UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
TAMKIN HUSSAIN,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25 - 3075 (SLS)
v.
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
NATALIE A. BAKER, Chargé d’Affaires,
U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In June 2021, Pakistani citizen Tamkin Hussain filed an application for an EB-2 visa, which
provides a path to permanent residence for highly skilled foreign professionals. The U.S. Embassy
in Pakistan interviewed Dr. Hussain in 2024, and then placed her application in administrative
processing. Since then, the Department of State has taken no further action on Dr. Hussain’s
application. Dr. Hussain sued Natalie A. Baker, Chargé d’Affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan,
and Marco Rubio, Secretary of State, seeking an order to compel them to adjudicate her visa
application. The Defendants have moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Although the Court is aware of the systemic delays in our immigration
system and sympathetic to Dr. Hussain’s frustrations, it cannot grant the relief that she seeks.
BACKGROUND
The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and
attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).
Dr. Hussain is a citizen of Pakistan. Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 1. She previously spent time in
the United States while completing her Ph.D. program. Compl. ¶ 4. On June 2, 2021, Dr. Hussain submitted all the necessary paperwork to apply for an EB-2 visa, which “is available to noncitizens
with ‘advanced degrees’ or ‘exceptional ability.’” Masroor v. Noem, No. 25-cv-256, 2025 WL
2439176, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(A)); Compl. ¶¶ 2, 18, 20.
In 2024, Dr. Hussain completed an interview for her visa at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. Compl.
¶ 21. Following that interview, Dr. Hussain’s application was placed in “administrative
processing,” where it has since remained. Id. ¶ 22.
In September 2025, Dr. Hussain sued the Secretary of State and Chargé d’Affaires at the
U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. Id. She alleges that the Defendants have unreasonably delayed
adjudicating her visa application, and she seeks a writ of mandamus and relief under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Id. ¶ 11. In January 2026, the Defendants moved to dismiss
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 5. That
motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. See Opp’n, ECF No. 7; Reply, ECF No. 9.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court will dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts ‘must construe the complaint in
favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged.’” Sadiq v. Rubio, No. 25-cv-2448, 2026 WL 913084, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2026)
(quoting Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). “But courts need not
accept as true ‘a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,’ nor an inference unsupported
by the facts set forth in the complaint.” Id. (quoting Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir.
2006)).
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DISCUSSION
The Defendants make several arguments in support of dismissal, including that they have
no duty to take further action on Dr. Hussain’s visa application and that her claims are barred under
the doctrine of consular non-reviewability. Mot. Dismiss 1. “The Court has previously addressed
and rejected identical arguments in similar cases.” Sadiq, 2026 WL 913084, at *2 (first citing
Thein v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2369, 2025 WL 2418402, at *7–11 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 2025); and then
citing Motevali v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-1029, 2025 WL 885116, at *5–6 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2025)). But
here, “the Court need not address these arguments because, even assuming that [Dr. Hussain]
prevails on those issues, [her] claims ultimately fail.” Id.; see Dep’t of State v. Muñoz, 602 U.S.
899, 908 n.4 (2024) (“[T]he doctrine of consular nonreviewability is not jurisdictional[.]”);
Sereshti v. Gaudiosi, No. 24-cv-1288, 2024 WL 4625802, at *6 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2024) (assuming
without deciding the existence of a nondiscretionary duty and collecting cases).
“The standards for reviewing agency inaction—including visa processing delays—are the
same under the APA and Mandamus Act, so the Court will address both claims together.”
Doroodchi v. Rubio, No. 24-cv-3170, 2025 WL 1865114, at *2 (D.D.C. July 7, 2025).
“Unreasonable delay is measured by six factors,” known as the “TRAC factors.” Motevali, 2025
WL 885116, at *6; see Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d
70 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The factors are:
1. the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule of reason;
2. where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with
which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory
scheme may supply content for this rule of reason;
3. delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less
tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake;
4. the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency
activities of a higher or competing priority;
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5. the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests
prejudiced by delay; and
6. the court need not find any impropriety lurking behind the agency lassitude in
order to hold that agency action is unreasonably delayed.
Motevali, 2025 WL 885116, at *6 (quoting Khazaei v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1419, 2023 WL
6065095, at *6 (D.D.C. Sep. 18, 2023)). “[C]ourts applying the TRAC factors at the
motion-to-dismiss stage apply them ‘not to determine whether there has been an unreasonable
delay, but to determine if a plaintiff’s complaint alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible claim
for unreasonable administrative delay.’” Id. (quoting Giza v. Blinken, No. 23-cv-1641, 2024 WL
3967284, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2024)). Here, Dr. Hussain’s Complaint does not sufficiently
allege a claim of unreasonable delay.
1. TRAC Factors One & Two
The first TRAC factor “asks whether the [agency’s] response time is governed by a ‘rule of
reason’” and “is widely understood to be the ‘most important’ aspect of the analysis.’” Id. at *7
(quoting In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). “The second factor
‘gives content to the first’: ‘where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the
speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme
may supply content for this rule of reason.’” Thein, 2025 WL 2418402, at *12 (first quoting In re
United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1999); and then quoting
TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80). Neither Party has identified a mandatory timeline for visa adjudication. In
such cases, “courts in this District ‘typically turn to case law as a guide’” to determine whether a
delay is unreasonable. Motevali, 2025 WL 885116, at *7 (quoting Niyomwungere v. Blinken, No.
24-cv-1990, 2024 WL 5075827, at *4 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2024)).
“Courts in this District label delays ‘between three to five years’ as reasonable.” Id.
(quoting Ahmed v. Blinken, 759 F. Supp. 3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2024)). And “[u]nder this District’s
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prevailing approach, ‘the proper method for calculating delay is the length of time between the last
action the government took on a visa application and the filing of plaintiff’s complaint.’” Sadiq,
2026 WL 913084, at *3 (cleaned up) (quoting Isse v. Whitman, No. 22-cv-3114, 2023 WL
4174357, at *6 n.4 (D.D.C. June 26, 2023)). Although Dr. Hussain alleges that she filed her EB-2
application in 2021, Compl. ¶ 18, the Court must calculate her delay based on the government’s
last action, which was an interview at the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan on August 27, 2024, Compl.
¶ 21. So Dr. Hussain’s delay totals just over one year between August 2024 and when Dr. Hussain
filed her Complaint in September 2025. Because this delay does not exceed what courts in this
District recognize as reasonable, the first and second TRAC factors weigh in the Defendants’ favor.
2. TRAC Factor Four
“The fourth factor addresses the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of
a higher or competing priority.” Thein, 2025 WL 2418402, at *13 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “This factor ‘strongly disfavors’ plaintiffs whose request is akin to cutting the
line of applications ahead of them, which would ‘disrupt competing agency priorities with no
overall improvement in the [agency’s] backlog.’” Motevali, 2025 WL 885116, at *8 (quoting Da
Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off., 80 F.4th 330, 343 (D.C. Cir. 2023)). According to the
Defendants, this is such a queue-jumping scenario. Mot. Dismiss 17. Dr. Hussain responds that
the Defendants have not provided any evidence about how they order their priorities or whether
they use a queue to complete administrative processing. Compl. ¶ 52. “But at the
motion-to-dismiss stage, the focus is on the ‘factual matter’ alleged in the Complaint.” Sadiq, 2026
WL 913084, at *4 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Dr. Hussain’s suggestion that the Defendants
do not use a queue or other formal ordering system is “‘entirely speculative’ because [her]
Complaint ‘pleaded no facts to support it.’” Id. (quoting Niyomwungere, 2024 WL 5075827, at *5).
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“In similar cases—i.e., challenges to visa-application delays in which the complaint is silent about
the effect of relief on other visa applicants—courts have held that this factor favors defendants.”
Id. (collecting cases). The same is true here.
3. TRAC Factors Three & Five
TRAC factors three and five “focus on the interests affected by agency delay.” Afghan and
Iraqi Allies v. Blinken, 103 F.4th 807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 2024). They “examine ‘the nature and extent
of the interests prejudiced by the delay,’ including whether ‘human health and welfare’ might be
implicated.” Isse, 2023 WL 4174357, at *7 (quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80). Dr. Hussain reports
that she has suffered emotionally, professionally, and financially because of the delay in
adjudicating her visa. Compl. ¶¶ 5–7. Multiple employers have told her that she is not an eligible
candidate due to her lack of a visa. Id. ¶ 5. As a result, Dr. Hussain has not been able to achieve
financial independence and has suffered considerable stress and anxiety. Id. ¶ 5–7. The Court takes
these injuries seriously. TRAC factors three and five thus tip slightly in Dr. Hussain’s favor. See
Rashidian v. Garland, No. 23-cv-1187, 2024 WL 1076810, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2024) (finding
that professional and financial harms “at least arguably tilt in Plaintiffs’ favor”); Ahmadi v.
Scharpf, No. 23-cv-953, 2024 WL 551542, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2024) (finding that TRAC
factors three and five weigh in the plaintiffs’ favor because a visa delay caused them to suffer
anxiety in addition to financial, professional, and personal harms).
4. TRAC Factor Six
Lastly, “TRAC factor six asks the court to consider ‘whether there is any impropriety
lurking behind agency lassitude.’” Motevali, 2025 WL 885116, at *8 (quoting Da Costa., 80 F.4th
at 345). As Dr. Hussain has not alleged impropriety, “this factor is neutral.” Id.
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* * *
The Court recognizes Dr. Hussain’s frustration with “the well-documented delays in our
visa-adjudication system.” Sadiq, 2026 WL 913084, at *4. But here, the facts alleged in her
Complaint are insufficient to state a claim for unreasonable delay. The Court must grant the
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5. A
separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN
United States District Judge
Date: June 24, 2026
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