[Cite as State v. Bethel, 2025-Ohio-4755.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 114722
v. :
JU’VEIL BETHEL, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 16, 2025
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-22-676907-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Mason McCarthy, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
Noelle A. Powell-Sacks, Assistant Public Defender, for
appellant.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, A.J.:
Appellant Ju’Veil Bethel (“Bethel” a.k.a “Veil”) brings this appeal
challenging his conviction for felonious assault with three- and five-year firearm
specifications. We affirm the jury’s verdicts.
Facts and Procedural History
This matter arises from a shooting that occurred on March 6, 2022 at a
gas station parking lot in Warrensville Heights.
On December 19, 2022, as a result of the investigation into the shooting,
Bethel and his brother Arthur Bethel (“Arthur” a.k.a. “Inky”) were charged with four
counts of felonious assault with accompanying one-, three- and five-year firearm
specifications and one count each of having a weapon while under disability.1
The case proceeded to trial where Bethel and Arthur were tried as
codefendants regarding the felonious assault counts. Bethel and Arthur waived
their right to a jury trial as it pertained to having a weapon while under a disability,
which was tried to the court.
At trial, the State presented testimony from multiple police officers,
witnesses and the victims, as well as dozens of exhibits, including video-surveillance
footage.
Despite some inconsistent and varying testimony among the witnesses,
the following facts were established at trial and were detailed in great length in
Bethel 1:
On the night in question, sometime after 4:00 a.m., former Shaker
Heights Police Officer Alexandria Starcher was in her patrol car at the
intersection of Lee Road and Chagrin Boulevard. While she was waiting
at a traffic light, a blue Nissan Kick with a female driver stopped by her
cruiser. The windows of the vehicle were rolled down, and the female
1 Arthur Bethel appealed his convictions to this court in State v. Bethel, 2024-Ohio1365 (8th Dist.) (“Bethel 1”).
driver and male passenger were screaming that “he” had been shot and that they needed help.
Ptl. Starcher exited her vehicle and went to the blue car. The driver opened the rear driver’s side door, and Ptl. Starcher observed a small, young boy “hunkered down” in the seat. He told her that he needed help and that his chest hurt. The boy, J.P., was ten years old at the time.
Backup arrived on the scene, and Ptl. Starcher and another officer removed the boy from the vehicle. Ptl. Starcher had noticed that J.P. had blood on him, so the officers removed his shirt and pants to look for any bullet hole wounds. Ptl. Starcher observed two circular holes on J.P. Her partner placed a chest seal over the holes to prevent any further blood loss. Once EMS arrived, they took J.P. in the ambulance to the hospital. Ultimately, he recovered but had been shot in the back, shoulder, and leg. He was in the hospital for a week and had to relearn how to walk because of having been shot in the leg.
Warrensville Heights police were called to the scene after Ptl. Starcher learned that the shooting had occurred in Warrensville Heights. Ptl. Starcher took photographs of the blue vehicle and observed “more than a handful” of bullet holes on the outside.
Warrensville Heights Police Sergeant Jerome Thomas arrived on scene along with Sergeant Adam Scherrer. Sgt. Thomas observed a blue
Nissan Kick with six to ten bullet holes on the outside of it. He learned that the driver of the vehicle was named Blaze Davis (“Blaze”) and that the young shooting victim was the brother of the man in the passenger seat of the Nissan, [R.C.], who was also known as “Brody.”
Blaze was very scared at the time. She expressed that she wanted to get to the hospital to be with the victim and tried to walk away from the officers. At one point, Blaze was acting very agitated; the officers handcuffed her to get her to calm down. After she was calmer, she was able to talk to the officers and visit the scene of the shooting.
Sgt. Thomas drove Blaze back to the scene of the shooting, which was an Exxon gas station on Miles Road, and had her explain to him what had happened. Blaze stated that the shooting was by a black vehicle with multiple occupants. She believed that two occupants of the vehicle had firearms.
Ptl. Reginald Rucker and Ptl. Stetka went to the gas station and spoke with the clerk working that night. After speaking with the clerk, who confirmed that there had been a shooting, the officers went outside to look for shell casings. Because it was dark, and the weather was very windy and rainy, the officers had to hurry to collect any evidence. Ptl. Rucker located nine shell casings at the west entrance/exit of the gas station.
Ptl. Stetka then went to the hospital where J.P. was going into surgery. He learned that [R.C.] was also there, being treated for minor injuries. [R.C.] was able to tell Ptl. Stetka what had happened and identified someone known as “Main” as a suspect and stated that the vehicle
where the shots had come from was dark-colored. [R.C.] told Ptl. Stetka that Main had pulled a firearm on him at an earlier encounter.
There was a security guard at the gas station. Prior to the incident occurring, there were eight to ten vehicles at the gas station, and the security guard had told them to disperse. When asked about the
incident by Ptl. Rucker, the guard stated that he was inside the station at the time, but that he had not observed any shooting that night. He did not call the police because he did not believe the shooting had occurred on the gas station property.
Sgt. Michael Turner went to the Exxon station to retrieve the
surveillance camera video. He spoke with the owner of the gas station, who was aware that a shooting had occurred on the property. The
owner had trouble accessing the video but was able to pull it up on his cell phone. Sgt. Turner used his body cam to record the footage from the owner’s cell phone.
There was footage from two different cameras at the gas station. The first camera depicted the parking lot area on the west side of the gas station. The video showed a darker-colored vehicle and a lightercolored Mercedes. The second camera depicted the south side of the gas station, where the pumps were located. Blaze’s Nissan Kick can be seen in the video.
The video showed three heavy-set individuals getting into a silver Mercedes and driving southbound through the Exxon parking lot. The Mercedes can be seen pulling alongside the driver’s side of the Nissan Kick. The Mercedes paused briefly, and then the Nissan Kick pulled away at a high rate of speed. The Mercedes then left as well. Sgt. Turner did not observe any altercation between the occupants of the two
vehicles nor did he observe any weapons.
Janay Bland (“Bland”) was at the gas station on the night in question.
Bland knew [Arthur], whom she knew as “Inky,” and [Arthur’s]
codefendant, [Bethel], whom she knew as “Veil.” She heard shots that
night but did not know how many; she did not see the shooting. She did
not see [Arthur] or [Bethel] at the gas station.
Rayana Howard (“Howard”) was also at the gas station that night and
saw [Arthur] or [Bethel] in a two-door Mercedes. She observed [Bethel]
in the driver’s seat and [Arthur] in the passenger seat.
[R.C.] saw the Mercedes pull up next to the Nissan Kick in which he
was a passenger. He had seen [Bethel] driving the vehicle. [R.C.] was
looking down at his phone when he saw laser beams on the windows —
one on the front window and one on the back. He saw the barrel of a
gun point toward the window on the driver’s side. He could not see who
was holding the gun, but saw an individual in a white shirt. He believed
that[Bethel] had been wearing a white shirt earlier that night. He told
Blaze to drive, and as she took off, shots were fired. J.P. was hit multiple
times, and [R.C.] was grazed by a bullet on his back.
At the police station the following day, Det. Curry showed [R.C.] a
photo lineup. From that lineup, [R.C.] identified [Bethel] as having had
flashed his gun at him earlier on the night of the shooting. This differed
from when he initially told Ptl. Stetka that it was Main who had flashed
his gun at him.
J.P. was in the backseat of the Nissan Kick and had observed a “guy”
driving the Mercedes, a “boy” in the backseat, and a “girl” in the
passenger seat. He saw the guns pointed at Blaze’s car but did not get a
good look at who was shooting at them.
State v. Bethel, 2024-Ohio-1365, ¶ 2-19 (8th Dist.).
The jury found Bethel guilty of all four counts of felonious assault. The
court then found him guilty of having a weapon while under a disability and he was
sentenced to an aggregate term of 29 years to 31 and one-half years at the Lorain
Correctional Institution.
Bethel now appeals the jury’s verdict raising four assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. I:
Mr. Bethel received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel
failed to call a witness, who counsel had previously indicated was
crucial to Mr. Bethel’s defense.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. II:
Mr. Bethel’s right to due process was violated when the State of Ohio
engaged in prosecutorial [mis]conduct during closing argument.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. III:
Mr. Bethel received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel
failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct during the State’s closing
argument.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. IV:
Mr. Bethel’s convictions are against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
Law and Analysis
Second Assignment of Error
For the sake of judicial economy, we will be discussing Bethel’s
assignments of error out of order, beginning with the second assignment of error.
For his second assignment of error, Bethel alleges that his right to due process was
violated when the State of Ohio engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing
argument. Bethel alleges there were three types of misconduct the prosecutor
engaged in during closing arguments: (1) expressing opinions on witnesses’
truthfulness; (2) shifting the burden of proof to the defendants and (3) demeaning
the defense. Bethel admits that he failed to object to any of the alleged misconduct
during trial.
Standard of review
“A prosecutor’s remarks constitute misconduct if the remarks were
improper and if the remarks prejudicially affected an accused’s substantial rights.”
State v. Williams, 2003-Ohio-4164, at ¶ 44, citing State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13,
14 (1984).
When there is no objection to prosecutorial misconduct during the
trial, it must be shown to amount to plain error. State v. Newman, 2020-Ohio-658,
¶ 8 (8th Dist.), citing State v. White, 1998-Ohio-363 (“Since defense counsel failed
to object to the alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct, the alleged
improprieties are waived, absent plain error.”) Plain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of
the court.” Crim.R. 52(B). An error rises to the level of plain error only if, but for the
error, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. State v.
Eisermann, 2015-Ohio-591, ¶ 71 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Becker, 2014-Ohio-4565
(8th Dist.). Notice of plain error is to be taken with utmost caution, under
exceptional circumstances, and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of
justice. State v. Phillips, 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 83 (1995).
Analysis
The first alleged misconduct occurred when the State commented on
the credibility of witnesses based upon their in-court testimony. Bethel
acknowledges that there were many versions of events presented by the various witnesses. The State commented on which witness’s testimony it believed was not
truthful or was evasive. A prosecutor may comment on the credibility of witnesses
based upon their in-court testimony. State v. Price, 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 140 (1979).
Bethel fails to establish that, but for these comments, the outcome of
the proceeding would have been different. There was a fair amount of conflicting
testimony by the witnesses and before the jury about what occurred, where and who
was present, when. Bethel fails to prove it was prejudicial for the State to
acknowledge that fact during closing arguments or to suggest what in-court
testimony the State believed to be credible. There is no evidence that these
comments affected the outcome of this case.
The second alleged misconduct occurred when the State attempted to
shift the burden of proof to Bethel to prove his innocence by asking the jurors to
consider what they thought Bethel should do at trial if he knew truth was on his side.
After a careful reading the alleged improper statement in the
transcript, we find that the State’s comment does not amount to plain error. The
State’s comment did not amount to telling the jury Bethel had a burden of proof at
trial. The comments concerned what questions defense counsel did or did not ask
witness–victim J.P. and why. At no point did the State suggest that Bethel had any
kind of burden of proof at trial. We find this statement did not affect the outcome
of this case and thereby there is no plain error for this statement.
The last suggested alleged misconduct occurred when “[t]he
prosecutor demeaned the defense as just ‘defense attorney 101.’” Bethel alleges that during closing argument the prosecutor insinuated that “1) defense counsel did not
believe the defense that she was presenting and, 2) [] it was all just standard smoke
and mirrors designed to mislead the jury – ‘defense attorney 101.’”
Even if we were to find these statements improper, Bethel puts forth
no evidence that he was somehow prejudiced by these statements. There is nothing
in the record and no argument is made that, as a result of these statements, the jury
verdict would have been different. It cannot be said that Bethel did not have a fair
trial. As such, we decline to find these comments amount to plain error.
Wherefore, none of these comments by the State amount to plain error
and Bethel’s second assignment of error is overruled.
First and Third Assignments of Error
Bethel’s first and third assignments of error allege ineffective
assistance of counsel.
Standard of Review
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate that (1) “counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable representation,” and (2) they were “prejudiced by that performance.”
State v. Collier, 2020-Ohio-3033, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Hill, 2018-Ohio4327, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688
(1984).
For the second prong, prejudice is established when the defendant
demonstrates “‘a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Collier at ¶ 18,
quoting Strickland at 694.
“A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was
deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the
alleged deficiencies.” State v. Marriott, 2021-Ohio-2845, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.).
“The decision to call or not call witnesses is generally a matter of trial
strategy and, absent a showing of prejudice, does not deprive a defendant of the
effective assistance of counsel.” State v. Lopez, 2011-Ohio-182, ¶ 93 (8th Dist.),
citing State v. Utz, 2004-Ohio-2357, ¶12 (3d Dist.), citing State v. Williams, 74 Ohio
App.3d 686, 694 (8th Dist. 1991).
Analysis
For his first assignment of error, Bethel alleges that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to recall Warrensville Heights Police Officer Stetka (“Ofc.
Stetka”) to testify during his case-in-chief. Bethel alleges this was error because Ofc.
Stetka’s testimony regarding what witnesses initially told him conflicted with Ofc.
Steka’s in-court testimony.
We note at the outset that Ofc. Stetka was called to testify in the State’s
case-in-chief and was subject to cross-examination and recross-examination by
both Bethel’s attorney and Arthur’s attorney.
After the witness testimony was concluded, Bethel’s counsel informed
the court that “[she] would like to reserve potentially calling him again and ask that