IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1
OF SNOHOMISH COUNTY, a No. 84166-1-I
Washington Municipal corporation; (consolidated with
BARRY CHRISMAN and KERRY No. 84167-0-I)
CHRISMAN, individually and as
husband and wife, DIVISION ONE
Appellants, PUBLISHED OPINION
v.
STATE OF WASHINGTON, SIERRA
PACIFIC INDUSTRIES DBA SIERRA
PACIFIC INDUSTRIES, INC., a
California corporation, PRECISION
FORESTRY, INC., a Washington
Corporation, JOHN DOE NOS. 1-10,
and ABC CORPORATIONS 1-10,
Respondents.
HAZELRIGG, A.C.J. — Barry Chrisman and his spouse, along with the
Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1, appeal from summary judgment
dismissal of their respective claims against the State and other involved entities
following a tragic tree-fall accident which left Chrisman with devastating injuries.
Because there is a genuine issue of material fact, and because the respondents
are not entitled to statutory immunity as a matter of law, dismissal was improper.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No. 84166-1-I/2
FACTS
In 2017, the State of Washington, through the Department of Natural
Resources (DNR), auctioned timber harvesting rights for an area named “Lugnut”
in Snohomish County. Olney Creek runs through this area; the creek is classified
as a Type S Stream requiring a riparian management zone (RMZ) under WAC
222-30-021. An RMZ is an area near a stream, set aside by the DNR, where
timber harvesting is limited or excluded so the trees may fall naturally for the
benefit of the wetland environment. WAC 222-30-010. The DNR sectioned
Lugnut into three units; Sierra Pacific Industries (SPI) purchased the timber rights
to Unit 2. The RMZ surrounding Olney Creek, as designated by the DNR, is
located outside of the sale area.
SPI contracted with Precision Forestry (Precision) to fell and process the
timber in Unit 2, pursuant to the constraints set out in the timber sale agreement
between the State and SPI. Precision began harvesting activities in midFebruary 2018 and completed all cutting “up to the timber sale boundary tags” in
the beginning of March 2018. On March 13, 2018, around 8:30 a.m., Barry
Chrisman, an employee of the Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1
(PUD), was driving a PUD vehicle on Sultan Basin Road in this area. The wind
speeds were “extremely high” at the time and had been throughout the morning.
An uprooted tree fell, striking the PUD car, and caused catastrophic injuries to
Chrisman. The PUD filed a complaint against the State, SPI, and Precision
(collectively, the respondents), seeking compensation for property damage and
for payments it made for Chrisman’s injuries through workers’ compensation.
-2-No. 84166-1-I/3
Chrisman and his spouse also sued the respondents, seeking recovery for
personal injuries and loss of consortium. The Snohomish County Superior Court
consolidated the two cases.
The respondents all separately moved for summary judgment dismissal,
arguing they were each immune from all claims under the Forest Practices Act of
1974 (FPA). 1 Precision additionally argued dismissal of all claims against it was
warranted because there was no issue of material fact as to the elements of
negligence or gross negligence, strict liability was inapplicable, and the nuisance
claims of both appellants were duplicative of their claims for negligence. The
parties offered a number of declarations in support of their respective positions
on summary judgment. The State submitted a declaration from John Moon, a
forester with the DNR who assisted in planning the Lugnut sale. The PUD
responded with a declaration from Galen Wright, an expert in forestry and
vegetation management, including riparian vegetation. Chrisman filed a
declaration from Michael Jackson, a forester and expert on forestry practices.
The court granted the respondents’ motions for summary judgment and
dismissed all of the claims based on statutory immunity. Chrisman and the PUD
(collectively, the appellants) moved for reconsideration, which the court denied.
Chrisman and the PUD timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
This court reviews a trial court’s decision on summary judgment de novo,
engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. Davies v. MultiCare Health Sys.,
1 LAWS OF 1974, 3rd Ex. Sess., c 137, § 1.
-3-No. 84166-1-I/4
199 Wn.2d 608, 616, 510 P.3d 346 (2022). Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, summary judgment is proper “when there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Dobson v. Archibald, 1 Wn.3d 102, 107, 523 P.3d 1190
(2023). The moving party bears the initial burden to show there is no issue of
material fact; if it successfully does so, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party
to demonstrate a material question of fact. Atherton Condo. Apt.-Owners Ass’n
Bd. of Dirs. v. Blume Dev. Co., 115 Wn.2d 506, 516, 799 P.2d 250 (1990). A
genuine issue of material fact exists when reasonable minds could reach
different conclusions regarding evidence upon which the outcome of the litigation
depends. Haley v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, 25 Wn. App. 2d 207, 217, 522
P.3d 80 (2022). “On summary judgment, the trial court may not weigh the
evidence, assess credibility, consider the likelihood that the evidence will prove
true, or otherwise resolve issues of material fact.” Id.
This court interprets the meaning of a statute de novo. Dep’t of Ecology v.
Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Our aim is to carry
out the intention of the legislature, and “if the statute’s meaning is plain on its
face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of
legislative intent.” Id. at 9-10. We first look to the text of the statute and context
of the provision. Dobson, 1 Wn.3d at 107. Where a term is undefined by statute,
we may rely on a dictionary definition to discern the plain meaning of the term.
Nissen v. Pierce County, 183 Wn.2d 863, 881, 357 P.3d 45 (2015). If there is
more than one reasonable interpretation, we turn to the canons of statutory
-4-No. 84166-1-I/5
construction, legislative history, and other case law to determine the legislative
intent. Cockle v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583
(2001).
“Statutes in derogation of the common law are construed strictly to apply
only to those who fall within the terms of the statute.” In re Gen. Receivership of
EM Prop. Holdings, LLC, 199 Wn.2d 725, 734, 511 P.3d 1258 (2022). 2 “Strict
construction is simply a requirement that, where two interpretations are equally
consistent with legislative intent, the court opts for the narrower interpretation of
the statute.” Est. of Bunch v. McGraw Residential Ctr., 174 Wn.2d 425, 432-33,
275 P.3d 1119 (2012).
I. Immunity Under Forest Practices Act
The appellants contend the trial court erred by applying an overbroad
interpretation of RCW 76.09.330 in holding that the immunity afforded by the FPA
applies to any injuries caused by trees that are left, regardless of the allegedly
wrongful act that constitutes a breach. RCW 76.09.330 provides:
The legislature hereby finds and declares that riparian ecosystems
on forestlands in addition to containing valuable timber resources,
provide benefits for wildlife, fish, and water quality. The legislature
further finds and declares that leaving riparian areas unharvested
and leaving snags and green trees for large woody debris
recruitment for streams and rivers provides public benefits including
but not limited to benefits for threatened and endangered
salmonids, other fish, amphibians, wildlife, and water quality
enhancement. The legislature further finds and declares that
2 SPI argues that RCW 76.09.330 is not in derogation of the common law and, even if it
is, the court is not required to construe the statute narrowly because the meaning is plain on its face. The relevant statute provides for immunity “[n]otwithstanding any statutory provision, rule, or common law doctrine to the contrary.” RCW 76.09.330.
“Statutory grants of immunity in derogation of the common law are strictly construed.” Michaels v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 171 Wn.2d 587, 600, 257 P.3d 532 (2011). Accordingly, the statute is construed strictly to the extent the language is not plain on its face.
-5-No. 84166-1-I/6
leaving upland areas unharvested for wildlife and leaving snags
and green trees for future snag recruitment provides benefits for
wildlife. Forestland owners may be required to leave trees standing
in riparian and upland areas to benefit public resources. It is
recognized that these trees may blow down or fall into streams and
that organic debris may be allowed to remain in streams. This is
beneficial to riparian dependent and other wildlife species. Further,
it is recognized that trees may blow down, fall onto, or otherwise
cause damage or injury to public improvements, private property,
and persons. Notwithstanding any statutory provision, rule, or
common law doctrine to the contrary, the landowner, the
department, and the state of Washington shall not be held liable for
any injury or damages resulting from these actions, including but
not limited to wildfire, erosion, flooding, personal injury, property
damage, damage to public improvements, and other injury or
damages of any kind or character resulting from the trees being left.
A. Forestland Owner
Under the plain language of the statute, only the State of Washington, the
DNR, and the relevant landowner are entitled to immunity under the FPA. The
statute articulates in part that “[f]orestland owners may be required to leave trees
standing in riparian and upland areas” and that “the landowner . . . shall not be
held liable for any injury or damages resulting from these actions.” RCW
76.09.330. While the statute operates to immunize landowners who leave
riparian trees, as required, for the benefit of the ecological system, that immunity
is limited to the State, the DNR, and the forestland owner. Id. “Forestland
owner” is defined by statute as “any person in actual control of forestland,
whether such control is based either on legal or equitable title, or on any other
interest entitling the holder to sell or otherwise dispose of any or all of the timber
on such land in any manner.” RCW 76.09.020(16). Precision concedes it did not
have the right to harvest in the RMZ, but argues it had the right to dispose of the
timber and slash from Unit 2, giving it partial control and fulfilling the statutory
-6-No. 84166-1-I/7
definition of forestland owner. SPI asserts that it had the right to sell or dispose
of the timber in Unit 2 under the terms of the Bill of Sale with the State and, as
such, was a forestland owner entitled to statutory immunity.
Under the Bill of Sale, SPI (and Precision, by extension through the
Logging Agreement) had the “right to harvest and remove forest products from
the timber sale area.” The Bill of Sale defined the “Contract Area” as:
All timber bounded by white timber sale boundary tags, adjacent
young stands, the Sultan Basin Road and the SP-ML and SP-02
roads except cedar salvage (cedar snags, preexisting dead and
down cedar trees and cedar logs), trees marked with blue paint on
the bole and root collar, and forest products tagged out by yellow
leave tree area tags in Unit #2.
The Timber Sale Map reveals sale boundary tags along the RMZ near Sultan
Basin Road and establishes that the RMZ is not part of the sale area. In its brief,
SPI admits that “[t]he only trees adjacent to Sultan Basin Road on March 13,
2018, near the accident to the south, were standing trees within the RMZ and
outside the timber sale area.” (Emphasis added.) The express terms of the
Timber Sale Agreement exclude SPI and Precision from the RMZ.
Consequently, they have no control over that zone and, thus, are not covered by
the FPA. Based on the contractual language, SPI and Precision had no right to
harvest or remove forest products from the RMZ and, therefore, are not
forestland owners of that area under the statutory definition. Accordingly, they
are not entitled to statutory immunity under the FPA, as to these claims, based
on the plain language of the contract and the statute.
Precision alternatively contends immunity applies regardless of whether it
had the right to harvest trees in the RMZ under Ruiz v. State. 154 Wn. App. 454,
-7-No. 84166-1-I/8
225 P.3d 458 (2010). However, the appellant in Ruiz argued that the respondent
was not a landowner within the meaning of the FPA because it was merely a
management company for the landowner, not because it did not have possession
or control of the area where the tree was left. Br. of Appellant at 28, Ruiz v.
State, 154 Wn. App. 454, 225 P.3d 458 (2010), No. 63783-6-I. 3 This is distinct
from the appellants’ argument here, where they contend Precision and SPI are
not forestland owners because they have no control or possession of the RMZ.
As such, Ruiz is distinguishable and does not control; we instead look to the plain
language of the statute.
Precision and SPI are not forestland owners required to leave trees
standing in riparian areas—they were not involved in the decision regarding
which trees to leave and which to harvest, and they had no control or possession
outside of the timber sale area under the terms of the contract, independent of
the DNR’s reasoning for excluding the trees from the timber sale. Because
Precision and SPI do not meet the statutory definition of “forestland owner,”
neither is entitled to statutory immunity as a matter of law. The trial court erred in
dismissing the appellants’ claims against those respondents under the Forest
Practices Act.
B. Immunized Acts
In the original 1987 amendment, RCW 76.09.330 immunized landowners
from “damages resulting from the leave trees falling from natural causes in
riparian areas.” LAWS OF 1987, ch. 97, § 7. In 1992, the legislature removed this
3 https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/Briefs/A01/637835%20appellants.pdf.
-8-No. 84166-1-I/9
language and amended the statute to read, “It is recognized that these trees may
blow down or fall into streams . . . The landowner shall not be held liable for any
injury or damages resulting from these actions, including but not limited to
wildfire, erosion, flooding, and other damages resulting from the trees being left.”
LAWS OF 1992, ch. 52, § 5. (emphasis added to amended portion). In 1999, the
legislature again amended the statute, adding: “it is recognized that trees may
blow down, fall onto, or otherwise cause damage or injury to public
improvements, private property, and persons. Notwithstanding any statutory
provision, rule, or common law doctrine to the contrary,” the applicable parties
are immune from liability for injury or damages. LAWS OF 1999, 1st Spec. Sess.,
ch. 4, § 602. The 1999 amendments also added to the injuries listed, providing
immunity for “personal injury, property damage, damage to public improvement,
and other injury or damages of any kind of character” and expressly added the
DNR and State to the list of parties or entities not liable for damages arising from
these actions. Id.
These amendments reflect the clear aim of the legislature to protect
entities who are required to leave riparian trees standing to protect valuable
ecological systems, despite the risk of damage. While these legislative
amendments expanded the provision of immunity, the legislature expanded only
the acknowledged harms and protected parties, not the protected acts. In each
iteration of the statute, only the act of leaving a tree, and the damage resulting
therefrom, is shielded. The plain language of the statute is unambiguous and
protects only “these actions:” leaving a riparian tree as required.
-9-No. 84166-1-I/10
Under this plain language, SPI and Precision are not entitled to immunity
as a matter of law. As Precision admits, neither it nor SPI had any authority to
determine the RMZ or decide what trees would be cut and what trees would be
left standing, regardless of the DNR’s reasoning for such designation. Indeed,
the area was already marked and the parameters of the RMZ set at the time the
Bill of Sale was signed. Because these entities did not make the decision to
leave the injury-causing tree standing, there is no act by them subject to
immunity under the statute. SPI and Precision are not shielded from liability
under RCW 76.09.330 as a matter of law because they are not forestland owners
and because they had no part in deciding what trees would be left.
In contrast, the State (through the DNR) designated the RMZ, decided
what trees would be harvested, and determined what trees would be left. Again,
under the plain language of RCW 76.09.330, only this act of leaving a tree is
immunized. While the State decided the injury-causing tree was required to be
left, the State also elected to permit a successful bidder to strip Unit 2 up to the
boundary of the RMZ despite the known risk of forest-edge effects. The choice
to permit SPI and Precision to log all trees in Unit 2, and to designate an RMZ
without a wind buffer, 4 rendered the RMZ trees vulnerable to forest-edge effects.
These acts are distinct from the decision to leave the RMZ trees standing, and,
4 Despite Precision’s statement to the contrary at oral argument before this court, the record reflects that no wind buffer was included in the RMZ at issue here, though RMZs do generally include a wind buffer. Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral argument, Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County v. State, No. 84166-1-I (July 18, 2023), at 16 min., 00 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, https://tvw.org/video/division-1-court-ofappeals-2023071123.
Counsel for the PUD countered this assertion in rebuttal argument by quoting from the Forest Practices Application/Notification Addendum for the Lugnut Sale prepared by the DNR that clearly states, “‘no wind buffers were applied’ to Olney Creek’s 162-foot RMZ.” Wash. Ct. of Appeals oral argument, supra, at 21 min., 25 sec.
- 10 -No. 84166-1-I/11
under the plain language of the statute, are not immunized. For these reasons,
the State is not entitled to immunity under RCW 76.09.330 as a matter of law on
these claims.
C. Designation of RMZ
The appellants also argue there is an issue of material fact as to whether
the respondents were required to leave the injury-causing tree. They contend
immunity under RCW 76.09.330 only applies if the forestland owner is required to
leave the injury-causing tree standing. The appellants concede the tree that fell
on Chrisman was within the State-designated RMZ, but they assert that the RMZ
was erroneously measured and therefore the respondents were not legally
required to leave the tree. As discussed previously, Precision and SPI were
required to leave all trees designated by the State as outside of the Timber Sale
Area and had no authority to determine the RMZ. See Section I.A, supra.
The State responds in its brief that the propriety of RMZ designations may
only be challenged through the administrative process under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) 5 and that the RMZ was accurately designated, or
alternatively, that immunity applies to the DNR’s allotment of the RMZ regardless
of whether the classification is accurate.
i. Application of Administrative Procedure Act
The respondents contend the appellants can only challenge the RMZ
specification through the administrative process under the APA, not through the
present civil suit. The appellants respond that this court may choose to not reach
5 Ch. 34.05 RCW.
- 11 -No. 84166-1-I/12
this argument under the Rules of Appellate Procedure, or alternatively, that the
APA explicitly makes an exception for personal injury claims from the limitations
on judicial review.
Under RAP 9.12, we “will only consider evidence and issues called to the
attention of the trial court.” Here, the trial court explained in a supplemental letter
decision that, in making its summary judgment ruling, it did not rely upon the APA
argument advanced by the respondents in their reply. In the court’s order
granting summary judgment, it noted it had considered the reply memoranda by
Precision in support of the respondents’ motions for summary judgment without
any limitations identified. However, this court may affirm a summary judgment
dismissal on any ground supported by the record. Port of Anacortes v. Frontier
Indus., Inc., 9 Wn. App. 2d 885, 892, 447 P.3d 215 (2019); see also Wolf v.
State, 24 Wn. App. 2d 290, 303, n.7, 519 P.3d 608 (2022) (reaching merits of an
issue raised in a reply supporting a motion for summary judgment).
The APA is the “exclusive means of judicial review of agency action”
subject to three exceptions. RCW 34.05.510. The first exception is where “the
sole issue is a claim for money damages or compensation and the agency whose
action is at issue does not have statutory authority to determine the claim.” RCW
34.05.510(1). None of the respondents addressed this statutory exception
before the trial court or this court. The appellants brought a claim for money
damages; the parties cite no legal precedent providing the DNR authority to
- 12 -No. 84166-1-I/13
determine this claim. 6 As the appellants note, a holding that the parties had to
challenge the RMZ through the administrative process, two years before
Chrisman was injured, would create absurd results.
Under RCW 34.05.510(1), the appellants may challenge the designation
of the RMZ through this suit, rather than through an administrative proceeding.
We determine that judicial review of the propriety of the RMZ designation, based
on the claims presented, is proper.
ii. Immunity for Incorrectly-Drawn RMZ
The State argues immunity attaches for any damages caused by an RMZdesignated tree regardless of whether the DNR has measured the zone correctly.
It cites no authority for this contention, nor does it engage in an analysis of the
plain language of the statute.
RCW 76.09.330 states in relevant part:
Forestland owners may be required to leave trees standing in
riparian and upland areas to benefit public resources . . . the state
of Washington shall not be held liable for any injury or damages
resulting from these actions, including but not limited to . . . injury or
damages of any kind or character resulting from the trees being left.
“Required” is not defined by the statute. Where a term is not defined by the
legislature, this court may look to the context of the statute and dictionary
definitions to determine the plain meaning of the word. Samish Indian Nation v.
Dep’t of Licensing, 14 Wn. App. 2d 437, 442, 471 P.3d 261 (2020). The
dictionary definition of “require” includes “to demand as necessary or essential
6 “Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, we are not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.” Helmbreck v. McPhee, 15 Wn. App. 2d 41, 57, 476 P.3d 589 (2020).
- 13 -No. 84166-1-I/14
(as on general principles or in order to comply with or satisfy some regulation).”
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1929 (2002).
Under the plain language of RCW 76.09.330, immunity attaches only
where a forestland owner must leave a tree standing in order to comply with the
relevant regulations. This interpretation is consistent with the general rule that
this court strictly construes immunity in derogation of the common law. See
Michaels, 171 Wn.2d at 600 (“Statutory grants of immunity in derogation of the
common law are strictly construed.”). Under the plain language of the statute,
immunity only attaches if the RMZ is properly drawn.
iii. Genuine Issue of Material Fact as to Designation of RMZ
The appellants aver there is a question of material fact as to whether the
tree was properly located in an RMZ. They argue Olney Creek is classified as a
Class III stream that requires a 140-foot RMZ under WAC 222-16-010, while the
RMZ designated by the DNR is 162 feet. Alternatively, the appellants argue that
there is an issue of material fact as to whether a Channel Migration Zone (CMZ) 7
exists in the area, modifying the correct size of the RMZ. The State responds
that 162 feet is the required width under the Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP)
and aligns with the Incidental Take Permit. DNR expert Moon declared that the
RMZ width of 162 feet “was determined based on HCP rules” and reflected the
“required width under the HCP standard.” While the appellants repeatedly rely
on the standard for RMZ width in WAC 222-16-010, they did not address the
7 A Channel Migration Zone is “the area where the active channel of a stream is prone to
move and this results in a potential near-term loss of riparian function and associated habitat adjacent to the stream.” WAC 222-16-010. Near-term is “the time scale required to grow a mature forest.” Id.
- 14 -No. 84166-1-I/15
width required under the HCP in the litigation at the trial court or in briefing on
appeal. PUD expert Wright opined that only the first 140 feet of the RMZ was
required under the FPA, but did not address the HCP requirements. Both
appellants fail to address the expert opinion that the RMZ was measured not only
under the FPA and WAC 222-16-010, but also under the HCP standard. The
State established through Moon’s uncontroverted expert testimony that the RMZ
was the width required by the HCP.
The appellants alternatively argue there is a question of material fact as to
whether a CMZ exists in the area, based on the opinions of their respective
experts. PUD expert Wright opined that the tree that struck Chrisman was
located 227 feet from the ordinary high-water mark of Olney Creek; outside of the
162-foot RMZ. He declared that there is “a topological break at Olney Creek,”
preventing a CMZ. Chrisman’s expert Jackson adduced that there is no CMZ
based on “the physical features at the site.” He noted that on the top of the
Olney Creek bank, there is a tree cut in the late 1800s, indicating that the bank
has been in place since at least that time. However, DNR expert Moon’s opinion
was that there is a CMZ present and that the CMZ was delineated based on the
Forest Practices Board Manual. But, he did not describe what that process is or
what guidance the manual provides. An expert’s opinion “‘cannot simply be a
conclusion or based on an assumption if it is to survive summary judgment.’”
Strauss v. Premera Blue Cross, 194 Wn.2d 296, 301, 449 P.3d 640 (2019)
(quoting Volk v. DeMeerleer, 187 Wn.2d 241, 277, 386 P.3d 254 (2016)).
- 15 -No. 84166-1-I/16
Viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the appellants, as we must,
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a CMZ exists in Olney
Creek and, by extension, whether the tree that struck Chrisman was outside of
the 162-foot RMZ. Even if the 162-foot RMZ is proper under the HCP, the
appellants have raised an issue of material fact as to whether the tree is outside
that zone based on the existence (or nonexistence) of a CMZ. We have decided
DNR expert Moon’s declaration reflects a mere conclusion, thus, without more, it
is insufficient to demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact on this
question. As such, summary judgment was improper as to the State.
II. Conclusion
Based on the plain language of the FPA and our summary judgment
standard, dismissal of the appellants’ claims was improper. SPI and Precision
are not entitled to statutory immunity under the FPA as a matter of law because
they do not meet the statutory definition of “forestland owner,” nor were they
involved in the only act protected by the statute. The State is not entitled to
statutory immunity because its act of stripping the wind-barrier is not protected by
the FPA. Further, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
RMZ was correctly designated and, by extension, whether FPA immunity applies
to the State on that alternate basis. For these reasons, summary judgment
dismissal of the negligence claims under the FPA for all respondents was
improper and we reverse. 8
8 Because the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, its denial of the motion for
reconsideration was an error of law and therefore an abuse of discretion. See Council House, Inc. v. Hawk, 136 Wn. App. 153, 159, 147 P.3d 1305 (2006).
- 16 -No. 84166-1-I/17
We decline to reach the other bases for summary judgment raised by
Precision. Precision moved for dismissal of Chrisman and PUD’s claims on
alternative grounds, arguing the appellants’ negligence claims should be
dismissed because it did not owe any duty to Chrisman, that the appellants’
nuisance claims were duplicative of its negligence claims, that there was no
genuine issue of material fact as to the slight care element of gross negligence,
and that Chrisman’s claim for strict liability was inapplicable to Precision. The
trial court did not reach the merits of these claims as it determined they were
mooted by its ruling on statutory immunity. We likewise decline Precision’s
invitation to analyze the merits of these issues.
We reverse the summary judgment dismissal and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
- 17 -