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Huang v. Murray
SHAOHUA HUANG v. BRIAN CONSTANTINE
MURRAY ET AL.
(AC 47364)
Suarez, Westbrook and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The named defendant, M, appealed from the trial court’s judgment of possession for the plaintiff landlord in the plaintiff’s summary process action. M claimed, inter alia, that the court had misapplied the law in rendering the judgment of possession. Held:
M failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s legal conclusion regarding his right to occupy the premises was not legally and logically correct or that the relevant facts that the court had relied on were not supported by the evidence in the record, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the judgment of possession rendered against M.
This court dismissed the appeal with respect to M’s claims regarding the trial court’s rulings against the other defendants because it concluded that M was not aggrieved relative to those claims, and, therefore, the claims were jurisdictionally defective, and this court could not adjudicate their merits.
Argued January 22—officially released February 24, 2026
Procedural History
Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Housing Session, where the court, Cirello, J., granted the
plaintiff’s motions for default for failure to appear and judgment of possession against the defendant Jane Doe
#1, also known as Dana Lynn Dalrymple, et al.; thereafter, the court, Cirello, J., entered a default judgment of possession against the defendant Jonathan Dalrymple;
subsequently, the court, Cirello, J., entered default judgments against the defendant John Doe #1, also known
as Sean Dalrymple, et al.; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Cirello, J.; judgment of possession for the plaintiff, from which the named defendant appealed to
this court. Appeal dismissed in part; affirmed.
Huang v. Murray
Brian Constantine Murray, self-represented, the
appellant (named defendant).
Opinion
PER CURIAM. In this summary process action, the
defendant Brian Constantine Murray1 appeals from the
judgment of possession rendered by the trial court in
favor of the plaintiff, Shaohua Huang.2 Murray claims
on appeal that the trial court improperly (1) misapplied
the law in rendering the judgment of possession, (2)
determined that the plaintiff had established her ownership of the premises and, thus, her standing to bring the summary process action, (3) granted motions for default
and rendered default judgments of possession against
other defendants, and (4) allowed the court-appointed
attorney for the defendant Jonathan Dalrymple to withdraw from representation.3 We disagree with claims
one and two and conclude that Murray is not aggrieved
with respect to claims three and four. Accordingly, we
1
Also named as defendants in the action were Murray’s wife, Jane Doe #1, also known as Dana Lynn Dalrymple; his two adult sons, Jonathan Dalrymple and John Doe #1, also known as Sean Dalrymple; and John Doe #2, Jane Doe #2 and Jane Doe #3, whose names were not known to the plaintiff at the time the action was commenced. Jane Doe #2 and Jane Doe #3 were later identified as, respectively, Ashlee N. Dalrymple and Kaitlyn M. Dalrymple. Prior to trial, the court granted motions for default for failure to appear and entered default judgment of possession against Ashlee N. Dalrymple, Kaitlyn M. Dalrymple and Dana Lynn Dalrymple, none of whom is a participant in the present appeal.
2
We note that the plaintiff did not file an appellee’s brief with this court nor did she appear at oral argument. Therefore, the appeal was considered on the basis of Murray’s brief and oral argument and the record only.
3
Murray’s appellant brief is not a model of clarity. We nevertheless are mindful of the fact that Murray is a self-represented party, and we have attempted to be solicitous in our review of his claims, restating them as necessary for clarity. See C. B. v. S. B., 211 Conn. App. 628, 630, 273 A.3d 271 (2022) (“[i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Huang v. Murray
dismiss the appeal with respect to claims three and four
and otherwise affirm the judgment of the court.
The following facts, which were found by the court
or are undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of this appeal. The
plaintiff is the landlord and owner of premises located
at 38 Drumlin Road in Westport. She leased the premises to Murray for a two year term between February,
2021, and February, 2023. The premises was occupied
by Murray and his immediate family members, who also
were named as defendants in this action. See footnote
1 of this opinion. In November, 2023, following service
of the statutorily required notice to quit, the plaintiff brought the underlying summary process action, in which
she alleged termination of the lease by lapse of time, that the defendants’ right or privilege to occupy the premises had terminated, that the defendants never had the right
or privilege to occupy the premises, and the nonpayment
of rent or use and occupancy payments. Murray entered
an appearance as a self-represented litigant. Attorney
Richard Rapice was appointed by the court and entered
an appearance on behalf of Jonathan Dalrymple. The
defendant Sean Dalrymple and the remaining defendants
were nonappearing in the trial court action.
The court, Cirello, J., conducted a trial on the plaintiff’s summary process complaint on February 8, 2024,
following which, on the same day, it issued an order
rendering a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff. In its order, the court explained that, during the
hearing, it had excused Rapice from his representation
of Jonathan Dalrymple on the basis of the court’s in camera review of correspondence indicating that Jonathan
Dalrymple had requested that Rapice’s representation
be terminated. The court further explained that the
summary process trial had proceeded with the plaintiff,
her counsel, and Murray present. The trial court stated
that it had rendered a default judgment of possession
against Jonathan Dalrymple because “he was aware of
the matter and failed to appear or retain counsel for
Huang v. Murray
the scheduled trial date.” Moreover, the court provided
that it was entering “default [judgments] against John
Doe #1 [also known as] Sean Dalrymple and John Doe
#2 upon oral motion of the plaintiff during trial,” after “conclud[ing] that the nonappearing defendants wilfully
failed to file an appearance in the action for the purposes of delay.” In addition to the default judgments, the court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment
against Murray on the ground that his right or privilege
to occupy the premises had terminated and, as a result,
the court rendered judgment of immediate possession
for the plaintiff against all of the defendants. Murray
thereafter timely filed the present appeal.4
“Summary process is a special statutory procedure
designed to provide an expeditious remedy. . . . It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms. . . . Summary
process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination. . . . Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly
followed. . . . As a condition precedent to a summary
process action, proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional necessity.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) HUD/Willow Street Apartments v. Gonzalez,
68 Conn. App. 638, 642–43, 792 A.2d 165 (2002). In
an appeal challenging a judgment of possession, “it is
the function of this court to determine whether the
decision of the trial court is clearly erroneous. . . . This 4
On April 12, 2024, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss this appeal as frivolous, which this court denied on May 8, 2024. Prior to oral argument, this court notified the parties “to be prepared to address at oral argument to what extent Murray is raising claims on appeal regarding the trial court’s rulings against the other defendants in this action, Sean Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple, and whether such claims should be dismissed as jurisdictionally defective for lack of aggrievement. See U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey, 224 Conn. App. 867, [874–75, 315 A.3d 1112] (dismissing appeal by summary process defendants because they sought to assert claims involving legal interests of another party), cert. denied, 350 Conn. 910, [324 A.3d 141] (2024).”
Huang v. Murray
involves a two part function: [if] the legal conclusions
of the court are challenged, we must determine whether
they are legally and logically correct and whether they
find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of
decision; [if] the factual basis of the court’s decision is challenged we must determine whether the facts set out
in the memorandum of decision are supported by the
evidence or whether, in light of the evidence and the
pleadings in the whole record, those facts are clearly
erroneous.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Getty
Properties Corp. v. ATKR, LLC, 315 Conn. 387, 406,
107 A.3d 931 (2015).
Murray’s first two claims on appeal challenge the propriety of the judgment of possession rendered against
him. Specifically, Murray argues that the plaintiff “has a history of filing defective and erroneous summary process actions” and implies that there was a problem with the
notice to quit in the present case without explaining the precise nature of the purported defect or how the court
misapplied the law. He additionally argues that the plaintiff failed to properly establish that she was the owner
of the property with standing to litigate this action.
The court, however, found that the plaintiff owned the
property and that finding is not clearly erroneous because it is supported by the plaintiff’s testimony at trial. See Sullivan v. Lazzari, 135 Conn. App. 831, 846, 43 A.3d
750 (“As the trier of fact, it was the court’s exclusive
province to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine
the credibility of witnesses and determine whether to
accept some, all or none of a witness’ testimony. . . . The function of the appellate court is to review, and not retry, the proceedings of the trial court.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 305 Conn. 925, 47 A.3d
884 (2012). Finally, Murray argues that the lease had
an arbitration clause that should have precluded the
court from hearing the summary process action, but he
fails to analyze how such a clause would bar this eviction action, which was not premised upon a dispute regarding
the lease, which had expired, and nothing in the record
shows that Murray sought to exercise his rights under
Huang v. Murray
the arbitration clause. Having thoroughly reviewed the
underlying record, including the relevant pleadings,
exhibits and transcripts, as well as the briefs of the parties, we conclude that Murray has failed to demonstrate
that the court’s legal conclusion regarding his lack of a right to occupy the premises was not legally and logically correct or that the relevant facts that the court relied on were not supported by evidence in the record. Accordingly, with respect to claims one and two, we affirm the
judgment of possession rendered against Murray in favor
of the plaintiff.
With respect to Murray’s remaining claims, claims
three and four, we construe them as seeking to challenge
the judgment of possession rendered against his sons.
Specifically, Murray claims that the court improperly
allowed Rapice to withdraw his representation of Jonathan Dalrymple and subsequently rendered a default
judgment of possession against Jonathan Dalrymple.
Murray further claims that the court improperly rendered a default judgment of possession against Sean
Dalrymple without properly taking into account that
Sean Dalrymple was a military reservist and by failing to provide him proper notice pursuant to the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3901 et seq.5
“The terms aggrievement and standing have been
used interchangeably throughout most of Connecticut
5
Murray filed his appellant’s brief on November 13, 2024. Jonathan Dalrymple filed an appellee’s brief as a self-represented litigant on March 27, 2025, and Sean Dalrymple filed an appellee’s brief as a selfrepresented litigant on July 23, 2025. In his appellee’s brief, Jonathan Dalrymple claims that the trial court misapplied the governing law in rendering a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff, improperly allowed Rapice to withdraw his representation, and improperly rendered a default judgment of possession against him. The appellee’s brief filed by Sean Dalrymple is substantively similar to the briefs filed by Murray and Jonathan Dalrymple insofar as he appears to claim that the trial court improperly rendered a default judgment against him, arguing that he was a military reservist and that the plaintiff did not comply with the notice requirement of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3901 et seq. Neither Jonathan Dalrymple nor Sean Dalrymple, however, is listed on the appeal form as an appellant, and neither filed a cross appeal. Moreover, neither sought to formally participate in this
Huang v. Murray
jurisprudence. We previously have stated that [t]he question of aggrievement is essentially one of standing . . . . Although these two legal concepts are similar, they are
not, however, identical. Aggrievement is established if
there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected. . . . Aggrievement, in essence, is appellate
standing. . . . It is axiomatic that aggrievement is a basic requirement of standing, just as standing is a fundamental requirement of jurisdiction. . . . There are two general types of aggrievement, namely, classical and statutory;
either type will establish standing, and each has its own unique features.6 . . . The test for determining [classical] aggrievement encompasses a well settled twofold
determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement
must demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest
in the subject matter of the decision, as distinguished
from a general interest shared by the community as a
whole; second, the party claiming aggrievement must
establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.” (Citations omitted; footnote added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Healey, 224
Conn. App. 867, 873–74, 315 A.3d 1112, cert. denied,
350 Conn. 910, 324 A.3d 141 (2024).
In Healey, this court dismissed an appeal in a summary
process case taken from the denial of the self-represented defendants’ motion to open and dismiss the judgment of
possession rendered against them because the basis for
appeal as an appellant rather than as an appellee. Therefore, insofar as their briefs also seek reversal rather than affirmance of the trial court’s judgment, we treat them as briefs filed by appellees who support the position of the appellant in accordance with Practice Book § 67-3A, notwithstanding their noncompliance with the provision that “an appellee who supports the position of the appellant shall meet the appellant’s time schedule for filing a brief.”
6
There is no statute relevant to this appeal that would provide a basis for Murray to claim aggrievement with respect to the rulings made as to Sean Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple, and Murray has not argued to the contrary. Accordingly, statutory aggrievement is not at issue, and we limit our discussion to classical aggrievement.
Huang v. Murray
the motion to open was the plaintiff’s alleged failure to serve a nonparty adult resident of the premises with a
statutorily compliant notice to quit. Id., 875–77. This
court determined in Healey that the specific, personal,
and legal interest asserted by the defendants belonged
only to the nonparty, such that their appeal from the
denial of a motion based wholly on the nonparty’s interest was jurisdictionally defective for lack of aggrievement.
Id., 875. Here, Murray raises claims on appeal regarding the trial court’s default judgments rendered against
Sean Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple, as well as the
trial court’s ruling regarding the termination of Rapice’s representation of Jonathan Dalrymple. Although Sean
Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple were named as defendants in the trial court action, unlike the nonparty at
issue in Healey, Healey nonetheless is instructive insofar as Murray, like the defendants in Healey, seeks appellate relief in part on the basis of rulings regarding Sean Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple that do not affect
his own specific, personal, and legal interest because a
separate judgment of possession was rendered against
him on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. See id. “[If] a defendant has not established individual standing .
. . this court is without subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the merits of his underlying claim.” State v.
Bradley, 341 Conn. 72, 91, 266 A.3d 823 (2021); see also
Zenon v. Mossy, 114 Conn. App. 734, 734 n.1, 970 A.2d
814 (2009) (holding that self-represented plaintiff could not represent interests of another party); Third Taxing
District v. Lyons, 35 Conn. App. 795, 798, 647 A.2d 32
(“[g]enerally . . . a party does not have standing to raise another person’s rights”), cert. denied, 231 Conn. 936,
650 A.2d 173 (1994).
To the extent that Murray makes claims on appeal
regarding the trial court’s rulings against other defendants, such as Sean Dalrymple and Jonathan Dalrymple,
we conclude that Murray is not aggrieved relative to
those claims, and, therefore, we cannot adjudicate their
merits. Stated plainly, to the extent that Murray seeks to vindicate claims belonging to his sons, those claims are
Huang v. Murray
jurisdictionally defective and, thus, not properly before us. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal with respect to
those claims.
The appeal is dismissed with respect to the named
defendant’s claims regarding the default judgments of
possession against Jonathan Dalrymple and Sean Dalrymple; the judgment is affirmed in all other respects.