[Cite as State v. Michalski, 2026-Ohio-2398.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 25-COA-023
Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Ashland County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 24-CRI-236
ROBERT MICHALSKI, JR.,
Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant - Appellant
Date of Judgment Entry: June 24, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; Robert G. Montgomery, Judges
APPEARANCES: CHRISTOPHER R. TUNNELL, Ashland County Prosecuting
Attorney by JAMES B. REESE III, for Plaintiff-Appellee; BRIAN A. SMITH, for Defendant-Appellant.
Montgomery, J.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
{¶1} On August 17th, 2024, the child victim, who was 6 years old at the time, was
on his annual two week visit with his mother. The child’s mother was residing with
Appellant, who they call “Uncle Bob,” in a home that Appellant owns. On the day in
question, the child and several other individuals were present. The child’s mother,
Angelina, told the child victim to go pick up dog excrement in the yard. The child refused.
{¶2} After this refusal, the child was instructed to go inside. The child’s hands
and feet were ultimately handcuffed to a chair in a back room and Appellant’s pit bull
named Mason, entered the room to terrorize the child. Appellant ordered his sister to
stay in the room with the child but did not restrain the dog in any manner. The door to
the room closed. The pit bull went for the child’s throat, latched on, and began to bite the
child viciously. Individuals outside the home heard screaming and commotion, rushed
into the house, eventually got the pit bull released, and called 911. Ashland County
Sheriff’s Deputy, Asa Derry (“Deputy Derry”), responded to the 911 call. The Deputy was
flagged down by the caller at Cattleman’s Restaurant. The Deputy provided life sustaining
care on the child’s deep neck lacerations until EMS arrived to transport the child to the
emergency room.
{¶3} Dylan Olivas (“Olivas”), was in a relationship with the child victim’s mother,
Angelina Williams (“mother”). Olivas testified that he was outside when he heard
“screaming and commotion inside of the house,” and when he went inside, he saw
Appellant’s pit bull attached to the throat of child victim. Olivas testified that handcuffs
were on the child but he did not know who put them there. Deputy Rondal Stone
(“Stone”) of the Ashland County Sheriff’s Office testified that he spoke with Taylor
Marvin-Brown (“Marvin-Brown”), who told Stone that the bite happened inside
Appellant’s home. Stone testified, “you could see multiple blood stains leaving from the
front door out to the steps on the front porch.” Deputy Derry testified that “we received
three different stories,” one from Laura Williams (“Laura”) the child’s grandmother and Appellant’s sister; another from the child’s mother (“Angelina”); and another from codefendant Taylor Marvin-Brown.1
{¶4} Law enforcement ultimately determined that Appellant owned the dog.
Within 24-hours, they executed a search warrant and found the dog in the upstairs
portion of the home in what Deputy Derry described as an attic “cubby hole.” The deputy
who found the dog had to pull away chairs and other items to get to the dog. Deputy Derry
testified that when they arrived at the house to execute the warrant, Appellant was
uncooperative. Detective Jump testified as follows:
Q: And Robert Michalski was there?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you get to speak with him at all?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Tell us about that?
A: At first he was upset, irate that they were there to do a search warrant,
and he had to be restrained several times, and one point threatened to
actually put him in the car, and he kept trying to go up on the porch and
walking behind the officers, and he was told to sit in the chair or he was
going to be put in a chair.
Q: He has been quiet throughout this trial, you are saying that he wasn't
then?
A: No.
Q: Was he helpful?
1 Angelina and Marvin-Brown pled guilty prior to trial. Marvin-Brown pled guilty to “kidnapping”
and “child endangering,” and was awaiting sentencing at the time of Appellant’s trial.
A: No.
Q: Did he tell you that the dog was in the house?
A: No.
Q: Do you know were the handcuffs and tie ropes were found?
A: Immediately right inside of the main entrance door, immediately within
like five to ten feet of the door that we went in.
Trial Tr., Day 2, pp. 29-30.
{¶5} Appellant denied owing the handcuffs stating they were left at the home by
a previous resident.
{¶6} Appellant was charged with multiple crimes and pled not guilty. The matter
proceeded to trial and the jury found Appellant guilty of the following: (1) Count Four,
Complicity to Commit Endangering Children (first child victim who was bitten by the
dog), a third-degree felony and violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(3), (E)(3); (2) Count Five,
Complicity to Commit Endangering Children (second child victim), a third degree felony
and violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(3), (E)(3); and (3) Count Six, Tampering With Evidence,
a third-degree felony and violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), (B).
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶7} “I. APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
{¶8} “II. THE FAILURE OF APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL TO FILE A
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE THE STATE’S EXHIBITS CONSTITUTING
DUPLICATE PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE BLOOD, KEYS, HANDCUFFS, AND ROPE
CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, IN VIOLATION OF
APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I,
SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
{¶9} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING
A PHYSICAL DEMONSTRATION OF WHETHER DEPUTY CURTIS HALL COULD
PLACE HANDCUFFS ON APPELLANT’S TRIAL COUNSEL WITHOUT DEPUTY
CURTIS HALL USING HIS FINGERS, IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO
CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES UNDER THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND APPELLANT’S
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I,
SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
{¶10} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION TO ADMIT DUPLICATE
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE BLOOD, KEYS, AND HANDCUFFS, OVER APPELLANT’S
OBJECTION, VIOLATED EVID.R. 403(A), EVID.R. 403(B), AND APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I,
SECTION 16 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.”
{¶11} “V. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN IMPOSING
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES ON APPELLANT, BECAUSE ITS FINDINGS UNDER R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.”
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶12} In his first assignment of error, Appellant claims the jury clearly lost its way
in finding him guilty of endangering children either as a principal offender or under a
theory of complicity, and in finding him guilty of tampering with evidence. In support,
Appellant claims that various testimony is inconsistent with or contrary to other
testimony, and/or that the State failed to present direct evidence of Appellant’s guilt.
Appellant’s arguments are wholly without merit.
{¶13} Weight of the evidence addresses the evidence's effect of inducing belief.
State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997); State v. Williams, 2003-Ohio-4396,
¶ 83. When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court as against the manifest
weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a “thirteenth juror” and disagrees with
the fact finder's resolution of conflicting testimony. State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800; Thompkins, at 387; Williams, ¶ 60. The reviewing court must determine whether the jury
clearly “lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice” that the conviction
cannot stand, and a new trial must be ordered. Id., quoting State v. Group, 2002-Ohio7247, ¶ 77 (citations omitted). Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight
of the evidence and ordering a new trial should be reserved for only the exceptional case
in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. State v. Dotson, 2017-Ohio5565, ¶ 1 (5th Dist.).
{¶14} In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of
the presumption in favor of the finder of fact. Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21;
In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 14. “The underlying rationale of giving deference to the
findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the [trier of fact] is best able to
view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use
these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal
Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). In determining whether a witness is
credible, the trier of fact is in the best position to consider inconsistencies in testimony,
as well as the witnesses' demeanor and manner of testifying. Dotson, ¶ 50. A defendant
is not entitled to a reversal on manifest weight grounds simply because there was
inconsistent evidence presented at trial. Id.; State v. Raver, 2003-Ohio-958, ¶ 21 (10th
Dist.). If the evidence is susceptible to one or more interpretations, a reviewing court
must interpret it in a manner consistent with the verdict. Dotson, ¶ 49.
{¶15} Circumstantial evidence has the same probative value as direct evidence,
and a conviction can be sustained based on circumstantial evidence alone. State v.
Mahone, 2014-Ohio-1251, ¶ 48 (10th Dist.). It is within the province of the jury to
consider the probative value of the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, and to draw reasonable inferences from the facts and testimony in evidence. Id., ¶ 49. Here,
upon review, we find that the jury did not “clearly” lose its way or create a manifest
injustice in finding Appellant guilty. Accordingly, Appellant’s convictions are not against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶16} Specifically, R.C. 2919.22 [Child endangering] provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:
(B) No person shall do any of the following to a child under eighteen years
of age or a child with a mental or physical disability under twenty-one years
of age:
(3) Administer corporal punishment or other physical disciplinary measure,
or physically restrain the child in a cruel manner or for a prolonged period,
which punishment, discipline, or restraint is excessive under the
circumstances and creates a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the
child.
(E)(1) Whoever violates this section is guilty of endangering children.
(3) If the offender violates division (B)(2), (3), (4), or (6) of this section,
except as otherwise provided in this division, endangering children is a
felony of the third degree.
R.C. 2919.22(B)(3), (E)(3).
{¶17} Regarding complicity, R.C. 2923.03 defines it as follows:
(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the
commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:
(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense.
(F) Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the commission
of an offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal
offender. A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in
terms of the principal offense.
{¶18} And finally, tampering with evidence is set forth in R.C. 2921.12 and
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(A) No person, knowing that an official proceeding or investigation is in
progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, shall do any of the
following:
(1) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or thing,
with purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence in such
proceeding or investigation;
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of tampering with evidence, a
felony of the third degree.
R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), (B).
{¶19} Here, the testimony from law enforcement officers, first responders, codefendants, as well as the video evidence showing Appellant’s own contradictory
statements, provides ample credible evidence to support Appellant’s convictions. With regard to Counts Four and Five, Detective Garrett Dudte (“Dudte”) of the Ashland County
Sheriff’s Office testified that Angelina identified Appellant as having “tied up” the children
on prior occasions, as well as the day in question, and claimed it was “Bobby’s” idea. Trial
Tr., p. 22. Law enforcement witnesses as well as the child victim himself identified
Appellant as the one who restrained the child victim on August 17. The child victim also
stated that on prior occasions, Appellant restrained him and another child. Angelina’s
phone contained disburbing photos showing both child victims being restrained and said
photos were admitted into evidence. Thus, although Appellant claims that the officers
did not physically “witness” Appellant restraining the child victims, the jury could have
reasonably believed that he did.
{¶20} Further, contrary to Appellant’s claims that he could not tie ropes or operate
handcuffs due to his disability, testimony demonstrates that Appellant caged and muzzled
his dogs, tied his own shoes, inserted keys into his front door and car ignition and turned
the keys, rolled his own joints, etc. Appellant’s sister and the child’s grandmother, Laura
Williams, testified that while Appellant has not had an easy life due to his disability, he is
in fact able to use various objects that require fine motor functionality. Trial Tr., Day 3,
pp. 10-12. Indeed, prior to Angelina living with Appellant, he lived by himself. It is
certainly possible that Appellant may not have been as helpless as he portrayed himself
at trial. Appellant’s claim that Marvin-Brown had motive to lie, because he was awaiting
sentencing for his offenses, is similarly unavailing. Marvin-Brown was forthcoming at
trial that he pled guilty to kidnapping and endangering children and had not yet been
sentenced. It was within the province of the jury to consider the testimony and determine
Marvin-Brown’s credibility.
{¶21} Regarding tampering with evidence, the jury was free to disbelieve
Appellant’s version that the dog was “lost.” To the contary, law enforcement testified they
found the dog on the top floor of the home in an attic “cubby hole” behind multiple chairs
and laundry baskets and blankets. One officer testified the dog was “barricaded.” Trial
Tr., Day One, pp. 32-33. Further, Appellant was uncooperative when the officers arrived
to conduct the search warrant, and even had to be restrained, and did not disclose to the
officers that the dog was upstairs.
{¶22} Simply stated, Appellant’s arguments center around what he considers false
or contradictory statements made by other witnesses and cites a lack of direct evidence.
However, as set forth above, circumstantial evidence is equally probative to direct
evidence and is indeed sufficient to support a conviction. Similarly, the jury is charged
with making credibility determinations. Where the evidence is susceptible to one or more
interpretations, a reviewing court must interpret it in a manner consistent with the
verdict. Dotson, ¶ 49. Because the jury did not clearly lose its way in finding Appellant
guilty of the three charges above, Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶23} In the second assignment of error, Appellant claims trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a Motion in Limine to exclude duplicative photos of the blood
stains, handcuffs, and keys from evidence. Appellant claims that the duplicative photos
should have been excluded under both Evid.R. 403(A) and Evid.R. 403(B). The State
responds that the photos are not duplicative because they show different angles of the
evidence. Indeed, the photos illustrate both the testimony of the police officers who
arrived on scene and the crime scene itself.
{¶24} The standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel as set forth in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), was discussed by this court in Mansfield
v. Studer, 2012-Ohio-4840 (5th Dist.):
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a two-prong analysis.
The first inquiry is whether counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonable representation involving a substantial violation of
any of defense counsel's essential duties to appellant. The second prong is
whether the appellant was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. Lockhart
v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989). In order to warrant a
finding that trial counsel was ineffective, the petitioner must meet both the
deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland and Bradley.
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009).
In light of “the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the
range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal
defendant,” the performance inquiry necessarily turns on “whether
counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances.”
Strickland, at 689. At all points, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland, at 689.
Studer, ¶¶ 58-61.
{¶25} Thus, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel argument, appellant
must establish two prongs: first, that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonable representation involving a “substantial violation” of an
essential duty to appellant. Studer, ¶¶ 58-61. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id.; Strickland, at 687. Second, Appellant must
demonstrate actual prejudice by such alleged ineffectiveness. In other words, there must
be a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Strickland, at 691-696.
{¶26} Importantly, as stated above, an appellate court’s review of trial counsel’s
actions and decisions is highly deferential and strategic or tactical decisions will not form
a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id., at 689; State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio
St.2d 45, 48-49 (1980); State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 157-58 (1998) (stating that an
appellate court may not second guess a trial counsel’s strategy decisions). Further, in
determining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, our review is limited to the record
before us. State v. McCauley, 2017-Ohio-4373, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Prophet,
2015-Ohio-4997, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.).
{¶27} Here, trial counsel’s decision not to file a Motion in Limine is precisely the
definition of a tacitcal or strategic decision that will not be second-guessed by an appellate
court. Trial counsel provided an effective and comprehensive defense to Appellant, who
was charged with horrendous crimes against a young child. Further, the Ohio Supreme
Court ruled that photos of blood from different angles are not duplicative and are
admissible. State v. Leonard, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶¶ 86-87. Each photo depicts a different
view or angle of the injuries and crime scene. As such, Appellant cannot demonstrate
that the outcome of the trial would have been different had said Motion been filed. Even
if counsel filed said Motion in Limine, the court has broad discretion in ruling on
evidentiary matters, meaning there was no guarantee the trial court would have granted
any such Motion. Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Physical Demonstration
{¶28} In the third assignment of error, Appellant argues that because he was not
able to have a law enforcement witness on the stand, Deputy Hall, attempt to handcuff
defense counsel as a demonstration for the jury - to show that Appellant could not do it -his confrontation clause rights were violated. Appellant’s argument is without merit.
{¶29} A trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility
of evidence, so long as such discretion is exercised within the rules of procedure and
evidence. “The admission of relevant evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 401 rests within the
sound discretion of the trial court.” Rigby v. Lake County, 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271 (1991),
citing e.g., State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. An
appellate court reviews the trial court’s admission or exclusion of evidence under an abuse
of discretion standard. Rigby, at 271; State v. Finnerty, 45 Ohio St.3d 104, 107 (1989).
Aside from Appellant’s extremely unusual request, his argument that he was not able to
confront the witness is without merit. The record demonstrates that defense counsel
cross-examined Deputy Hall at length and that the demonstration would add nothing by
way of “evidence.” Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request.
Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.
Duplicative Photos violated his right to a fair trial
{¶30} In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant argues that the admission of
duplicative photos violated his right to a fair trial. Again, we disagree. As stated, “[t]he
admission of relevant evidence pursuant to Evid.R. 401 rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court.” Rigby, at 271. The admitted photos were taken from different angles,
showing the victim’s injuries as well as different areas of the crime scene. Thus, the
photos were not duplicative. Defense counsel fully cross-examined the witness describing the photos. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting same. Appellant’s
fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Consecutive Sentences
{¶31} In the fifth and final assignment of error, Appellant argues the court erred
in imposing consecutive sentences because the record does not support the court’s
findings. Appellant makes several arguments against the severity of his sentence. Again,
we disagree.
{¶32} Generally, a trial court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence and
in determining whether multiple prison terms shall be served consecutively. State v.
Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177. However, such discretion is not unlimited and is subject to
review. The appropriate standard of review on appeals challenging a felony sentence is
set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). Bonnell, ¶ 9. An appellate court may vacate a sentence
and/or remand a matter to the trial court when a sentence does not comport with
sentencing statutes, or when the sentence is “otherwise contrary to law.” Id., ¶ 9. When
reviewing a criminal sentence, R.C. 2953.08(F) requires a court to examine the entire
record, including any oral or written statements and presentence-investigation reports.
State v. Carbaugh, 2023-Ohio-1269, ¶ 25 (5th Dist.) (citations omitted).
{¶33} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) sets forth the specific findings a trial court must make
on the record when imposing any consecutive sentence. Before a trial court may impose
consecutive sentences, it must make three findings: (1) that consecutive sentences are
necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender; (2) that
consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's
conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public; and (3) that one of the three specific findings set forth in (C)(4)(a)-(c) apply. State v. Carmel, 2014-Ohio-1209, ¶ 6
(9th Dist.); Carbaugh, ¶ 32.
{¶34} In Bonnell, the Ohio Supreme Court determined that when imposing
consecutive sentences, “a trial court must state the required findings as part of the
sentencing hearing, and by doing so it affords notice to the offender and to defense
counsel.” Bonnell, ¶ 29; Crim.R. 32(A)(4). And because a court speaks through its journal
entries, “the court should also incorporate its statutory findings into the sentencing
entry.” Id., ¶ 29, citing State v. Brooke, 2007-Ohio-1533, ¶ 47.
{¶35} Importantly, the court does not need to state reasons for the findings, the
findings alone are sufficient. Bonnell, ¶¶ 29-30. If the reviewing court can discern that
the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record supports
the findings, then consecutive sentences should be upheld. Id.; State v. Wade, 2024-Ohio-4556 (5th Dist.) (concluding the trial court's failure to recite precise statutory
language of the required findings for consecutive sentences did not render sentences
contrary to law).
{¶36} Here, the record reveals that prior to imposing sentence, the Court afforded
all parties the opportunity to be heard. The Court gave defense counsel an opportunity to
speak and present mitigation on Appellant’s behalf, personally addressed Appellant, and
provided Appellant an opportunity for allocution. The court reviewed all presentence
reports, victim statements, and considered the purposes and principles of sentencing as
well as the the seriousness and recidivism factors. The Court then sentenced Appellant
to 36 months for each offense and ordered the sentences to run consecutive to each other,
for an aggregate prison term of 108 months. The sentencing hearing transcript reflects that the trial court made the required consecutive sentence findings. In its corresponding
Judgment Entry, the court stated:
The Court finds that consecutive sentences are necessary to punish offender
or protect the public from future crime and not disproportionate to the
seriousness of conduct and danger posed by the defendant and that two or
more offenses are part of one or more courses of conduct; and the harm
caused is so great or unusual that a single prison term would not adequately
reflect the seriousness of the conduct. Therefore, the sentences imposed for
Counts Four, Five, and Six shall be served consecutively to each other.
{¶37} After reviewing the record in its entirety, we conclude that the trial court
properly imposed consecutive prison terms. These offenses were horrific, involved
children who were defenseless, scared, and suffered significant physical and emotional
trauma. Accordingly, Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
CONCLUSION
{¶38} Appellants first, second, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error are
overruled in their entirety.
{¶39} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the
Ashland County Court of Common Pleas is Affirmed.
{¶40} Costs to Appellant.
By: Montgomery, J.
King, P.J. and
Hoffman, J. concur.