IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
FILED
Douglas Hicks, Jun 24 2026, 9:12 am
Appellant-Petitioner CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
v.
Rebecca Hicks,
Appellee-Respondent
June 24, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-DC-2054
Appeal from the Wayne Circuit Court
The Honorable April R. Drake, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
89C01-2401-DC-2
Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas
Judges Weissmann and Foley concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-DC-2054 June 24, 2026 Page 1 of 10
Tavitas, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Douglas Hicks (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s dissolution of his marriage
to Rebecca Hicks (“Wife”). Husband argues that the trial court abused its
discretion in dividing the marital estate. We agree with Husband, and
accordingly, we reverse and remand.
Issue
[2] Husband raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its
discretion when it divided the marital estate.
Facts
[3] The parties married in August 1991 and had three children. Husband filed a
petition for dissolution of marriage in January 2024. A final hearing was held
on November 13, 2024, and February 21, 2025. The parties stipulated that the
marital residence was valued at $262,500, with a mortgage balance of $99,200.
Husband requested that he be awarded the marital residence, that he be
assigned the mortgage debt, and that an unequal division of the marital assets
be awarded in his favor due to Wife’s higher earning ability. Wife requested
that the marital residence be sold to pay the marital debts.
[4] The trial court entered a dissolution decree on May 29, 2025. The trial court
determined that Husband’s income was $40,000 per year, and Wife’s income
was $52,126 per year. The trial court further determined that the parties’
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-DC-2054 June 24, 2026 Page 2 of 10 marital assets totaled $390,806, and the marital debt totaled $266,705. The trial
court awarded Husband the marital residence and other assets totaling
$272,000, and ordered Husband to pay marital debts, including the mortgage,
totaling $208,719. Husband received a net distribution of $63,281 from the
marital estate. The trial court awarded Wife marital assets totaling $118,806,
and ordered her to pay marital debts totaling $57,986. Wife received a net
distribution of $60,820 from the marital estate. The trial court found that “no
compelling evidence has been presented to deviate from a nearly equal
distribution of marital property. However, because there is some disparity in
current earnings, the Court finds that a slight deviation from a 50-50 split is
warranted in the division of marital assets.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 23.
The trial court then found:
7. Regarding the former marital residence . . . Husband shall
retain possession of the marital residence and be responsible for
all obligations, including the mortgage, that pertain to the former
marital residence from the date of this order.
8. [Husband] shall refinance the mortgage to remove [Wife’s]
obligation within ninety (90) days of the issuance of this order.
Upon [Husband] demonstrating in writing that he has obtained
the ability to refinance the mortgage and remove [Wife], [Wife]
shall transfer title of the property to [Husband].
9. In the event [Husband] is unable to refinance the mortgage,
the former marital residence will be listed for sale no later than
September 5, 2025. Upon sale of the property, and assuming that
the former marital residence is sold at the currently appraised
value presented to the Court of $262,500, and allowing for $5,000
of costs in the selling of the property, the current mortgage shall Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-DC-2054 June 24, 2026 Page 3 of 10
be paid in full from the proceeds. Of the remaining $158,300 in
equity from the sale, again, assuming the selling price and
costs, that equity shall be divided as follows: the first $51,500
in equity to [Husband] to offset the assignment of liabilities to
[Husband], with the remaining amount being divided equally
between the parties.
Id. at 23-24 (emphasis added).
[5] Husband filed a motion to correct error and argued, in part, that Finding No. 9
of the dissolution decree should be revised to award Husband all of the
proceeds of the sale of the marital residence. Wife disagreed and argued:
If [Husband] can sell the house without any monies transferring
to Wife, he would be receiving a lump sum that would allow him
to leave this Marriage debt free. No such option is afforded to
Wife, which would result in an unjust decision. It’s one thing if
in the future the parties can make decisions to use their assets to
remove all debts. It’s quite another to allow [Husband] to sell
immediately and find himself in a much more favorable position
regarding debt than Wife.
Id. at 113. The trial court denied Husband’s motion. Husband now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Husband challenges the trial court’s division of marital assets. “The division of
marital assets is within the trial court’s discretion, and we will reverse a trial
court’s decision only for an abuse of discretion.” Kearney v. Claywell, 181
N.E.3d 336, 339 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Additionally, the trial court issued sua
sponte findings of fact and conclusions thereon. “Where a trial court enters
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-DC-2054 June 24, 2026 Page 4 of 10
findings sua sponte, the appellate court reviews issues covered by the findings
with a two-tiered standard of review that asks whether the evidence supports
the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment.” Steele-Giri v.
Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016). “Any issue not covered by the findings
is reviewed under the general judgment standard, meaning a reviewing court
should affirm based on any legal theory supported by the evidence.” Id. at 123-24.
[7] When reviewing the accuracy of findings entered sua sponte, we first consider
whether the evidence supports them. Fetters v. Fetters, 26 N.E.3d 1016, 1020
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Next, we consider whether the findings
support the judgment. Id. We will disregard a finding only if it is clearly
erroneous, meaning the record contains no facts to support it either directly or
by inference. Id. We will not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility.
Id. “A judgment also is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal
standard, and we do not defer to a trial court’s legal conclusions.” Id.
[8] “‘The party challenging the trial court’s property division bears the burden of
proof.’” Meyer v. East, 205 N.E.3d 1066, 1071 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting
Smith v. Smith, 194 N.E.3d 63, 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)). “That party must
overcome a strong presumption that the court complied with the statute and
considered the evidence on each of the statutory factors.” Id.; see Ind. Code §
31-15-7-5. “The presumption that a dissolution court correctly followed the law
and made all the proper considerations when dividing the property is one of the
strongest presumptions applicable to our consideration on appeal.” Meyer, 205
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-DC-2054 June 24, 2026 Page 5 of 10
N.E.3d at 1071 (quoting Smith, 194 N.E.3d at 72). “Thus, we will reverse a
property distribution only if there is no rational basis for the award.” Id.
[9] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-4(b), the trial court “shall divide the
property in a just and reasonable manner . . . .” We “presume that an equal
division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable.”
Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. This presumption “may be rebutted by a party who
presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the following factors,
that an equal division would not be just and reasonable”:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
property, regardless of whether the contribution was income
producing.
(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each
spouse:
(A) before the marriage; or
(B) through inheritance or gift.
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
disposition of the property is to become effective, including the
desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell
in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just
to the spouse having custody of any children.
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to
the disposition or dissipation of their property.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-DC-2054 June 24, 2026 Page 6 of 10
(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:
(A) a final division of property; and
(B) a final determination of the property rights of the
parties.
Id.
[10] When ordering an unequal division, “the trial court must consider all of the
factors set out in [Indiana Code Section] 31-15-7-5.” Wallace v. Wallace, 714
N.E.2d 774, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (emphasis added), trans. denied. If the
trial court focuses “only upon one factor when others are present, a trial court
runs the risk of dividing a marital estate in an unreasonable manner.” Id.
[11] Here, the trial court found that “no compelling evidence” was presented “to
deviate from a nearly equal distribution of marital property.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. II p. 23. Accordingly, the trial court seemed to award an equal division of
marital property. The trial court, however, then found “because there is some
disparity in current earnings, the Court finds that a slight deviation from a 50-50
split is warranted in the division of marital assets.” Id. Although the trial court
mentioned a disparity in current earnings, the trial court failed to make any
findings regarding the remaining factors of Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-5.
[12] We acknowledge that the deviation in Husband’s favor is indeed slight, 51% to
49%, and that our Supreme Court has held that “express trial court findings
[regarding the factors of Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-5] will not be compelled
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-DC-2054 June 24, 2026 Page 7 of 10
for insubstantial deviations from precise mathematical equality.” Kirkman v.
Kirkman, 555 N.E.2d 1293, 1294 (Ind. 1990); see, e.g., J.M. v. N.M., 844 N.E.2d
590, 603 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (declining to remand for further findings where
the 49.117% to 50.883% division was “an insubstantial deviation”), trans.
denied. Given the insubstantial deviation resulting from the trial court’s order,
we would be inclined to affirm, but we find further issues in the order, which
require reversal.
[13] The problem arises in Finding No. 9, which applies if Husband is unable to
refinance the mortgage. In that case, the marital residence must be sold and,
“assuming that the former marital residence is sold at the currently appraised
value presented to the Court of $262,500, and allowing for $5,000 of costs in the
selling of the property, the current mortgage shall be paid in full from the
proceeds.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 24. “Of the remaining $158,300 in
equity from the sale, again, assuming the selling price and costs, that equity
shall be divided as follows: the first $51,500 in equity to [Husband] to offset the
assignment of liabilities to [Husband], with the remaining amount being divided
equally between the parties.” Id.
[14] In this situation, assuming that the marital residence sells for $262,500 and
$5,000 in selling costs are incurred and the mortgage balance of $99,200 is paid,
Husband will receive $114,400 in marital assets; $109,519 in marital debts;
leaving Husband with $4,881. Wife, on the other hand, will receive $172,206 in
marital assets; $57,986 in marital debts; leaving Wife with $114,220.
Accordingly, if the marital residence must be sold, Husband will receive 4% of
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-DC-2054 June 24, 2026 Page 8 of 10
the marital estate, and Wife will receive 96%. This is not a slight or
insubstantial deviation. Moreover, the only factor mentioned by the trial
court—the disparity in current earnings—favored Husband, not Wife. This
factor clearly would not warrant a 4% to 96% deviation in favor of Wife. We,
thus, conclude that Finding No. 9 is clearly erroneous.
[15] Given our conclusion that Finding No. 9 is clearly erroneous, we conclude that
the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital assets. The trial court
made no findings that would warrant such an extreme deviation from the
presumption of an equal division of marital assets. Given these circumstances,
we reverse and remand.
Conclusion
[16] The trial court’s finding regarding the distribution of funds from the sale of the
marital residence is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion when it divided the marital assets. We reverse and
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[17] Reversed and remanded.
Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Alexander N. Moseley
Adrian Deneen
Dixon & Moseley, P.C.
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-DC-2054 June 24, 2026 Page 9 of 10 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Christopher T. Armour
BBFCS Attorneys
Richmond, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 25A-DC-2054 June 24, 2026 Page 10 of 10