Lesly Miot v. Trump

2026-02-23

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court denied the government's motion to stay the court's order granting relief under 5 U.S.C. § 705.

The government sought to stay a court order that had previously halted the termination of Haiti's Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designation. The court rejected this request, finding that the government failed to demonstrate irreparable harm—a required element for obtaining a stay. The government could not identify any concrete adverse effects from maintaining the current status quo, in which Haitian TPS holders retain their legal status while litigation proceeds. Instead, the government argued that any judicial limitation on executive action constitutes irreparable harm, which the court found to be an improper standard.

The court addressed two additional arguments raised by the government. First, regarding the required consultation with "appropriate agencies," the court clarified that it did not impose any new demands; rather, Congress established this requirement in the TPS statute. The court noted that the Secretary of Homeland Security failed to consult with any agency outside of DHS, undermining the statutory requirement for meaningful consultation. Second, the court rejected the government's claim that a pattern of decisions in one direction reflects policy dysfunction, distinguishing between this case and prior administrations' TPS renewal practices that were not subject to legal challenge.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether the government met its burden of demonstrating irreparable harm necessary to obtain a stay pending appeal
Statutory interpretation of "appropriate agencies" consultation requirement in the TPS statute
Comparison of relative harms between government and immigrant plaintiffs

Procedural posture

The government moved to stay a district court order that had previously blocked the termination of TPS for Haitian nationals pending judicial review.

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FRITZ EMMANUEL LESLY MIOT, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 25-cv-02471 (ACR)

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Government moves to stay, pending judicial review, the Court’s Order staying the

effective date of the Termination of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 90

Fed. Reg. 54733 (Nov. 28, 2025) (Termination). See Dkt. 123 (Order); Dkt. 126 (Mot.). The

Government offers no new merits argument, however. And it now bears the burden of

establishing irreparable harm, a burden it cannot meet. See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434

(2009). The Court therefore DENIES the Government’s Motion to Stay the Court’s Order

Granting Relief Under 5 U.S.C. § 705.

Taking heed (finally) that “brevity is the soul of wit,”1 the Court does not regurgitate its

Memorandum Opinion, Dkt. 124 (Mem. Op.). The Court does, however, address two new

assertions the Government makes and its claim of irreparable harm.

***

Consultation. The Government contends that the Court “demanded that the Secretary

consult some other (unnamed) ‘appropriate’ agency in addition to the State Department.” Miot v.

William Shakespeare, Hamlet act 2, sc. 2.

Trump, No. 26-5050, at 8 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 6, 2026). Not so. To start, the Court did not demand

anything, Congress did. And the Court found that the Secretary did not consult any agency,

including that it did not consult with the Department of State. See Mem. Op. at 41–43. To be

sure, that Congress requires the Secretary to consult “agencies”—plural—confirms its intent that

the consultation to be meaningful. See id. at 41–46.2 But the Court did not reach whether

consulting only one other agency would meet the requirement that the Secretary “shall” consult

“appropriate agencies.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A). It did not reach it because, again, the

Secretary did not consult outside DHS at all.

Pattern or Practice. The Government lobs that “[t]he mere existence of multiple

decisions in the same direction does not suggest dysfunction; otherwise, the fact that the Biden

Administration renewed every TPS designation it reviewed,3 for four years, would be equally

suggestive of failure to objectively follow the legal process.” Mot. at 14. This “he started it”

grievance is a non-starter. The Biden administration’s TPS decisions were not the subject of this

or, to the Court’s knowledge, any other litigation. If they had been, courts may well have

considered those uniform designations to be a pattern or practice subject to APA scrutiny. This

Court, all else equal, assuredly would have.

On a related note, the Court in its Memorandum Opinion cited definitions of “consultation” and to “consult” from 2024 and 2015, respectively. See Mem. Op. at 43. It would have done better also to consult (no pun intended) dictionaries from the time Congress enacted the TPS statute, 1990. It has now done so. “Consultation” was then defined as the “[a]ct of consulting or conferring; e.g. patient with doctor; client with lawyer” and “[d]eliberation of persons on some subject.” Consultation, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). To “consult” was then defined as “to have regard to” or “to ask the advice of opinion of (~a doctor).” Consult, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed. 1990). These definitions mirror the later ones, see Mem. Op. at 43, and so do not change the Court’s analysis.

The Court assumes, for now, that the Government’s uncited assertion is true.

Irreparable Harm to the Government and the Public Interest/Balance of Equities. At

argument, the Government attempted to sidestep the irreparable harm analysis. It stated: “I can

make this very simple. If Your Honor’s not going to rule for us on the likelihood of success on

the merits, then that’s the end of the inquiry.” Feb. 12 Hr’g Tr. at 14. Fair enough, since the

Government has no legitimate interest in enforcing a likely unlawful Termination. But the

irreparable harm standard exists and so the Court considers it.

The Order preserves the status quo, which at least suggests that the Government will not

face irreparable harm. See Make the Rd. New York v. Noem, No. 25-5320, 2025 WL 3563313, at

*32 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 22, 2025) (statement of Judges Millett & Childs). Haitian TPS holders will

maintain their TPS status pending litigation. They will continue to work and maintain health

insurance. They will continue to pay federal, state, and local taxes. They will continue to

contribute to their communities. And no additional Haitians will gain TPS. Given this, the Court

asked the Government to identify concrete examples of harm if the Termination remains stayed

pending litigation. It could not name one. See Dkt. 129 (ICE Decl.); Dkt. 132 (Feb. 12 Hr’g Tr.)

at 22–23.

The Government cannot name a single concrete harm from maintaining the status quo.

And so instead it argues that the Court’s decision is “‘an improper intrusion by a federal court

into the workings of a coordinate branch of the Government’” Mot. at 14 (quoting INS v.

Legalization Assistance Project, 510 U.S. 1301, 1305–06 (1993)). The argument, taken to its

logical conclusion, is that anytime a court stays government action, the Government is

irreparably harmed. That is not the standard.

Consider the Supreme Court’s recent decision granting the Government’s motion

for an emergency stay in Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415, 1415 (2025). The Supreme

Court held that the Government was likely to succeed on the merits, but it did not then

just call it a day. It next explored the comparative irreparable harm as between the two

parties: “the Government faces greater risk of harm from an order allowing a removed

officer to continue exercising the executive power than a wrongfully removed officer

faces from being unable to perform her statutory duty.” Id.

Here, Plaintiffs and other Haitian TPS holders face a greater risk of harm from an

order allowing the Government to remove them to a “perfect storm of suffering” than the

Government faces from maintaining the status quo. See Mem. Op. at 72–82 (discussing

further the comparative harms). The Supreme Court went on: “A stay is appropriate to

avoid the disruptive effect of the repeated removal and reinstatement of officers during

the pendency of this litigation.” Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. at 1415. Here, granting a stay would

cause disruption. Indeed, with almost 353,000 TPS holders having, then losing

overnight, and then potentially regaining legal immigration status, it would cause chaos.

***

For the reasons stated in its Memorandum Opinion of February 2, 2026, and the reasons

above, the Court DENIES the Government’s Motion to Stay the Court’s Order Granting Relief

Under 5 U.S.C. § 705, Dkt. 126.

SO ORDERED.

Date: February 23, 2026 ____________________________

ANA C. REYES

United States District Judge