FILED
OCTOBER 3, 2023
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: ) No. 39495-6-III
)
JOSHUA KELLY PINNEY, ) ORDER GRANTING
) MOTION TO PUBLISH
Petitioner. )
)
THE COURT has considered a motion filed by the respondent, Washington State
Department of Corrections, to publish our September 12, 2023, opinion; and the record
and file herein;
IT IS ORDERED that the motion to publish is granted. The opinion filed by the
court on September 12, 2023, shall be modified on page one to designate it as a published
opinion and on page 14 by deletion of the following language:
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be
printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public
record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
PANEL: Judges Siddoway, Lawrence-Berrey and Staab
FOR THE COURT:
GEORGE B. FEARING
Chief Judge
FILED
SEPTEMBER 12, 2023
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of ) No. 39495-6-III
)
JOSHUA KELLY PINNEY, )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner. )
SIDDOWAY, J.P.T.⁎ — Joshua Pinney filed a personal restraint petition (PRP)
asking us to order the Washington State Department of Corrections (WDOC1) to clear a
2014 warrant for a community custody violation and release him from supervision or to
order it to conduct a remote hearing on the alleged violation. He fails to demonstrate
grounds for the requested relief or that a remedy he seeks is appropriate. We dismiss the
petition.2
⁎
Judge Laurel H. Siddoway was a member of the Court of Appeals at the time argument was held on this matter. She is now serving as a judge pro tempore of the court pursuant to RCW 2.06.150.
1
We stray from our usual use of the acronym “DOC” because the Arizona
Department of Corrections has a role in this matter as the prison system whose policies are the immediate cause of some of Mr. Pinney’s alleged losses of liberty. We will refer to it as “ADOC.”
2
Mr. Pinney’s PRP is arguably moot. The Arizona prison website reports that he obtained early release to community supervision within days of the panel hearing his appeal without oral argument. Neither party has suggested that we dismiss the appeal as moot, however, and given that the matter has been fully briefed and any violation of his community supervision in Arizona could result in additional confinement, reviving the issues, we choose to address the petition on the merits.
No. 39495-6-III
In re Pers. Restraint of Pinney
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After pleading guilty to second degree identity theft charges in Pierce County and
King County in 2013, Joshua Pinney was released from confinement in May 2014 and
began serving a 12-month terms of community custody that had been imposed in both
cases. Within three days of his release, Mr. Pinney failed to report to his community
custody officers (CCOs). He was sanctioned and taken into custody from June 13-14.
On the day of his release, he committed another, unspecified violation. He was then
taken into custody for one week and released on June 25. He was due to report to one of
his CCOs the following day, June 26, but instead absconded to the state of Arizona.
WDOC issued a secretary’s warrant for his rearrest, which remains active.
By December 2014, Mr. Pinney had committed crimes in Arizona; he was
convicted in 2015 of theft of means of transportation, aggravated taking of identity, and
forgery. He was sentenced in September 2015 to a total of nine years and six months of
confinement.
At some point, the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) became aware of
the warrant issued by WDOC. Because the WDOC warrant is nonextraditable from
Arizona, ADOC treated it as a felony hold.
In November 2021, a lawyer for Mr. Pinney reached out to WDOC, explaining
that Mr. Pinney was then in an Arizona prison and that the WDOC warrant was
“preventing him from progressing through the Arizona system to lesser levels of
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supervision and keeping him from accessing certain programs.” PRP, Attach. G at 1. He
said he was attempting to assist Mr. Pinney with the warrant and explained,
My hope is that we can schedule him for a hearing on his violation, waive
his presence, and resolve this in some way such that the warrant is cleared.
In a perfect world on our end, he would be able to simply serve out his
[Washington] community custody time in Arizona [Department of
Corrections].
Id. In further communications, the lawyer was directed to community custody supervisor
Christopher Muhs.
Initially, Officer Muhs responded that WDOC would not address the warrant via
an administrative hearing until Mr. Pinney completed his Arizona sentence and returned
to Washington. But at some point in early 2022, WDOC’s position changed and Officer
Muhs and other WDOC personnel began communicating with authorities in ADOC about
facilitating a virtual hearing for Mr. Pinney. Those efforts came to a halt in March 2022
when WDOC became aware that contrary to what they had been led to believe about Mr.
Pinney’s unserved community custody—that it was 15 days—he had much more prison
return time in Washington, which WDOC asserted made him ineligible for a telephonic
hearing. When Mr. Pinney’s lawyer pressed WDOC for a copy of the policy, he was told
that the policy had not been codified.
Mr. Pinney’s lawyer’s continued to communicate with WDOC in an effort to
persuade it that its refusal to facilitate a virtual hearing or clear the warrant was violating
Mr. Pinney’s constitutional and statutory rights. WDOC responded that Washington law
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did not impose a time frame within which it was required to address Mr. Pinney’s
violative behavior. It conceded that due process would require WDOC to conduct a
hearing “promptly” and “within an immediate time” once it charged him with the
violation, but there was no requirement that he be immediately charged, especially since
he was is in custody on another matter. It cited the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 97 S. Ct. 274, 50 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1976), as
support. Mr. Pinney replied that unlike the offender in Moody, he was suffering a loss of
liberty, but WDOC was not persuaded.
In May 2022, Mr. Pinney filed a PRP with Division Two of this court. In
January 2023, the acting chief judge of that court referred the petition for a decision
by a panel. In February 2023, the PRP was administratively transferred to this division.
A panel considered the PRP without oral argument.
ANALYSIS
To obtain relief through a PRP, a petitioner must establish that he is under a
“restraint” and that the restraint is unlawful for one or more of the reasons identified in
RAP 16.4(c). RAP 16.4(a). A petitioner is under restraint if he has limited freedom
because of a court decision, is confined or subject to imminent confinement, or is
under some other disability resulting from a judgment or sentence in a criminal case.
RAP 16.4(b). Mr. Pinney identifies his grounds for relief as follows:
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[A] Washington DOC warrant for community custody violation is limiting
my liberty while I serve a sentence in Arizona DOC, for which Washington
DOC is denying me a hearing in violation of [the] [United States] and
Washington Constitutions, and RCW 9.94A.737.
PRP at 2-3. The statute cited—RCW 9.94A.737(1)—provides that if an offender
is accused of violating a condition or requirement of community custody, WDOC
“shall address the violation behavior.”
While a petitioner who has had a prior opportunity to judicially appeal the issues
presented in his PRP must make a threshold showing of prejudice, that requirement does
not apply to circumstances such as this, where there has been no prior opportunity for
judicial review. In re Pers. Restraint of Stuhr, 186 Wn.2d 49, 52, 375 P.3d 1031 (2016).
I. NO DUE PROCESS VIOLATION IS SHOWN3
Mr. Pinney traces his due process claim to Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972), a case involving the due process owed parolees
who face a revocation of parole. The Supreme Court observed that parole is an
established variation of imprisonment, arising after the end of a criminal prosecution, and
that the liberty of a parolee is indeterminate. Id. at 477, 480, 482. Nevertheless, the
Court recognized that parole “includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and
3
Mr. Pinney invokes the Washington Constitution as providing an additional ground for relief but his briefing makes no reference to state constitutional authority nor does it conduct any state constitutional analysis, so we undertake none of our own. See RAP 10.3(a)(6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (assigned error is waived if not supported by argument).
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its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.” Id. at 482. It
found parole to be a “valuable” liberty, which “must be seen as within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment [to the United States Constitution].” Id.
The Court characterized a revocation decision as a two-step process in which it is
necessary to determine first, whether the parolee has in fact acted in violation of one or
more conditions of his parole and, second, what to do about the violation. Id. at 479-80.
The second step is predictive and discretionary. Id. at 480. The Court held that what is
required by due process is “an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a
parole violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be
informed by an accurate knowledge of the parolee’s behavior.” Id. at 484.
The Court identified minimum requirements of due process, among them being a
preliminary hearing after the parolee is arrested and detained, for the purpose of
determining whether there is probable cause or a reasonable ground to believe that the
arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole conditions.
It held that due process would seem to require that this preliminary inquiry “be conducted
at or reasonably near the place of the alleged parole violation or arrest and as promptly as
convenient after arrest.” Id. at 485.4
4
Elaboration on the requirements of the preliminary hearing appears at 408 U.S. at 485-87.
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Also required, but with “typically a substantial time lag,” is the hearing at which
the eventual determination by the parole board whether to revoke parole is made. Id.
The Court held that “the revocation hearing must be tendered within a reasonable time
after the parolee is taken into custody,” and “[a] lapse of two months . . . would not
appear to be unreasonable.”5 Id. at 488.
In the five decades since Morrissey, federal and state courts have extended its
principles to analogous situations involving probationers, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973); felons sentenced under the
special sex offender sentencing alternative, see State v. Dahl, 139 Wn.2d 678, 683,
990 P.2d 396 (1999); and those serving a term of community custody, see In re Pers.
Restraint of Blackburn, 168 Wn.2d 881, 884, 232 P.3d 1091 (2010).
Mr. Pinney was never arrested for the community custody violations at issue and
has not been detained by WDOC. The more apt authority from the United States
Supreme Court is its decision in Moody v. Daggett, in which a parolee was convicted of
and incarcerated for manslaughter and second degree murder committed while on parole.
429 U.S. at 80-81. The crimes for which he had been serving parole and his newlycommitted crimes were both federal crimes. Id. After Moody was incarcerated, the
board of parole issued, but did not execute, a warrant for his parole violation. It was
5
Elaboration on the requirements of the formal revocation hearing appears at 408 U.S. at 488-89.
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lodged with the prison as a detainer. Id. Mr. Moody asked the board to execute the
warrant because he wanted imprisonment for violation of his parole to run concurrently
with his homicide sentences. Id. He also believed the warrant adversely affected his
parole eligibility for later convictions and his prison classification status. Id. at 85.
The Supreme Court held that simple issuance of a parole violator warrant does not
trigger the duty to conduct an immediate hearing. Id. at 89. It pointed out that Moody’s
“present confinement and consequent liberty loss derive not in any sense from the
outstanding parole violator warrant, but from his two 1971 homicide convictions,” and
“[t]he other injuries [he] claims to suffer either do not involve a loss of protected liberty
or have not occurred by reason of the warrant and detainer.” Id. at 86-87.6 It observed
that in Morrissey, “we established execution of the warrant and custody under that
warrant as the operative event triggering any loss of liberty attendant upon parole
revocation.” Id. at 87 (citing 408 U.S. at 488); see also id. at 89 (“The Commission
therefore has no constitutional duty to provide petitioner an adversary parole hearing until
he is taken into custody as a parole violator by execution of the warrant.”).
In addition to the fact that Moody did not face a loss of liberty, the Court observed
that there would be no need for a preliminary hearing in his case because “the subsequent
6
In a footnote, the Court explained that it had previously “rejected the notion that every state action carrying adverse consequences for prison inmates automatically activates a due process right. . . . The same is true of prisoner classification and eligibility for rehabilitative programs in the federal system.” Moody, 429 U.S. at 88 n.9.
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conviction obviously gives the parole authority ‘probable cause or reasonable ground to
believe that the . . . parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole
conditions.’” Id. at 86 n.7 (alteration in original) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485).
Finally, it identified a practical advantage to conducting the hearing later: a parolee’s
institutional record is often the best source of information as to whether the parolee can
reintegrate into society, and “[f]orcing [a] decision immediately after imprisonment
would not only deprive the parole authority of this vital information, but since the other
most salient factor would be the parolee’s recent convictions, . . . a decision to revoke
parole would often be foreordained.” Id. at 89.
Mr. Pinney seeks to distinguish Moody by asserting that the warrant in his case
was “executed and fully active” whereas Moody was only subject to an “uncharged
violation hold.” Br. in Support of PRP at 16. This is simply wrong. An arrest warrant is
“issued” upon being signed by the proper authority and “executed” when a violator is
taken into custody pursuant to the warrant. See, e.g., CrR 2.2; RCW 9.94A.716. The
secretary has only issued a warrant for Mr. Pinney’s violation; it has not been executed.
He also points to the Supreme Court’s observations in Moody that because of the
federal parole commission’s discretion, Moody had overstated the adverse consequence
of a late-stage hearing: the parole commission would continue to have the authority to
release him from federal custody. He argues that in his case, by contrast, two
jurisdictions are involved and Washington will lack discretion to retroactively impose a
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concurrent sentence that the parole commission would have enjoyed in Moody’s case.
Yet almost 50 years after Moody, Mr. Pinney does not identify a single case in which a
correction authority’s inability to retroactively impose concurrent sentencing has been
held to require a result different from that in Moody. WDOC, on the other hand,
identifies dual-jurisdiction cases in which Moody’s holding has been applied, including
two from federal appellate courts. Resp. of DOC at 15-16 (citing cases). And see State v.
Valentine, 20 Wn. App. 511, 514-15, 580 P.2d 1119 (1978), in which this court held,
“The [Moody] court held it was permissible and appropriate to delay the decision on
revocation until after the petitioner had served his subsequent sentences. Thus, as long as
Mr. Valentine was being held on another criminal charge, Moody expressly negatives any
conclusion that Gagnon and Morrissey require that he receive an immediate revocation
hearing.”7
7
Mr. Pinney tries to distinguish Valentine arguing that unlike him, Valentine did not diligently seek a hearing and Valentine was not suffering an ongoing loss of liberty, whereas he is “restrained by the inability to work certain jobs, have more freedom in Arizona DOC’s facility, and see early release.” Reply Br. in Support of PRP at 5.
In Valentine, the defendant’s court-appointed appellate lawyer filed an Anders brief (Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967)), so this court mused about possible error. In so doing, it discussed how Valentine had himself to blame for the violation of his rule-based, time-for-trial right but it did not hold that a timely request for a probation revocation hearing would have triggered a constitutional duty to conduct one.
As for Mr. Pinney’s alleged loss of liberty unrelated to confinement, petitioner Moody complained of injuries other than confinement, which the Supreme Court held “do not involve a loss of protected liberty or have not occurred by reason of the warrant and detainer.” Moody, 429 U.S. at 87. The lack of causation is even clearer here because
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A final case cited by Mr. Pinney is State v. Welker, 157 Wn.2d 557, 141 P.3d 8
(2006), but WDOC rightly observes that it construes procedures provided by the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, see chapter 9.100 RCW, and has no application here.
II. BECAUSE STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR ADDRESSING COMMUNITY CUSTODY
VIOLATIONS ARE NOT ABSURD OR MEANINGLESS WITHOUT A TIME FRAME FOR
EXECUTING A WARRANT, WE HAVE NO BASIS FOR IMPLYING A TIME FRAME
As recounted earlier, RCW 9.94A.737(1) provides that “[i]f an offender is accused
of violating any condition or requirement of community custody, [WDOC] shall address
the violation behavior.” It states that WDOC “may” hold disciplinary proceedings “not
subject to chapter 34.05 RCW,” Washington’s Administrative Procedure Act,
which governs agency adjudicative proceedings unless otherwise provided. See
RCW 34.05.410(1).
Elsewhere, the statute identifies some procedures to be followed for high level
violations, but otherwise provides that WDOC shall adopt rules creating procedures for
hearings on those matters, which are “offender disciplinary hearings and are not subject
to chapter 34.05 RCW.” RCW 9.94A.737(6). RCW 9.94A.737(6)(b) requires a hearing
within 5 to 15 days from the giving of written notice, depending on the defendant’s
custodial status, and RCW 9.94A.737(1) states that WDOC shall notify the offender in
it is the prison policies of Arizona, not Washington, that impose the consequences of the warrant that are the basis for Mr. Pinney’s complaint.
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writing of the violation process. No provision identifies a time frame within which the
written notice is required, however.
“‘Our paramount duty in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the
Legislature’s intent.’” Moses Lake Irrig. & Rehab. Dist. v. Pheasant, 24 Wn.
App. 2d 428, 453, 520 P.3d 1052 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
State v. Barnes, 189 Wn.2d 492, 495, 403 P.3d 72 (2017)). If a statute’s meaning is plain
on its face, then the court will give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of
legislative intent. State ex rel. Citizens Against Tolls v. Murphy, 151 Wn.2d 226, 242,
88 P.3d 375 (2004).
If we perceived either the federal or the state constitution as requiring WDOC to
take some action toward a hearing promptly or within a reasonable time after issuing a
warrant, we could construe RCW 9.94A.737 as including that requirement under the
canon of constitutional avoidance. See, e.g., In re Det. of Marcum, 189 Wn.2d 1, 12, 403
P.3d 16 (2017) (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring). We find no constitutional requirement
for such action, however, and, in fact, can identify reasons why no such requirement
would be imposed: because WDOC may lack jurisdiction over the offender, or it may be
difficult or undesirable to hold the hearing until the offender completes a different
sentence.
Otherwise, a perceived omission may not be corrected by the courts unless it
renders the entire statute absurd or meaningless. In re Det. of Martin, 163 Wn.2d 501,
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511, 182 P.3d 951 (2008); State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 730, 63 P.3d 792 (2003);
State v. Taylor, 97 Wn.2d 724, 728, 649 P.2d 633 (1982) (observing that the court “has
exhibited a long history of restraint in compensating for legislative omissions”). For the
legislature to omit a time frame within which WDOC must act after issuing a warrant
does not render RCW 9.94A.737 absurd or meaningless.
III. A REQUESTED REMEDY IS NOT AVAILABLE
WDOC’s final, additional basis for dismissing Mr. Pinney’s PRP is that the
remedies he seeks are not available. To repeat, the relief he requested is that this court
“[o]rder DOC to clear up my warrant and release me from their supervision and
jurisdiction,” or, “[i]n the alternative, . . . order DOC to provide me with a remote hearing
where I can ask for a sentence concurrent to my Arizona sentence.” PRP at 5.
A petitioner must not only show that he is entitled to a remedy, but must show
that he is entitled to the remedy he requests. E.g., In re Pers. Restraint of Snively,
180 Wn.2d 28, 32, 320 P.3d 1107 (2014) (per curiam) (petitioner was entitled to a
correction of his judgment and sentence, but not to withdraw his guilty plea); In re Det. of
Reyes, 184 Wn.2d 340, 348, 358 P.3d 394 (2015) (declining to decide an appropriate
remedy, if any, where the remedy sought was not appropriate). Mr. Pinney’s requested
remedy of clearing up his warrant and releasing him from WDOC supervision and
jurisdiction is inappropriate. It would eliminate WDOC’s right to maintain a warrant or
detainer if it conducted a violation hearing, revoked his community custody, and imposed
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additional confinement time (a result that he has been informed is likely). And in any
event, Mr. Pinney has additional community custody time to serve, which remains tolled
while he is out of state.
The petition is dismissed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
cl1dd,c,w~ TPT 1
Siddoway, J.P.T~
WE CONCUR:
14