [was] not obvious
from the context of the plea colloquy that the defendant understood the effect of a
guilty plea.” Greene at ¶ 10. In Greene, the defendant also expressed some
confusion about whether he was pleading “guilty” or “no contest,” and the trial court
failed to explain the difference between the pleas, let alone the effect of a guilty plea.
Id.
The trial court never explained the effect of a guilty plea to Molina as
required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b). And, when taking Molina’s plea, it did not place
the factual basis for the plea on the record. As in Cuyler, the court merely recited
the statutory name of each offense, the applicable code section, and the felony or
misdemeanor level of each offense. Although Molina indicated she understood the
offenses, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Molina understood that her
guilty pleas constituted an admission of guilt with respect to each of the acts alleged
in the indictment. Unless it is obvious from the record that the defendant
understood that a guilty plea constitutes a complete admission of guilt, we cannot
presume such an understanding. The complete failure to comply with
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) under these circumstances compels us to vacate Molina’s plea