[Cite as Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Truck Sales Leasing, Ltd., 2026-Ohio-2402.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
THE CINCINNATI INSURANCE Case No. 2025 AP 08 0031
COMPANY,
Opinion And Judgment Entry
Plaintiff/Counterclaim
Defendant-Appellant Appeal from the Tuscarawas County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2024 CT 03 0242
-vsJudgment: Affirmed
TRUCK SALES LEASING, LTD.,
TRUCK SALES LEASING,
Date of Judgment Entry: June 23, 2026
INC.,GARY CORPMAN,
WESTFIELD INSURANCE
COMPANY aka AMERICAN SELECT
INSURANCE COMPANY, and
RODNEY RAFAEL,
Defendants/Counterclaim
Plaintiffs-Appellees
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin; Kevin W. Popham; David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: RICHARD C.O. REZIE, DENNIS G. REHOR, JUSTIN A. DUBLIKAR, MICHAEL E. JACOBS, for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant-Appellant; CARI FUSCO EVANS, for Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Baldwin, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“CIC”) appeals the decision
of the trial court denying its motion for summary judgment and granting the appellees’
motion for summary judgment. Appellees are Truck Sales Leasing Ltd./Truck Sales
Leasing, Inc. (“Truck Sales”), Gary Corpman (“Corpman”), Westfield Insurance Company
aka American Select Insurance Company (“Westfield/American Select”), and Rodney
Rafael. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE
{¶2} On April 30, 2019, Winesburg Chair Co., Ltd. (“Winesburg”) entered into a
Vehicle Lease and Service Agreement (“Lease”) with appellee Truck Sales, whom the
Lease identified as “Lessor.” At all times relevant hereto Winesburg, whom the Lease
identified as “Customer,” was insured by the appellant, and appellee Truck Sales was
insured by appellee Westfield/American Select. The Lease provided that appellee Truck
Sales would lease to Winesburg a tractor rig identified in Schedule A of the Lease.
Schedule A identified the subject vehicle as a 2020 International LT TAS, Serial Number
3HSDZAPR9LN160754. The Lease provided, inter alia, that appellee Truck Sales would
provide parts and supplies, and scheduled mechanical preventative maintenance and
repairs; and, that Winesburg would deliver the vehicle to a designated facility for repairs
and scheduled maintenance. Schedule A listed the term of the Lease to be 66 months.
{¶3} In addition, the Lease provided in pertinent part:
9. INSURANCE
A. Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Loss. The
party designated on Schedule A shall provide and maintain at all
times during the term of this Agreement, at its expense, auto liability
insurance covering the Vehicles, with limits not less than those
specified on Schedule A. Said coverage (“Liability Insurance”) shall
include as insureds, Customer, Lessor, Owner, IDEALEASE, INC.
and such other parties as determined by Lessor. Customer is
responsible for all losses, claims, demands and liability that are not
covered by such insurance or are in excess of the limits specified on
Schedule A and that relate to the ownership, maintenance, condition,
use or operation of Vehicles.
(1) Provided by Customer. If Customer is designated to
provide Liability Insurance, said insurance shall provide primary
coverage with an Insurance carrier satisfactory to Lessor, and shall
provide a waiver of subrogation by the insurance carrier in favor of
Lessor, IDEALEASE, INC. and Owner.
Further, the Lease contained the following indemnification provision:
10. INDEMNIFICATION. Customer agrees to defend, release,
indemnify and hold Lessor, Owner, IDEALEASE, INC., and their
insurers harmless from and against any loss or liability arising from:
(A) Any claim or cause of action for death or injury to persons
(including Customer and its employees, drivers and other agents)
and damages to or loss of property (including the Property as
defined in section 9.E1), arising out of or caused by the ownership,
maintenance, use or operation of any Vehicle covered by this
Agreement during its term or thereafter.
* * *
(E) All costs of defense and expenses of every kind, including
reasonable attorney’s fees, incurred in connection with any suits or
claims for which Customer grants an indemnity in this Section 10 or
in any other provision of this Agreement.
1
Section 9(E) of the Lease addresses damage to goods, cargo, and other property, and is therefore not applicable herein.
(Boldface original.)
Winesburg, the “Customer”, is the party designated on Schedule A as responsible
for providing and maintaining “at all times during the term of this Agreement, at its
expense, auto liability insurance covering the Vehicles.”
{¶4} Winesburg is insured by appellant CIC under a commercial policy which
provides, inter alia, business auto coverage. Appellant CIC’s policy contains an
Automobile Schedule that lists, as a covered vehicle, the 2020 International tractortrailer, Serial Number 3HSDZAPR9LN160754. “Who is an Insured” is defined by the
policy at Section II – Liability Coverage, which was amended by the CinciPlus Business
Auto XC+ (Expanded Coverage Plus) Endorsement to include additional insureds by
contract. The pertinent policy language states:
C. Additional Insured by Contract
SECTION II – LIABILITY COVERAGE, A. Coverage, 1. Who
is an Insured is amended to include as an insured any person or
organization for whom you have agreed in a valid written contract to
provide insurance as afforded by this policy.
This provision is limited to the scope of the valid written contract.
(Boldface original.) Appellant CIC issued Winesburg an insurance card that set forth its
coverage of the 2020 International tractor-trailer with serial number
3HSDZAPR9LN160754.
In addition, the CinciPlus Business Auto XC+ (Expanded Coverage Plus)
Endorsement also provides:
A. Blanket Waiver of Subrogation
SECTION IV – BUSINESS AUTO CONDITIONS, A. Loss
Conditions, 5. Transfer of Rights of Recovery Against
Others to Us is amended by the addition of the following:
We waive any right of recovery we may have against any person or
organization because of payments we make for “bodily injury” or
“property damage” arising out of the operation of a covered “auto”
when you have assumed liability for such “bodily injury” or “property
damage” under an “insured contract”, provided the “bodily injury” or
“property damage” occurs subsequent to the execution or [sic] the
“insured contract.”
B. Noncontributory Insurance
SECTION IV – BUSINESS AUTO CONDITIONS, B. General
Conditions, 5. Other Insurance c. is deleted in its entirety and
is replaced by the following:
c. Regardless of the provisions of Paragraph a. above, this Coverage
Form’s Liability Coverage is primary and we will not seek
contribution from any other insurance for any liability assumed
under an “insured contract” that requires liability to be assumed on
a primary noncontributory basis.
(Boldface original.)
{¶5} On March 19, 2022, appellee Corpman, an undisputed employee of appellee
Truck Sales, was returning the leased tractor to Winesburg as a courtesy following routine
maintenance. Appellee Corpman stopped at a stop sign, then proceeded to turn left, not seeing Robert Miller riding his bicycle towards the intersection. An accident resulted,
causing significant injuries to Miller. The appellant, who insured Winesburg, ultimately
settled the claim with Miller for $4,578,135.56, and thereafter demanded contribution
from the appellees.
{¶6} The appellees argued that Winesburg’s insurer - appellant CIC - was solely
responsible for providing coverage for the accident and refused to contribute. The
appellant filed a declaratory judgment action on March 15, 2024, seeking a declaration
regarding the existence and priority of insurance coverage for the March 19, 2022,
accident. The parties engaged in discovery, and filed various motions, including
dispositive motions.
{¶7} On August 1, 2025, the trial court issued a Judgment Entry setting forth a
detailed analysis of the coverage issues presented, the applicable Lease, and the
appellant’s policy of insurance. The court found that the appellant was not entitled to
summary judgment; and, found that the appellees were entitled to summary judgment.
{¶8} The appellant filed a timely appeal, and sets forth the following two
assignments of error:
{¶9} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING
CORPMAN TO BE AN INSURED OF CINCINNATI, THUS, CINCINNATI WAS
SUBROGATED TO THE RIGHT OF THE INJURED PARTY AGAINST CORPMAN AS
THE TORTFEASOR AND, BY EXTENSION, CORPMAN’S INSURER, WESTFIELD.”
{¶10} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENTERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT/
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS RATHER THAN
CINCINNATI ON EACH OF ITS CLAIMS OR, AT MINIMUM, FINDING NO GENUINE
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT TO EXIST.”
STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶11} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the
unique opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court.
Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36 (1987). Accordingly, this Court
reviews a trial court’s award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.,
77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996).
{¶12} Civ.R. 56(C) states in pertinent part: “Summary Judgment shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions,
affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in
the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... A summary judgment shall not be
rendered unless it appears from such evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence
or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion
is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that
party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the
party's favor." Thus, summary judgment may be granted only after the trial court
determines that: 1) no genuine issues as to any material fact remain to be litigated; 2) the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and, 3) it appears from the
evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and viewing such
evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary
judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc.,
50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977).
{¶13} As this Court recently stated in Infield v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-1199
(5th Dist.):
It is well established that the party seeking summary judgment bears
the burden of demonstrating no issues of material fact exist for trial. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The standard for granting summary judgment is delineated in Dresher v.
Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996): “* * * a party seeking
summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot prove
its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for
the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of
the nonmoving party's claims. The moving party cannot discharge its initial
burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion the
nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case. Rather, the moving party
must be able to specifically point to some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R.
56(C) which affirmatively demonstrates the nonmoving party has no
evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. If the moving party fails
to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be
denied. However, if the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the
nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to
set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the
nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
be entered against the nonmoving party.” The record on summary judgment
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Williams
v. First United Church of Christ, 37 Ohio St.2d 150, 309 N.E.2d 924 (1974).
Id. at ¶ 21.
ANALYSIS
{¶14} The appellant’s assignments of error are interrelated, and as such we choose
to address them together.
{¶15} This case involves the interpretation of two contracts: first, the Lease
between Winesburg and appellee Truck Sales; and second, appellant CIC’s policy of
insurance. This Court recently discussed appellate review of a trial court’s interpretation
of a contract in Crum-Cianflone v. Cianflone, 2026-Ohio-663 (5th Dist.):
"The standard analysis used to review a trial court's interpretation of
a written contract * * * begins with the threshold question of whether the
writing is ambiguous—that is, reasonably susceptible to more than one
interpretation." (Citation omitted.) Adams v. MHC Colony Park, L.P., 224
Cal.App.4th 601, 619, 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146 (2014)….
Id. at ¶ 26. As set forth by the Ohio Supreme Court in the seminal case of Alexander v.
Buckeye Pipeline Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241 (1978), “Common words appearing in a written
instrument will be given their ordinary meaning unless manifest absurdity results, or
unless some other meaning is clearly evidenced from the face or overall contents of the
instrument.” Id. at paragraph 2 of the syllabus, 245-246. The Alexander Court stated
further that “… where the terms in an existing contract are clear and unambiguous, this
court cannot in effect create a new contract by finding an intent not expressed in the clear
language employed by the parties.” Id. at 246.
{¶16} It is undisputed that appellee Corpman was at all times relevant hereto an
employee of appellee Truck Sales, and that he was acting within the scope and course of
his employment with appellee Truck Sales at the time of the accident. As such, appellee
Corpman’s actions rendered appellee Truck Sales vicariously liable for Corpman’s operation of the subject vehicle. The clear and unambiguous language contained in the
Lease between the appellant’s insured (Winesburg) and appellee Truck Sales states that
Winesburg shall provide and maintain auto liability insurance covering the subject
vehicle, and shall include Truck Sales as an additional insured under the terms of
appellant CIC’s policy. Winesburg did so through its insurance carrier, appellant CIC.
Appellant CIC’s policy specifically names not only the subject vehicle as a “covered auto”
under the terms of the policy, but also specifically names appellee Truck Sales as an
additional insured under the terms of the policy.
{¶17} In addition, the terms of the Lease clearly and unambiguously state that
appellant CIC’s insured “agrees to defend, release, indemnify and hold” appellee Truck
Sales “harmless from and against any loss or liability arising from any claim or cause of
action for death or injury to persons … arising out of or caused by the ownership,
maintenance, use or operation of any Vehicle covered by” the Lease. Further, appellant
CIC’s policy contains a blanket waiver of subrogation which states “[w]e waive any right
of recovery we may have against any person or organization because of payments we make
for ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ arising out of the operation of a covered ‘auto’
when you have assumed liability for such ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ under an
‘insured contract’, provided the ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ occurred subsequent
to the execution of the ‘insured contract’.” The Lease was signed on April 30, 2019, and
the accident occurred on March 19, 2022, clearly within the 66 month term of the Lease.
Furthermore, the blanket waiver of subrogation language waives any right of recovery as
against “any person or organization” arising out of payments made by appellant CIC for
bodily injury arising out the the operation of the covered auto.
{¶18} The vehicle leased to the appellant’s insured by appellee Truck Sales was
specifically named as a covered vehicle in the appellant’s policy, and appellee Truck Sales
was named as an additional insured under the terms of the policy. The Lease specifically
indemnifies and holds appellee Truck Sales harmless. Further, the appellant’s policy
contains a blanket waiver of subrogation, waiving any right of recovery against persons or
organizations for payments made for bodily injury arising out of the operation of a
covered ‘auto’ when liability for such ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ has been
assumed under an ‘insured contract’. The trial court correctly found that no genuine
issues of material fact exist regarding the insurance coverage issues presented herein, and
correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees. The appellant’s
assignments of error are, therefore, without merit.
CONCLUSION
{¶19} Based upon the foregoing, the appellant’s assignments of error numbers one
and two are overruled, and the decision of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas
is hereby affirmed.
{¶20} Costs to appellant.
By: Baldwin, P.J.
Popham, J. and
Gormley, J. concur.